CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000171
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 10, 1961

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10 January 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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TUP 5ILI;KL I
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110012-SE-C-RE-T-
. 10 JANVARY 1961
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China--Food shortages re-
sult in popular discontent.
Communist China to grant large credit
to Burma.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
Situation in Congo.
III. THE WEST
Majority of OAS members appear will-
ing to discuss multilateral break with
Cuba.
Watch Committee. evaluation of report
Castro to attack Guantanamo Naval
Base.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
N
No
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Communist China: ,Food shortages on the Chinese main-
land have become so severe that popular discontent is now
taking the form of open antiregime activities in some local-
ities. In late November and early December anti-Commu-
nist slogans were written on public buildings in both Dairen
and Hainan Island
food riots took place in Harbin in mid-December. with
70 persons arrested and summarily shotg
(Page 1)
*Communist China - Burma: Following successful set-
tlement of the Sino-Burrnese boundary question, Commu-
nist China is embarking on a major effort to expand its eco-
nomic and political ties with Burma. As a result of Chou
En-lai's trip to Rangoon, where the instruments of ratifica-
tion of the border treaty were exchanged, Peiping has agreed
to extend large-scale economic aid to Burma. A Joint com-
munique. issued on 9 January announced an economic and
technical cooperation agreement under which the Chinese
will provide an interest-free credit of about $85,000,000--
the largest amount ever granted by Peiping to a non-bloc
OK
C.)
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country. The Chinese will undertake the construction of un-
specified industrial projects in Burma. The new aid pact, as
well as a trade agreement signed in October 1960, will pro-
vide the basis for a much greater volume of Sino-Burmese
tvarla a anal the ChinesP have been seeking for some time.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
*Laos: The Communist airlift into Laos continues. Nine
flights possibly to the yang Vieng area, were confirmed on
9 January; eleven flights to Vang Vieng are scheduled on 10
January.
Four -6 aircraft were scheduled to arrive in Sava.nnakhet
on 9 January, and are to be flown to Vientiane on 10 January.
The T-6s will lve the Laotians a capability of interdicting the
Soviet airlift. Supplies for transshipment Laos
are Probably being moved into North Vietnam by rail.
the North Vietnamese refused to
permit the ICC to inspect a train possibly transporting military
equipment from Communist China on 23 December. This train
was at Lao Kay, the North Vietnamese entry point on the rail
line from Kunming to Hanoi. The North Vietnamese denied the
inspection on the grounds that the train was a "local." allegedly
*Congo: Indications that the Gizenga dissidents are continu-
ing to extend their control of areas of the eastern Congo have
coincided with reports of uncoordinated countermeasures on the
part of the Mobutu regime. An emissary of Mobutu is in Elisabe
vine for talks with Katanga President Tshombe concerning the
possibility of Katangan financial support for Mobutu's forces. In
Leopoldville, however, Mobutu's commissioner for finance re-
portedly assured UN representative Dayal on 5 January that the
017
In Tnrk
nAlT V lAR(EF
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economic blockade cf Orien
o v cf.'s, a should negotiate with the Stan-
kyvilk regime, including Gizlnga.
Some 600 Lumumbist troops have entered northern Katanga
and more are reported on their way in a move apparently aimed
at establishing an "independent" enclave within the province.
Tshomb4 has given the UN until midnight tonight to disarm the
invarj3rs or he claims he will c:der his troops to occupy UN-
controlled neutral zones alo
IIL THE WEST
Latin America: Officials of a number of Latin American
countries have stated that, while their governments
could not now unilaterally break with Cuba without beimg sub-
' jectA to the charge of too closely following US footsteps, they
maid support multilateral acUon severing diplomatic ties with
VI? Castro regime. A majority now appear ready to begin
looking toward a multilateral break and the imposition
economt- --,nctions, although the necessary two-thirds support
r such a,t..e.Ja by the OAS is still not certain. Two key countries--
nexico and Brazil--are in doubt, and Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador,
and the Dominican Republic appear at this time reluctant to
ata themselves with moves for strong action against Castro.
(Page 2)
Cuba:
10 Jan 1
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today that Fidel Castro intends to.
save his Cuba by launching a simultaneous air-ground attack
on Guatanamo Naval Base before the Kennedy inauguration,
claiming publicly that the US inttiated the action. The Cuban'
ambassador in Prague, who reportedly has been very nervous
in the past few days, allegedly left by air for England today,
ostensibly in response to a British Council invitation to his
wife to inspect the English school system."
Members of the Watch Committee of the USIB have indi-
vidually examined the above report and have evaluated it as
probably false. In reaching this evaluation, the committee
members note that the Mexican ambassador, who professed
to have gotten the report from a Czech official, is notorious-
ly unreliable. In any event, the Cuban first secretary would
be unlikely to have been informed of such an operation plan by
his government. Moreover, Castro is not considered to have
the capability, at least in the air, to succeed in such an opera-
tion, and a failure of this order would have disastrous conse-
quences for the Castro regime. It is unlikely that the Soviets,
whose advice would have some weight with Castro, would fa-
vor such a course of action in view of their current professed
conciliatory policy toward the President-elect. The Soviets
would probably estimate that an attack on Guantanamo would
result in the defeat of the Cubans at the hands of the US and
would show up their own unwillingness to honor their vaguely
worded promises of military support for Cuba.*
The Committee members further note that the report may
possibly reflectsan attempt by bloc elements to cause reactions
in US armed forces whose nature would support the internal
Cuban tension-building propaganda that a US invasion of Cuba
Is imminent. There is no information from other sources to
corroborate this report. Nevertheless, the possibility of mil-
itary action against Guantanamo by Castro, given his rashness
and instability, cannot be completely discounted.
4.v.kiteAssiptp#,Q00.-01pAlcor.Intelligence, Department of
the Army, would omit this sentence for the reason that it is esti-
mative in nature and thus beyond the purview of the Watch charter.
10 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Food Shortage Stirring Up Discontent in Communist China
ascontent strong enough to take the form of antir,egime
manifestations is reported in Communist China. The prin-
cipal cause is the effect of protracted food shortages--now
going into their third year, "Bad" living conditions and grow-
ing discontent were reported in late November on Hainan Is-
land. Anti-Communist slogans were painted on the walls of
official buildings in Paso, one of the island's Dort cities.
stevedores there could no longer carry heavy loads because
of undernourishmene.3
CA similar report has been received from Dairen, where
signs believed to have read "More Food" and "Down with Com-
munism" were being erased from public buildings in mid-De-
cember. An unconfirmed report
states that food riots occurred last month in Harbin
and that 70 persons were arrested and summarily executed.
There is considerable dissatisfaction among civilians in Dairen
over the army's favored treatment
GiThile the regime's controls appear more than adequate to
cope with the present scale of popular dissatisfaction, the near-
famine conditions may have resulted in organizational changes
in at least one and perhaps two provinces. According to the
Peiping press, the north coastal province of Shantung was the
hardest hit in last summer's drought. People's Daily announced
on 8 December that four neighboring provinces were organiz-
ing a major relief campaign to assist the people of Shantung.
Two weeks earlier the local press noted the ouster of the Shan-
tung first party secretary, Shu Tung. His replacement de-
clared that twi cadres should overcome the high and mighty
bureaucratisrn and habit of excusing themselves by pleading
special circumstances." The American Consulate general in
Hong Kong reports that there is also some evidence of a shake-
up in the Kwangtung party provincial committee. The number
of refugees fleeing Kwangtung into Hong Kong because of the
food shortage is increasing despite stringent border controls-:-/
-GONRDEN-T-M-L-
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Latin American Reactions to Cuban Situation
als of a number of Latin American countries have
F�CIffil'stated that, while their governments could not now
unilaterally break with Cuba without being subjected to the
charge of too closely following US footsteps, they would sup-
port mtatilateral action--1. e., through the 21-member Or-
ganization of American States (OAS)--severing diplomatic
ties with the Castro regime. Six governments had already
broken or suspended relations with Cuba prior to the US ac-
tion on 3 January. A majority of OAS members now appear
ready to begin discussions looking toward a multilateral break
and the imposition of economic sanctions, although the neces-
sary two-thirds support for such action by the OAS is still not
certain.
Colonabian Foreign Minister Turbay told the US ambas-
or on 5 'January he felt the time had come for collective
S action and urged the United States to make special efforth
pers.,: -de the three "doubtful" governments of Mexico, Bra-
arti. I.,!cuador, since he considered that unanimity was es-
_tidal for collective action to be effective. Mexican Foreign
rinister Tello had already advised the US Embassy that his
,;overiunent would feel obliged.to abstain on any OAS action
en under the Caracas resolution against international Com-
� Al1SM, but implied that Mexico would not actively oppose
:.ch action.
In Brazil, where policy making is virtually suspended
nding the President-elect's return from Europe and his in-
uration on 31 January, there is pressure for an attempt to
Liiediate US-Cuban "differences." The Ecuadorean Government, �
preparing to play host to the 11th Inter-American Conference
scheduled to open there in March, appears anxious to avoid any
action that might jeopardize its plans. Three other countries--
Chile, El Salvador, and the Dbminican Republic�appear reluc-
tant to associate themselves with moves for strong action against
Castro. In Chile, the government hopes to keep the Cuban
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Nad
problem out of the congressional election campaign during
the next two months, fearing a further swing to the left if
emotions are raised over the Castro issue.
Demonstrations by pro-Castro groups protesting the US
break with Cuba--in Uruguay, El Salvador, and Panama thus
� far--have been relatively ineffective, a fact that may encour-
age some regimes that have been reluctant to support anti-
Castro moves for fear of strong domestic reaction.
Argentina, whith has been the sharpest critic of Cuba
among the major Latin American countries, would probably
support economic sanctions against Cuba but would be reluc-
tant to break diplomatic relations at this time for both hem-
isphere and internal security reasons. The government be-
lieves it should maintain a listening post in Cuba, where a
number of important Peronista leaders reside, and Cuban
or:position leaders have requested Argentina to maintain its
embassy in order to furnish assistance to these seeking asy-
lum. The foreign minister has said that relations with Cuba
could definitely aot be severed before the 5 February local
and senate elections.
The Cuban situation is not now on the agenda for the Inter-
American Conference, which was prepared some time ago.
*t Uruguay is seeking to en-
large the arcenda to include "Communist penetration of Amer.
Some governments, on the other
hand, are giving thought to convening a special foreign minis-
ters' meeting to deal with Cuba, and Panamanian Foreign Min-
ister Solis told Ambassador Farland on 4 January that Panama
would be happy to host such a conference.
The US break in relations coincided with intensive prep-
arations within Cuba to resist "imminent aggression" and with
a drastic tightening of police state controls, leaving the majority
10 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Pais 3
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the people in Havana in a stit of frightened cxpectany.
the US
"had a conoiellrable impact upon the general public,"
-.717.1c1a had already bw t fool isolated from the rest of
hem' ere.
carmAL nfrimucinrcz BULLETIN
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. �
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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