CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000169
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 7, 1961

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7 January 1961
Copy No. C 76
GE\ TRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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7 JANUARY 1961
7"P
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev reportedly cites need to es-
tablish contact with new US administra-
tion as reason for postponing Soviet party
congress.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nigeria severs diplomatic relations with
France.
Somali defense officials indicate opposi-
tion to proposal for Anglo-Italian military
training mission, with preference for
UAR assistance. 0
Situation in the Congo.
Situation in. Laos.
III. THE WEST
Dominican Republic seeks diplomatic
relations with USSR and others of Soviet
bloc.
Panamanian security forces alerted to
possible clashes in capital between pro-
and anti-Castro factions.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Khrushchev stated at a reception in Moscow on
2 January that the Soviet party congress scheduled for Feb-
ruary will be postponed until later in the year, and he at-
tributed the postponement to the need to establish contact
with the new US administration, according to the Yugoslav
ambassador in Moscow. Khrushchev allegedly said he did
�not expect to meet with the new US President until perhaps
July. The Soviet leaders probably believe that the Chinese
Communist challenge makes it imperative that the forthcom-
ing party congress take unequivocal positions on doctrinal as
well as foreign-policy questions, and that this will be impos-
sible until the Soviet leaders have an opportunity to assess
the character and likely moves of the new US administration.
Khrushchev may also feel compelled to achieve some tangi-
ble success which can be used to demonstrate the validity
and effectiveness of his foreign policy before committing the
Soviet party to the kind of authoritative and long-range pro-
grams that are enunciated at party, congresses. It is also
possible that internal Soviet developments may be at least
partly responsible for postponement of the party congress.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Nigeria: The intensity of Nigeria's reaction to the third
French nuclear test�illustrated by the severance of diplo-
matic relations with Paris on 5 January�imposes a further
strain on the disposition of the Nigerian rulers to follow a
moderate and basically pro-Western course. Nigerian atti-
tudes toward the West, particularly the US, were already
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being affected by Western support for Kasavubu over Lu-
muxnba, who is regarded even by conservative Nigerians
as the Congo's legitimate premier. Prime Minister Balewa's
recent initial experience with the frustrations of the Alge-
rian situation and Nigeria's exposure this fall, for the first
time, to the prevailing currents in the Asian-African bloc at
the UN may also be contributing to an erosion of Nigerian
good will toward the West. (Page 1)
Somali Republic: An offer by Britain and Italy to estab-
lish a joint military a visory mission to train the Somali
Army is meeting opposition from Somali defense officials,
who favor UAR assistance for the new republic's embryonic
military establishment. These officials recently told mem-
bers of an Anglo-Italian negotiating team that lack of confi-
dence in British and Italian support of Somali nationalist
aspirations militated against the joint mission proposal. The
Somali Army chief also said that the first shipment of weap-
ons promised by Nasir was "being delivered now," and that
UAR instructors were expected. Somali interest in acquiring
military aid presumably has been heightened by recent clashes
along the ill-defined border with Ethiopia
II
Congo: The UN Command in Leopoldville has airlifted
a team, commanded by an Indian officer, to investigate the
31 December landing in Equateur Province of a UAR, IL-14
carrying aid for the Gizenga dissidents. In the Bukavu area,
tension appears to have eased, with the dissidents now mov-
ing to install a new government in Kivu Province under Lu-
mumba's erstwhile information minister, Anicet Kashamura.
(Page 4)
Laos: The Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in the Plaine des
Jarres area retain the initiative. The government outpost at
Ban Ban, northeast of Xieng Khouang town, has apparently
fallen. The Soviet airlift into Laos continues, with flights
7 Jan 61
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scheduled through 7 January. Most of these flights continue '
to be scheduled to the Yang Vieng area, suggesting Commu=
nist intentions to retain this strategic area either as a block-
ing position or as a staging area for a possible future attack
on Vientiane.
Detailing a long series of alleged acts of intervention in
Laos by the United States and its Asian allies, Hanoi issued
a lengthy memorandum on 5 January apparently intended to
answer recent Western charges of Communist intervention.
The memorandum also "deemed it necessary to emphasize"
that a reactivated ICC should deal only with Souvanna Phouma
as the "legal government of Laos." (Dn 3 January Soviet First
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, in a discussion with the
British ambassador, took the position that Souvanna's consent
was a prerequisite to reactivation of the icq
(Page 6) (MarT
III. THE WEST
Dominican Republic The Dominican UN delegation was
instructed on 13 December to notify the Soviet delegation
that the Dominican Republic desires to re-establish diplo-
matic relations with the USSR. The instructions,
also
ordered similar approaches to the Albanian, Czech, Hungar-
ian, Polish, and Rumanian delegations. These instructions
may be the outgrowth of advice given Generalissimo Trujillo
recently by a group of his most bitterly anti-US aides that he
align himself with the Sino-Soviet bloc and convert his re-
gime into a "socialist state" as the only effective means of
withstanding concerted United States and OAS pressure against
him. At this time, however, the Soviet bloc as a whole is un-
likely to take any action that would publicly associate it with
the unpopular Trujillo dictatorship, although the USSR may
have one or more members of the bloc establish relations.
(Page 9)
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Panama: Clashes between pro- and anti- Castro forces
may break out soon in Panama City as a result of publica-
tion of the government's plan to declare the Cuban ambas-
sador persona non grata for meddling in internal Panamanian
affairs.
both pro- and anti-Castro factions were preparing rallies in
the capital, and that goon squads supporting each faction were
coming to Panama City from the Atlantic port of Colon. Pan-
amanian security forces reportedly are on a semialert status.
Castro supporters in other Latin American countries may
also stage demonstrations similar to the one which occurred
in Uruguay on 5 January as a protest against Washington's
break with Havana
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Nigerian Attitudes Toward West Adversely Affected
The intensity of feeling aroused in Nigeria by the third
French nuclear test in the Sahara�reflected in the sever-
ance by Prime Minister Balewa's government on 5 January
of diplomatic ties with Paris�imposes a further strain on
the disposition of the leaders of Africa's most populous state
to follow a moderate and essentially pro-Western course.
France's two earlier tests also had evoked a strong popular
and official reaction and were an important factor in the
growth during the past year of sentiment for an "independ-
ent" foreign policy which would identify Nigeria closely with
Africa-wide interests. The failure of leading Western na-
tions--especially the US and UK--to react more vigorously
to South Africa's suppression of native rioting last spring
and to its subsequent refusal to abandon its apartheid policy
have likewise damaged the general Western image in Nigeria.
Such developments were effectively exploited by neutralist-
inclined Nigerian elements even before the country became
independent on 1 October.
More recently, the Congo situation, especially the arrest
of Lumumba by Colonel Mobutu's forces in early December,
has provoked unprecedentedly severe press criticism of the
US, NATO, the "colonial powers," and the UN, which have
been lumped together :as instigators of a plot against the Con-
go's sovereignty. When such attacks were at their height last
month the heaviest criticism was directed against the US, while
the USSR appeared to gain prestige for its pro- Lumumba posi-
tion. 'Ckyhile reaction on the official level was much more re-
strained, top Nigerian leaders�including generally conserva-
tive northerners�expressed to American officials strong
criticism of Lumumba's arrest and the failure of the UN to
insist on his release. Nearly all such Nigerians have little
use for the erratic Congolese leader, but they nevertheless
regard him as still the legitimate premier and appear to share
the general public's increasing tendency to view him as the per-
sonification of Africa in its fight against "imperialism n
Balewa's initial direct experience with the frustrations of
the Algerian situation--he recently visited Tunis and London
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in the apparent hope of playing some sort of mediatory role
between France and the rebels--and Nigeria's exposure this
fall, for the first time, to the prevailing currents in the
Asian-African bloc at the UN may also have contributed to
the apparent erosion of Nigerian good will toward the West.
EIeanwhile, Balewa's reported invitation to the Soviet
ambassador in Ghana to visit Lagos on 11 January to discuss
details regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations
� between Nigeria and the USSR suggests that the prime minis-
ter now feels he can no longer defer such action. At the time
of Nigerian independence celebrations Balewa had rebuffed a
bid by Soviet representatives for immediate relations and in-
dicated to US Embassy officials a desire to avoid them as long
as possible. Since then, there have been several additional
formal Soviet requests for diplomatic tiesD
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Somali Army Rebuffs Anglo-Italian Aid
an offer by Britain and Italy to establish a joint military
advisory mission to train the Somali Army is meeting opposi-
tion from Somali defense officials who favor UAR assistance
for the new republic's embryonic military establishment.
These officials recently told members of a joint Anglo-Italian
negotiating team, which arrived' in Mogadiscio in late Decem-
ber to discuss terms of a military assistance agreement, that
lack of confidence in British and Italian support for Somali
nationalist asRirations militated against accepting the joint mis-
sion proposal. j
Icrhe Somalis reiterated their desire to limit the British
and alian role to rear-echelon training and implied they were
considering UAR assistance for training the army's combat
elements. The Somali Army chief told the mission that the
first consignment of weapons promised by Cairo�presumably
under the accords reached by Nasir and Prime Minister Abdi-
rascid in Cairo last month--was being delivered and that UAR
instructors were expected with the weapons-3
aomali interest in acquiring military aid presumably has
been heightened by a recent flare-up between Somalis and
Ethiopian security forces in the disputed Haud region of east-
ern Ethiopia. Clashes occur sporadically throughout the year
between tribes from both sides of the ill-defined border, es-
pecially during the seasonal migration of Somali herdsmen in-
to Ethiopia in search of pasturage and water. The present dif-
ficulties may have been aggravated by Ethiopian preoccupation
with border security in view of the recent abortive collo in
Addis Ababa]
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The Situation in the Congo
Tension appears to have eased in the Bukavu area, with
the Gizenga dissidents now moving to install a new govern-
ment in Kivu Province under Lumumba's erstwhile informa-
tion minister, Anicet Kashamura.
The UN Command in Leopoldville has airlifted a team,
commanded by an Indian officer, to investigate the 31 Decem-
ber landing in Equateur Province of a UAR IL-14 carrying aid
for the Gizenga dissidents. The extent to which UAR personnel
at Gemena are able to conceal the actual purpose of the flight
may determine whether further such flights will be attempted.
There are indications that the trend toward political frag=
mentation in the Congo may continue.
Jean Bolikango--a leader of the
Bangata tribe and a member of Ileo's "shadow cabinet"--ap-
proached the Portuguese ambassador in Leopoldville concern-
ing Portuguese support for an independent state in Equateur
Province. Although the ambassador was noncommittal concern-
ing Bolikango's request for arms, he observed that
the trend toward autonomous provinces in the Cgo may bring
closer relations between the separate provinces and Portuguese
Africa. He noted that this tendency had already appeared in the
case of Angola's relations with Katanga.
On 5 January, Katangan Foreign Minister Kimba expressed
"surprise" at Kasavubu's proposal for a Congo round= table con-
ference in Leopoldville on 25 January. Noting that Tshombe had
earlier scheduled such a conference for Elisabethville on 15
February, Kimba stated that Katanga would not be represented
at Leopoldville.
Tshombe continues to face a major security problem in the
form of Baluba depredations in northern Katanga. UN officials
have indicated that certain UN forces in Katanga will be transferred
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to Kivu and Orientale provinces; and that Tshomb6's militia
will have to assume more extensive security responsibilities.
Tshombe's Belgian military adviser recently characterized
Katanga's 4,500-man militia as undisciplined and increasingly
anti-white; he stated that Tshombe has agreed to the recruit-
ment of an all-white company in Europe as a hedge against
any army revolt.
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CHINA
BURMA
THAILAND
SAYABOURY
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STATUTE MILES 100
UNCLASSIFIED
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GULF OF TONKIN
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,ARAVANE
Saravane.
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CHINA
NORTH VIETNAM
THAILAND
Thakhek
Savannakhet
CAMBODIA
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NE.4'
� Situation in Laos
The Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces retain the initiative in
Xieng Khouang Province; the government outpost at Ban Ban,
to the northeast of Xieng Khouang town, appears to have fallen
after having been under enemy pressure for some days. With
the fall of Ban Ban, the enemy would appear to have effective
control of the road leading from Nong Het, on the North Viet-
namese frontier, westward to the Plaine des Jarres. Govern-
ment troops remaining in this area, including some 300 para-
troopers dropped on 1 January, appear to be dispersed in the
jungle, he bulk of the troops in Xieng Khouang Province at the
time of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao offensive which began in late
December reportedly have withdrawn to an area about 45 miles
southeast of Xieng Khouang town. Estimated to number, between
1,200 and 1,500, these elements are said to be equipped with
small arms and to have left heavier equipment behind. Many
of these troops are Meo tribesmen, who in the past fought the
Pathet Lao with considerably greater ardor than did Lao troops.
Given proper leadership and equipment, they might at least pose
a strong guerrilla threat to the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces3
The ten Soviet IL-14s based at Hanoi flew logistic support
missions into Laos on 6 January and on the 7th were again scheduled
for flights into the yang Vieng area. Three North Vietnamese air-
craft were also scheduled for flights into Laos on 7 January.
Continued air support flights over the yang Vieng area indi-
cate a Communist intention to retain this strategic position on the
road between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. yang Vieng could serve
either as a blocking position to prevent an overland effort by troops
from Vientiane to retake the Plaine des Jarres or as a staging area
for a future attack on Vientiane.
Four hitherto unobserved Soviet KI-1 helicopters were noted
flying between Haiphong and Hanoi on the 6th; these aircraft prob-
ably recently arrived by ship at Haiphong or may have been carried
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aboard the Soviet AN-12s recently in the area. The MI-1 is
a small helicopter more suitable for observation than for car-
rying cargo. The five larger Soviet MI-4 helicopters which
� entered China on 23 December en route to Hanoi are scheduled
�to leave Nanning for Hanoi on 7 January.
While the bloc continues its appeals for the reactivation
of the International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos, it has
repeatedly asserted that any new commission must deal only
with Souvanna Phouma. The bloc has maintained the fiction
that Souvanna represents the legal government of Laos to pro-
vide a necessary cover for its continuing airlift of supplies to
the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. By predicating its appeal for
the ICC on the consent of Souvanna, the bloc has made it even
more difficult to reach any agreement in principle regarding the
reactivation of the ICC and will probably continue to exploit its
recent military successes in order to secure control of as much
territory as possible before the time comes for international
negotiation.
Souvanna Phouma's consent is a prerequisite to reactivation of
the ICC. This follows the even stronger declaration by the Chi-
nese Communists on 28 December] In that statement, Chinese
Foreign Minister Chen Yi said categorically that any reconvened
ICC "must not have any contact" with the Boun Oum government.
This same point was emphasized by Hanoi in a lengthy memoran-
dum issued on 5 January.
This memorandum made North Vietnam the first Commu-
nist-bloc nation to give public endorsement to a recent proposal
by Prince Sihanouk for an international meeting on Laos. The
meeting reportedly would be held in some neutral country and
would include representatives from Burma, Thailand, and South
Vietnam, along with the 1954 Geneva participants and members
of the ICC.
Additional warnings against further US "intervention" in
Laos came from Chinese Communist leaders on 6 January. Chou
En-lai, speaking in Rangoon, charged that armed intervention in
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Laos "endangered the peace of Indochina and the world."
Chu Teh, speaking at a Cuban Embassy reception in Pei-
ping, warned that US actions in Laos "endanger China's
security." He said that the US and its allies have "gone far
enough on this dangerous road and it would be most danger-
ous to go father?'
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Trujillo Seeks Diplomatic Relations With Soviet Bloc Countries
the Dominican
TJN-wanwuctetotL[yThSOviet delegation of
the desire of the Dominican Republic to re-establish diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union. The instructions also called
for similar approaches to the Rumanian, Polish, Czech, Hun-
garian, and AlbanL,n delegations. These instructions apparent-
ly are the outgrowth of advice recently given Generalissimo
Rafael Trujillo by his son Ramfis and a group of bitterly anti-
US aides that aligning himself with the Soviet bloc and convert-
ing his regime into "soci listic state" would be the only
means of withstanding concerted US and OAS pressure against
him. However, the Soviet bloc as a whole is unlikely to take
any action at this time that would publicly associate it with the
unpopular Trujillo dictatorship, although the USSR may have
one or more members of the bloc establish relations.
aime
hierarchy and at liquidating the pro-US underground, made
up primarily of members of the small Dominican middle
class. Trujillo, in anticipation of such economic sanctions
as were approved by the OAS on 4 January, has been attempt-
ing to develop commercial and more active diplomatic rela-
TT
1 ary
recommended that Dominican exiles,
pro-Communists and C stro sympathizers,
turn in order that the
sians."
several
e igence Service
many of whom are
be invited to re-
hing the Rus-
SIM has made
errorizing the local Catholic
tions with neutr list and Middle Eastern n
The regime reacted to the new OAS sanctions by accusing
the US consul general of being a spy. The Trujillo-controlled
Radio Caribe urged that the US Consulate be picketed, and later
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)1.1
In the day about 25 persons gathered around the consulate
carrying signs "Imperialist Yankees Get Out" The rubber-
stamp Dominican Congress reportedly has shelved temporar-
ily a law recently drafted to expel all US citizens and to end
consular relations with the US.
The consulate reported on 4 January that no organized
uprising by anti-Trujillo elements is in sight, but that assas-
sination plotters are increasingly active in the unciPmfrcnind
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--C4dALHVbtirrrAT, Nourr'
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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