CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000192
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 10, 1961

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10 February 1961
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CENTRAL
79
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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10 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: Moscow may be considering release of U-2
pilot Powers. (Page t)
2. USSR - Communist China: Annual trade talks begin
In Peiping; Sino-Soviet trade expected to drop. (Page t)
3. USSR-Indonesia: Earlier reports of Soviet agree-
ment to. provide Djakarta with TU-16 jet bombers
and 1VLIG-21 jet fighters now confirmed. (Page ti)
4. France-Algeria: De Gaulle to meet Bourguiba for
preparatory talks on Algeria. (Page tit)
5. Congo: Ghana now supports disarmament of all
forces in Congo except UN troops.
(Page ttt)
6. Portugal: Riots of 4-5 February in Angola have a-
roused further criticism of Salazar regime. (Page tu)
7. USSR-France: Moscow protests inter ent of Brezhnev's
plane by French aircraft off Algiers.
(Page tv)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
10 February 1961
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BULLETIN
r-
USSR:LMoscow may be planning to release 13-2 pilot
Gary Powers, in spite of the security consideration in-
volved, as a further gesture toward improving relations
with the US.
Powers would be
released "within three weeks.' in
late December took a similar line. At the end of the Pow-
ers trial the chairman of the Moscow Lawyers Collegium
told American attorneys that US-Soviet relations would
Improve in coming months and a commutation or remis-
sion of Powers' sentence might then be possible. Powers'
Soviet defense attorney told US lawyers that he would file
application for commutation of sentence "at an appropriate
k
� USSR - Communist China: A Soviet trade delegation'
headed by Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Kumykin ar-
rived in Peiping on 8 February to begin "preliminary talk
on trade and economic relations with Communist China.
Negotiations for the annual trade protocol usually begin b:
December or January but this year were delayed by Pei-
ping's unwillingness to proceed while readjustments were
being made in its over-all trade policy. The preparatory
talks normally require from one to three months of hard
bargaining before the annual trade pact is signed. This
year's discussions are likely to be especially difficult as
a result of the deterioration in Sino-Soviet economic re-
lations which began in mid 1960 when Moscow abruptly
called home its technicians who were at work in China.
Developments since the withdrawal of the technicians indi-
cate that a new stage in the relations has been reached in
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which there are indications that Peiping may be adjusting
Its foreign trade to reduce its very heavy dependence on
the Soviet Union and the rest of the bloc. While trade with
the USSR is expected to drop considerably in 1961, it will
continutoaccount for a major share of Chinese foreign
trade. (Backup, Page 1)
TIRSR-TrAnnPRini
under the $244,000,0(10
Soviet-Indonesian arms pact signed in Moscow on 6 Jan-
uary the USSR agreed to deliver high-performance TU-16
jet bombers, MIG-21 jet fighters, and air-to-air and air-
to-surface missiles to Indonesia in 1961 and 1962. The
USSR has allowed for a 10-year payment period beginning
in 1965 and is to accept Indonesian goods in return for most
of the equipment. Indonesian ability to absorb and effective-
ly use this modern equipment will depend on the USSR's car-
rying through a training program, which is outlined in the
agreement, in the use of this equipment and also on an im-
proved Indonesian maintenance and logistic capability. The
Indonesians are now able to utilize less than 30 percent of
bloc jet aircraft delivered under. the 1958 arms deal. It is,
�of course, possible that the Indonesians may find the more
advanced air force equipment too expensive and time con-
suming to maintain and use and therefore may subsequently
request a modification of the agreement. However, the past
pattern of such Soviet agreements suggests that the USSR
will for its part carry out the terms of the agreement. The
more favorable terms of this agreement were also report-
edly extended to cover the $277,000,000 naval equipment
pact concluded in September 1960. Since Ithrushchev's visit
to Indonesia in February 1960, Moscow has sought to develop
cordial relations with Djakarta while exploiting President
Sukarno's aspiration to be considered a leader of the Afro-
Asian blocD (Backup, Page 2)
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Cango: Phana is now advocating disarmament oi all
forces in the Congo except those serving the UN,
This is a shift away
from the position held by other militant African neutral-
ists, who maintain that only those Congolese troops which
do not support Lumumba should be disarmed. Ghana con-
tinues to insist, however, that Lumumba and other political
prisoners should be released at an early stage of any pro- 71
ram to restore order in the Cong6-.)
Katanga President Tshombe continues to express
vehement opposition to any disarmament plan. The govern-
ment headed by Joseph Ilea, which was formed at Kasavubu's
behest in Leopoldville on 8 February, is largely a regroup-
ing of the Ileo cabinet which failed to obtain parliamentary
approval last August. A few posts apparently have been left
open for Mobutu and for supporters of Tshombe and Lumumba,
but none of these factions has so far commented on the forma-
tion of the new government. (Backup,
Page 3)
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France-Akeria:ahe prospective meeting between
De Gaulle and Tunisian President Bourguiba, seen by De
� Gaulle as a means of preparing the way for negotiations
with the Algerian rebels, could complicate French rela-
tions with the rebels. The rebel government has almost
� certainly not authorized Bourguiba to discuss any substan-
tive aspects of the Algerian problem, and one of its offi-
cials already has expressed resentment of what he terms
Bourguiba's "newspaper. diplomacy." Bourguiba himself
seems uneasy over the loss of prestige he will suffer if
the encounter with De Gaulle is without real results, but
he is anxious to gain credit for promoting a settlement.
He has therefore asked the US and UK to encourage the
French to be for,thcomine.-i,
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SOVIET IL-18 FLIGHT TO RABAT
ITALY
FRANCE
CORSICA
ARDINIA
Location of incident
as reported by the
Soviet aircraft.
Orteansville.
� ALGIERS
MOROCCO ALGERIA
4 STATUTE MILES
4
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� Portugal: The riots in Angola over the week end of
4-5 February have aroused further, criticism of the Sal-
azar regime from its supporters.
haig charged
that the government's present policy in Africa is designed
to protect a few important commercial interests and has
hinted that Moniz may tell the government that unless it
i)
makes radical changes, it can no longer rely on sunpoll
from the militar
there is widespread dissatisfaction with Salazar among
army officers and has stated that some move against him
may be made in the next few weeks.
(Backup, Page 4)
*USSR-France: The swiftness of Moscow's action in
protesting the "attack" by a French jet fighter on the IL-18
carrying Soviet President Brezhnev to Guinea via Morocco
suggests that the USSR hopes to use this incident to exploit
anti-French sentiment in these countries. Within a few hours
after the incident occurred on 9 February, Moscow published
the note which Foreign Minister Gromyko delivered to the
French charge. denouncing the action as an "act of interna-
tional banditry." Brezhnev was en route to Guinea for an of-
ficial visit at the invitation of President Sekou Toure. He is
stopping over in Rabat as the guest of King Mohammed V. An, *I
original transit stop at Rabat reportedly was extended to a L
24-hour layover.
The Soviet aircraft position at the time of
the incident as 37052bout 79 statute miles
north of Algiers. This would place the
aircraft within the area described by French officials as the
"zone of French responsibility" which they say extends north
to the 38th parallel--88 statute miles north of Algiers. The
French have long maintained a wide-ranging program of sur-
veillance, search and seizure of ships and aircraft in the
North African-Mediterranean area which they suspect of car-
rying arms to the Algerian rebels. They have boarded and
10 Feb 61
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searched for and in some cases seized arms cargo aboard
West European and Soviet Bloc ships and last month forced
down in Algiers a Lebanese plane which was flying arms
from Sweden to Uruauay.
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available During the Preceding Week)
Prospects for Japan over, the next few years: Foreign
Policy, Economic Situation, and Domestic Politics Including
Communist Activity and Ikeda's role as Premier. Tables.
NIE 41-61. 2 February 1961.
10 Feb 61
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Sino-Soviet Trade Talks Begin
The belated start of this year's Sino-Soviet trade talks
reflects both internal Chinese economic difficulties and the
uncertainties resulting from the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Peiping had great difficulty in meeting export commit-
ments to the bloc last year and was forced to postpone or
cancel many deliveries, as well as to delay all decisions on
trade plans for 1961. Alter surveying their export capabil-
ities, the Chinese began making preliminary offers on cer-
tain commodities about mid-December. In January, formal
trade talks began with Bulgaria and East Germany. The
present negotiations with the USSR suggest that adjustments
in trade policy which have been under way in Peiping for the
past few months are to be formalized in a series of new agree-
ments.
Chinese trade with the USSR did not reach the planned
goal of about $2 billion last year. Both Chinese imports and
exports were affected, but the sharp rise in China's short-
term indebtedness to the USSR suggests that while Soviet ex-
ports to China were maintained at a high level for much of the
year, Chinese deliveries did not keep pace. The Soviet Union
allowed this indebtedness to mount, but it may not tolerate
further increases as long as the Chinese insist on maintain-
n an course in ideological matters.
Trade prospects for 1961 point to a marked reduction in
total Chinese trade, an increase in trade with the non-Communist
world relative to that with the bloc, and a substantial cut in
imports from the bloc, particularly from the USSR. Import
reductions probably will be chiefly in machinery and equip-
ment�which accounted for about $600,000,000 or some 60
percent of China's imports from the Soviet Union in 1959. A
continuing cutback of these deliveries--a consequence of the
withdrawal of Soviet technicians�would greatly reduce China's
rate of industrial and technological progress.
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10 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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aclAt, 1 �orof
S9viet Military Aid to Indonesia
CMoscow, in keeping with its past performance in certain
other underdeveloped countries-=such as the UAR, Afghan-
istan, and even Yemen�apparently is willing for political
reasons to provide modern weapons to the Indonesian armed
forces regardless of Indonesian ability to utilize such ma-
terier3
[Since the Soviet Union's extension of a $250,000,000 eco-
nomic credit to Indonesia during Ithrushchey's visit to Dja-
karta last February, Moscow has engaged in a program with
far-reaching political implications to ensure Soviet participa-
tion in Indonesia's economic and military development. It has
effectively capitalized on the Indonesian President's sensitiv-
ity to what he considers US hostility to himself. The Soviet
Union probably hopes that this approach, combined with its
economic aid and well over $500,000,000 in military assist=
ance since February 1960, will strengthen Sukarno's resolve
to bring members of the Indonesian Communist party into his
cabinetD
[Previously the anti-Communist posture of Army Chief of
Staff General Nasution and the Indonesian Army had fore-
stalled Sukarno's .intentions in this regard. However, on Su-
karno's orders, General Nasution led the Indonesian mission
to Moscow in January which resulted in the army's acceptance
for the first time of a substantial amount of bloc military equip-
ment. Moscow may feel that Nasution's acceptance of this ma-
teriel will undercut his opposition to President Sukarno's plans.
In addition Soviet
officials also impressed Nasution with their support of Indo-
nesia's intention to recover West New Guinea]
(Since the conclusion of the January arms agreement, Mos-
cow radio has launched a steady propaganda barrage in support
of Indonesia's position on Guinea. Subandrio told the US ambas-
sador in Djakarta that accommodation with the bloc "had been
unavoidable" since no alternative was available, to the Soviet of-
fer of political support on the question of New Guinea. Moscow
probably hopes that Soviet assurances of continued full diplo-
matic support for Djakarta in the New Guinea campaign will�
strengthen the Communist party in Indonesia in its efforts to ex-
' le throughout all levels of the government
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Nits,
Situation in the Congo
the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry outlined a five-point program
for ameliorating the Congo situation. The program makes
the usual neutralist demands for the release of Lumurnba, for
the withdrawal of all Belgians, and for the early reconvening
of the Congolese parliament. However, Accra also proposed
that all forces in the Congo, except those serving with the UN,
should be disarmed and that all military assistance should be
channeled through the UlsT:1
In contrast to its neutralist allies, Ghana has continued
to support the UN effort in the Congo. Moreover, there has
been some indication that Nkrumah would accept Lumumba's
participation in the government in some capacity other than
premier. On the other hand,
other
Nasir and participants at the January Casablanca
conference still insist that forces of the "legitimate Congo-
lese government"--that of Lumumba and his supporters--
should not be disarmed, &though Nasir recently told the
American ambassador in Cairo that he was prepared to co-
operate with recent Western nronnsals fnr thp (7n gg,
./Although UN representatives of the Leopoldville govern-
ment recently showed less opposition to the proposals than
they had previously indicated,{
icatanga would resist UN efforts
to disarm its forces with all the means at its disposal. At
the same time, Tshomb6 apparently is becoming more closely
identified with the separatists in his cabinet, and the Belgians
believe that he would refuse to enter into any agreement with
the Leopoldville government unless Katanga's indetienclenee
we'rP rPerwrii7ed firstT
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SEGRE-I�_ %Pi
1.140 CLLIDIctlo WAAL LA rtli 1.3461Mbe Military
With Salazar Regime
the polit-
ical situation in Portugal was very bad and that drastic
changes were needed in its African policy.
the military, while able to handle disorders of the kind that
took at least 31 lives in Angola over the previous week end,
could not solve the African problem by repression or cope
with a general uprising. Portugal must
henceforth give satisfaction to "valid complaints" from over-
seas on the part of both Portuguese and Africans.
Moniz would raise the question of needed
radical changes at a cabinet meeting scheduled for 7 February
and might even issue an ultimatum to the government to effect
these changes or forfeit support by the military.
Dissatisfaction among the armed forces with Salazar's
policies is further reflected in an 8 February statement to
the US consul in Oporto by an Who had pre-
dicted Salazar's fall six weeks before the abortive coup of
March 1959 that "a military movement" against the premier
had been exnected last week,
such a move was being "freely"
discussed at a military, base near Lisbon, and said it might
take place in the next few weeks. However, the US Embassy
in Lisbon reports its service attaches have received no im=
pression of an early attempt at a coup from contacts in the
upper level of defense officials and among the middle and
junior ranks of the armed forces, where it believes such a
move would be most likely to originate.
On 6 February three leaders of a group which had signed
a letter calling on President Thomaz to grant Portugal a gov-
ernment willing to restore the fundamental liberties, told
Thomaz personally
that if he wanted to rally Portuguese popular support in the
face of a deteriorating domestic situation and threats to the
overseas provinces, he would have to dismiss Salazar and
bring some of the opposition into the government. Similar
views reportedly have long been held by iunior and even some
high-ranking nrlitary officers.
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'THE*PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Director, The Joint Staff
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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