CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000188
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 6, 1961

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Nveo, yr ..16%�MC I v.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
6 February 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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6 February 1961
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: Sputnik VII carries heaviest payload to date;
if re-entry and recovery were planned. however,
fnilyirP in this nhase seems indicated.
2. USSR: First Deputy Premier Kosygin reportedly says
Khrushchev will attend UN General Assembly ses-
sion. (Page i)
3. Laos: Government forces report they have occupied
strategic junction near Phou Khoun. (Page it)
4. Congo: Support developing in UN for neutralization of
rival forces; various factions in Congo likely to op-
pose such an effort. (Page it)
5. South Korea: Chang Myon government, plagued with
economic problems and corruption, failing to gain wide
support. (Page tit)
6. Arab League: Surface unity of meeting which ended on
4 February covers continuing differences among league
members. (Page iv)
7. Italy: Breakdown of talks with Austria over South T
may threaten Fanfa,ni cabinet. (Page tv)
8. Dominican Republic: Government is reportedly bank-
rupt as result of Trujillo's long-continuing transfer of
funds and investments abroad for his own use. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
6 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
USSR: The mission objectives of Sputnik VII, launched
from Tyura Tam at about 0115 GMT 4 February (2015 EST,
3 February) are not yet clear. If the primary objective was
the demonstration of a more powerful propulsion system, the
operation appears to have been successful in orbiting the
heaviest payload to date. If in addition, however, a re-entry
and recovery were planned, the evidence suggests a failure
in this phase. The final stage propulsion system separated
from the satellite immediately after launching.
the satellite was stabilized in its
flight, while the other piece was tumbling.
Sometime between the 16th and 22nd or-
bit the number of Sputnik VII pieces increased from two to at
least three, and possibly six, although all pieces have con-
tinued in essentially the same path. Tenuous evidence, includ-
ing the continuation in a fixed position of the four Sibir-class
missile-range instrumentation ships in the Pacific, suggests
that another launching may be attempted in the near future.
(Backup, Page 1) (Chart)
USSR: The German ambassador to Moscow has informed k
Ambassador Thompson that First Deputy Premier Kosygin
told him in answer to a direct question that Khrushchev would
attend the General Assembly session. presumably the regular
session resuming on 7 March. Moscow had
/P
previously sparked rumors to this effect through the SudaneseAe-n-t
delegate to the UN and the UAR ambassador in Moscow, and,
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in discussing a possible date for the visit to Moscow by the
� Ceylonese prime minister, the Soviet Foreign Ministry was
vague as to Khrushchey's schedule for March.
) Although
N
Khrushchev
would not return to New York, the USSR appears to be pur-
posely holding the possibility of such a visit open perhaps
with the final decision dependent on US reaction.
) (Backup, Page 3)
Laos: ,Government forces have occupied 0 K
the strategic junction of Routes 13 and 7 just north of Phou
Khoun, guarding the western approach to the Plaine des Jar-
res area. Kong Le/Pathet Lao troops, after several days
of delaying action, apparently offered little resistance to the
government's final move.
the Chinese Nationalist irregulars who re-
cently crossed the Burmese border into Laos may attempt
some harassment of the Pathet Lao, President Chiang Kai-
shek has reportedly ordered the irregulars to regroup and
keep their strength intact so that they can survive either in
Laos or in Burma. (Backup, Page 4)
(Map)
[Congo Situation: The generally favorable response in the O 1�
UN to Hammarskjold's suggestion that the Congo crisis be "--c--
solved by neutralizing rival Congolese military factions has
led to similar but more comprehensive proposals by several.
UN members. Typical of these is a Nigerian plan which�in
addition to neutralizing the Congolese Army and the fighting
orces of the several "breakaway states"--would make the
N responsible for law and order, permit the release of all ----' /7 4
olitical prisoners, including Lumumba, and provide for the
stablishment of a new, broad-based government. This gov-74t
ernment would then draft a new federal-type constitutio0
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permitting a considerable degree of provincial autonomy and
call for general elections under UN sponsorship. Reaction
by the Soviet representative at the UN to the neutralization
proposal of Hammarskjold has been reserved. The Congo-
lese spokesmen at the UN, when apprised of specific neu-
tralization proposals, strongly objected. Although Gizenga
and Tshombe have not released statements on their reac-
tions, a maximum amount of pressure would probably be
needed to secure their compliance.
The military situation in the Congo continues to pose
difficulties for the UN forces, which have recently been weak-
ened by� troop withdrawals. On 4 February, a UN Nigerian
unit was ambushed by a pro-Lumumba force near Kindu in
Kivu Province. Although an uneasy truce was called after
an all-day exchange of fire b etween the two units, both sides
have continued to maintain their battle positions. An improve-
ment in the security of the outlying areas cannot be expected
until more troops under UN control arrive in the Congo.
Malaya and Liberia have expressed a willingness to supply
additional military aid to the UN force, and the Republic of
Too is scheduled to provide a "token" unit.
(Backup,. Page 7) (Map)
South Korea: The recent reshuffle of the cabinet, which
brought five new ministers and four vice ministers into the
government, is an attempt of the Chang Myon administration
to rally more parliamentary support. Popular expectations
were high following the ouster of Syngman Rhee last April,
but the Chang Myon government, beset with factionalism and
corruption and handicapped by a demoralized police estab-
lishment, has not shown the dynamic leadership needed to
gain popular support. Popular demands for reprisals against
those associated with the Rhee regime has led to ex post facto
legislation. Action under these laws could exclude from public
life large numbers of the limited supply of trained personnel.
With an assist from a heavy propaganda barrage from the
North, the belief is spreading, particularly among younger
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intellectuals, that some accommodation with North Korea of-
fers the solution to South Korea's chronic economic difficul-
ties. Student elements, despite South Korea's continued
strong friendship for the United States, are also beginning
to blame their country's difficulties on its close ties with
the US. (Backup, Page 9)
Arab League: The Arab League, which ended its for-
eign ministers' conference in Baghdad on 4 February, was
again able to create a semblance of unanimity only by ap-
proving:resolutions concerning opposition to Israeli activ-
ities, support for the Algerian rebels, and agreed Arab
candidates for UN positions. Five of the 16 resolutions
were related to Israel. Continuing intra-Arab differences
were reflected in the resolution, which again postponed ac-
tion on amending the League charter to reduce Nasir's dom-
inance. These differences are also reflected in the resolu-
tion,which recommended that the Casablanca Conference
resolutions merely be conveyed to those Arab governments
which had not participated in that conference, instead of
approving Nasir's role at Casablanca by endorsing the res-
olutions. According to a report by Radio Baghdad, the Arab
states renewed the oft-broken resolution to suspend radio
and press attacks against each other. The important devel-
opment of the meeting seems to have been the return of
" 4-" " "4- 4 vs" s�%��� i.4-4 Mv����+; non
Italy: The-Ffeakdown of Italo-Austrian negotiations over
the status of the German-speaking population in the South
Tirol area of northern Italy has resulted in some local vio-
lence and poses a further, threat to the stability of the Fanfani,t,
cabinet. Bomb explosions of anti-Italian tharacter have taken
place in the South Tirol, while students in Rome�encouraged/7' 1 1 I
by neo-Fascists--staged several days of anti-Austrian dem-
onstrations which on 4 February took an antigovernment turn.
Although Fanfani won parliamentary approval on 4 February
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Mr his handling of the dispute, the conservative Italian Lib-
eral party has long been uneasy over the domestic policies
of his government and may still be tempted to use Fanfani's
allegedly "soft" approach on the South Tirol issue as a pre-
text to dump him. (Backup, Page 10)
Dominican Republic: Trujillo's continuing transfer of
his own and the government's assets into dollars and invest-
ments abroad has been on such a "fantastic" scale that the
regime is now bankrupt,
foreign ex-
change reserves are now zero, despite recent technical ar-
rangements with foreign banks to make it appear otherwise.
Trujillo is probably expecting economic improvement from
the current sugar crop.,- much of which he stands to sell at
premium prices in the US market under the present legis-
lative reallocation of the former Cuban sugar quota.
(Backup, Page 11)
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SOVIET EARTH SATELLITES 1960-1961
Sputnik IV
Sputnik V
Sputnik VI
Sputnik VII
Date of Launch 15 May 1960
19 Aug. 1960
1 Dec. 1960
4 Feb. 1961
Weight (lbs.) 10,011
10,143
10,050
14,292
Orbit Period (min.) 91.2
90.68
88.6
89.82
Apogee (statute miles) 219
196
164
227.5*
Perigee (statute miles) 194
196
116
110.8*
*tentative
10205 2
6 FEBRUARY 1961
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Launching of Sputnik VII
The launching of Sputnik VII was quite similar in
many respects to two space program launchings--both
of which resulted in in-flight failures--made by the
Soviets in October
our ir-c ass missile-range in-
strumentation ships were in the Pacific in about the same
positions they were in last October. Two other Soviet
ships, possibly range-associated, which are now in the
South Atlantic, were also associated with the October op-
erations from about the same general area they nrri nnui
in.
usoIb�ICBM booster system,
but with an additional propulsion stage. This final propul-
sion stage together with the payload made up a much heav-
ier combination than ever before launched. Calculations
indicated a Soviet capability to orbit
a payload of 15,000 to 20,000 pounds, depending upon the
degree of design sophistication made in the new final pro-
pulsion stage. We have no reason, therefore, not to be-
lieve the figure, 14,300 pounds, announced by the Soviets
as the weight of Sputnik VII's payload.
tne electrical system aboard the satellite m
It is possible that the separation of Sputnik VII into sev-
eral parts was planned and occurred on the 17th orbit. Dur-
ing this orbit, the satellite passed over the area of the USSR
where Sputnik V was recovered last August. The fact that all
the various pieces of Sputnik VII appear to be in essentially
the same orbit suggests that recovery of this satellite was
planned, but that the retro=rocket system failed to operate.
It is now anticipated that all parts of Sputnik VII will shortly
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411.04
re-enter the atmosphere and burn up, probably in about
a week.
Sputnik VII is probably the latest in the series of heavy
Soviet satellites in the Soviet man-in-space program. This
series began with Sputnik IV, which was launched on 15 May
1960 and which the Soviets subsequently tried but failed to de-
orbit. The second successful launch in this series was Sput-
nik V on 19 August 1960. Sputnik V carried a capsule con-
taining two dogs and other biological specimens which was
successfully recovered after being in orbit about 24 hours.
The Sputnik V launching followed a launching on 24 July which
resulted in an in-flight failure but which is believed to have
been of an earth satellite vehicle, possibly part of this same
series.
On 1 December 1960, Sputnik VI was successfully launched,
but due to some degree of failure during re-entry, only frag-
ments of the capsule,which was carrying dogs, are believed to
have reached the earth the following day. On 22 December,
another attempt to orbit an earth satellite vehicle failed, but
part or all of the payload is believed to have been recovered
by the Soviets after an 1.800-mile flight.
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Khrushchev May Attend UN Session
Since the US election, Soviet bloc sources have en-
couraged speculation that Khrushchev would use the UN
as a forum for establishing contact with President Ken-
nedy. Last September, Khrushchev put forward a pro-
posal for a special session of the UN General Assembly
in the spring of 1961 to be attended by heads of govern-
ment for a discussion of disarmament. The Soviet del-
egation attempted to clear the way for such a session by
pressing for an early resumption of the assembly after
the holiday recess in order to complete work on all items
except disarmament, which would then be considered by
the heads of government. Although Foreign Minister
Gromyko reiterated this proposal for a special meeting
in his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet on 23
December, bloc propaganda has not stressed the idea. In-
stead, Soviet spokesmen have indicatedr that
Khrushchev would return to New York for e resumption
of the assembly and would expect to meet with the Pres-
ident.
An Izvestia correspondent sufflYPStPC1 this nrnficallire.
although such a meeting could be confined to a general dis-
cussion, the two leaders might reach agreement to resume
negotiations on Berlin; Shortly before the inauguration, the
Soviet military attache in Turkey stressed to his American
counterpart the need for an early meeting between the Pres-
ident and Khrushcev. About the R2111P fitYtC77
Khru-
shchev and the satellite leaders wlllnrobablvreturn to
New York. Soviet of-
ficials did r exuuae a meeting between Khrushchev and
the President.
Khrushchev's apparent desire to establish early contact
with the President was also reflected in hisP lconver-
sations with Western diplomats at the end ohieith,er and
in early January. He made it clear, however, that his main
purpose would be to lay the groundwork for a four-power
summit meeting. While leaving open the possibility of his
attendance at the UN, the Soviet leader may wish to avoid
a firm commitment to return to New York until he has had
more time to estimate the position of the new ITS administra-
tion on specific East-West issues.
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The Situation in Laos
C-Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces are reported to be mov-
ing eastward along Route 7 leading to the Plaine des
Jarres following their withdrawal from the junction of
this road with Route 13. Artillery fire probably was a
major factor in the government's retaking of this point. �
Some consolidation presumably will be necessary before
General Phoumi's forces can press their apparent advan-
tage0 govern-
ment troops to "push on as far as possible toward Muong
Soui" after Phou Khoun was occupied, leaving some troops
there and at Muong Kassy to the south to guard against pos-
sible enemy counterattacks.
aubstantial numbers of Kong Le/Pathet Lao troops con-
tinue to block the southern approaches to the Plaine des
Jarres area in the vicinity of Ban Ta Viang, and the gov-
ernment airstrip at Tha Thom has recently, been reported
to be under sporadic shelling by 120-mm. mortars.
C-Soviet IL-14s based in Hanoi continue to conduct supply
flights into the Xieng Khouang area.
Soviet LI-2s be-
gan to fly supply missions into Laos on2 February. Eighteen
of these aircraft arrived in North Vietnam in mid-January
and have been engaged in shuttle flights between Haiphong
and Hanoi. The 11-2 is similar to the US C-47 and has a
slightly smaller cargo-carrying capacity than the IL-14.
[-General I Fu-en, chief of staff for intelligence of the
Chinese Nationalist Air Force, has said that the irregulars
In the Burma-Laos border area have had long and excellent
contacts with Laotian officials in the district adjacent to the
Mekong River and in Vientiane,
The general claimed that Phoumi Nosavan
was not only friendly toward Taiwan but would be delighted
if the Nationalist troops, pretending to be Laotians, caused
e
the Pathet Lao trouble. He reportedly planned to leavD
6 Feb 61
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LAOS
6 FEBRUARY 1961
Government forces
Government
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fit Antigovernment cencenrrations
In /RR* Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces
A
Main route number
Road
Trail
Chinese Nationalist Irregulars
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Mode rem, red by th� U.S. Government
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(-Taiwan for Bangkok and Vientiane on 2 February to pro=
mote closer ties with Phoumi in Vientiane:7
CAccording to one report, Chinese Communist troops
supported the Burmese attack on the irregulars at Keng
Lap and Mong Pa Liao but have withdrawn from the area
and are returning to China. Peiping has made no public
reference to the fact that Chinese troops have been in-
volved in action against the irregulars, but the New China
News Agency (NCNA) reported on 4 February that irregu-
lar forces had withdrawninto Laos following clashes with
the Burmese Army. The NCNA dispatch cited Hong Kong
press reports to the effect that the irregulars, under Tai-
pei's direction, plan to join the Bourn Oum government and
fight against the Pathet Lao. Peiping could use the move-
ment of irregulars into Laos as a pretext for more open
intervention there but would be unlikely to do so at least
until" the irregulars become actively engaged in the fight-
ing._
_ [In Vientiane, former Premier Phoui Sananikone is re-
ported anxious to undertake the formation of a more broad-
ly based government under, certain conditions. According
to one version, these conditions include approval of the Boun
Oum government and the United States, participation of Sou-
vanna Phouma, and acceptance of Pathet Lao representatives
into the government at some future date. Phoui was forced
out of office in late December 1959 as the result of pressure
by the army, the King, and General Phoumi's now moribund
Committee for Defense of National Interests. As a leader of
the moderate, old-guard politicians in Laos, Phoui is prob-
ably hopeful that he can emerge as a compromise premier in
a broadened government. However, the group he represents
has progressively lost ground to extremist forces of both right
and left:3
[There are rumblings of discontent in the Laotian mil-
itary establishment. Numerous ranking officers have been
shunted off to relatively unimportant positions during the
course of General Phoumi's purge of those officers who fai1 ed
to demonstrate unswerving loyalty to him during the period)
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4taur 'WO
C thi6 fall when he was in opposition in Savannakhet to the
Souvanna Phouma government. Many of those whose
careers are now suffering as the result of Phoumits shake-
up come from the north and resent the disproportionate in-
fluence enjoyed by PhoumPs and Boun Oum's southern fol-
lowers.
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Situation in the Congo
LThe American interest in promoting a new approach
to the Congo is meeting with general approval from many
UN delegates. Latin American and Scandanavian represent-
atives consulted have expressed general agreement, a UK
delegate has recommended to London that the approach be
supported, and the UAR representative has characterized
It as a "step in the right directionr_I
ThP French position is unclear.
Paris probably
would cooperate, but at the meeting in rang last week of the
foreign ministers of the Community of Six, the French for-
eign minister was quoted by his Belgian counterpart that
the "UN effort had failed" and that France was considering
extending "bilateral military and other assistance on an ade-
quate scale to Kasavubu and his supporters73
[Most representatives of the neutralist Afro-Asian bloc
in the UN have stressed the need for Lumumba's release at
an early stage and indicated that they would tolerate Bel-
gium's continued presence in the Congo only under strict UN
contro1:3
__{Th 't ti confused.iva onin aan aconmues o e
negotiations between representatives of the Leopoiaviiie and
Katanga governments to form a common military front a-
gainst the Gizenga regime had collapsed. Tshombe, after
rejecting Kasavubu's final offer, announced his refusal to
send a delegation to the round-talle talks scheduled for 15
February. since further approaches
to Tshombe would prove useless, the Leopoldville govern-
ment probably would eventually renew its attempt to elim-
inate Tshombe by armed attack)
Ctshombe, however, may believe that his regime will
benefit more from Belgian�and possibly French--support
than by becoming involved with the distant Leopoldville)
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_ pm%
A don tic
Ocean
Brazzaville
Leopoldville
Matadi .ThY"ille
Luanda
�Gemena
Coquilhatville
6 FEBRUARY 1961
UNCLASSIFIED
STATUTE MILES ,
/Pas.oko
Port Francqui
Luluabour;
31534
Luputa
the Congo
Stanleyville
Bakwanga
.Kamina
Kindu
Bukavu
Kongolo
Albertville
Manono
Elisabethville
Lake
Albert
Usumbura
Lake
Tanganyika
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tPtid **00
(f. orces. Hammarskjold implied to Ambassador Stevenson
on 2 February that Belgian supply efforts to Katanga were
of greater magnitude than those to Stanlevvilie hv thp TTAR
and the bloc.
Ha,mmarskjole. bdIU U1N personnel nag observed three Belgian
officers aboard the aircraft which bombed Manono last week
and had seized at least one crate of arms on a Belgian air-
craft which landed at Kitona on 1 February. Five other crates
carried by the ail-craft are to be inspected, -E--gaielj
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CONFIDENTIAL
South Korean Problems
Since his election by a bare� legislative majority last
August, Prime Minister Chang Myon has gradually con-
solidated power by easing factional opponents from the
ruling Democratic party and the government, and has in-
creased his support in the 233-member lower house from
118 to 127 seats. Although internal maneuvering against
Chang is likely to continue, the new cabinet appointments
are aimed at resoring party harmony and securing the pas-
sage of the supplementary budget later this month.
The public has been willing to reserve judgment until
Chang has had an opportunity to prove himself. However,
there are signs of growing impatience with the failure of
the administration to satisfy the expectations generated by
the April revolution against Syngman Rhee. An increasing
number of South Koreans are coming to believe that only
unification will solve their economic problems.
South Korea, which has over two thirds of the Korean
population but few basic resources, is dependent on the
United States for more than 50 percent of its budget and
about 90 percent of its imports. Cut off from the Commu-
nist-controlled industrial North and saddled with a huge de-
fense burden, South Korea is unlikely to achieve a viable
economy soon.
The Chang government, aware of the dangers, has un-
dertaken a series of economic reforms. The effect of these,
however, is undermined by factionalism within his party and
irresponsible opposition attacks. Unless the administration
can win wide public confidence before spring, when food will
be in even shorter supply, students and others may again
take to the streets. In the event of large-scale disorders,
the army may not react with the same restraint and unity it
displayed last April.
-QON1DfNTtt
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Tension Over South Tirol Issue
After years of inconclusive negotiation regarding
Italian implementation of the Italo-Austrian pact of 1946--
providing special rights for the inhabitants of the former
Austrian South Tirol--Austria brought the issue to the UN
General Assembly last fall. In line with a UN recommen-
dation, the two countries undertook new and high-level ne-
gotiations on 26 January, but the talks broke down after
two days. Italy had offered greater administrative powers
for Bolzano Province--the heart of the German-speaking
area�but Austria had insisted on a kind of local autonomy
similar to that of the Italian region of Sicily. This would
have required legislative changes.
CAn Italian delegate who participated in the abortive
talks has told US officials that Rome is in "no hurry" to
admit that further talks "are hopeless." The government
apparently intends to maintain a public posture of holding
the door open for further talks while maintaining the status
quo in the area
Eif the Liberal party--which fears Premier Fanfani will
form a center-left reformist government dependent on Nenni
Socialist parliamentary support�withdraws from the coalition
that supports Fanfani's minority all - Christian Democratic
cabinet, the government will be brought down. Discussing
the general outlook for the government a few days ago, the
secretary of the Christian Democratic party said the situa-
tion has become unstable. Although hopeful of saving the
government, he spoke of its continued existence in terms of
months and weeks-7,3
The neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement, with its pres-
tige revived as a result of having been the sole parliamentary
supporter of the Tambroni Christian Democratic government
last year, is trying to exploit the situation. The neo-Fascists
may provoke further anti-Austrian demonstrations in Rome
and probably, hope that new clashes will occur in the South Tirol
which will require disciplinary measures and draw Italian troops
to the area.
-9EeRET
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11141!' �SECRET
Thp Dominican Republic's Economic Situation
The 24 January decree naming Generalissimo Tru-
jillo "P resident of the State Banks" and coordinator of a
wide range of institutions dealing with most phases of
the countr 's econo
reports
that the dictator's financial manipulations had
brought the regime to the point of bankriinte70 On 27 Jan-.
uary, a cabinet
minister said that there were virtually no funds left to
run the government.
Trujillo's tightened control over the country's econ-
omy will enable him better to cover up his recent depreda-
tions and mismanagement and to continue to siphon off the
country's wealth. During the past 30 years he has amassed
a fortune estimated at between $500,000,000 and $800,000,-
000 and gained personal control over a large portion of the
country's agricultural and industrial enterprises. Over the
past 13 years all but one of the top officials of the Central
Bank have been denigrated and made scapegoats for the gov-
ernment's economic and financial decline.
Few knowledgeable Dominicans interpret Trujillo's fi-
nancial moves as evidence that he is preparing to flee the
country soon--though provision for such a possibility is one
of the motives for hitaransferring large amounts of assets
abroad. In fact, Trujillo's present political activities--such
as his campaign to pressure the Catholic Church into con-
ferring on him the title of Benefactor of the Catholic Church--
suggests that he feels confident of his position.
The controlled press and radio claim to see reason for
hope that the new US administration will reverse the previ-
ous one's "disastrous" policy of joining in the OAS' diplo-
matic and economic sanctions against the Dominican Repub-
lic. Trujillo's lobbyists in the United States have been ac-
tively promoting the contention that recent US policies have
been pushing the country toward the Sino-Soviet bloc--a con-
tention that the vindictive Trujillo has himself attempted to
prove by instructing his propaganda media to engage in
SECRET
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'sae' SECRET
pre-Castro and pro-Soviet diatribes and by actively
seeking political and economic ties with the Soviet bloc.
Trujillo's main hope of early improvement in the
economic situation lies in the sugar crop now being har-
vested and in the maintenance of existing legislative ar-
rangements governing its marketing in the United States.
Under a law which expires on 31 March, the Dominican
Republic obtains more than 200,000 tons of the former
Cuban sugar quota with its premium of more than 2.5 cents
per pound over the world price, in addition to the same pre-
mium on the long-standing Dominican sugar quota.
US officials in Ciudad Trujillo report that both the re-
gime and the dissident elements view congressional action
on the "windfall quota" as the critical test of US policy to-
ward Trujillo, and that the reaction of the dissidents will
be strongly adverse to the US if the "windfall" is continued.
Trujillo has met with at least preliminary success in
his effort to circumvent the embargo on sales of petroleum,
petroleum products, trucks, and truck spare parts to the
Dominican Republic voted by the OAS on 4 January. Oil
companies operating in the country have assured him that
they can prob e obtained in Europe, though perhaps at
higher prices.
SECRET
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Sr'
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman,* The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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-GONFIDENTIA-t-
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188
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