CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001969
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 14, 1961

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14 March 1961
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CENTRAL
C
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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14 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Congo: Gizenga makes conciliatory gesture toward US,
indicates more moderate attitude toward Leopoldville.
(Page t)
2. Situation in Laos. (Azge t)
3. USSR: Khrushchev sets bloc line for resumed UN
General Assembly session. (Page it)
4. Nationalist China: Survey team says most irregulars
willing to evacuate Thai-Burma-Laos border area. (Page tti)
5. Iran: New cabinet appointed. (Page itt)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Congo: The Gizenga regime, unable to obtain bloc aid C if-,
and in desperate economic straits as a result of the blockade/
of the Congo River, is making conciliatory gestures toward 4
the US and indicating a more moderate attitude toward Leo- "�
poldville. An American official who visited Stanleyville re-
cently was given red-carpet treatment, including a private 7. z
interview lasting more than an hour with Gizenga, who usually
is inaccessible to outsiders. General Lundula, Gizenga's
chief of staff and one of the moderate members of the Stanley-
ville group, sent a message to two of the participants at the
Tananarive conference who have been associated with Orientale
suggesting that they come to Stanleyville to discuss a "nationaL
entente and amicable settlement."
Meanwhile, contacts with the bloc are continuing.
the chief of Gizenga's/P,3
mission in Cairo is to return there on 16 March from a trip to
Moscow. At that time the mission hopes to sign a commercial
agreement with Poland "of the type signed with Czechoslovakia."
The Tananarive conference's proposed revision of the
Congolese constitution, in its formal recognition of separatist
sentiment, would virtually eliminate central authority in the
country by requiring unanimous agreement of the states on any
action. Further talks are to be held in the Congo among the
participants. (Backup, Page 1)
Laos: Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces apparently continue
efforts to exploit their successes along the Vientiane - Luang r
Prabang highway. Pathet Lao guerrilla forces in the area ap-
parently are being activated to assist in this effort; General
V.
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Phoumi is reported to have admitted that Muong Kassy was
taken by irregular troops.
On the political side, there are reports that the Lao
government delegation arriving in Phnom Penh today for
additional talks with Souvanna Phouma will also meet with
Pathet Lao representatives. The Indian mbassador to
Vientiane, reporting on a onversation with
Phoumi, claims the Lao army commander expressed the
hope that such talks would be productive, with Souvanna act-
ing as a referee rather than participant.
Peiping and Hanoi seem particularly disturbed by the
Phnom Penh meeting between Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi.
While avoiding any direct criticism of Souvanna, they are re-
broadcasting Pathet Lao statements clearly intended to re-
mind Souvanna that his position would be weak were it not for
the support of pro-Communist military forces in Laos. Pei-
ping, on 12 March, carried a Pathet Lao item which did not
mention Souvanna by name but pointedly implied that he could
not control developments in Laos.
*A 13 March Pathet Lao broadcast likened the recent Phoumi
Souvanna. communiqu�o the 19 February proposal of King Savang
for a neutral nations commission and noted that Souvanna had
already rejected this proposal. The broadcast declared that the
Pathet Lao would "oppose all concessions which are against the
interests of the nation"
*USSR-UN: achrushcheIr reportedly has instructed the hast-
ern European satellite governments that the bloc's general line
at the resumed session of the General Assembly should be to
Improve the atmosphere for East-West negotiations. In these
instructions, the Soviet premier did not introduce any novel
concepts. He indicated that the Soviet scheme for general and
complete disarmament would not be modified but that the USSR
would be ready to engage in bilateral talks with the US. IChru-
shchev hinted, however, that if the US refused to take a "con-
structive" approach, the USSR would renew its demand for_ay
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apecial assembly session on disarmament, presumably at-
tended by heads of government. He set forth a negative line
on the Congo crisis, indicating that the bloc's main purpose
should b so..ose de i i ns d �in� t izenga
regime. (Backup,
Page 3
Nationalist China:
4,500 of the 6,000
to 7,000 irregulars which the Chinese Nationalists claim are
in the area are willing to be removed to Taiwan; 1,500 de-
pendents reportedly are also willing to be evacuated. While
Chiang Kai-shek has agreed "in principle" to the evacuation
and US officials in Taipei believe that he will cooperate, they
point out that he still feels the evacuation will damage Nation-
alist interests,
It is unlikely that more
than about 3,000 irregular troops will agree to evacuation)
(Backup, Page 5)
Iran: Prime Minister Sharif-Emami has appointed non-
polifirtechnicians to the key ministries of foreign affairs,
interior, and finance in his new cabinet. The prime minis-
ter's resignation on 11 March and his reappointment was a
pro forma maneuver in connection with the installation of a
new parliament following the recent election. Nevertheless,
the occasion has enabled him to strengthen the cabinet, es-
pecially in the appointment of General Amir-Azizi as interior
minister. (Backup, Page 7)
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Situation in the Congo
Gizenga and other members of his regime, in conversation
with an official of the US Embassy in Leopoldville who was in Stanley-
ville last week, stated that they have decided as a matter of policy
to cooperate� with the UN, despite their dislike of that organization.
Stating that they are not Communists, they asked for understanding
and aid from the United States. Gizenga was critical of Kasavubu,
but said he recognized him as Congolese chief of state. Gizenga
also said that if his security were assured, he would be willing to
attend a session of the Congolese parliament, and, if then voted out
of the government, would take a position in the parliamentary op-
position.
The American Embassy official reports that there are four
centers of political power in Stanleyville. Gizenga and his group
apparently occupy a position between that of Lundula, characterized
as "almost too moderate and reasonable for Stanleyville," and
Interior Minister Gbenye, who is described as a "potentially danger-
ous, vindictive, stupid racist." These three elements still work
together, but Orientale provincial president Manzikales provincial
administration apparently is at odds with all of them. Manzikala
seems to be trying to build up enough strength to challenge Gizenga,
but his prestige declined after Gizenga refused to let him go to
Tananarive. Manzikala, generally considered a moderate,
standard Stanleyville demands for a reconvening
of parliament and the expulsion of foreign troops. He also echoed
the Communist line that Hammarskiold should no longer be recog-
nized as secretary general.
may have been an attempt to gain
the initiative as an opponent of conciliation.
The economic situation in Stanleyville is critical. Gizenga
told his Cairo representative that
unless help came by 15 March, he would not be able to pay his
troops. He further stated that he recognized the consequences which
would follow "if the government even on one occasion has difficulty
in paying the salaries of the soldiers."
The Tananarive conference recognized the existence of eight
"sovereign" states--a division which has already been challenged
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by Jason Sendwe, a Baluba tribal leader who claims to have set up
another state in northern Katanga. Other separatist demands are
likely to come from Equateur Province, where the Mongo and Bangala
tribes have been competing for domination of the provincial govern-
ment. The conference's resolution is likely to produce further frag-
mentation.
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Khrushchev Sets Bloc Line for UN General Assembly
Clihrushchev pointed out that since the US election, the
Soviet Union had "done everything" to improve relations with
the US and thus open the way to a solution of the most impor-
tant international problems. He cited the release of the RB-47
fliers, withdrawal of the Soviet item on "aggressive" actions
of the US Air Force from the General Assembly's agenda, and
Moscow t decision not to publish its note protesting an alleged
"Violation by an American aircraft of the USSR's northern
frontier" after the President had stated that such flights would
not be repeated. Although Khrushchev complained about the
"contradiction" between US declarations and actions, he said
the bloc's general line should be to work for improving the at-
mosphere for negotiations, but, at the same time, to manifest
"firmness of principles" so as to obtain "concrete" solutionsi
ro-n disarmament, Khrushchev claimed that the USSR's scheme
for general and complete disarmament has already gained the
support of a "majority of humanity" and that the US and its al-
lies are becoming isolated on this issue. He indicated that the
Soviet position would not .be modified, that bloc delegations
should work to have the General Assembly endorse the princi-
ples of general disarmament, and that they should support the
12-nation resolution, drafted by India last fall, calling for gen-
eral disarmament. He made it clear, however, that these tac-
tics would not preclude bilateral US-Soviet negotiations, should
the US "assume a more flexible position" and take the initiative
for such talks. He said that if, on the other hand, the US "with-
draws from constructive discussion," this would create a favor-
able situation for renewing the Soviet proposal for a special
assembly session on disarmament, presumably attended by
heads of government]
4ith regard to the Congo crisis, Khrushchev claimed that
the USSR had been prepared for serious discussion with the US
to work out a common line, but that American actions show that
the US intends to support the "colonialists." In this situation,
said Khrushchev, the bloc's general line will be to opposenyil
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rd-ecisions which could damage the interests of the "legal gov-
ernment of the Congo" in e., Gizenga's Stanleyville regime)
(Although the question of Laos has not been placed on the
assembly's agenda, Khrushchev urged that bloc delegates
seize every opportunity to express support for the views of
Souvanna Phouma and Prince Sihanouk, particularly the pro-
posal for an international conference on Laos. He defined
bloc interests as keeping Laos out of any "political and mil-
itary bloc" and ensuring that it pursues a policy of "genuine
neutrality.")
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Evacuation of Chinese Nationalist Irregulars
�e Chinese Nationalist irregulars in the Burma-Thai-
land-Laos border area are scattered and semiautonomous,
and the degree to which they will respond to Taipei's efforts
Is problematical. Most of the 3,000 irregulars now in Laos
probably will consent to evacuation. This group includes
a large proportion of the 1,000 Taiwan-trained Special
Forces which were sent to the area during 1960. They are
regular army personnel and responsive to orders. Others,
who have been in the area since 1949 and retreated into Laos
from Burma after surrendering their bases, have lost their
means of livelihood.]
Lie 3,000 to 4,000 irregulars farther south, in the
Burma-Thailand border area, have been relatively independ-
ent of Taiwan. The Burmese Army has pressed them less
vigorously than the group which retreated into Laos, and the
Thai inhabitants tend to support them against the Burmese.
Many of these irregulars have homes and families in Thai
refugee villages and have achieved relatively high standards
of living. As they have returned to these villages, with Thai
approval, when Burmese pressures became too strong in the
past, it is unlikely that many of them will opt for repatriation
to Taiwaq
(-Although the Burmese Government has expressed grati-
fication for United States efforts to speed the evacuation of
irregulars from Burma and the anti-American press cam-
paign has subsided, the issue remains extremely sensitive
in Rangoon. The government considers the irregulars en-
tirely dependent on foreign assistance and asserts this could
not be supplied without tacit American approval; the army is
bitter over the heavy casualties it has sustained in the recent
campaign against the Chinese; and the country as a whole
fears that the irregulars provide a standing Justification for
Chinese Communist incursions into Burma. It is probable
that the government will renew its campaign of press denun-
ciation and public demonstrations against the United State_s_
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%Ise se,*
its associations with Nationalist China if and when the
irregulars stir up trouble for the Burmese Government)
Eio deal with an influx of several thousand men and their
dependents, a resettlement center is being prepared near
the provincial capital of Taichung. The minister of national
defense plans to organize the returnees into a fourth special
forces unit because of their experience, language, and ethnic
origin.)
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New Iranian Cabinet
General Amir-Azizi, minister of interior in Iran's new
cabinet, replaces General Alavi-Moqadam, who under the
Shah's direction was primarily responsible for rigging the
recent parliamentary elections. This is perhaps intended to
give the impression of punishment for Alavi-Moqadam; at the
same time, however, it is rumored that he will be given an
ambassadorial post, perhaps in Turkey or Spain, suggesting
a reward for carrying through the elections successfully in
spite of protests by the nationalist opposition.
Amir-Azizi has established a record for honesty and hard
work in his two years as chief of the gendarmerie and has
greatly reduced the corruption which has long plagued that
force.
The new foreign minister, Hossein Qods-Nakhai, is a
career Foreign Ministry official who has been ambassador in
London and is among Iran's foremost literary men. He is be-
lieved solidly pro-Western, has a reputation for scrupulous
honesty, and has been described as Iran's ablest diplomat.
Other new appointees, as well as the holdovers from the
previous cabinet, are competent and nonpolitical. t. General
Timur Bakhtiar apparently still remains as chief of he National
Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAX), although
Prime Minister Sharif-Emami had said that Bakhtiar--as well
as General Abdullah Hedayat, chief of the Supreme Commander's
Staff, and General Haj All Kia, the staff's chief of intelligence--
would be replaced. It is possible that these changes will yet be
made. The Iranian ambassador in Washington, Ardeshir Zahedi,
son-in-law of the Shah, reportedly has complained to the Shah
about Bakhtiar's "conduct and contacts" during a recent visit in
the United States3
The new cabinet appears generally of greater competency
than the previous one; the Shah will still make all important de-
cisions. The prime minister and the parliament will continue to
limit themselves to approving the Shah's decisions.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investi'gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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CONFIDENTIAL
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