CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000186
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 3, 1961

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3 February 1961
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CEVTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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3 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
USSR: Launching on Tyura Tam Missile Test
Range yesterday results in in-flight failure.
(Page t)
2. Laos: Souvanna Phourna appoints "acting pre-
mier" of his "government" in rebel-held Xieng
, Khouang. (Page i)
3. Chinese UN Representation: Peiping's supporters
may attempt to reopen the moratorium issue at UN
General Assembly reconvening in March. (Page ii)
4. Congo: Gizenga suggests to Nasir that arms aid
from UAR transit Sudan� under guise of "humani-
tarian assistance." page it)
5. Iraq: Several reports indicate recent shipment of
Soviet arms included MIG-19 jet fighters. (Page tti)
6. Arab League: Tunisia, Iraq, and Jordan are at-
tempting in current league meeting to curtail
Nasir's influence. (Page iit)
Ethiopia: Haile Selassie delays naming new gov-
ernment; appears more concerned with pressing
charges against the rebels. (Page tv)
8. Bolivia: President Paz Estenssoro believes ac-
ceptance of bloc aid will not endanger further aid
from US. Page iv)
9. Venezuela: Army units alerted against possible ac-
tion by rightist Venezuelan exiles in Colombian bor-
der areas. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*USSR:1 test vehicle was launched on the Tyura Tam
Missile Test Range yesterday at about 1400 EST and failed in
flight a few minutes thereafter. It is not yet known whether
the launching involved a test ICBM or a vehicle associated
with the Soviet space program. The launchine from Tvura
Tam and subsequent failure were confirmed
A test failure is also indicated
terday's launching
activity, involving the entire Tyura Tam range complex
and Soviet tracking sites, as well as the four Sibir-class
missile-range instrumentation ships in the Pacific. These
four ships, however, which since mid-January have main-
tained positions in the Pacific similar to those assumed for
the space-related activities in the fall of 1960, did not partici-
pate in the last eight hours of the operation yesterday. This would
suggest that the vehicle launched may have been a test ICBM
intended for impact on the 'Kamchatka Peninsula, similar to the
test ICBM launched successfully to Kamchatka on 13 January.
Nevertheless, part of the protracted activity which preceded
yesterday's launch indicated space-vehicle preparations, and we
still look for a major test in the Soviet space Drogram to be
attempted in the near future-7
Laos: Souvanna Phouma has designated Khamsouk
Keola, who is in rebel-held Xieng Khouang, to be "act-
ing premier, "according to a Pathet Lao radio announce-
ment of 2 February. Souvanna is alleged to have named
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two other members of his "government"--Quinim Phol-
sena and Tiao Sisoumang�to assist Khamsouk in carry-
ing out the responsibilities of the "lawful government of
Laos." The broadcast asserted that Souvanna himself
would return to Laos in the "near future" to "resume his
administration of domestic affairs."
Communist China's foreign minister told a Peiping
rally on 2 February that aid would be given the "lawful
Laotian government" of Souvanna Phouma if it were re-
quested. (Backup, Page 1)
Chinese UN Representation: UNIationalist China's po-
sition in the United Nations is becoming increasingly
precarious. Taipei suffered some of its worst setbacks
during the first half of the 15th UN General Assembly.
Although the assembly in October decided to shelve the
question of Chinese UN representation for the duration
of the session, it did so by the slimmest margin Taipei
has received since 1951. In addition, for the first time
Nationalist China will almost certainly lose its seat on
the UN Economic and Social Council, although the five
permanent members of the Security Council have tradi-
tionally been re-elected when their three-year terms ex-
pire. Nationalist China may also lose its right to vote un-
less it makes a payment of more than $1, 000,000 toward
its overdue assessments before the assembly resumes.
Although it is difficult to overrule a previous decision
of the assembly, all these factors may encourage
some of Peiping's supporters to reopen the issue of
Chinese UN representation at the General 4sscrnb1
session scheduled to resume on 7 MarcE
(Backup, Page 3)
Congo: he preliminary round-table conference
of Congolese factions at Leopoldville is proceeding
fairly well, in part because of prodding by the Ni erian
chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission,
Recognizing
3 Feb 61
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ahe difficulty of disarming rival Congolese factions
particularly Tshombes force in Katanga,
neutralization might be achieve
by putting the Congolese troops in camps and initiating
a program of retraining an at-
tempt at the Security Council to seek a new mandate
would risk a Soviet veto, and reports that Hammarskjold
has indicated he is prepared to begin Congolese troop neu-
traization without a new mandate:i
Gizenga in Stanleyville has answered Nasir's recent mes-
sage of willingness to furnish supplies if the Sudan's per-
mission for transit rights could be obtained. Gizenga
suggested that arms be sent in the guise of "humanitarian
assistance." He also reiterated his warning that the sit-
uation in the Congo was "more than grave" because of the
"imperialists" efforts to unite the forces of Mobutu,
Tshombe, and Kalonji for an attack on the Stanleyville
regime. Gizenga stated that without assistance hispo-
sition would become untenable within two weeks.
(Backup, Page 4)
USSR-Iraq: Several reports indicate that a recent
shipment of Soviet arms to Iraq included 12 to 16 crates
containing MIG49 jet fighters. If confirmed, this would
be the first delivery of these high-performance aircraft
to a nonbloc country. Although the aircraft have not yet
been positively identified,
If such aircraft have been shipped to Iraq, it
is likely that a similar shipment has been, or soon will
be, made to the UAR. Both countries have been seeking
MIG-19s, and Moscow has conducted training courses in
the USSR for Iraqi and UAR personnel on this type of air-
craft. (Backup, Page 6)
Arab League: The Arab League foreign ministers be-
gan meeting in Baghdad on 30 January with the represent-
atives of all ten league members present for the first time
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in nearly three years. Tunisian participation in the meet-
ings, ending the boycott imposed by Bourguiba in 1958, ap-
pears to be part of an effort by Tunisia, Iraq, and Jordan
to make the league more effective and less of an exclusive
instrument of UAR President Nasir's policies. Nasir, how-
ever, holds important advantages in any contest for influ-
ence in the league. His more strident anti-Western prop-
aganda has greater popular appeal in the other Arab states,
while the league's secretariat is located in Cairo, subject
to all the direct and indirect influences the UAR leader can
bring to bear. Most other Arab leaders will almost certain-
ly feel compelled to echo Nasir's strong propaganda attacks
on Western policies, especially concerning Algeria, Congo,
and Israel, regardless of their differences with Nasir and
their real attitudes on these questions.
(Backup, Page 7)
Ethiopia: The political situation in Ethiopia appears to
be deteriorating further as Emperor Haile Selassie continues
to delay naming a new government. The Emperor, preoccu-
pied with security matters in the seven weeks following the
abortive coup, has concerned himself more with pressing
charges against those who participated in or sympathized
with the revolt than in reconstructing the government or in
attempting to alleviate the conditions which caused the up-
rising. The American ambassador believes new disorders
could break out in Addis Ababa if the military tribunal,
which is reported ready to begin proceedings against the
popular r Menghistu Neway, imposes the death
sentence. (Backup, Page 8)
Bolivia: '.'resident Paz Estenssoro believes that accept-
ance of Soviet bloc economic aid will not endanger the US
grant-aid program which makes up a substantial part of Bo-
livia's domestic budget, according to American Ambassador
Strom. Strom states that although Paz is aware the blo_cj
3 Feb 61
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Gray score politically in Latin America through contributing
"show" projects for Bolivia, Paz feels no obligation to im-
pede such a development. A Bolivian economic mission will
probably leave for the Soviet bloc on 1 March to explore a
Soviet offer of a $150,000, 000 credit.
(Backup, Page 9)
Venezuela:
army units along the Colombian frontier have
been alerted against action by Venezuelan exiles--who are
krinwn to he riehtist tPlotters--in the border area.
the Venezuelan Government nas con-
firmed reports of a "collo (-Petal. which can occur any time
from today onward." President Betan-
court has been concerned since November with evidence of
plotting by rightists who apparently have the support of Do-
minican dictator Trujillo. (Backup, Page 10)
SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
AND ESTIMATES
(Available During the Preceding Week)
Ethiopian Prospects After the Abortive f Decem-
ber 1960. SNIE 76.1-61. 24 January 1961.
Supplements NIE 76-60.
3 Feb 61
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Situation in Laos
Arrangements for the designation of an acting
premier under Souvanna Phouma were presumably
made during the course of a recent visit to Phnom
Penh by Phoumi Vongvichit, an influential Pathet Lao
leader. Tonflicting versions be-
tween the Pathet Lao leader and Souvanna have been
received, Souvanna
agreed to return shortly to rebel-held territory in Lao!)
His return would considerably buttress claims by Com-
munist countries that they are supporting the legal gov-
ernment of Laos, as well as improve this "government's"
competitive position for equal status with the Boun Oum
government in any negotiations which might take place on
the Laotian crisis.
Meanwhile, the arrival of Khamsouk and Sisoumang
in Xieng Khouang will give greater substance to the hith-
erto rather shadowy "lawful government of Laos," for
which Quinim had been the sole spokesman. Khamsouk,
the new "acting premier," had been minister of health in
the Souvanna government, and was identified with Quinim's
left-wing faction in the cabinet. He is 52 years old and is
a locally trained doctor, the equivalent of a medical tech-
nician. In early December, Khamsouk fled to Rangoon at
the same time Souvanna took refuge in Phnom Penh. He
and his party returned to Xieng Khouang by way of Kunming
and Hanoi. Sisoumang was a secretary of state in the Sou-
vanna cabinet and was also identified with the Quinim faction.
Sisoumang is a nephew of Souvanna and a son of the elder
brother of the late King Sisavang Vong. He fought against
the Viet Minh in their 1953=54 invasions of Laos and was
captured by the Pathet Lao in 1954, remaining with them until
the unification agreements of November 1957. Quinim will
serve in the Xieng Khouang "government" as minister of de-
fense, foreign affairs, and finance; and Sisoumang as min-
ister of social affairs, economy and interior.
Without encouraging any Laotian appeal for Chinese "vol-
unteers," Communist China's Foreign Minister. Chen Yi never-
theless has implied that the Chinese are prepared to step up
3 Feb 61
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the scale of bloc assistance to pro-Communist forcea in
Laos. Souvanna, so far as is known, has never formally
asked for Chinese aid. The ex-premier has expressed his
interest in "friendly relations" with the Chinese and was
planning a trip to Communist China before he fled to Cam-
bodia.
The two Soviet AN-12s which arrived in Peiping on
1 February left for the USSR as scheduled on 2 February.
They are presumably en route to their home base in the
Moscow area, from which they departed on 24 January.
Airlift operations into Laos continue to be scheduled
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Chinese UN Representation: Taipei's UN
Position Precarious
_ffhile a majority of UN Members have supported
the moratorium on Chinese UN representation since 1951,
it has been evident since 1955 that Taipei would not be able
to muster the necessary two-thirds majority vote to sus-
tain its position if its right to the China seat were formally
questioned on a substantive vote. The 15th UN General As-
sembly on 8 October "decided not to consider" the question,
but only 42 members supported the resolution, while 34 op-
posed it and 22 members�mostly African--abstained. Fol-
lowing the balloting, various African delegates made state-
ments indicating that the abstentions were grudgingly given
and would not be repeated in the future. Many supporters of
the moratorium agreed that it could not be upheld at any fu-
ture session. One of these, the government of Pakistan, has
recently asked the US Embassy in Karachi whether the United
States would be prepared in the future to have its allies "fol-
low their own conscience" on the question or whether it con-
siders support of the moratorium a test of friendship with
the United State/
aTationalist China, considerably in arrears in paying its
assessed dues, would find it difficult to get the assembly to
grant an exception which would enable it to retain its vote at
the resumed 15th session. The UN Charter does provide that
the General Assembly may permit a defaulting member to vote
if failure to pay is due to "conditions beyond the control of the
member:9
Nationalist China faces another critical vote when the
World Health Organization convenes in New Delhi on 7 Feb-
ruary. If Peiping's supporters--encouraged by� Taipei's pre-
carious UN position--succeed in unseating Taipei, this will
be the first time Communist China has been formally admitted
to an international organization affiliated with the United Na-
tion
CONFIDENTIAL
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Situation in the Congo
Neutralization of rival Congolese factions may prove
impossible in view of the current reduction in UN troop
strength and the opposition which could be expected from
each major Congolese faction. The Leopoldville govern-
ment would refuse to disarm its troops until all other
Congolese forces had been neutralized, The Gizenga re-
gime in Stanleyville would not abandon its military efforts
unless assured of political dominance.
President Tshombe of Katanga, who has concluded
a military accord with Albert Kalonji of the South Kasai
mining state, is likely to prove at least as recalcitrant as
Kasavubu and Gizenga. Katanga appears about to tap new
sources of military equipment; reportedly nine Fouga
Magister jet aircraft have been purchased from France
and South Africa has agreed in principle to supply fighter
aircraft,
some seven
tons of military supplies would be sent to Katanga by spe-
cial aircraft on 30 January, but that a shortage of money
prevented the purchase of submachine guns in Belgium.
Katanga is beginning offensive action against the Baluba
tribesmen, who with Gizenga's military support have set up
an autonomous regime around Manono in northern Katanga.
Tshombe, in reply to UN protests against an aerial bombing
of Manono on 30 January which endangered Nigerian troops,
has warned of further land and air attacks.
on 1 February Katangan armed forces began mov-
ing northward along the rail line toward the UN military base
at Kamina.
The Katanga government claims to have information that
Moroccans at a Baluba center in central Katanga have been
instructing the rebels in the use of small arms and 81 milli-
meter mortars. The Moroccans reportedly plan to leave large
stocks of these weapons for the rebels when they leave the
Congaj
Gizenga,
has asked Moscow if the bloc could refine Congo
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gold. He asked that a plane be sent to Stanleyville to
collect gold ore. This request suggests that Gizenga
has been able to resume some production at the Kil-
omoto mines in Orientale, which in past years pro-
duced ore worth several million dollars annually. Pro-
duction at these sites was interrupted last summer when
the European staff left. Gizenga may also hope that the
UAR and the bloc will make greater efforts to supply mil-
itary assistance if offered payment in gold.
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Soviet Arms Deliveries to Iraq
Moscow had agreed to supply to Iraq 16 MIG-19s an
three Antonov transports. These aircraft were scheduled
to be provided under the Soviet-Iraqi arms agreement ne=
gotiated earlier in 1960. At least seven shiploads of ma-
teriel have been delivered under this agreement since
November.
Cairo asked the USSR to provide MIG-19s in mid-
1958, but Moscow apparently did not agree to do so until
early 1960. 1 mid-1960, the UAR sent a group of pilots
to the Soviet Union for training in these aircraftg UAR of-
ficials claimed on several occasions in past months that
they were going to receive MIG-19s.
[The Soviet Union reportedly has also agreed to sup-
ply MIG-19s to Djakarta under a major arms agreement
negotiated with Indonesia early this year-)
"CR 11E1
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CONFIDENTIAL
The Arab League
The Arab League was founded in 1945 to promote
unity among its member states, but it has made little
progress toward achieving this goal. Its founders--fore-
most of whom was the late Iraqi Prime Minister Nuni
Said--professed a desire to work toward the sacrifice of
sovereignty and special interest in order to attain such
unity. The original members were Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen, along with Egypt and Syria,
which in 1958 formed the United Arab Republic. Entry into
the league by Libya (1953), the Sudan (1956), and Tunisia
and Morocco (1958) brought the total membership to its
present ten. Algeria, whose rebel government has a rep-
resentative attending the current meeting, is not a mem-
ber. In the 16 years of the league's existence, relatively
minor advances in cultural and economic cooperation have
been made, but political differences remain as pronounced
as ever.
The league attempts to set forth a coordinated Arab
viewpoint on various issues and maintains information of-
fices outside the Arab world for this purpose. This kind of
display of unity is negated, however,by the almost constant
propaganda contest among Arab leaders for position as the
leading champion of Arab causes, At various times, for ex-
ample, Cairo, Amman, and Baghdad have accused each
other of promoting a policy of softness toward Israel or of
lukewarmness toward the Algerian rebels.
In recent years, Nasir's strong advocacy of his type of
Arab nationalism and neutralism, which offends pro-Western
Arab governments and many ambitious Arab leaders, has been
the most constant irritant in inter-Arab relations. Jordan's
King Husayn and Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim--well aware of
Nasir's past sponsorship of attempts to overthrow their re-
spective regimes--oppose Nasir's continued dominance of the
League, but neither commands great trust or respect from
other members. In such an atmosphere, the league is unlike-
ly to increase its meager contributions to Arab unity, and ef-
forts to form a bloc to undermine Nasir's influence in the or-
ganization will probably grow only gradually.
QN..F4DEN77XC
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,Situation in Ethiopia Deteriorating
Haile Selassie's legal adviser had urged that trials
of those suspected of disloyalty be conducted "in an open
and dignified manner!' This the Emperor has refused.
secret
trials of civilians accused of criticizing the regime or of
expressing sympathy for the aims of the rebels have been
under way for over a week, with sentences of up to eight
years pronounced.
The Emperor has failed to reassert his strong personal
leadership and the American ambassador has characterized
the political situation in Ethiopia as a "state of aimless drift."
Dissident elements are circulating antiregime rumors and
distributing leaflets in the capital asking for support of the
rebel cause. This activity, together with the widespread con-
cern over the fate of General Menghistu, the former Imperial
Body Guard commandant, has increased public support for
the objectives espoused by leaders of the abortive coup.
Western officials in Addis Ababa, aware that a continu-
ation of the present trend could lead to further disorders, have
apparently been unable to persuade the Emperor that prompt
political and economic reforms are necessary to quell the dis-
content.
Addis
Ababa had "the stink of Baghdad"--an allusion to the situation
there preceding the revolution which overthrew the Iraqi roy-
alty.
The British Embassy, anticipating no constructive action
v the eror, is formulating an emergency evacuation plan.
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,Bolivian President Plans to Accept Both US and Soviet
Bloc Aid
alresident Paz has indicated to American Ambassador
Strom that he is making plans to utilize both US and Soviet
bloc aid. The United States has contributed grant aid in re-
cent years to enable the Bolivian Government to balance its
domestic budget. In a conversation with Ambassador Strom
on 30 January, Paz conveyed the impression that he consid-
ers American grant aid, contributed in recent years to bal-
ance Bolivia's domestic budget, a part of ordinary revenues
on which his administration can count:7
ijie USSR,which has offered a credit of $150,000,000,
wants its aid to go to projects entirely separate from
those where US aid is involved, according to an earlier
statement by Paz. Paz has also said that he was consid-
ering "reserving" for the USSR the opportunity to provide
equipment for hydroelectric generating plants for the nation-
alized Bolivian Mining Corporation because he assumed that
such plants would not be included in aid to the mines from
the United States, Germany, and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank. If this assumption was incorrect, Paz said,
Soviet aid could be reserved exclusively for the national pe-
troleum compang
ffhe Bolivian Government signed a cultural agreement
with Czechoslovakia on 23 January providing for relations
between scientific institutions, universities, and cultural and
sports organizations. The signing took place during the six-
day visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Hajek, who had been in-
vited by President Paz. Ambassador Strom notes that the pact
is Bolivia's first cultural agreement with the bloc and that it
provides opportunity for political penetratiod.)
CONF TIAL
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Venezuelan Government Concerned With
Rightist Plotting
Venezuelan military dissidents in exile are appar-
ently plotting another attempt against the Venezuelan
Government. Their plans might include an attempt on
the life of President Betancourt, who was seriously in-
jured last June by an assassination effort backed by Do-
minican dictator Trujillo. Venezuela claimed to have
evidence of Trujillo's continuing involvement with the
plotters and presented charges against the Dominican
Republic before the Organization of American States in
November. Trujillo was recently reported "impatient
and upset" at the delay or miscarriage of a new plan to
assassinate Betancourt.
The Dominican Republic also backed the abortive
Venezuelan military uprising of 20-21 April 1960, which
was led by exiles who crossed the border from Colombia.
the Colombian Gov-
ernment has been asked to cooperate in the surveillance of
Venezuelan exiles reported to be in the border area.
During two extended periods in late 1960 Betancourt
faced widespread violence by strong pro-Castro elements
which posed a serious threat to the stability of his mod-
erate-leftist regime. On those occasions, and during the
April coup attempt, the majority of the armed forces dem-
onstrated loyalty to the government by taking prompt meas-
ures to suppress the unrest. There is no evidence of seri-
ous disaffection among the top levels of the officer corps.
Another coup attempt is likely to aggravate the serious
economic problems confronting Betancourt which both right-
ist and leftist opposition elements can be expected to exploit.
RET
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Ld'LJI 1 1111.4
RRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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