MEMO TO ALEXANDER M. HAIG RE THE FOLL0WING MESSAGE (PHNOM PENH 357) WAS RECEIVED "TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY "TO: BRIG. GEN. HAIG, THE WHITE HOUSE "FROM: MR. LADD, PHNOM PENH 357, THIS MESSAGE IS AN UPDATING OF PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01520573
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01443
• Publication Date: October 21, 1970

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CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
21 October 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The following message (Phnom Penh 357) for Brigadier General
Haig was received from Jonathan Ladd this morning, 21 October 1970:
"Top Secret Sensitive Exclusive Eyes Only
"To: Brig. Gen. Haig, The White House
From Mr. Ladd, Phnom Penh 357
"1. This message is an updating of previous assessments.
"2. The enemy situation has not changed very much during the
past few weeks. There have been no major enemy unit movements
and I have not been able to find any significant reinforcements of
units that have been directly oriented against the Cambodians.
Indications are that the enemy continues to experience difficulties
in the logistics, communications and medical evacuation fields.
Enemy responses to limited FANK operational initiatives have not
been impressive and for the most part enemy activity has been
characterized by defensive tactics and occasional harras sing fires.
There are growing indications that fractures are oceuring in the
VC/NVA-Khmer Rouge relationship in several locations.. I believe
the enemy is building the structure for a logistical base area in the
vicinity of the triangle formed by Prek Kak (WU 6560), Kompong Thma
(WU 1481) Chamkar Leu (WU 3050) and that the Chenla operation Con-
stitutes a threat to this project - particularly if the operation turns ,
to the east. Although the flood waters have commenced to subside a
bit, it will be several weeks before the terrain dries up to the point
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where the the enemy can move overland with reasonable ease. Patterns
have not developed yet to indicate definitively that the enemy intends
to make his main effort in Cambodia. I anticipate little change in
the local enemy situation during the next 4 to 6 weeks.
"3. Within the limitations of its capability and the level of
assistance provided from all sources, FANK continues to develop
and to conduct both defensive and offensive operations in a most
satisfactory and encouraging manner. U.S. materiel military assistance
has been, and continues to be, utilized properly. Those FANK forces
trained in South Vietnam and equipped by MAP which have returned to
Cambodia have given FAN I( the flexibility to conduct limited offensive
operations against known enemy concentrations. These. operations
have forced the enemy to react to modest FANK initiatives. Stated
another way, FANK has moved from Phase I of its previously reported
strategy (defense and preparation) into Phase II (defense, preparation,
and limited offensive).
"4. The continuation of the wet season and apparent enemy
difficulties in several respects have, of course, also played a part in
permitting the continuing FANK development and the transition to the
second phase of its strategy.
"5. High morale and determination to establish national indepen-
dence continue to characterize almost every aspect of the Cambodian
effort. All official and most unofficial visitors to Cambodia with whom
I have had contact during the past two months, seem to have been
impressed with the commendable progress made by the Cambodians.
This is not to say that serious problems do not face this young republic
as there are many gaps to be filled both militarily and economically.
Rather, it simply means the Cambodians are conscientiously trying
to do their best with what they have and I believe they can be counted
on to continue to do their part.
"6. Operation Chenla is currently occupied with political warfare
and village defense training programs for the people in the areas FANK
now controls along, and adjacent to, Route 6 between Skoun and Tang
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Kouk. Preparations are being made to continue the advance north
and to the east of Tang Kouk at a date not yet determined or revealed
to me. Kornpong Cham will soon be reinforced by at least one of the
MSF battalions.
"7. On 14 October FANK initiated an operation to attack the
enemy to the south along Route 2, from Phnom Penh toward Takeo.
Four battalions are pushing south along Route 2, with two battalions
behind them in reserve. Two battalions are moving eastward toward
Charnbak (VT 7940) from Route 3. Two additional battalions are
prepared to move northward along Route 2 from Takeo. This operation
has not yet developed any significant enemy resistance and all contact
has been on FANK initiative. The head of the main force advancing
southward is in the vicinity of Chambak.
"8. On the morning of the 18th I left for Bangkok to attend a
meeting to discuss the modest development of a FANK UW capability.
If we can work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the Thais,
I think FANK and Thai Special Forces type units can work in combined
teams to show the flag and conduct psychological warfare in the northern
and northwestern provinces of Cambodia where there is presently no
significant GOC presence. I am insisting this time that all of the U. S.
officials concerned are singing from the same sheet of music before
we bring either the Thais or Cambodians into the picture. I don't want
another "Thai/Khmer volunteer regiment" misunderstanding to develop.
CINCPAC and MACV had representatives at the Bangkok meeting.
CINCPAC has a concept for UW operations in Northeastern Cambodia
that far exceeds my analysis of FANK's capability to conduct and
support such operations. Fortunately, MACV concurs with me, so
we can probably keep this otherwise worthy project within the realm
of reality.
"9. Lon Nol sent a message to Admiral McCain. through Embassy
channels requesting that General Sak Sutsakahn visit McCain in Hawaii
before McCain leaves for the U. S. late on the 25th. We forwarded
the message and you probably know of it already. We, of course, are.
fully aware of the content of the briefing Sak Sutsahanh will present.
With the possibility of an eventual ceasefire in the offing, General
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Lou Nol hopes to expedite his strategy and be able to establish a
FANK presence as far forward as possible before a cease fire occurs
and to have the maximum back up in country before his support from
us is possibly curtailed or cut off. He knows we can't support him in
his total concept to the extent he would like, but he nevertheless wants
to present his revised and expedited strategy to the highest level with
which he now feels he has a close personal relationship - that is Admiral
McCain, of course.
"10. An unusual situation concerning Vietnamization is beginning
to arise that no one anticipated when Vietnamization plans were de-
veloped or even as late as June of this year. The Cambodians are
currently actively engaged with and are occupying the attention of at
least four VC/NVA division equivalents. In III and IV Corps in Vietnam
and in most of II Corps the war has slowed up considerably since the
sanctuary incursions and the enemy campaign against Cambodia.
The attention of these VC/NVA units on Cambodia continues to relieve
considerable enemy pressure from South Vietnam and thus contributes
rather markedly to Vietnamization. The Cambodians are in quite close
contact with these major enemy units and are beginning to carry the
fight to him with fairly satisfactory results. As long as the Cambodians
are able to do this, they are certainly contributing to Vietnamization
in a most positive and direct way. The Cambodians need among other
things some artillery augmentation, training for their 12 helicopter
pilots, a company or troop of M113's, PDO web equipment, helmets
and flak jackets turned in by departing US troops, radios, etc. I am
informed that to obtain these things for Cambodia now will apparently
"impact unfavorably on Vietnamization". Therefore, they are not
available for Cambodia in spite of the fact they are in general abundance
in Vietnam and are being provided to the Vietnamese for "Vietnamization".
I, of course, recognize the vital importance .of Vietnamization, but
serious consideration should be given to the rather significant part the
war in Cambodia is playing in making the concept work. As long as the
Cambodians keep the 1st, 5th, 7th and 9th enemy divisions occupied
and off the back of III and IV corps, it certainly makes Vietnamization
easier to achieve. If in addition to keeping those enemy units off the
back of III and IV Corps, the Cambodians can kick them around a bit
(and they are willing to do so if they are able), it will even further
enhance Vietnamization. I understand that this matter of resource
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allocation is extremely complex and that it is most difficult to modify
firmly organized plans. I also know that situations can and often do
change considerably in short periods of time. I feel we should keep
ourselves flexible enough to consider the alternatives and options that
surface because of changed situations. Our planners should keep in
mind that for each minor bit of military assistance we have given to
the Cambodians, they have responded positively. From the near dis-
aster of five months ago, FANK has worked itself into a position of
relative military stability. My thought is that we have a good thing
going for us and I hope we won't let it fade away for complete and
absolutely inviolate adherence to a plan developed before we even knew
what these people could do for us or themselves or for Vietnamization.
I present this as food for thought. I guess what I am trying to say is
that there should be some rather sophisticated thought given to the
distribution of available material assets based on the degree to which
one activity or another impacts on the ultimate goal of Vietnamization
and not based upon a rigid plan for Vietnamization.
"11. The small arms and small arms ammunition situation is
well in hand and on-going projects to provide additional weapons are
contributing to standardization of weapons in main force units and to
the arming of self defense and paramilitary outfits. In the communi-
cations field, vast improvement has been made but there are still
critical requirements for PRC/ 25 radios. To fulfill operational needs
of the past few weeks we have diverted some 30 PRC/2 5's we had in
storage for the training program in Vietnam. We are still trying to
find replacements for them. I am advised PRC/ 2 5's are short world-
wide.
"12. With regard to the press, I think that for the most part
they are slowly coming around to an understanding of what is going
on here. At lunch the other day, John Wheeler told me he was doing
a story on how wounded VC/NVA prisoners in the Cambodian military
hospitals are getting the same treatment as FANK wounded. I don't
know whether or not he will ever send it in or if it will be published,
but it is a far cry from the course he was pe.rsuing eight weeks ago.
Henry Kax-nm told me recently that most of the journalists are
experiencing serious doubts about their earlier and totally pessimistic
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analyses of the situation here. It may still take a while for their
current feelings to make their way into print but I can sense a change
in their attitudes.
"13. At the present time Generals Sak Sutsakanh and Sappana
Nginn are enroute to Hawaii and Gen U-Say is at the UN in New York.
These are the stalwarts with whom I normally work in whom I have
most confidence. The fact that Lon Nol permits all three to be so far
away at the same time reflects, I believe, his confidence in the current
situation.
"Top Secret Sensitive Exclusive Eyes Only"
,////
Vls7
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
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