CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000178
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 23, 1961

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000178
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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
23 January 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
BULLETIN
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23 January 1961
CONTENTS
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
1. USSR prepares to launch space vehicle.
(Backup, Page 1) (Map
2. Chinese Communists map steps to combat eco-
nomic difficulties. (Backup, Page
ASIA-AFRICA
3. Laotian Government wants UN and SEATO com-
mittees to investigate Communist involvement
in Laos. (Backup, Page 5),(Map)
4. Belgian defense officials apparently aiding Tshomb6
government. (No Backup)
5, Situation in South Vietnam, (No Backup) (Nap)
THE WEST
6. Brazilian ambassador in Mexico expresses misgiv-
ings over attitude of new Brazilian Government to-
ward Castro regime. (No Backup)
TOP SECRET
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Okid ur 3ILLACIL 1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: We reported on 19 January that the USSR was
comfogifii-g preparations for launching a space vehicle from
Tyura Tam; present evidence indicates that these now are
virtually finished and, barring technical difficulties, a
launch and probable recovery attempt could now occur at
any time. Four Soviet ships which have supported missile
tests in the past are "on station" in the Central Pacific, and
three other Soviet vessels now are in or approaching posi-
tions off Africa where they also could monitor or help direct
an orbiting vehicle.
(Page 1)
(Map)
Communist China: Following the Chinese Communist
central committee plenum held from 14 to 18 January, Pei-
ping announced a series of moves designed to overcome the
present economic difficulties, bolster popular morale, and
silence critics within the country who are blaming the regime
for China's current difficulties. According to the communiqu�
issued at the end of the plenum, agricultural production will
receive primary stress in 1961, capital construction will be
cut back, and quality will be emphasized in industrial pro-
duction.� In addition, free markets are to be encouraged at
the village level. Politically, Peiping has inaugurated a
mass campaign against both "bad elements" who oppose and
are sabotaging the regime's policies and "well-intentioned"
cadres which have "misunderstood" those policies. The cam-
paign--to be carried out with great publicity�will provide
the regime with scapegoats for its own mismanagement as
well as discouraffe further criticism from the population.
(Page 2)
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A
ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: i'he Boun Oum government decided on 20 Jan-
uary to ask the United Nations and SEATO to send ad hoc
committees to Laos to investigate its charges of Soviet and
North Vietnamese involvement in the current fighting, ac- 4-r-L
cording to the secretary of state for foreign affairs. The
Laotian Government apparently hopes that the presence of J-i
such foreign observers would stop or at least minimize a�,x
external support of local antigovernment elements as oc-
curred during the hostilities in 1959 after a four-nation
United Nations committee arrived in Laos.
Laotian Army headquarters claims that Tha Thom, in
southern Xieng Khouang Province, has been retaken by gov-
ernment forces, but confirmation is lacking. Meanwhile, new
and important engagements between government and Kong Le -
Pathet Lao forces appear imminent in the Phou Khoun Junc-
tion area anti n6rtli Of Varig Vierig,
Soviet IL-14s and North Vietnamese transports continued
airlift operations into Laos through 22 Jan, and additional
flights are scheduled for 23 January. The Soviet LI-2s which
recently arrived in Hanoi have not yet participated in the air-
lift into Laos. (SECRET SABRE) (Page 5) (Map)
Congo-l3e1gium:Cafficia1s of the Belgian Defense Minis- c/c--
try appear to be aiding Tshombe's Katanga government without Jtki
the knowledge of the Belgian Foreign Ministry. A Foreign Min -&-04) J,
istry official told the American ambassador on 19 January that 6, 7/
his office had just learned that Defense Ministry personnel had /c,, /5(
assisted in the screening of a group of white recruits who had
left Brussels that day for service with Tshombd's forces. Ac-
cording to an earlier report from the Congo, a senior Belgian
military officer had stated that Belgium was willing to sell the equip-
ment then at Kamina base to Tshombe for a token payment; in
addition, the officer reportedly had recommended that equip-
ment and training for a paracommando battalion be provided by
Belgium. Another report indicated that more than 200 "deserters"
from Belgian units in Ruanda-Urundi are now serving with the
Katangan forces. The military activities apparently conflict]
23 Jan 61
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DAILY BRIEF ii
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its0
with policies develoi,..,.a ui ute heads of other ministries, whose
representatives have told American officials that although Bel-
gii wielle-d to send aid it would defer to its maior NATO al-
lies.
*2auth V1etnn1: The survival of the Diem government in
-,:th Vietnam centinues to be threatened by the operations of
e'Aimated 7,000 Cc ramr:Aist guerrillas directed by North
arK1 V/ the c!,.nerally deteriorating situation. In the
n ..era thcy are concentrated, the
ills now exercise control in many rural areas despite
seevtrity s-,71.;:eria by units of Diem's 150,000-man ar-
'.,t7inn,litcarl for C cnnmunists have also shown
ertrike in force in the northern plateau region and
out93 L'aigon. In addition to the guerrilla
tilt; 731.1L Vietnalnese tre conducting a major prop-
eem.taeen cesigned to promote a united front that would
the eral dissatisfaction with the Diem regime's so-
ef,e1 control.?
increased Co..04..alst threat has reinforced Diem's
Leeemation with security mearures at the expense of eco-
1c development pre...plums. His failure to counter Cora-
menial influences by rel'eree of his rigid and highly centralized
-evernment is encouraging further plotting by frustrated pol-
iticians ar.d restiveness within the military. Diem survived
fte attempted coup by paratroop elements in November 1960
cause the rest of the army remained loyal to him.
(Map) ' �
7:11E WEST
:43rmil-Cuba: The Brazilian ambassador in Mexico has
---eea concern to the US Embassy over the probable at-
of the new Brazilian Government toward the Castro re-
:'e in Cuba. He said that President-elect Janio Quadros, who
be inawrurated on 31 Jammu, has a number of pro-Cuban
sera. Qtritros visited Castro last March in an effort to re-
Communist charges that he is a 'Wall Street lackey" and
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subsequently made a. number of statements favorable to Cas-
tro. In his only postelection press conference last October,
Quadros refused to comment on the Cuban situation and has
not issued any policy statements on any subject since. Quadros
has been holding himself virtually inaccessible in Europe for
the past three months and upon his return to Brazil on 20 Jan-
uary brushed aside queries as to his cabinet choices. It seems
unlikely that he will take any precipitate action either for or
against Castro and he may make an effort to mediate between
Cuba and the anti-Castro governments In the hemisphere.
�� r
23 Jan 61
. DAILY BRIEF
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Soviet Preparations for Space Vehicle Launching
� We reported on 19 January that the USSR was complet-
ing preparations for launching a space vehicle from Tyura
Tarn; present evidence indicates that these now are virtual-
ly finished. Four missile-range instrumentation ships, which
have previously operated in connection with Soviet missile
tests in the Pacific, have for the past five days maintained
positions similar to those assumed for the space related ac-
tivities in September and October 1960. This disposition sug-
gests that the USSR will again undertake� to achieve the ob-
jectives of the unsuccessful attempts of 10 and 14 October.
Three other. Soviet vessels, which were stationed in the
South Atlantic and appear to have been associated with the Oc-
tober tests, may also be involved again. Since 16 January. the
Dolinsk has been standing by near Fernando Poo Island off the
Cameroons. On 18 January the Krasnodar was on a southerly
course south of the Canary Islands The Vornshilov 111AV lin in nr
headed for the Red Sea.
These ships as well as those in
me Pacitic may be in or approaching positions where they could
monitor or help direct an orbiting space vehicle.
The forthcoming operation will probably involve an attempt
to launch and recover an earth satellite vehicle. The Soviet
high-frequency direction-finding organization KRUG has been
conducting intensive exercises of the type noted in past capsule-
recovery operations. In view of the Soviet record with Sputnik
recoveries in 1960--one success and two failures--it is not be-
lieved that this operation would involve a human passenger.
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Chinese Communist Communist Central Committee
Announces Retrenchment
The first plenary session of the Chinese Communist party
central committee to be held in 17 months, meeting in Peiping
from 14 to 18 January, decided on a series of moves designed
� to bolster the Chinese economy and silence domestic critics
who are blaming the regime for the current difficulties.
The communiqu�ssued by the plenum acknowledges a sec-
ond year of bad harvests in China and makes an appeal for every
effort to bring in a better harvest in 1961.
g)pposition to the regime's economic policies is known to
ave flared into the open recently, and posters reading "more
ood" and "down with Communism" have been reported in Dairen,
aina,n Island, and Peiping The central committee communique
akes cognizance of this opposition, while claiming that over 90
ercent of the population wholeheartedly stands behind the regime.
t admits that a� "small minority of unreformed landlord and
ourgeois elements" have taken advantage of the present prob-
lems to carry out sabotage, and in some cases have infiltrated
party ranks and economic organizations on the lower level. The
communique also asserts that a few "well-intentioned" cadres
have misunderstood the party's fundamental policies and therefore
have erred in their work. These cadres are accused of failing
to comprehend the difference between socialism and Communism
and not giving enough stress to the workers' need for material
incentives. Peiping is thus blaming these cadres for implement-
ing policies advocated by the leadership itself just a short time
ago.
To silence the opposition and provide scapegoats for its own
mismanagement, the central committee has announced a mass cam-
paign to be carried out with maximum publicity against the "bad
elements" and to raise the ideological level of those "well-inten-
tioned" cadres which erred. This rectification campaign will
-SECRET--
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Itas, OZLTVZ-i-- %wolf
probably last for several months and result in some widely
publicized purges at the provincial or lower levels. The
references to opposition of only a "few elements" in the par-
ty and government, however, suggest that any purge will
affect only a small minority of the cadres; there is no indi-
cation that it will reach into the top leadership.
In citing overfulfillment in advance of production goals
originally scheduled for 1962, the communique puts the best
face possible on industrial performance in 1960, but failure
to meet 1960's "leap forward" goals is apparent. The com-
muniqu�uggests that the value of industrial output increased
by only 14 percent in 1960, less than half the 29 percent sched-
uled. The guidelines for 1961, as spelled out in the communi-
qu�comprise mainly a further effort to boost agricultural
production, stopgap measures to tide light industry over con-
tinued shortages of raw materials, and a reduction in the rate
of growth in heavy industry. Investment in capital construc-
tion is to be reduced, and the emphasis in industry is to be on
"consolidating, filling out, and raising of standards." No pro-
duction goals are announced for 1961, but the tone of the com-
munique is a clear admission that Peiping's "great leap forward"
bas .spent its force.
The communique also announces that the central committee
plans to establish six regional bureaus to strengthen leadership
over the municipal and provincial party committees. The six
regional committees are identical with the form of party organ-
izations in force before June 1.954. They were dissolved at that
time in the aftermath of the purge of two regional leaders who
were charged with attempting to set up "independent kingdoms."
The current reorganization points up the lack of qualified lead-
ership at the intermediary level, which apparently is severe
enough to force Peiping to run the danger of allowing regional-
ism to develop once again.
The plenum also passed a resolution on the Moscow meet-
ing of Communist parties held in November 1960, affirming
--SEGRET--
,23 Jan 61
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CA..-IVE ke0
Peiping's satisfaction with the results of the conference and its
intention to adhere to the declaration produced by the conference.
The resolution is similar to the Soviet party central committee's
resolution of 18 January. The language of the Chinese resolution
at several points implies that the Chinese party will continue to
advocate a more militant strate than Moscow currently favors,
but the emphasis on the importance of Sino-Soviet "unity"�de-
dared to be in the "fundamental interests" of the two countries
�
s gests that Peiping will refrain, for a time at least, from
polemics with Moscow.
-SECRET-
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*.ari
The Situation in Laos
Ghe Boun Oum cabinet voted on 20 January to send sep-
arate requests to the United Nations and SEATO to send ad
hoc committees to Laos to investigate its charges of Soviet
and North Vietnamese involvement in the current hostilities,
according to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Sop-.
saisana. Laos' representative at the United Nations report-
edly received instructions on 21 January to put the request to
Hammarskjold, but the approach to SEATO apparently is still
in draft form. The government's announcement on 21 January
that three regiments of North Vietnam's regular army had
crossed into Laos' southern provinces may be intended to re-
inforce these requests. Available evidence does not support
the claimed intrus10n:7
aced with a deteriorating military situation, the Boun
Oum government apparently hopes that the presence of such
foreign observers would stop or at least minimize external
support of local antigovernment elements. A similar unilat-
eral appeal to the United Nations in 1959 during a period of
less serious fighting resulted in the dispatch to Laos of a four-
nation committee. Although the committee came up with no firm
evidence of direct involvement of North Vietnamese units, its
presence had an immediate quieting effect)
Ciientiane may also hope by these moves to forestall other
international action--such as reactivation of the International
Control Commission or another meeting of those nations attend-
ing thefl 1954 Geneva Conference--which it fears would only play
into Communist handsq
Laotian Army headquarters claims that government troops
have retaken Tha Thom, in southern Xieng Khouang Province,
which had been reported lost to Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces on
20 January. Reports from this front are sketchy and confused,
but a strong enemy, effort apparently continues in this area, which
is a potential jumping-off, place for a government attack on the
Plaine des Jarres.
\
5-ifeanwhile, important engagements between government and
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces appear imminent in the area of the-
-SEGRETT-
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*OS LJEA....nr, I
CP'hou Khoun road junction of Routes 7 and 13, and at Muong
Kassy about 18 miles to the south of the junction. The enemy
force, numbering about 600 men, which seized the junction
from government units last week has split into two elements:
one to defend the junction and reinforce enemy forces at
Muong Kassy facing government columns advancing from
yang Vieng; and the other to move north onRoute 13, some
twelve miles toward Luang Prabang, where a government
force equivalent to two augmented infantry battalions is ready-.
ing for an attack on the junction. Additional enemy troops com-
ing from the Plaine des Jarres will probably be committed to
these two efforts to thwart the government's plan to clear the
Vientiane - Luang Prabang road preparatory to a drive east
aloneRoute 7 toward the laine des Jarres.
7
Soviet IL-14s and North Vietnamese transports continued
airlift operations into Laos through 22 January and are sched-
uled for flights on 23 January. Since the arrival of the 18 So-
viet LI-2s last week, there has been no indication that the 10
IL-14s which have been the backbone of bloc airlift operations
since early December are to be retired, although this continues
to be a possibility. None of the recently arrived LI-2s have been
noted in missions to Laos, but several flights between Hanoi and
Haiphong have been detected. Two MI-4 helicopters, possibly two
of the five which recently arrived in North Vietnam from the USSR,
were scheduled to fly from Hanoi to Sam Neua on 21 January. This
is the first time any of the Soviet MI-4s have been scheduled for
� flights into Laos. There are indications that the helicopters may
have completed the flight as scheduled.
-SECRET-
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TWO
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman,' The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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