CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000180
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 25, 1961

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l aC�KL I New 3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
25 January 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
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INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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25 January 1961
CONTENTS
1. Laos: Prospects are dim that bloc will accept
Britain's plan for reactivating International Con-
trol Commission. (Page t)
2. Situation in the Congo. (Page t)
3. Nasir, deeply involved in aiding pro- Lumumba
elements in Congo, may be drifting toward great-
er dependence on Communist bloc. (Page tt)
4. West Germany urges continued NATO restrictions
on East German travel until Ulbricht regime ends
Berlin pass requirements for West Germans. (Page ti)
5. Salvadoran ruling junta has complied only in part
with army's demands to curtail Communist activ-
ities. (Page itt)
6. Agitation by leftist extremists impedes Western
economic aid plan in Bolivia. (Page ft)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: There seems little prospect that the bloc will
accept a British proposal to approach the King of Laos
directly with the aim of reactivating the International Con
trol Commission.
LL
441J__e_2
v
and Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong states that the Brit-a-"'
North Vietnam's Premier /?p..
ish proposal was unacceptable because the Laotian King
"is not considered to be independent."
the Communists would accept an ICC only if it "recog-,
nizes the Souvanna Phouma government." In addition, the (
Boun Oum government has expressed strong reservations
about. the ICC's return.
LGovernment forces, meanwhile, are said to be within
three miles of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao strong point at
Muong Kassy on the Vientiane - Luang Prabang road, and
have called for strikes by T-6 aircraft to reduce expected
enemy, resistance. Government and enemy forces facing
each other on Route 13 north of the Phou Khoun road junc-
tion have sent out reconnaissance patrols, but no engage-
ment has yet taken place. Fighting continues in southern
Xieng Khouang Province, where government forces still re-
tain the Tha Thom airstripd
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
Congo: The UN is moving speedily to implement the 0 r
UAR's request that its troops be withdrawn from the Congo.
ff4eanwhile, the Ghanaian foreign minister, who is in Cairo
attending a meeting of representatives from states which sup- a j
port Lumumba, reportedly has put further pressure on Sudan
to permit passage of clandestine shipments to Gizenga, so far
apparently without result. In another development, France
apparently is joining Belgium in allowing army officers tst"
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aerve as military advisers to Tshombe's fnrces in Kntancra
Prnvinera:i
*Morocco's announcement yesterday of a decision to with-
draw its troops from the Congo probably will put Ghanaian Presi-
dent Nkrumah under increased pressure to withdraw Ghana's
2,400-man UN contingent, despite his personal belief that the
African neutralists could wield more influence if their forces
remained in the Congo. (Backup, Page 4)
UAR-Africa: On 23 January President Nasir--address-
ing the UAR National Assembly�again attacked Western
"imperialist" policies in Algeria and the Congo, claiming
they are designed to divide and suppress the people of Africa.
Nasir also called for the end of "imperialist maneuvers" in
the United Nations, which he described as the proper instru-
ment for accomplishing African freedom and prosperity. He
repeated previous warnings on the alleged role of Israel as
one of imperialism's tools in Africa,
diasir's continued interference in African affairs is bringing
him into sharper conflict with the West and contributing to a
drift away from his avowed policy of "positive neutrality" and
toward a greater dependence on the C
and material support.
Cairo is giving
c a assis ance o many ra ical African nationalists,
and Nasir has personally tried to pressure African chiefs of state
into following his Doliciei-1
west uermany: A West German Foreign Ministry official
told American officials in Bonn that the East Germans are con-
tinuing to require passes for West Germans entering East Ber-
lin, but that Bonn expects a de facto relaxation of the pass
requirement probably by the end of January or early February.
Such a relaxation was one of the major points of the agreement
25 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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on 29 December which allowed West - East German inter-
zonal trade to continue. The East German negotiator has
claimed the delay is a "face-saving" device of the Ulbricht
� regime and implied it would be only temporary. Neverthe-
less, Bonn is still urging that NATO restrictions on travel
of East Germans to NATO countries be continued pending
clear evidence of East German compliance with the terms
of the agreement. The Allied restrictions and Bonn's can-
cellation of the trade agreement last fall were precipitated
by the East German imposition last September of new con-
trols on the travel of West _ermang fn orirl withir,
El Salvador: The Salvadoran armed forces, gravely
concerned over the steady Communist gains since the 26
October coup replaced the weak administration of President
Lemus with a six-man military-civilian junta, may oust the
junta if convinced that it does not intend to implement the
commitments extracted on 16 January. The military leaders
are reportedly receiving only partial compliance with their
16 January demands that the governing junta curtail Commu-
nist and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador.
The military leaders appear to have resolved at least
partially the differences among themselves. Many officers, (
however, still fear taking any, drastic action that might lead
to bloodshed and the assumption of unpopular political re-
sponsibilities by the army.
Meanwhile, the Communists are steadily strengthening
their mass support for any showdown with the military. Since
October, Communists and pro-Communists have been appoint-
ed to important posts throughout the bureaucracy and have been
permitted free rein outside the government. Their drive to
organize the peasants is progressing rapidly throughout the
country and they are increasing their infllitannp in lahrvr
student groups.
25 Jan 61
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Bolivia: Agitation among tin miners led by Communists
and extreme leftists threatens to disrupt an arrangement
whereby the US and West Germany are cooperating with Bo-
livia to reorganize and re-equip the tin mines on which Bo-
livia's economy depends. The West German Government may
withdraw its technicians, who are essential to the project,
should the present unrest lead to the violence which is char-
acteristic of Bolivia's mining areas. An increase in extrem-
ist agitation has been brought about in recent months by So-
viet overtures concerning economic aid, including a $150,-
000,000 credit offer. (Backup, Page 6)
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Situation in Laos
Prospects seem poor for early reactivation of the In-
ternational Control Commission in Laos. Both Premier
Boun Oum and Quinim Pholsena, spokesman for the Com-
munist-recognized "government" of former Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma, have criticized Britain's compromise pro-
posal of 21 January to Moscow that the ICC be activated
through the agency of King Savang as "head of state," there-
by avoiding the question of recognition of the competing re-
gimes. Boun Oum has expressed a preference for the es-
tablishment of a commission of neutral nations. Quinim
claimed, in a statement rebroadcast on 24 January by Hanoi,
that the Laotian King is a prisoner of the "pro-US reaction-
aries," and that all administrative details must be handled
by the "legal government" headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma.
North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong made the
same points in
terming the British proposal unacceptable,"
The USSR has made no formal reply as
yet to the UK proposal, but is unlikely to accept any imme-
diate Western proposals which would stabilize the develop-
ing military situation while Communist forces in Laos con-
tinue to make substantial gains. The Communist bloc, while
calling for the return of the ICC, has recently placed empha-
sis on convening an international meeting along the lines of
the 1954 Geneva Conference to deal with the Laotian crisis,
ouring the past week, Soviet Foreign Ministry officials have
clearly expressed to various Western diplomats Moscow's
preference for such a conference_.
An ICC, composed of an Indian chairman and represent-
atives from Canada and Poland, was established in Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam under terms of the 1954 Geneva
Conference--chaired by Britain and the USSR--which ended
25 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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the eight-year Indochina war. These three separate but in-
terrelated commissions, responsible to the co-chairmen,
were charged with maintaining the armistice and supervis-
ing implementation of political terms that varied according
to country. The agreement for Laos provided for the inte-
gration of the Pathet Lao fighting forces into the national
community and the subsequent holding of country-wide elec-
tions. The government claims its obligations were fulfilled
by the short-lived 1957 "Vientiane agreements" under which
the Pathet Lao agreed to relinquish military control of Sam
Neua and Phong Saly provinces in return for a legal status as
the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) party and two portfolios in the
cabinet, and by the supplementary National Assembly elec-
tions held in May 1958 which resulted in a sweeping leftist
victory. In July 1958, under increasing pressure by the Lao-
tian Government to get out, the ICC adjourned sine die on a
Canadian proposal which was carried over Communist objec-
tions. Then, as now, Vientiane resented the ICC's presence
because it tended to equate the Pathet Lao with the royal gov-
ernment and hampered military efforts against the insurgents.
C-The Indian chairman, on technical and legalistic grounds, fre-
quently voted with the Polish representative against the Cana-
dian:3
con the military side, government troops advancing north
from Yang Vieng on the Luang Prabang road are about three
miles from Muong Kassy, where a combined force of Kong Le -
Pathet Lao troops is expected to make a determined stand.
The commander of the government forces
has called tor strikes against Muong Kassy by T-6 aircraft to
soften the position, but operational plans also call for an at-
tempted flanlincr trinvPmpnt in void enemy, holding positions
on the road. A temporary shortage of food
and 105-mm, artillery ammunition has delayed the govern-
ment's advance, giving the enemy more time to organize de-
fenses. About 15 miles north of the Phou Khoun junction a
government force consisting. of two infantry battalions faces
a Kong Le - Pathet Lao force presently estimated at about the]
25 Jan 61
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Gtrength of one battalion supported by artillery. No contact
between these forces has been reported as yet, although both
sides have sent out reconnaissance patrols. Meanwhile, fight-
ing continues in southern Xieng Khouang Province, where gov-
ernment forces are attem tin to re ain
Thom airstrip.
Tha Thom was under heavy attack and might have to
be relinquished. Government control of Tha Thom is essential
to block an enemy advance south to Pak Sane, Tha Thom is also
a point of departure for any future drive to retake the Plaine des
Jarres, which Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces have held since 1
Januari:3
Soviet and North Vietnamese aircraft continued airlift op-
erations into Laos through 24 January and are scheduled for
flights on 25 January.
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Situation in the Congo
The UN is moving with alacrity to implement the UAR's
request of 23 January that its battalion be withdrawn from the
Congo. A UN official stated on 23 January that the evacuation
was scheduled for 1 February and that all the battalion's equip-
ment would be airlifted at the same time in order to give Cairo
no opportunity to renege. India, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Iran have
been asked to furnish replacement troops.
[The announcement yesterday by Morocco that it also is
withdrawing its troops from the Congo is a further sign of
Rabat's growing ties with the militantly neutralist African bloc
which includes the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The an-
nouncement said the UN was being asked for return of the
troops to Morocco "before the end of this month," but the Moroccan
Information Minister indicated a realization that logistical problems
could keep this deadline from being met. Guinea's 700-man force
in the Congo is already scheduled for withdrawal early next month.
Mali now has no forces in the Congo. The Moroccan decision pre-
sumbably will mean increased pressure on Ghanaian President
Nkrumah to withdraw Ghana's 2,400-man UN contingent, despite
his personal belief that the neutralists could wield more lab ence
if their forces remained in the Cong6:3
[Meanwhile, Lumumba's international supporters apparent-
ly are stepping up their pressure on Sudan to permit passage
of clandestine shipments to Gizenga's Stanleyville government.
Ghanaian Foreign Minister Ako Adjei, who recently visited
Khartoum on the way to Cairo, reportedly joined the ambassa-
dors of the USSR, Communist China, and the UAR in a plea to
Sudanese officials to permit overflights by UAR aircraft. These
efforts have so far been unsuccessful. However, pressure is
likely to increase as a result of the consultations among Lu-
muniba supporters at the recent meeting of the Afro-Asian Sol-
idarity Organization's executive committee-.)
&ranee apparently is joining Belgium in allowing army of-
ficers to serve as Militnry ndvisPrc tn thp fnrePR nf Katancra
President Tshombe.
25 Jan 61
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Wise
ETshombe asked Colonel Roger Trinquier to become an adviser,
and the French Army has granted him a long leave of absence
for this purpose. Trinquier reportedly is attempting to recruit
other officers. The French Government apparently was pleased
at the opportunity to send Trinauier, a rightist plotter, out of
the country
Gizenga apparently remains
fearful of an attack by Mobutu, although such an attack is unlike-
ly and Gizenga's forces and his allies have extended their control
throughout Orientale and Kivu provinces and into northern ICatanga
Province without meeting serious resistance. Both he and his
representative in Cairo appear to have little understanding of
the difficulties confronting any attempt to supply large-scale
aid to Stanleyville, and their apprehensions are likely to grow
as dela s in the delivery of assistance continue.
Liizenga's government has received $400,000 from the
USSR, $250,000 of which has actually been delivered to Stanley-
vine. In addition, a small quantity of Soviet arms reportedly
has been smuggled to the Congo in UAR aircraft, and Commu-
nist China and the UAR are providing substantial financial sup-
port for Gizenaa's mission in Cairo
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*fteif
Agitation by Leftist Extremists Impedes Western Economic
Aid Plan in Bolivia
Agitation ledr by leftist extremists is impeding a triangu-
lar US - West German - Bolivian plan to reorganize and re-
equip the tin mines, which are the basis of Bolivia's economy.
The government has just settled a strike,which began on 17
January and prevented an initial survey of the mines, but con-
tinued agitation may prompt West Germany to withdraw its
technicians, who are vital to the project.
The triangular plan is West Germany's first substantial
venture in economic assistance to a Latin American country.
The Bonn government is backing a private firm's offer to pro-
vide financial, technical, and managerial skill for the mines,
where production has declined since 1945. The United States
has supplemented the German offer with a $10,000,000 credit
for mine development.
The five-month-old administration of President Paz Es-
tenssoro is under strong domestic pressure to make demon-
strable progress in economic development, especially since
Paz is the leader of the party which won the sweeping leftist
revolution of 1952 but has since been unable to improve living
standards substantially.
Extremist agitation has been increased in recent months
by Soviet overtures concerning economic aid, particularly So-
viet offers to construct a tin smelter in Bolivia and to extend a
$150,000,000 credit. Previously the largest credit offers by the
USSR in Latin America have been $100,000,000 each to Argentina
and Cuba.
A press report on 21 January stated that President Paz has
announced Soviet offers of aid for hydroelectric power and lead
mining, probably as projects under the proposed $150,000,000
credit. Earlier this month a Bolivian government spokesman an-
nounced that Czechoslovakia had decided to offer to install an
antimony smelter in Bolivia.
�eONRDEN�TIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 4toi
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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