CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001973
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 29, 1961

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29 March 1961
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
TOVSEMET-
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TOP SECRET 'Notoo
ii
29 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. France: Fourth nuclear test planned for 15 April.
(Page t)
2. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
3. Congo: Tshombe considering attack on Marion�. (Page t)
4. South Vietnam: Army officers discontented over gov-
ernment's failure to check Communist guerrilla activ-
ities. (Page it)
Iraq: Anti-regime demonstrations continued in Baghdad
on 28 March, (Page tt)
6. Jordan: King Husayn forces resignation of defense min-
ister, discharges four senior officers. (Page tn)
7. Yemen: Imam superficially wounded but reported in
state of shock following assassination attempt. (Ave tit)
8. Tanganyika: Britain to be urged to announce early date
for independence. (Page tit)
9. Communist China: Economic difficulties continue to limit
Peiping's ability to pay for planned imports. (Page iv)
10. Albania: USSR and Tirana apparently continue coopera-
tive naval activities despite political differences.
(Page iv)
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H.
BURMA
LUANCi PRABANG
Luang Prabang
SAYABOURY
LU
13 XIENG KHOUANG
Muong Soul an Ban \
Vang
VIENTIANE
Vientiane
NORTHERN LAOS
4ir GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
41#
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
ROAD
� TRAIL
0 ROUTE NUMBER
50
t t
STATUTE MILES
100
I
Xieng Khouang
Ban Ta Viang,
Tha Thom
Pak Sane
� Ka Keu
KHAMM � UANE
Thakhek
S'avannakhet 1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
29 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
France: The next French nuclear test is planned for 15
April at the eggane test center, or as soon thereafter as
meteorological and operational conditions permit.
this test, the fourth conducted by France
since 13 February 1960, will be France's last atmospheric
test, and further tests beginning in the fall of 1961 will be un-
dergrotindp Since the resumption of the Geneva talks, the So-
viet delegation has emphasized that continued French testing
would make a test ban treaty "pointless," and Moscow is likely
to issue ' rning to the US and Britain following the
next test. the Soviet delegation has hinted, however,
)
that cessation of French testing is not a precondition for con-
tinuing negotiation3 The French test is certain to bring re-
newed protests from African states and may possibly compli-
cate negotiations between France and representatives of the
Algerian rebel government which are scheduled to open on 7
Am.41
�
a 4--
*Laos:
the British note on Laos has generated enough pressure '-,----4; --.' / 4 �23:,
for Soviet acceptance to put Khrushchev in a difficult position. ;4:-.,------/-- ; e
i -
Nehru, meanwhile, says he has sent a message to Souvanna 9, i 6,
Phouma, in Paris urging him to return to Phnom Penh for fur-
ther talks with Phoumi. The Laotian Army apparently is con-
tinuing its efforts to recruit some Chinese Nationalist irregu-
lars, despite its position that all are in process of repatria-
tion to Ta'wan. The military situation remains essentially un- ,
4Tz.
change9 ',
Backup, .�,
Page 1 MaP)
1:
Page
al ,e: 7 -
Congo: Tshombe's forces apparently are gathering for d'i__.-'2;-''' /
an attack on Manono, the capital of the Baluba tribal state in '
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Banana
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kama
INDONESIA
Luanda
At/antic
ocean
lepublic of the Congo
INDIA
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
MALAYA
210
IN
MOBUTU
7200,
MALAYA
150
Gemena
Scattereyarc k_
_Alen TU MOBUTU''
..." 3,400
/,, 800
./j7, EQIJATEIJ
(Coquilhatville
T.14,� � Boende
'
Scattered Forces
EOPC)L.DVILL
Leopoldv.
ysville
GHANA
1600
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasavubu�Mobutu
fl Gizenga
Kalonp
Tshombe
United Nations Forces
�....�. Selected road
Selected railroad
=Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
STATUTE MILES
I 00
Francqui
Luputa
MALAYA
400
KALONJI
LIBERIA
NIGERIA
Kongolo
Albertvilld
600 J NIGERIA I
I 1,300
�Manono
�
Piana Mwanga)
MItwab�
.r�
Usumbura
SWEDEN
650
TSHOMBE
4,000
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'/A. s-T-011-SEGREZ
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northern Katanga. The attack may take place sometime this
week. The offensive force reportedly is to comprise 1,000
European and African troops nrt viri 1 1 ha Intl Fru n unit a An
South African legionnaires. I
there are only 164 troops in Manono to resist
the attacp Gizenga's forces are likely to be supported by
Baluba irregulars, however. Nigerian UN units in the area
probably will try to interpose themselves between Tshombd's
forces and Manono, and the Swedish UN commander in Elis-
abethville has said he would try to arrest the South Africans
as violators of the Security Colineil regolution against foreign
military intervention.
Commenting on his most recent trip to Stanleyville, an
official of the American Embassy in Leopoldville reports that
public order in Orientale Province continues to improve. The
official believes that although the main leaders in Stanleyville
are still preoccupied with their own claims to legitimacy, Stan-
leyville representatives might now be willing to attend a confer-
ence of Congolese leaders on some neutral ground if their se-
curity were assured by the UN. (Backup,
Page 5) (Map)
South Vietnam: rowing discontent is reported among
middle- and junior-grade officers of the South Vietnamese
armed forces over the government's failure to check Commu-
nist guerrilla successes and to rally popular support; in addi-
tion, the officers are fearful that the Communists themselves
might initiate an ostensibly non-Communist coup.
discontent in the officer corps is greater than at any time
since last November's attempted coup d'etat against President
Diem. A restraining factor, however, is the realization that,
without effective alternative leadership, any effort to replace
Diem could lead to a Communist takeover'.)
(Backup, Page 6)
iIraq: The anti-regime demonstrations in Baghdad con-
tinue 2 lVfarch despite troops firing on demonstrators
late Monday. Baghdad University is closed and its students')
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DAILY BRIEF ii
C
27i
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PIIli
S UDAN
REPUBLIC
Lake Echear
OF THE
Lac Kim
CONGO
1.ake
Alberl
UANDA
'
Isumbura
Lake
UGANDA
Lake Kuaga
EntebbelAr
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1, Victoria
4
ETHIOPIA
.ake
� Rudolf
KENYA
Nairobi*
Meru.
TANGANYIKA
,Tanganyika
SliVekrt
FEDERATION OF
RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
Dada ma
Dar es salaam*',
(
.Makumbako
�Njombe Lindi 31603
.Mtwara UNCLASSIFIED
MOZAMBIQUE 10 3 2 9 2
SOMALI
REPUBLIC
, iNDIAN OCEAN
TANGANYIKA
400
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ihave joined the strike. A large part of the population is ac-
tively in sympathy with the strikers. Military Governor Abdi
has cordoned off the nationalist quarter of Baghdad with troops
and ordered a curfew. Troops have been ordered to shoot on
sight anyone entering the quarter (Backup, Page 7)
(Map)
Jordan: King Husayn has acted to thwart What he believed
was a plot td seize control of the Jordanian Army and perhaps
ultimately the government. , On 27 March he forced the resigna-
tion of the minister of defense and discharged the commander
of the armored forces and three other senior officers. At least
one of the officers had been in touch with Jordanian exiles in
Syria who have been plotting a coup against Husayn's regime.
The minister and the armored commander are leaders of the
Bani Sakhir Bedouin tribe, which heretofore has been the dom-
inant influence in the Jordanian Army and a main support of the
King. Their dismissal has aggravated an already unsettled sit-
uation and invites further army dissidencej
(Backup, Page 8)
Yemen: The Imam was wounded by gunshots on the night of
26 March. He is reported to be in a state of shock, although the
wounds are said to be superficial. No information is yet avail- 'te.
able on the identity of those involved in the assassination attempt,-"'-
�- `-/
although some arrests have been made, reportedly including i �e
young army officers. If the Imam should be incapacitated for a -6- "1--
lengthy period, his opponents might seek to supplant him and
prevent the succession of his unpopular son, Crown Prince Badr,
now in Rome for medical treatment Such an effort could lead to
a prolonged struggle in Yemen.
Badr was informed by
members of the court that the situation in Yemen was under con-
trol, expressed the hope that Badr
would soon return home. (Backup, Page 9)
ITanganyika-UK: ,gulius Nyerere, chief minister of Tanganyi-
ka, is expected to urge British Colonial Secretary Macleod, who
is chairing the constitutional conference now under way in Tan-
ganyika's capital, Dar es Salaam, to announce an early date�pos-
sibly 1 October--for the independence of this East African trus0
29 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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IA
territory.
While Macleod is expected to agree to eliminate
he few remaining British controls over Tanganyika's internal
affairs, he will probably attempt to maintain Britain's present
schedule, which calls for independence in 1962, unless he is
convinced that Nyerere's prestige would otherwise seriously
de t line (Backup, Page 10) (Map)
Communist China: Economic difficulties continue to limit
China's ability to maintain a satisfactory export-import pro-
gram. The Japanese Embassy in Warsaw has informed Tokyo
negotiators at trade talks with
Poland said China would not be able to supply rice, wheat,
pork, or other foodstuffs in 1961. The Japanese Embassy re-
ceived this information from the Polish minister of foreign
trade. In addition to agricultural problems, the Chinese also
admitted difficulties in exporting iron ore, claiming that igh-
quality ores from Hainan Island "had all been dug out.' More-
over, Chinese negotiations for additional purchases of grain
from Australia have bogged down because the Australians haif
not agreed to a Chinese request for credig
(Backup, Page 11)
Albania-USSR: Albania and the USSR appear to be continu-
ing cooperative naval activities despite political differences.
two W-class sub-
marines of the 12-unit Soviet submarine detachment stationed
in Albania, as well as a subtender, are now under some de-
gree of Albanian control. The Soviet Union may be providing
Albania with these naval units in exchange for base rights in
the Mediterranean area.
In addition, all Soviet naval units based in Albania have
been integrated into the Albanian communications system,
and two countries have been cooperating in the development
of naval shore facilities in Valona Bay. An extensive joint
naval exercise began on 20 March and is still in !progress
29 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF
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�r019�SE-efiLE�T-
The Situation in Laos
the British note of 23 March on Laos,
which incorporated Soviet proposals for reconvening the Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC) and an international confer-
ence, has generated strong pressure for Soviet acceptance and
Ir_p_Hced Khrushchev in a difficult position,
other pressures on Khrushchev which are likely to prevent
full acceptance of the British plan. These include the timing
of the note just prior to the SEATO conference and movements
of the US Seventh Fleet which, gave the British note
the flavor of an ultimatum and would cause resentment and re-
sistance in Moscow. Khrushchev
cannot afford to give the appearance of retreating under Ameri-
can pressure, since both the "extremists" in his own party and
the Chinese Communists are ready to make capital out of any
"appeasement" of the USD
Khrushchev most likely will
accept the substance of the British proposals but will recom-
mend that the first step of arranging a cease-fire be incorpor-
ated into the second phase, whereby the Geneva conference co-
chairmen would call for the immediate reactivation of the ICC
and would authorize the ICC to request and arrange for super-
vision of a cease=fire;3
Although the authoritative "Observer" article in Pravda
on 27 March avoided direct comment on the timing and terms
of a cease-fire, it implied that the USSR would not agree to any
approach which would indicate Soviet responsibility for and
direction of the Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces. Pravda charac-
terized President Kennedy's statement of 23 March calling for
a cessation of armed attacks by externally supported Commu-
nists as being "tantamount to an ultimatum to the people of
Laos." While PraNida's position would not necessarily preclude
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Soviet agreement to a joint appeal by the Geneva co-chairmen
for a de facto cease-fire, recent bloc propaganda on this issue
suggests an intention to evade any firm commitments on the
timing of a formal cessation of hostilities prior to an interna-
tional conference, on the grounds that this is a matter for the
conference itself to decide.
The Pathet Lao radio on 28 March broadcast an interview
with Prince Souphannouvong in which the Pathet Lao leader ac-
cused the US of intensifying "its interference and aggression"
in Laos. Souphannouvong charged that the US was forced by
world criticism to accept the British proposal for a cease-fire,
but called it a US scheme to halt the war "in order to have
enough time to save the Phoumi Boun Oum clique from total
collapse, build up the rebels' strength, and hinder forever the
conference of 14 nations." Souphannouvong warned that if the
US continues to "create complications to a peaceful solution
to the Laotian problem, the forces and people of Laos... will
appeal to peace-loving countries for military help." This
threat had first been broadcast on 23 March by the Pathet Lao
radio, and subsequently repeated by the bloc.
Charging that "the Kennedy administration_ . is more
frenzied and more aggressive" than its predecessor, Peiping,
In a broadcast on 27 March, accused the US of planning to
crush the "national liberation movements" with armed force.
The following day Peiping broadcast a highly edited version of
the 27 March Pravda "Observer" article, choosing to empha-
size that portion of the article which implied the use of force
to counter any SEATO intervention.
[Nehru apparently feels continued efforts toward recon=
cuing Laotian political elements are needed as urgently as a
cease-fire and an end to foreign intervention in Laos. New
Delhi has generally taken the position that any national govern-
ment formed without Pathet Lao participation would be neither
effective nor acceptable as a basis for international agreement.
Nehru continues to urge in his public statements, as he has
privately to Ithrushchev, that the British- and US-backed pro-
posals be accepted as a "good way" to solve the crisisD
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces are continuing to maintain
their positions north of the junction of Routes 7 and 13; south
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of the Junction they� are blocking any further Laotian Army
advance with felled trees, mines, and mortar fire. In the
Tha Thom area, they retain control of the southern approach
to the Plaine des Jarres.
General Phoumi is still urging the
irregulars to remain in Laos; in Taipei,
the withdrawal of the ap-
proximately 2,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Laos is
going well but that the operation is being complicated by
Laotian efforts to recruit among the irregulars. Recruiting
agents reportedly are offering 26 US dollars a month to those
who Join the Laotian ArmyD
Erhis recruiting effort apparently is being extended to
those Chinese Nationalist forces grouping in northern Thai-
land for repatriation.
some irregulars have come over from
nearby Laotian territory to proselytize on behalf of Phoumit
forces. Out of one group of some 700 irregulars scheduled
to start repatriation from northern Thailand, all but 35 re-
fused to leave when trucks arrived for them on 23 March
phoumi is anxious to incorporate some of the
Nationalist elements clandestinely into his army to bolster
the fighting spirit of the Laotian troops.
those irregulars scheduled for inte-
gration all speak Laotian or a minority tongue
Pathet Lao propaganda continues to denounce the pres-
ence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Laos, and, as recently
as mid-March, threatened that the "legal" Laotian govern-
ment would take appropriate measures "to annihilate them as
the Burmese Government has done" unless they were withdrawn.
One Soviet AN-12 heavy transport may be en route to
North Vietnam from Moscow. A Soviet AN-12 en route from
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Moscow to Omsk on 28 March, although not breviouslv noted
in flights to South China or North Vietnam,
Soviet
transports have been scheduled to fly at least 14 sorties
from Hanoi to the Nam Bac area on 29 March.
ET
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Situation in the Congo
Tshombe's forces reportedly are gathering both north and
south of Manono, with the primary concentrations at Mitwaba,
Kongolo, and Piana Mwanga. They have had some success in
establishing control over areas on the periphery of Baluba ter-
ritory, and their willingness to fight has probably been strength-
ened to some extent by the "white legionnaires," most of whom
are scattered through the African units. However, the Katanga
troops have not mounted an operation of this size before, nor
have they ever attempted a deep penetration into the Baluba area.
Reports of the plans for an offensive against Manono have
caused increased tension in Elisabethville, which,, like most of
the other mining cities in southern ICatanga, has a substantial
Baluba population. Non-Baluba tribesmen reportedly fear that
violence will occur if the ICatanga forces move on Baluba terri-
tory in the north. The disturbances might be led by tribal lead-
ers whom Tshombe recently released.
According to the American Emb ssy official, the Stanley-
vine authorities appear to be developing some sense of responsi-
bility and are beginning to bring their forces under control. More-
over, they seem increasingly disenchanted with the failure of the
bloc and Afro-Asian nations to send aid or diplomatic representa-
tives. Gizenga and his aides apparently have been in tel
contact several times with the Leopoldville government.
However, Gizenga may be inhibited by Mulele, his
Cairo representative, who advised against a "rapprochement
with the puppets" Mulele also stated
that an ambassador from Mali would arrive in Orientale on 26
or 27 March--the first diplomatic representative to reach Stan-
leyville.
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Growing Discontent Among South Vietnamese Military Officers
Professional officers in South Vietnam have long felt
that operations against the Communist guerrillas were ham-
pered by political interference in assignments and field orders
as well as by inadequate intelligence and faulty command
structure. They have also been concerned that President Diem's
reluctance to reform his authoritarian rule and his suppression
of non-Communist political opponents are facilitating the Commu-
nist drive to take over South Vietnam.
While the bulk of army units remained loyal to Diem in
last fall's paratroop revolt, the coup attempt increased the of-
ficers' awareness of the army's political potential. The govern-
ment's subsequent mistrust of officers who did not give all-out
support to Diem has also had an unsettling effect. Diem's foot-
dragging in carrying out a promised government reorganization
prompted the air force commander to express doubt that Diem
Intended to do more than replace one group of "yes men" with
another& similar complaint was made recently by the marine
corps commandant. Deputy Chief of Staff General Khanh,
whose position was strengthened after the coup, is himself
reported unhappy over the situation. Early this month, a rank-
ing officer of the 1st Infantry Division defected to the Commu-
nistsi
Uneasiness in the armed forces is intensified by the pros-
pect of a major Communist political and military effort to dis-
rupt the presidential election on 9 April. [Recent open Commu-
nist efforts to win the cooperation of non-Communists in front
activity aimed at Diem's overthrow reportedly have led to
some military talk of a "preventive coup.-D
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I-
UAR
(SYRIA)
R A
SAUDI ARABIA
IRAQ
ASSYRIAN
PLAINS
,
AND
Kirkuk�
FOOTHILLS
Karbala �
Kurdish Tribal Area
Underlined cities mentioned in text
STATUTE MILES 150
UNCLASSIFIED
31156
Najaf �
BAGHDAD
�Ad Diwaniyah
An Nasiriyah
IRAN
-Basra
KUWAIT
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
10329 3
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Baghdad Demonstrations Growing More Serious
[Prime Minister Qasim returned to Baghdad from Basra
on the night of 27 March in the face of increasing open hos-
tility throughout the country. The strike began as a protest
by taxi and bus drivers against an increase in the price of
gasoline but expanded into an anti regime movement by var-
ious elements, including the Communists. Led by Baghdad
University students, demonstrators stoned buses again on 28
March in downtown Baghdad. Numerous shops have closed
after pressure from the students for a general strike. Al-
though troops fired on demonstrators on 27 March, they may
be reluctant to carry out extreme repressive measures against
a cause supported by the general populace. Sympathy strikes
have broken out in Kirkuk and Mosul in the north and Najaf
and Karbal�n the south.)
hecurring strife between groups of Kurdish tribesmen
in the Mosul-Kirkuk area appears to be increasing, although
Iraqi security authorities so far have relied on police detach-
ments to maintain order. While army troops have not yet been
involved in the tribal difficulties, the regime is not likely to
call them to Baghdad to assist in putting down the rioting there.)
riche disorders in Baghdad may weaken the effect of recent
moves against the Communists by the Qasim regime, unless
Communist participation can be demonstrated. Qasim, in a
speech on 28 March, blamed "imperialists and foreign com-
panies," an apparent slap at the Iraq Petroleum Companylwith
which he has been engaged in fruitless negotiations for some
monthq
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King Husayn Acts to Thwart Plot in Jordanian Army
r.Husayn made his move because he believed the suspected
officers were preparing to take military action to seize con-
trol of the Jordanian Army in the early morning of 27 March,
The
officers, led by Major General Akash Zabin, commander of
the armored forces, had alerted their units without appropri-
ate authority from army headquarters, and Defense Minister
Akif Fayiz subsequently endorsed their "right" to do so.
Counteralerts by other units had apparently discouraged the
plotters even before the King learned of the situation
CZabin and Fayiz may have aimed, at least initially,, only
to unseat Army Commander in Chief Habes Majalli, who is
the leader of a rival faction within the army. These Bani
Sakhir leaders reportedly were plotting to make such an at-
tempt during Majalli's current absence from the country. In
any case, their removal now leaves the Majalli faction in
the strongest position within the military establishment. How-
ever, members of the Bani Sakhir tribe still constitute a
large proportion of the army, especially the armored force,
and their future loyalty to the King seems doubtful at�bestD
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NNW %if
Imam of Yemen Survives Assassination Attempt
The 67-year-old Imam has ruled Yemen's 5,000,000 citizens
since 1948 by a combination of subsidies to powerful tribal ele-
ments and suppression of all dissidence. If he is able to act
quickly now, he can probably cow any opposition by imposing
wholesale punishment on those involved. In 1955 he handled a
similar situation with dispatch, publicly beheading his own
brother, who had sought to lead a revolt against his regime.
Yemen's northern tribesmen resent the Imam's disregard
for their traditional authority and would probably welcome his
removal. They also oppose Badr, whom the Imam named as
his heir in violation of the historic custom that Yemeni rulers
be chosen by tribal agreement. Badr's current absence from
Yemen would have facilitated the seating of a ruler acceptable
to the tribes.
The UAR may have an interest in seeing Badr's succession
hastened, inasmuch as Badr has been under its influence and
the Imam has recently shown a determination to lessen this
influence.
Chaotic conditions in Yemen might induce the UAR to in-
tervene in force, under the terms of the United Arab States
agreement of March 1958. This agreement links Yemen to
the UAR in a loose and so far ineffective confederation formed
in the aftermath of Egyptian-Syrian union. Saudi Arabia's in-
terest in the maintenance of a friendly government in Yemen
might also lead it to intervene in support of tribesmen and
other conservative elements, but King Saud would be unlikely r
to make such a move if it risked conflict with Nasir. _ 1
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Nftre *me
Tanganyika to Seek Independence at onstitutional Conference
The conference began on 27 March in an atmosphere of
general good feeling and is expected to adjourn on 30 March
without serious difficulties. The only problems expected to
arise are those related to the actual date for independence
and the terms of separation pay for the departing British civil
servants3
(London has already promised early independence for
Tanganyika but is reluctant to set a date earlier than 1962 be-
cause of the political situation in Britain and in its other A.f-
rican territories. Nyerere, an able and moderate national-
ist, reportedly told Minister of Home Affairs ICahama that
he is determined to hold out for independence in 1961. Nyerere
probably hopes that by taking a strong position at the confer-
ence he can appease the more radical members of his own
party and undermine the popularity of the rival--and increas-
ingly extremist�African National Congress (ANC)3
EI:he Colonial Office has already assured Nyerere that
Tanganyika can achieve "full internal self-government" at his
discretion�probably in June 1961. This would include re-
moving Governor Sir Richard Turnbull as chairman of the
Council of Ministers (cabinet) and replacing him in that capac-
ity by Nyerere, possibly eliminating the post of deputy gover-
nor, and replacing the two remaining government ministers
with elected African ministers acceptable to Nyerere. Macleod
is also expected to agree to an early transfer to the Tanganyika
Government of control over the remaining expatriate civil serv-
ants and to make a generous offer regarding salaries and sep-
aration paYD
CONFIDENTIAL
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woe
Communist China's Continuing Trade Difficulties
Two years of poor harvests have made Peiping unable
to maintain important export commitments. Poland's foreign
trade minister told the Japanese ambassador that his country
received "absolutely none" of the rice promised it under the
1960 trade agreement and only a small amount of the sched-
uled 120,000 tons of wheat. Peiping will not be able to recover
its export position in food unless there is a good harvest in
1961. The persistent drought in North China, now in its third
year, is making Peiping cautious about this year's food pros-
pects.
It seems unlikely that the iron ore deposits on Hainan Is-
land have been exhausted. It is more likely that the Chinese
want to reserve this high-grade ore for their own use.
CChina's foreign exchange position is under heavy strain
as Peiping pays out hard currency for grain imports from
the West. Despite rumors that Soviet financial aid will
be forthcoming, there is still no evidence of transfers of for-
eign currency to the Chinese. Although the London branch
of the Bank of China had been advised by its Peiping office to
expect a transfer of sterling from the USSR, no funds had
been transferred as of early Marchp
The future of economic relations between the USSR and
China is still under negotiation both in Moscow and in Peiping.
Some agreement may be reached to extend repayment of ex-
isting Chinese debts to the USSR, which would ease Peiping's
severe payments problem
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t'llitAt I IAL
1111.01e
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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" �Te-P�s-K-Rer
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