CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000187
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 4, 1961

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4 February 1961
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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4 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: Earth satellite launched from Tyura Tam Mis-
sile Test Range. (Page t)
2.
Congo: Soviet bloc continues attempts to transit
Sudan with "Red Cross aid" for Gizenga.
(1,42ge t)
3. Albania: Peiping emphasizes its "inviolable" friend-
ship with Tirana while rest of bloc criticizes Al-
bania's "deviationism." (Page t)
4. Tunisia: Negotiations under way for Soviet assist-
ance on public works projects. (Page tt)
5. Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike,
plans visit to USSR in March. (Page tt)
6. Portugal: Some former supporters of Salazar advo-
cate his replacement in wake of Santa Maria affair.
(Page tit)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 February 1961
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*USSR: An earth satellite was launched from the Tyura
Tam giggle Test Range at about 2015 EST yesterday. The
� period of revolution, apparently about BB minutes, indicates
a low altitude orbit, and present evidence suggests this
satellite will be recovered soon, probably this weekend.
It is considered likely that a satellite larger than Sputniks
IV, V and VI, which weighed in the neighborhood of 10,000
pounds, is involved. While such a satellite is probably part
of the Russian man-in-space program there is no basis for
concluding at this time that man or animal life is on board.
`1)
*Congo:a representative of Czechoslovak Airlines (CSA)
reportedly made preliminary arrangements on 31 January
with the Sudanese Government for establishment of CSA pas-
senger and cargo services from Prague to Khartoum via Cairo.
CSA hopes to continue the line to Stanleyville-.1
the Stanleyville regime expects a Czech
flight via Khartoum between 6 and 15 February, as part of the
Czech "Red Cross aid." The Sudan can probably stall in grant-
ing transit rights for permanent service, but may find it diffi-
rnir tn refuse transit of an alle7d1v humanitarian mission.
�ththCzech and the Soviet requests
of late January to transit the Sudan with food and medical sup-
plies for pro-Lumumba areas of the Congo may be part of a
plan to circumvent Sudanese refusal to grant transit of direct
aid to Gizenga. /
utiimunist unina' - Alban a In ecintraSt1Ot1Te oviet Un
ion and East European satellites, which have publicly shown
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their displeasure with Albania's "deviationism" since the Mos-
cow conference last November, Communist China continues
to play up the "inviolable" friendship between Peiping and Ti-
rana. On 2 February, Peiping announced the signing of six
documents concerned with economic relations negotiated dur-
ing the current visit to Peiping of an Albanian delegation.
Details of the agreements have not yet become available, but
a new Chinese loan to Albania may be involved. In discussing
the agreements, the Peiping People's Daily on 3 February,
In an apparent jibe at Moscow, emphasized the correctness
of the statement in the Moscow declaration of last November
that socialist countries "big and SYnn"" hnuP PrInAl rights
and should "support each other." (Backup,
Page 1)
*Tunisia - USSR: President Bourguiba is negotiating for k
Soviet credits for public works projects in Tunisia. Bourguiba cultic-)
has been unable to procure enough credits from Western sourcer,,/
to carry out his ambitious development program. This step is �
part of an adjustment of Tunisian policy intended to make it ap-
pear more consonant with Asian-African nonalignment. Two
Tunisian engineers went to Moscow this week to work out details
of an agreement in principle made with the USSR in January to
grant credits for the construction of three small dams in north-
ern Tunisia and to finance an engineering school. This is the
second Tunisian credit arrangement with the Soviet bloc; late
last year Tunis arranged for an eight-year $8,000,000 credit
from Poland, none of which has as yet been used. (CONFI-
(Backup, Page 3)
*Ceylon: Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government
continues to encourage closer economic and diplomatic
contacts with the bloc. The six-month-old government
under Mrs. Bandaranaike is motivated primarily by an
urge to demonstrate its neutralist position, while at the
same time profiting from favorable trade and aid terms
offered by the bloc. In addition to encouraging more ac-
tive Soviet participation in development projects and "di-
versifying" Ceylon's trade by allowing bloc countries a
4 Feb 61
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larger--though still limited�share, Colombo has fre-
quently taken positions favorable to the bloc on major in-
ternational issues, particularly in its role as a current
member of the UN Security Council. Mrs. Bandaranaike
plans to visit the USSR in March after the Common-
wealth prime ministers' conference in London--her
first official trip abroad and the first visit tn Mnsenur
by a Ceylonese head of Government.
(Backup, Page 5)
'03ortugal: Some of Premier Salazar's stanchest
supporters are reported to be shocked by his inability
to cope with the situation produced bY the seizure of
the Santa Maria and to have stated that he
ust be replaced at some time in the "not too distant
uture." No precipitate action is likely, but the various
actions within the regime will probably make an early
attempt to reach agreement among themselves regard-
ing a successor. (Backup, Page 7)
4 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF lii
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New Economic Agreements Reaffirm Sino-
Albanian Friendship
The Albanian regime, which supported Communist
China in its dispute with Moscow, has been under fire
from the Soviet bloc since the end of the Moscow confer-
ence in early December. East German party boss Ul=
bricht on 18 December publicly accused Albania's Enver
Hoxha of adhering to "dogmatic and sectarian" positions
at the conference. This is the first such censure since
the 1948 break with Tito. Other European satellites and
the USSR also have slighted the Albanians on a number of
occasions. Moscow's New Year's greetings to Albania
omitted the usual introductory phase "dear comrades,"
� and its 11 January greetings on the anniversary of the
proclamation of the "people's regime" in Albania, ad-
dressed only to titular head of state Lleshi, mentioned
only the Albanian people and not the party. On the same
day, an article in the leading Bulgarian daily about Al-
bania omitted the customary title "comrade" when speak-
ing of Hoxlia.
Tirana, however, has continued to hold to its devia-
tionist positions, probably in large part because of its
expectation of continued Chinese Communist support. In
contrast with Soviet bloc treatment of Albania, Peiping in
its 3 February editorial on the recently signed Sino=
Albanian economic agreements, lauded the Albanian re=
gime. It spoke of "the correct leadership of the Albanian
Workers' (Communist) party headed by Comrade Enver
Hoxha."
Peiping, hoping to retain Albania's support, would prob-
ably be willing to give Albania some additional aid despite
serious economic troubles at home. Between 1954 and 1958
Peiping granted about $20,000,000 in economic aid to Albania
to finance deliveries of Chinese goods and services. Under
an agreement concluded in 1959, the Chinese extended another
$13,800,000 credit to Albania for use between 1961 and 1965.
The series of new economic pacts just concluded in Peiping
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10111101 /*S
probably has altered the terms of this agreement by boost-
ing the total amount of aid.
The most notable example of Chinese economic support
to Albania during recent months has been the shipment of
wheat at a time of critical food shortages in China. In 1960
these exports to Albania totaled about 105,000 tons, only a
small part of which came from China, and the rest from
Western Europe, Australia, and the USSR; all of it was
shipped at the expense of the Chinese, however. Albania
also is receiving at least 40,000 tons of the wheat Peiping
currently is purchasing from Australia and additionaLde-
liveries probably will continue throughout the yearLJ
-ArRET,
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Tunisia Explores Soviet Credit for Public
Works Project
President Bourguiba's dispatch of two technicians
to Moscow is in line with the gradual expansion of
Tunisia's contacts with the Sino-Soviet bloc as well
as with Bourguiba's policy of nonalignment. Within
the past year, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR
have established embassies in Tunis; a Tunisian am-
bassador accredited also to Czechoslovakia and Poland
has taken up residence in Moscow; several Tunisian
secretaries of state have visited bloc capitals; and 32
Czech and Bulgarian technicians have been employed
under contract by the Secretariat of State for Public
Works. Moreover, Secretary of State for Information
Masmoudi is scheduled to visit Peiping later this month,
presumably as a prelude to Tunisian recognition of Com-
munist China.
These contacts have to some extent silenced Bour=
guiba's domestic critics, who had argued that his former
pro-Western alignment was hampering Tunisia's internal
development and its development as a power. Bourguiba's
long-standing quarrel with UAR President Nasir and his
recent difficulties with Moroccan King Mohamed V have
contributed toward the diplomatic isolation from which
Bourguiba is seeking to escape.
The American Embassy in Tunis estimates that the
projected three small dams located on streams in north=
ern Tunisia might involve foreign exchange costs of about
$6,000,000. The estimated construction cost of all three
is nearly $13,000,000. The Defense Loan Fund apparently
had been approached for financing one of these dams, the
Oued Kessab project.
one of the Tunisian tech-
nicians en route to Moscow plans to ascertain the nature of
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Soviet assistance to train junior engineers. Although
discussions have been held between the Soviet Embassy
in Tunis and the Tunisian Secretariat of State for For-
eign Affairs regarding an engineering school, these plans
remain vague. Present planning for a projected university
In Tunis envisages an American contribution of some
$2,000,000 over the next four years to a School of Law,
Economics, and Business. As of March 1960, the Tuni-
sians anticipated that France might contribute a faculty
of sciences.
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*40
� Ceylon Encourages Relations With the Sino-
Soviet Bloc
The cordial relations established under the leader-
ship of Mrs. Bandaranaike's husband, who was prime
minister from 1956 until his assassination in 1959, have
been revived during her six months in office. Work on
development projects contracted for under the Soviet Un-
ion's $30,000,000 credit of 1958 is being stepped up. Six
Soviet experts arrived on 25 January to resume work on
plans for the construction of an iron and steel mill near
Colombo. Soviet engineers have also presented the Cey-
lonese with preliminary plans for a flood-control scheme
and an automobile tire and tube factory to be partially fi-
nanced by Moscow.
The Ceylonese finance minister, who plans to accom-
pany Prime Minister Bandaranaike on her London-Moscow-
Cairo trip, probably will discuss other projects available
under the credit agreement as well as recent Soviet offers
of civil aircraft, pilot training, and refined petroleum
products. Moscow has offered petroleum products at
prices considerably below those of the Anglo-American
consortium, which is the sole local importer and dis-
tributor of these products.
Colombo's attempt to equalize its economic relations
with the Communist bloc and the free world has resulted
in new trade negotiations with various Communist govern-
ments. Since last December, 'Ceylon has contracted for a
total of 79,000 tons of sugar�chiefly of Cuban origin--from
Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the USSR;
Ceylon in the past has relied on free-world sources for
most of the 150,000 tons of sugar required annually. The
government may also be considering the proposal made
recently by a visiting East German trade union delegation
for a trade agreement; Ceylon now has neither diplomatic
nor formal trade relations with East Germany. A trade
pact probably would be encouraged by the leftist minister
of trade.
Negotiations between Ceylon and Communist China con-
cerning this year's protocol to their second five-year rice-
-GaisiRDENT-f-A-t,
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rubber barter agreement (1958-62), apparently are not
final. It seems likely, however, that the substantially
higher level of rice-rubber trade which existed prior to
1Qfl will e resumed under the 1961 contract.
7CONFIVEN1TAL--
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Impact of the Santa Maria Case on the Salaza,f Regime
he Santa Maria incident has placed Portuguese Pre-
mier Salazar in an unfavorable light in the eyes of some
strong supporters who had expected vigorous guidance in
directing governmental action. Salazar, who is almost 72,
reportedly has lost physical and mental vigor since his
early January attack of pneumonia. Since the end of 1958,
some of his supporters have believed he has outlived his
usefulness. Barring a turn for the worse in Portugal's re-
lations with Brazil or unrest of threatening proportions in
the African provinces, current dissatisfaction on the part
of Salazar's supporters may, however, die down in the
next few weeks. Furthermore, there appears to be no one
in sight who, in the opinion of the various factions of the
regime, could attract general support and carry through
a viable successor governmerit.3
Among possible successors, Minister of the Presi-
den y Theotonio Pereira is perhaps the leading contender,
although the attitude of the armed forces toward him is not
at prernt elPar, Others are Defense Minister Botelho
Moniz
and former Min-
ister of the Presidency marcelio Laetamo, who is probably
the most capable politician among the top proregirne civil-
ians.
e irritation shown by top-level Portuguese officials
over the US position on the Santa Maria is likely to per-
sist. The Portuguese still resent the US abstention on the
UN resolution calling on Portugal to give information on
non = self-governing territories. These factors are likely
�to cause tougher bargaining on the extension of the
bases agreement, which expires in December 1962.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman,' The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary. of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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