CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000191
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 9, 1961

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Nig *C�ICC I ,40( 3.5(c)
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9 February 1961
Copy No.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
-MID-SECRET-
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9 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
Laos: Vientiane troops east of Phou Khoun are meet-
ing strong resistance from Pathet Lao forces. (Page i)
2. Burma: Most of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars
still in Burma may be forced into Thailand. (Page t)
3. Congo: Mobutu moves troops in preparation fqr of-
fensive against Gizenga. (Page t)
4. UAR.-Syria: Nasir extending his control over Syrian
economy through new foreign exchange limitations.
(Page it)
5. Nepal: Exiled Nepalese politicians in India are com-
pleting plans for resistance movement in Nepal. (Page it)
6. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
9 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: bovernment troops probing several miles east-
ward along Route 7 from recently occupied Phou IChoun junc-
tion are reported meeting strong resistance from Kong Le -
Pathet Lao forces. Airdrop operations have been noted re-
cently at various points east of PhoulChoun'.1
[Soviet transports have been landing daily at the Plaine
des Jarres airfield regardless of heavy cloud cover, sug-
gesting the possibility that these landings are being aided by
a radio homing beacon located at the airfield
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
Burma: he only significant force of Chinese National-
ist irregulars still in Burma--possibly 3,000 to 4,000 troops--
was reportedly under attack from Burmese troops as of early
February. The irregulars will probably have to retreat into
Thailand. This group is 50 miles south of the fortified area
from which 2,000 to 3,000 irregulars were recently driven,,
into Lao)
*Congo:CMobutu is apparently moving troops toward the
northwestern and southwestern borders of Orientale Prov-
ince in the first stage of a long-planned offensive against the
Gizenga regime. There is insufficient evidence available to
permit an accurate assessment of the outcome of this opera-
tion. The military moves, which seem designed to coincide
with new efforts by Kasavubu and his followers to form a
provisional government in Leopoldville, will be hampered
by the general unreliability of the Congolese troops and by
logistical difficulties. However, Gizenga's ability to meet
an invasion has been weakened by Mobutu's blockade of Cong-o3
-77313-5E-C-RE-T
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(River traffic which has causPc1 A critical Ahnrtarre of gas-
oline in Orientale Province:- (Backup,
Page� 3) (Map)
UAR-Syria: President Nasir continues to wrestle with
the problem of making a reality of the three-year-old con-
stitutional union between Egypt and Syria. On 5 February
he took a major step in extending Egyptian control over the dgAtt,�
relatively free Syrian economy through a decree establish- '
ing foreign exchange controls aimed at halting the flight of .20.4.,t,
Syrian capital and conserving the UAR.'s dwindling reserves
of hard currencies. Reactions among Syrian businessmen
have been antagonistic and there has been a noticeable in-
crease in statements ormosing the union with Eavot.
a high degree of sensitivity to Syrian public opinion
and are coupled with orders to assuage public concern. im-
rile_m_Plation of the new decree has begun.
(Backup, Page 5)
Nepal-India: Ousted leaders of the Nepali Congress
party, who have en conferring in India since King Ma-
hendra's take-over of the government on 15 December, are
completing plans for a "peaceful" resistance movement in
Nepal. Their campaign will take the form of mass agitation
and strikes to be staged in the near future. Nepali Commu-
nists are also planning resistance activities, but their at-
tempts to form a united front have been rebuffed by the Con-
gress leaders. Nehru, while careful to avoid any overt ac-
tion which would alienate Mahendra, has reportedly sanc-
tioned Nepali Congress organizational activity in India. 'In
Katmandu, increasing signs of opposition have led the King
to make further arrests and shut down two newspapers; gov-
ernment operations remain largely at a standstill owing to
uncertainty and to the ineffectiveness of the King's new Coun-
cil of Ministers :- (Backup, Page 7)
9 Feb 61
-0
DAILY BRIEF ii
oP SECRET
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. To Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostil-
ities against the United States or its possessions in the
immediate future:3
B. CNo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to ini-
tiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US
allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate
future3
C. a'he capabilities of Communist forces in Laos for sus-
tained military operations continue to be increased by the
bloc airlift and by road improvements which permit truck
support of the Plaine des Jarres area from North Vietnam
during the dry season. There are no indications that the
Communists intend to launch a major offensive in Laos at
this time, but they possess the capability for such action
and hence could exploit any favorable opportunity with sur-
prise. The bloc is seeking both to legitimize its opera-
tion and to play for time by promoting the establishment
of the Souvanna Phouma "cabinet" in Xieng Khouang and by
opposing a reactivation of the International Control Com-
mission without a prior international conference:
D. izenga's Stanleyville regime appears to have lost momen-
tum, partly as the result of his failure to receive supplies
and because of withdrawals. of pro-Stanleyville UAR troops
from Equateur Province, Gizenga's African and bloc sup-
porters are likely to increase their efforts to furnish ma-
terial aid through the Sudan, which continues to deny trans-
it rights, particularly if the proposed military movements
of thP 11/1rihntii fnreps acraingri- Stanl llea wined. liTifh
9 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF
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Now'
Situation in Laos
assessing the capabil-
ities and intentions of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in
the Plaine des Jarres area, conclude, on the basis of
present indications, that the enemy will fight a delaying
action along Route 7 preparatory to making a major stand
either at Muong Soul or on the Plaine des Jarres itself.
They estimate that the force now in contact with govern-
ment troops just east of the Phou noun junction of Routes
13 and 7 consists of about two battalions, supported by a
battery of 105-mm. howitzers, a few 120-mm. mortars,
and two to four armored cars. This force could be rein-
forced by an estimated four battalions (1,200 to 1,500 men)
for a sudden counterattack on the government forces; how-
ever, it is considered more likely that the bulk of this re-
serve will be used in the defense of Muong Soul or the Plaine
des Jarres. A potent factor in any delaying action would be
the use of antitank mines, which the enemy has recently in-
troduced into the fighting:7
The assessment notes reports of intensive recruitment
activity on the part of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao combine,
both for new troops and work gangs to be used in road im-
provement and construction of defensive positions. The
Pathet Lao are considered poorly trained, with North Viet-
namese advisers in most cases providing tactical guidance
down to the company level. With regard to logistics, it is
estimated that a minimum of 40 tons of supplies are being
landed daily by Soviet aircraft at the Plaine des Jarres air-
field complex. This tonnage is apparently, being augmented
by an undetermined amount of supplies being moved in by
truck via Route 7 from North Vietnam)
0-Despite the defensive tactics being pursued by the en-
emy in Xieng Khouang Province at the present time, the
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces retain the over-all initiative
in Laos through their ability to mount guerrilla attacks on
widely scattered government posts:j
outh Vietnam reportedly plans shortly to send a s _Iiecial
army team to Laos, to be attached to Phoumi's staff.__
SECRET
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LAOS
9 FEBRUARY mei
Gavernment forces
Governm,nt
Antigovernment
Antigovernment concentrations
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Main route number
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the South Vietnamese
military attache had been asked by the I3oun Oum govern-
ment about the possibility of providing psychological war-
fare and intelligence advisers for a newly established in-
telligence organization. Phoumi and Boun Oum were in
frequent contact with South Vietnamese leaders last fall
during the period of their opposition to the Souvanna gov-
ernment. Although Saigon promised them full support, it
is not known to have provided significant assistance either
In terms of materiel or personnel, up to this time.
9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. BULLETIN Page 2
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Republic of the Congo
CENTRAL AFRICAN- REPUBLIC
SUDAN
.Gernena
EQUATEUR
Coquilhat011e
Brazzaville
� LEOPOLDVILLE
Leopoldville
�Thysville
Mat di
Luanda
Atlantic
Ocean
ANGOLA
9 FEBRUARY 1961
Port F ancqu
STATUTE MILES 400
31592
Bauko
KASA
Bakwanga
Luputa
A T A
Lake
Albert
UGANDA'
KIVU
Buka u RUANDA
WWI
Use
Kongolo
Albertville
.Manonc
GA
ElisabethNell
FEDFRVION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
ura
TANGANYIKA
Lake
Tanganyika
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Situation in the Congo
(Mobutu's troops in northeastern Equateur Province
reportedly will approach battalion strength in a week, af-
ter the reinforcements and trucks now being moved up the
Congo River by barge reach 13umba. Mobutu apparently
plans to move this force up a tributary of the Congo to
Buta and thence southward by truck toward Stanleyville.
At the same time he reportedly is concentrating other
troops in Luluabourg, preparatory to a move overland
through Lodja, Ikela, and OpaliQ
(Mobutu and his lieutenants have so far given no indi-
cation that they can handle a large-scale military under-
taking, although in the present operation they presumably
will be assisted by Belgian advisers. Congolese troops
are poor fighters unless they receive strong leadership.
In addition, the offensive will suffer from severe logistical
handicaps. The southern group in particular faces difficult
supply problems, since it will have to rely on secondary
roads, often passing through hostile territory, for all sup-
port once it leaves Luluabourg.73
rOongolese officials in Leopoldville appear to be under-
estimating the difficulties facing their forces. They appar-
ently are under the impression that Gizenga's regime has
been sufficiently weakened to permit conquest of the eastern
Congo. Ammunition and gasoline are in critically short sup-
ply among the Stanleyville forces as a result of Mobutu's
blockade of Congo River shipping. In addition,
parts of the Congolese Army in Orien-
tale and Kivu provinces are disaffected and have offered to
come over to Mobutu's 51de.3
LBehind-the-scenes maneuvering among Leopoldville pol-
iticians has intensified following the conference at the end of
January. At Kasavubu's request, representatives of various
groups reportedly are attempting to form a provisional gov-
ernment and to have it approved by the members of parliament==
representing all regions of the Congo--who have remained in
Leopoldville since the legislature was closed by Mobutu
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C8eptember. There apparently is widespread agreement
that all important Congolese factions should be represent-
ed; however, it is still questionable whether Lumumba
supporters will agree to serve with Katanga represent-
atives or that Kasavubu can reconcile himself to thp in-
clusion of some Lumumba aclherenti
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�4110
President Nasir Extends Control Over Syria
There are increasing indications that President Nasir
will issue a new unified currency, probably on 22 Febru-
,a,ry--the third anniversary of the United Arab Republic.
More than 15 million new "dinar" notes with a face value
of almost $215 million were printed in the UK in early
spring 1959, and issuance apparently was scheduled to
begin about July 1959. However, pressures from leading
Syrian politicians and businessmen caused Nasir to post-
pone this action until his political control was more firmly
estab
The economic philosophies of the leaders of Egypt and
Syria are quite dissimilar. Cairo has moved far in imple-
menting Nasir's "socialist, democratic cooperative" con-
cept which calls for substantial government ownership and
economic control. With such control Nasir has been able
to facilitate long-term economic planning, utilize large
Communist credits, and direct private investment accord-
ing to government design. Foreign exchange restrictions
are essential for such an operation.
In Syria, meanwhile, a free enterprise system has con-
tinued with relatively little interference from Damascus. In
fact most of the important Syrian leaders have fully support-
ed this system, realizing that with very limited government
resources the success of the country's overambitious econom-
ic plan depended on full cooperation from the private sector.
However, as Nasir added more and more controls in the
Egyptian region, Syrian businessmen began to lose confi-
dence. A substantial capital flight took place and foreign
exchange reserves dropped to all-time lows. This, coupled
with three successive years of drought, brought the country's
economy to a low level of activity.
In an effort to restore confidence, UAR Vice President
Nur al-Din Kahhalah, a Syrian who is in charge of planning
for the Syrian region, proposed a UAR guarantee for foreign
and domestic private investment in Syria. Acting for the
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Syrian Expeutive Council
In Nasir's 23 December speech celebrating the 1956
"victory" over France, Britain, and Israel, he described
UAR capitalists as "exploiters and profit seekers" and
threatened to liquidate them. Two days later,
Nasir denounced the Execu-
tive Council's recommendations point by point
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Ousted Nepali Politicians Organize Resistance
Movement Against King Mahendra
Exiled leaders of the Nepali Congress party met in the
northern Indian city of Patna on 27 and 28 January to plan a
detailed program of resistance activity in Nepal against King
Mahendra's direct rule. The King, acting primarily out of
fear for his personal power, in December dismissed the Con-
gress party government of Prime Minister Koirala, dissolved
Parliament, suspended constitutional rights, and banned all
political activity. Koirala and 138 other politicians remain
under arrest in Katmandu. Deputy Prime Minister Subarna
Shumshere, who has been in India since the day before the
King's take-over, has spurned royal overtures and undertak-
en to lead an active opposition campaign aimed at restoring
parliamentary government.
The gathering in Patna was attended by three former min-
isters and avnany as 29 of the 101 members of the dissolved
parliament. LThe Congress party leaders decided against any
resort to armed insurrection until all possible means of polit-
ical pressure on the King to reverse his action have failed.
They also agreed not to cooperate with the Nepali Communist
party to overthrow the monarchy except as a last resort. The
Communists have been urging violent resistance in selected
areas of Nepal; having failed to persuade other groups to work
with them, they reportedly now are concentrating on organiz-
ing bases, particularly in areas along the Tibetan border, from
which some future revolutionary action could be launched3
Relations between Katmandu and New Delhi have be
strained since Mahendra's move in December. Nehru, sur-
prised and highly annoyed by the King's action_.) immediately
expressed his "regret" over the "complete reversal of democ-
racy" following Nepal's successful national elections in 1959.
The Katmandu press reacted violently against Nehru's "inter-
ference," and Indian officials have since been guarded in their
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comments on Nepal. asiehr assured Mahendra that
India would continue to support s government) New Delhi ap-
parently has concluded that it cannot afford any action which
runs the risk of prompting Mahendra to seek closer relations
with Peiping. {'hose Indian officials and politicians who are in
regular contac with Nepali Congress leaders have privately in-
dicated that New Delhi will not oppose their activities as long
as they do not seriously embarrass the Indian Governmen13
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THE PRESIDENT
The 'ice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Director, The Joint �Staff
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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