CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000172
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 11, 1961

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
%sr ' i wi� .3G%/11CC I /
3.5(c)
Ne r 01/4-7 I)
//
3.3(h)(2) 4
e
11 January 1961
Copy No. C 77
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
-T-011-SEC-RET-
e/J
e-J
e-J
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved _for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
SECRET
11 JANUARY 1961
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Communist party congress set
for October.
Communist China slows pace of indus-
trialization.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
Situation in the Congo.
UAR opens new campaign against French,
interests in Arab states.
South Korean Government faces growing
public opinion in favor of contacts with
North Korea.
III. THE WEST
West Germany asks Allies to await con-
firmation of access to East Berlin be-
fore lifting all restrictions on East
German travel
Belgian strikes expected to end in two
weeks; new elections likely before mid-
1961. 8
1961.
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
, 44.1 TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
�11 January 1961
\
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: The next congress of the Soviet Communist
� party, the 22nd, has been set for October by the central
� committee plenum which opened in Moscow on 10 January�
The congress�formally the party's highest forum--was ap-
parently originally scheduled to meet earlier, but was post-
poned in view of the change-over in US administrations and
to allow the Soviet leadership to digest the results of its con-
frontation with the Chinese Communists last November. An-
nouncement of the congress indicates that Khrushchev will
speak on the two principal agenda topics and thus will domi-
nate the proceedings. Frol Kozlov, member of the party's
presidium and secretariat; is also slated to deliver a key
report to the congress, a fact which appears to reinforce
substantially the likelihood that he occuniec qecond place
in the Kremlin hierarchy. (Page 1)
Communist China:
China realizes the pace of its industrialization pro-
gram has been "too fast." In the railway industry, for ex-
ample, development plans have been revised downward
"considerably." This information is in line with other in-
dications that the Chinese economy has been having trouble
sustaining the pace of development envisaged by the regime
since 1958. Agriculture has had its second successive poor
year, and industry has been plagued with various problems,
complicated by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in Au-
gust. Furthermore, he 1960 canithl ennstriletinn lan prob-
ably was not fulfilled: (Page.3)
:,...
i�
TOP SECRET
k
\
\
(
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
II. ASIA-AFRICA
0 I
*Laos: ffhe Laotian Government has warned the USSR
that it will have to take defensive measures if the Soviet ect.� Lb/
airlift in support of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces contin-
ues. Four T-6 aircraft to be used in armed missions against II
the Soviet IL-14s arrived in Vientiane on 10 January. The Pathet
Lao have already protested their arrival as a "violation" of
the 1954 Geneva accords. Meanwhile, Chiang Ching-kuo,
Nationalist China's security chief, is considering offering to
General Phoumi 2,000 Nationalist irregular troops from the
Mekong River border area of Burma for use in Laos. A sim-
r_.1_offe.r_was_niRtle in late Septembarj
(Page 4)
Congo: The proclamation of a new Lualaba state in north- C.)
ern and western Katansa by the Gizenga dissidents threatens
to isolate the Tshornbe regime in southern Katanga, and fur- "'�
them damages the prestige of the Kasavubu/Mobutu government j? �
Tshombe has threatened to take military action against the dis-tt�t Att-J-
sidents, but would have difficulty operating in northern Katan-
aa, an area dominated by anti-Tshombe tribesmen. 17>
Gizenga's
ar y comprising atiout troons nnti inn Vehicles of
various types.
Gizenga's
request for ar s rations, gasoline, and other supplies for
11,000 more troops. with
such assistance, Gizenga could consolidate his control of Ori-
entale and Kivu provinces, "take over" Kasni Province, and
"attack" Equateur Province. (Page 6)
Arab States - France: At Nasir's behest the UAR Nation- �'k'
al Assembly has urged all Arab governments to sever economic.":4.
and political relations with France and to nationalize French at/A-A- I
properties in protest over Algeria. This appears to be the open-XL-b.-to
ing move of a new campaign against the French in the Arab statesra e.ee-telt;
and Nasir may soon follow up the assembly's action by nationaliz-
ing French investments and expelling French nationals,
(Page 7)
11 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
vwf
TOP SECRET
South Korea: he Chang Myon government is concerned
over. increasing public opinion that favors some direct con-
tact with North Korea. Some leaders of the conservative op-
position, at a loss for issues to differentiate their party from
the administration' are advocating exchanges with the Commu-
nist North--a line Pyongyang has belabored with repeated of-
fers of economic assistance. A small but vocal minority of
Intellectuals and students advocates neutralization of all Korea
as a possible solution to the South's chronic economic prob-
lems. Seoul may be forced to propose social and economic
exchanges of a sort unacceptable to the North to combat con-
tinued Pyongyang propaganda designed to stimulate dissatis-
faction among the South Korean6
(Page 8)
III. THE WEST
West Germany: Officials of the West German Foreign
Ministry favor only a partial lifting of last September's Al-
lied restrictions on travel of East Germans to NATO countries
until further assessment can determine whether East German
controls over West German access to East Berlin will be eased.
Following reinstatement of the interzonal trade agreement on e
29 December, Bonn officials consider East German actions
"not yet Satitsfactory." West Berlin Mayor Brandt is reportedlyibm-a
optimistic, lwrever, that the East Germans will further ease
their stand. Llyhile French officials in Bonn have urged Paris to
accept the West German position, the British representatives
have instructions to press for immediate relaxationpf Allied
controls in order to allow an East German trade mission to come
to London by mid-January. but have reported German views
without commeag
Belgium:: US Embassy officials in Brussels expect the 6/
Belgian strikes, now in the fourth week, to be broken within
the next two weeks. Meanwhile, there is a growing danger of
violence and sabotage, particularly in the Walloon area of south-
ern Belgium. Socialist party and labor union leaders are
II Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
�%El TOP SECRET *400
reportedly seeking a face-saving way out of the strike, which
has hurt the party's popularity and electoral chances. Elec-
tions are likely before mid-1961, since King Baudouin is re-
portedly anxious to build n o'rtIravnr"m+ nf "--w men" and get
rid of Premier Eyskens. (Page 10)
11 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
iv
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
41Or LA/nu ii-ocirif I IAL -
VW"
� Soviet Party Congress
The Soviet party central committee, meeting in Moscow
on 10 January, convoked the next party congress--the 22nd--
for 17 October 1961. Khrushchev was heard to say on 2
January at the Cuban National Day reception that the congress
had been put off until late in the year because of delay in es-
tablishing contact with the incoming US administration.
Although Khrushchev did not allude to the recent diffi�
culties with the Chinese, this factor also plainly figured in the
delay of the party meeting. The importance of the Chinese
problem has been demonstrated in recent weeks by an exten-
sive series of regional briefings on the November Communist
conference by top party leaders. A report on this subject
has now been added to the agenda of the central committee's
current plenum on agriculture.
The agenda set for the forthcoming congress indicates
that Khrushchev will dominate the proceedings with two major
speeches. He will give, as is customary for the party first
� secretary, the report of the central committee which will sum
� up developments since the last regular congress--in early
1956- -and lay down the basic lines of Soviet domestic and
foreign policy for the next four years. In addition, he is
scheduled to present a new party program to the congress.
The program, thought of as a long-term guide for the en-
tire international Communist movement, was ordered pre-
pared by the 20th congress in 1956, and is to replace the long-
outdated one adopted in 1919. Decisions to draw up a new pro-
gram have been made by every regular congress beginning
with the 18th in 1939 but have never been implemented. Khru-
shchev probably intends the new program to stand as one of
his major contributions to the course of Communist develop-
ment and an important monument to his leadership.
Frol Kozlov, member of the party presidium and secre-
tariat, is slated to present a proposed revision of the party
CONFIDENTIAL
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
� i�-���-di 1 A AA LA./
N101
rules to the congress. The selection of ICozlov to deliver this
key report tends to confirm previous indications that he is the
number-two man in the Kremlin hierarchy. The last major
revision of the rules, made at the 19th congress in 1952, was
reported on at that congress by Khrushchev.
The congress is also scheduled to elect a new central
committee. Over five years will have elapsed since the pres-
ent central committee was elected, and significant changes
have occurred in the political standing of a very large per-
centage of the members.
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Ner0
Communist China ffaid to Have Reviled Economic Plans
Communist
China realizes that the pace of its industrialization program
has been "too fast." the pace of industrial expansion,
stepped up greatly in 1958, has overburdened technicians
and administrators "beyond the limits of endurance" and led
to inadequate planning and coordination. The resulting diffi-
culties have forced the regime to revise downward its eco-
nomic development plans. In the railroad industry, for ex-
ample, development plans are said to have been revised
downward "considerably," with �one important improvement
postponed from 1961 to mid 1963]
his information is in line with other indications that
Chines economy has been having trouble sustaining the rapid
pace of development exacted since 1958. In 1960, agricul-
ture, still the most important single sector in the economy,
had its second poor year in a row; light industry, which de-
pends heavily on agriculture for raw materials, did not meet
its production targets; and heavy industry had more than its
usual share of problems. Shortages of industrial raw, ma-
terials have probably affected current output, lags in capital
construction have affected the rate at which new industrial
capacity is being added, and continued denial to CPR of So-
viet technicians who were withdrawn during the summer would
necessitate a fundamental revision of existing plans for in-
dustrial development)
1960, the appellation "leap forward" was applied only
to those increases scheduled for heavy industry; goals for
agriculture and light industry were not said to fit under this
definition. If Peiping's future plans for heavy industry en=
visage significantly smaller increases in output,the economic
development plan known as the "leap forward" will have lost
its last vestige of reality7
CONFIDENTIAL
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
%.
NW/
Situation in Laos
� The Laotian Government has warned the USSR that it would
have to take defensive measures if the Soviet airlift in support
of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces continued. Four armed
T-6 trainers, which will be employed against the Soviet IL-148
arrived in Vientiane on 10 January.
The Pathet Lao radio has already reacted in strong terms
to the arrival of the T-6s. In a broadcast on 10 January, a
spokesman for the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS)--the Pathet Lao
political front--denounced provision of the planes to the Boun
Oum government as a violation of the 1954 Geneva accords
and stated that unless they were withdrawn, the "Laotian
people will propose that the legal (SouvannA Phouma) govern-
ment take steps to resist them."
rEhiang Ching-kuo. Nationalist China's security chief,
would be willing to send ,
Nationalist irregular troops from the Mekong River area of
Burma to be used in Laos. Chiang said the troops he wanted to
send would be highly trained special forces equipped with light
arms and mortars and would carry Laotian documents and
insignia. He emphasized that the offer had not yet been made
to Phoumi, but he thought there was a good chance that he
would ccept if it were made. In late September, Chiang made
similar unofficial approaches and asserted that he would not
use the irregulars without advising and consulting the United
States)
Soviet IL-14s made nine confirmed flights into Laos on
10 January, and additional flights from Hanoi into Laos are
scheduled for 11 January. Three North Vietnamese trans-
ports are scheduled for Sam Neua on the same day. Three
Chinese Communist civil transports flew from Nanning to
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Nige SECRET
Hanoi on 10 January, and two of them are scheduled to return
to Nanning on 11 January. These Chinese Communist trans-
ports may be shuttling in supplies from Nanning, which was
the terminal point of the earlier Chinese Communist airlift
which ceased on 20 December.'
The five Soviet MI-4 helicopters which have been delayed
at Nanning because of weather have been rescheduled to fly
to Haiphong on 11 January.
In remarks probably intended to encourage British oppo-
sition o any SEATO intervention in Laos, the editor of a Hong
Kong Communist daily told a Chinese journalist on 2 January
that he believed Communist China would not intervene in Laos
unless US troops did first. The Chinese Communists probably
re aware that the journalist is in contact with the British and
eel that the remarks would reach London. With comments
strikingly similar to those attributed to Peiping's Foreign Min-
ster Chen Yi last October, the editor implied that Communist
China would like to keep the Laotian conflict localized. The
same impression has been conveyed by recent Chinese state-
ments to the effect that the Laotian people should be left alone
to settle their problems themselve_gti
SECRET
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
kir
TOP SECRET
The Situation in the Congo
The proclamation of a new Lualaba state in northern
and western Katanga by the Gizenga dissidents threatens the
isolation of the Tshombd regime in southern Katanga and
further damages the prestige of the Kasavubu/Mobutu govern-
ment. Tshombe has threatened to take military action against
the dissidents, but would have difficulty operating in northern
Katanga, an area dominated by anti - Tshombe tribesmen. There
are indications, moreover, that he does not have full confidence
in his Belgian-trained militia.
Gizenga's army
as comprising about 4,000 troops and 100 vehicles of various
types. Gizenga's transport situation as "ex-
tremely bad." with gasoline in short supply.
Gizenga's request for arms, rations, gasoline.
and other sunplies to equip a force of 15,000 men;
with such assistance Gizenga could consolidate
his control of Orientale and Kivu provinces, "take over" Kasai
Province, and "attack" Equateur Province.
Mobutu, meanwhile, has taken some steps to build up his
own forces. In early January he visited Kakwanga, capital
d Albert Kalonji's southern Kasai "Mining State," where he
legotiated with Kalonji for the services of three infantry bat-
alions under Kalonji's control. On 8 January, Mobutu's com-
missioner for foreign affairs, Justin Bomboko, left for Brus-
sels to discuss the restoration of diplomatic relations between
� the Congo and Belgium, and reportedly to request Belgian arms
and equipment for the Congo Army.
Notwithstanding such steps, there are indications that
morale in various Congo Army units is low, and unless Mobutu
can score a major success against the dissidents he may be
under pressure to step down in favor of one of his military sub-
ordinates.
Mobutu's troops had evacuated one position about
100 miles from Stanleyville, adding that "morale among Mobutu's
troops is low and discipline is nonexistent."
11 Jan 61
CENTRAL .INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Nue SECRET
UAR Takes Lead in Anti-French Campaign
Nasir has taken the first big step in an anti-French
campaign which may lead to concerted Arab action against
French interests in the Near East. Following Nasir's in-
structions, the UAR National Assembly on 9 January called
on all Arab governments to sever relations with France and
to nationalize French properties in protest against the Alge-
rian war. ( the assembly's
action may be followed by UAR moves to resequester French
assets seized at the time of Suez, nationalize other French
investments, and expel French nationals.
Other Arab states are unlikely to follow Nasir's lead
Immediately. The issue is likely to be discussed at the
Arab League foreign ministers' conference in Baghdad on
28 January. French policy on Algeria and
have already been widely denounced in the. Arab
world. Any Arab leader failing to go along with the UAR in-
itiative would risk strong public disapproval.
Among the more severe measures available to the Arabs
would be Iraqi nationalization of France's 23.75-percent share
of the Iraq Petroleum Company, a move already being urged
by the UAR-influenced Lebanese press. A boycott of French
vessels at Arab ports could probably be undertaken effective-
ly. The UAR-dominated International Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions has such a move under consideration.
SECRET
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
.11.0 S-IL C"1 L.4
Growing Pressure for Korean Unification
rihe Chang 1VIyon government is concerned that an increas-
ing segment of public opinion favors some direct contact with
North Korea. Although South Korean economic conditions are
Improving, a small but vocal minority of intellectuals and
students is propagating the idea that unification based on a
vague formula of Korean neutralization offers the only solution
to the country's chronic economic difficulties. In addition,
some leaders of the conservative opposition, at a loss for
issues to differentiate their party from the administration,
are advocating exchanges with the Nortljj
ffhere is a widening rift between the older generation and
some of the younger educated group, who recall little of Com-
munist actions in the Korean war and favor some sort of ac-
commodation with the North. Furthermore, despite South
Korea's continued strong friendship for the United States, a
few student leaders are blaming their country's difficulties on
its continued close ties with the US. There also is some indi-
cation that discontent among the civilian youth is spreading to
the military, particularly to the younger officers.
recent months North Korean propaganda on Korean re-
unification has reached an all-time high,. Kim Il-sung called
last August for a loose federation of North and South Korea
and a joint economic commission to be composed of repre-
sentatives from both sides. Since that time Pyongyang has
bombarded the South with aid offers and detailed remedies for
South Korea's economic problems. Growing South Korean agi-
tation for contacts with the North probably will lead to a further
increase in Communist efforts to incite popular dissatisfaction
with the Chang Myon governmeng
*emits ruling party and responsible opposition leaders
have agreed to the establishment of a citizens' council on uni-
fication. The government also is attempting to implement ex-
tensive economic reforms designed to stem dissatisfaction ancjj
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
aromote public confidence. Seoul may be forced to counter
Pyongyang's progagarxda overtures with proposals of its own
for social and economic exchanges of a sort unacceptable to
the North)
CONFIDENTIAL
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
ttiri?
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
�1104
nor SW. ...�� � 41 ,1 -A, 4.1
Belgian Strikes
Observers in Brussels expect the Socialist-instigated
strikes now in their fourth week to be broken within the next
two weeks. The back-to-work movement continues in Flan-
ders and Brussels, and there are some signs of lassitude
even among the strikers in the south.
The government, which has recently asserted that there
is a systematic plan of sabotage, has recalled more troops
from Germany and ordered the police to use "more firmness."
The Socialist party has countered by urging the strikers to
fight to the finish and to topple the government. However,
Socialist leaders, realizing that the party's electoral pros-
pects are being adverskly affected by the growing public bit-
terness, are seeking a face-saving way out. In addition,
there are serious dissensions within the General Federation
of Belgian Workers (FGTB) and the Socialist party between
the Walloon strike leaders, who are reluctant to admit de-
feat, and the more moderate leaders who only reluctantly
went along with the strikes once they had started.
There is, however, danger of more violence and sabo-
tage. Serious riots occurred recently in Liege and Mons,
and Andre Renard, deputy secretary general of the FGTB,
continues to threaten to withdraw caretaker crews maintain-
ing fires in the blast furnaces.
Even if the strikes are settled soon, the Eyskens gov-
ernment appears doomed, and new elections are likely in
the spring. After the strikes are over, the Roman Catholic
trade unions (CSC), which have loyally supported the govern-
ment, are likely to demand such modifications of the omnibus
bill that Eyskens will be replaced. King Baudouin reportedly
is anxious to get rid of Eyskens and hopes to build a govern-
ment of "new men" which would seek to heal the cleavage be-
tween the Walloon south and the Fleming north.
11 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page; 10
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
enivrinrxrry A I
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
vulie 410
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172
/7/ zrz, wrzzz '80 ,z,ezzzfrzr zne
TOP SECRET 004:z
1;5,
r;#
orfe
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000172