IRAQ AND AL-QA'IDA: INTERPRETING A MURKY RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01506324
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02373
• Publication Date: June 21, 2002

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Key Findings
Iraq and al-Qa`ida: Interpreting a Murky
Relationship
Intelligence reporting highlights more than a decade of contacts between
the Iraqi Government and al-Qa`ida based on shared anti-US goals and Bin
Ladin's interest in unconventional weapons and safehaven.
�
have reported on meetings dating from the
Persian Gulf war (1990-91) between senior Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin
or his lieutenants in Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
� Iraq and al-Qa`ida, despite competing secular and religious ideologies,
agreed as early as 1993 that they would not target one anothe
Both sides adopted a more belligerent anti-US
stance in 1998, when Saddam challenged UN weapons inspections and
Bin Ladin issued his now-famous.fatwa threatening US citizens
worldwide.
� In the past several years, Iraq reportedly has provided specialized training
to al-Qa`ida in explosives and assistance to the group's chemical and
biological weapons program, although the level and extent of this
assistance is not clear.
Our assessment of al-Qa`ida's ties to Iraq rests on a body of fragmentary,
conflicting reporting from sources of varying reliability. Our approach is
purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw connections, on the assumption
that any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements
could carry great dangers to the United States.
The pattern of contacts and cooperation between Iraq and al-Qa` ida over
the past decade reflects wariness coupled with recognition of potential
mutual benefit. In contrast to the traditional patron-client relationship Iraq
enjoys with radical secular Palestinian groups, the ties between Saddam
and Bin Ladin appear to be much like those between rival intelligence
services, with each side trying to exploit the other for its own benefit.
Baghdad was more willing to cooperate after the
African Embassy bombings in 1998 and al-Qa`ida's successful attack on
the USS Cole in October 2000.
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� We have few reports of contacts between al-Qa`ida operatives and Iraqi
regime officials. Limited direct interaction would help preserve security
and may reflect the concern of both sides that discovery of such a link
would provide the irtipetus for massive US strikes as the misdeeds of one
party could lead to punishment of the other.
� Overall, the reporting provides no conclusive signs of cooperation on
specific terrorist operations, so discussion of the possible extent of
cooperation between Iraq and al-Qa'ida is necessarily speculative.
Saddam had a liaison relationship with Bin Ladin only a few senior
officials would be aware.
if
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� An unresolved mystery surrounding Bin Ladin's years in Sudan is the
prominent role of Iraqi dissidents in al-Qa`ida. These individuals,
nonetheless, may have served as intermediaries with the Iraqi regime�a
link consistent with the exploitative nature of the relationship.
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Discoveries since 11 September shed new light on Iraqi training and
possible operational links to al-Qa`ida, which may be more fully developed
than we previously believed. Some of the most interesting include: (b)(1)
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Iraq provided unspecified training on
chemical or biological weapons starting in December 2000,
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� Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national in Malaysia, obtained a job
through an Iraqi Embassy employee as an airport expediter and facilitated
the arrival in January 2000 of Khalid al-Mihdhar�one of the 11
Scptember hijackers�to Kuala Lumpur for a key operational meeting
before Mihdhar traveled to the US. Reporting is contradictory on
hijacker Mohammad Atta's alleged trip to Prague and meeting with an
Iraqi intelligence officer, and we have not verified his travels through
other channels.
� As the Taliban Government in Afghanistan collapsed, at least some
al-Qa`ida operatives and fighters fled to Iraq, including most notably
senior al-Qa'ida operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, raising the possibility
that the Iraqi regime is complicit in providing safehaven for some of
these individuals.
We are looking closely for Iraqi regime connections
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Contents
page
Ke Findin s
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Sco e Note
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Conflicting Motives in the Relationship
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2
Early Ties From Persian Gulf War
The Sudanese Bridge Between Bin Ladin and Iraq
2
Conflict With the United States Advances Ties, 1997-98
4
Hints of Closer Cooperation, 1999-2001
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Iraq as a Potential Safehaven, 2002
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Scenarios Since 1998
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Next Steps
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Scope Note
This Intelligence Assessment responds to senior policymaker interest in a
comprehensive assessment of Iraqi regime links to al-Qa`ida. Our
approach is purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw connections, on the
assumption that any indication of a relationship between these two hostile
elements could carry great dangers to the United States.
� We reviewed intelligence reporting over the past decade to determine
whether Iraq had a relationship with al-Qa'ida and, if so, the dimensions
of the relationship.
� Our knowledge of Iraqi links to al-Qa`ida still contains many critical
gaps because of limited reporting and the
questionable reliability of many of our sources
Some analysts concur with the assessment that intelligence reporting
provides "no conclusive evidence of cooperation on specific terrorist
operations," but believe That the available signs support a conclusion that
Iraq has had sporadic, wary contacts with al-Qa`ida since the mid-1990s,
rather than a relationship with al-Qa`ida that developed over time. These
analysts would contend that mistrust and conflicting ideologies and goals
probably tempered these contacts and severely limited the opportunities for
cooperation. These analysts also do not rule out that Baghdad sought and
obtained a nonaggression agreement or made limited offers of cooperation,
training, or safehaven (ultimately uncorroborated or withdrawn) in an
effort to manipulate enetrate or otherwise keep tabs on al-Qa`ida or
selected operatives.
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vents 1990'202
Meetings in
Jordan between
representatives
of Iraq and Bin
Ladin.
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Bin Ladin
relocates
from Saudi
Arabia to
Sudan.
"Understanding" Hijazi travels
between al-Qa`ida to Sudan.
and Iraq not to
work against each
other. �
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�
Kuwait foils Iraqi-
First of at least
two meetings of
Bin Ladin and
senior IIS officials.
0
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Bombings of US Bombing of
Al-Qa`ida
Embassies in USS Cole.
attacks the
Africa.
�
World Trade
�
Center and the
Pentagon.
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Bin Ladin- -
Iraqi meetings
and cooperation.
sponsored assassination
attempt on former
President George Bush.
Ramzi Yousef
orchestrates bombing of
the World Trade Center.
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0 �
Al-Qa`ida Al-Qa`ida Some
training dispatches al-Qa`ida
camps two CBW associates
operational trainees to flee
in northern Iraq. Afghanistan
Iraq. to Iraq.
ET
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Iraq and al-Qa`ida: Interpreting
a Murky Relationship
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Conflicting Motives in the Relationship
Numerous intelligence reports on Usama Bin Ladin's
al-Qa`ida organization and the Iraqi regime indicate
that the two sides have had contacts and discussed
cooperation since the early to mid-1990s. Much of
the reporting is suggestive rather than conclusive, and
a review of al-Qa`ida's terrorist activity during this
period provides few indications the two have
cooperated on specific terrorist operations.
Nevertheless, common motives provide the
foundation for a relationship.
Shared Anti-US Agenda. Saddam Hussein and
Usama Bin Ladin share a hatred for the United States
and the Saudi royal family as well as a strong desire
to expel Western military forces from the Arabian
Peninsula. Bin Ladin's focus on opposing the United
States solidified during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm in reaction to the stationing of Western
forces on Muslim soil to attack another country�
Iraq.
� Bin Ladin and Saddam almost simultaneously
adopted a more confrontational stance against the
United States in 1998. Bin Ladin was able to
exploit Iraq's high-profile standoff and ultimate
expulsion of UN weapons inspectors.
� The Palestinian intifadah's anti-Western theme over
the past year may have spurred Bin Ladin and
(b)(3) Saddam to develop closer ties.
Plausible Deniability. Iraq's history as a state
sponsor of terrorism and its diplomatic goal of
eroding UN sanctions would make any cooperation
with al-Qa`ida an extremely sensitive
Our assessment of al-Qa`ida's ties to Iraq rests on a
body of fragmentary, conflicting reporting from
sources of varying reliability.
� Helps maintain security and prevents a backlash
among some al-Qa`ida associates who are hostile to
Saddam's secular ideology and policies.
This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis
Comments and aueries are welcome aric- may be directed to the Chief
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� Responds to concerns of both parties that discovery
of such a relationship would provide the impetus for
a massive US strike, and similarly, that the
misdeeds of one party will lead to punishment of the other.
Despite their shared goals, Saddam Hussein and
Usama Bin Ladin are not natural allies. Ideological
disagreements have fostered distrust between them
and rule out the sort of patron-client relationship that
Baghdad has forged with secular terrorist groups, "
such as the Abu Nidal organization (ANO).
(b)(3) Early Ties From Persian Gulf War
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 may have provided
the spark for Bin Ladin's first contacts with Iraq.
Angered by King Fand's decision to invite US forces
to defend Saudi Arabia, Bin Ladin reportedly tried to
avert a US military attack in Kuwait by sending
emissaries to Jordan to meet with Iraqi Government
representative
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� Iraqi agents, however, botched attempts to mount
� attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines in January
1991, while Iraq's most capable terrorist
surrogates�secular Palestinian groups such as the
Palestine Liberation Front�either remained on the
sidelines or lacked overseas infrastructure to carry (b)(1)
out attacks during the Gulf crisis.
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� The arrest and expulsion of
suspected Iraqi agents abroad during 1990-91
weakened Iraq's overseas terrorist capabilities,
which may have spurred Saddam toward new
methods, tactics, and alliances.
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Saddam's setbacks in 1991 failed to dissuade him
from striking US interests. In 1993, Iraq tried to
assassinate former President Bush during his visit to
Kuwait in a hastily assembled plot orchestrated by the
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IS). At the same time,
Sunni extremists with varying degrees of association
to Bin Ladin mounted a highly destructive attack on
the World Trade Center.
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The Sudanese Bridge Between Bin Ladin and Iraq
The alleged 1990 meeting in Jordan provided the
backdrop for direct contacts between Iraqi officials
and Bin Ladin in Sudan, where Bin Ladin moved in
1991. National Islamic Front leader Hassan
al-Turabi, who was promoting an ambitious pan-
Islamic foreign policy, reportedly helped Bin Ladin
develop relationships with Iran and Iraq,I
The reporting base emphasizes Bin
Ladin's interest in expanding his organization's
capabilities through ties to Iraq, but Saddam also ma:(b)(1 )
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have been equally intrigued by the prospects of using
al-Qa`ida to advance his own agenda.
� This directive followed a Bin Ladin
"understanding" with Saddam, according to
information released in US
court documents during the African Embassy
bombing trial.
Whatever the specific role of the Sudanese in
brokering contacts, Bin Ladin clearly was looking for
outside assistance in building a capable terrorist
apparatus and unconventional weapons capabilities.
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two sides also agreed to cooperate on unspecified
activities. (b)(3)
in 1996.
Bin Ladin
met with senior IIS representatives twice that year.
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We judge al-Qa`ida also could have benefited
indirectly from Iraqi support to Sudan's chemical
weapons effort during the mid-1990s�a period when
Bin Ladin's organization already was pursuing an (b)(1)
unconventional weapons capability (b)(3)
� Information acquired before and after the US strike
on the Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in
August 1998 suggests multiple links between Bin
Ladin and the plant, which in turn may have had an
Iraqi connection.
a key interlocutor
with Bin Ladin in Sudan was Faruq Hijazi
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� Saddam reportedly sent Hijazi to meet with Bin
Ladin at least twice
in Sudan
An Italian press report in 1998 alleges
Hijazi visited Sudan to meet Bin Ladin as early as
June 1994 and again in 1998 after Hijazi had been
named Iraq's Ambassador to Turkey.
An unresolved mystery surrounding Bin Ladin's
years in Sudan is the role of Iraqi nationals in
al-Qa`ida, characterized as Iraqi
dissidents who nonetheless may have served as
intermediaries with Baghdad. Saddam still could
have employed exploitive methods�such as threats
to family members and associates remaining in Iraq�
to engage al-Qa`ida through an unwilling Iraqi cadre.
Conflict With the United States Advances Ties,
1997-98
Contacts between al-Qa`ida and the Iraqi regime
persisted after Bin Ladin's move to Afghanistan in
mid-1996 as both parties began taking a more
aggressive stance against the United States and
al-Qa`ida associates apparently filtered into Kurdish-
controlled northern Iraq. Bin Ladin, for his part, may
have viewed US-Iraqi tensions as an issue he could
exploit. In February 1998�despite few indications
of contacts the previous year�Bin Ladin issued his
now-famous fatwa, declaring that all Muslims have a
religious duty "to kill Americans and their allies, both
civilian and military," worldwide.
� The timing of the statement appears linked to Iraq's
standoff against UN weapons inspectors in
February 1998 and the prospect of US airstrikes
against Iraq.
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al-Qa`ida may have
requested Iraqi assistance on chemical and
biological weapons (CBW)
By 1999, the reporting suggests al-Qa`ida established
a beachhead in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq,
possibly with Saddam's approval.
� Saddam may have perceived that Bin Ladin had
some interests in northern Iraq that could have
coincided with his own.
The ground for cooperation grew more fertile as both
parties in 1998 adopted a more aggressive stance
toward the United States. Just as Baghdad's standoff
with weapons inspectors coincided with Bin Ladin's
provocative fatwa in February, the UN's withdrawal
of inspectors in December based on Iraq's
noncompliance coincided with Bin Ladin's claim in
an interview that all US citizens are legitimate targets
because they pay taxes to the US Government.
Discussion on possible cooperation on CBW�and
possibly radiological or nuclear�programs may have
developed in earnest during this period.
Hints of Closer Cooperation, 1999-2001
A growing volume of
reporting�some of it probably circular and possibly
stimulated by perceived US animus toward Iraq�
since 1999 alleges Iraq's training of al-Qa`ida
personnel, especially in unconventional weapons.
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The CBRN Angle. The most ominous indications of
Iraqi�al-Qa`ida cooperation involve Bin Ladin's
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) ambitions. Although Iraq historically has
tended to hold closely its strategic weapons experts
and resources, Baghdad could have offered training or
other support that fell well short of its most closely
guarded secrets.
� Baghdad was more willing to cooperate after the
1998 Africa Embassy bombings and al-Qa`ida's
successful attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.
� Iraq provided unspecified chemical or biological
weapons training for two al-Qa`ida associates
beginning in December 2000.
Other Unconventional Training.
reports since 1999 suggests the Iraqi regime has
sponsored other training for al-Qa`ida. These reports
are part of larger body of reporting over
the past decade that ties the Salman Pak
Unconventional Warfare Training Facility, outside
Baghdad, to Iraqi surrogate groups such as
Arab trainees of
various nationalities. Reports surged after
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11 September from defectors of questionable
reliability who claimed that al-Qa`ida
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we cannot discount these
reports
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11 September and Other anti-US Attacks.
suggests ties
between Baghdad and the 11 September hijackers but
offers no conclusive indication of Iraqi complicity or
foreknowledge. A former Malaysia-based Iraqi
national, Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, facilitated the arrival
of one of the 11 September hijackers Khalid
al-Mihdhar for an operational meeting in Kuala
Lumpur in January 2000
Shakir worked for four months as a part-
time airport facilitator in Kuala Lumpur, a job he
claims to have obtained through an Iraqi Embassy
employee, the employee,
Ra'ad al-Mudaris, is a former US officer.
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� Shakir's travel and past contacts also link him to a
worldwide network of Sunni extremist groups and
personalities, including suspects in the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center and indirectly
to Bin I adin-associated (b)(1)
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A less productive lead came from foreign government
service indicating
that hijacker Muhammad Atta met with an IIS officer
in Prague in April of 2001. The reporting on this trip
is contradictory, and we have not verified Atta's
travel through other channels. At this time, the only
visit of Atta to Prague that is corroborated was in
June 2000. (b)(3)
Indications of an Iraqi connection to other major
terrorist attacks are similarly tantalizing but
inconclusive. Investigations of the 1996 Khubar
Towers and 1998 African Embassy bombings
uncovered no Iraqi involvement, although the
bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam fell on the
anniversary of the introduction of US troops into
Saudi Arabia in 1990�a date which, if relevant to the
attack, is significant both to Bin Ladin and Saddam.
Although the investigation into the attack on the USS
Cole in October 2000 unearthed no specific Iraqi
connections, fragmentary reporting points to possible
Iraqi involvement.
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Iraqi Links to the First World Trade Center
Attack
A judgment that Iraq is behind the 1993 bombing
would rest on the assumption that Baghdad
forged operational ties within the worldwide
network of Sunni extremists almost immediately
after the Gulf war, and some information could
suggest such a conclusion.
� Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the first World
Trade Center attack and a follow-on plot in
Manila, entered the US on an Iraqi passport
without a US visa in 1992. Yousef fled the US
after the attack with a passport based on
documentation from Kuwait�the types of
documents Iraq would have been in a position
to confiscate during its 1990-91 occupation of
Kuwait.
� Abdul Rahman Yasin, a fugitive in the
bombing, is of Iraqi descent, lived in Iraq as a
child, and fled to Iraq in 1993 with Iraqi
assistance following the attack. Another
potential Iraqi link is the maternal uncle of
convicted bomber Jordanian national
Mohammad Salameh, who held a Fatah post in
Iraq.
We have indications that support skepticism of
Iraqi involvement.
�
suggests
that stolen Iraqi passports appeared in
abundance at the time of Yousef s entry into the
US, so Yousef would not have had to have
received his from Baghdad.
� We have no indication Iraq has used
confiscated Kuwaiti documentation to create
false identities
� On the fugitive Yasin, Baghdad has offered the
explanation that it has held Yasin for fear that
, Washington would misrepresent Yasin's role in
the attack to implicate Iraq. Baghdad has a
history of holding detainees for long periods to
use as political leverage.
� If Salameh's Palestinian uncle in Iraq acted as a
controller for the bombers, Baghdad probably
would have forbidden him to relocate to the
West Bank, where he settled in 1995/
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Iraq as a Potential Safehaven, 2002
reporting show that
unknown numbers of al-Qa`ida associates fleeing
Afghanistan since December have used Iraq�
including the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq,
Baghdad, and other regions�as a safehaven and
transit area. We lack positive. indications that
Baghdad is complicit in this activity, but the
persistence of an al-Qa`ida presence and the
operatives' silence about any harassment from Iraqi
authorities, who closely monitor the population, may
indicate Baghdad is acquiescent or finds their
presence useful.
� Senior al-Qa`ida terrorist planner Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad in late May 2002,
seeking medical treatment for war injuries,
Zarqawi apparently traveled to Iraq in alias.
� In the north, the Iraqi Government does not control
the base of operations for the Islamic extremist
group Ansar al-Islam,
that indicates Iraqi intelligence operatives are active
there. Some al-Qa`ida associates may have
migrated to Kurdish areas of the country now
controlled by Ansar.
Saddam has tried to dispel perceptions of Iraqi ties to
al-Qa`ida since 11 September, lest he undermine his
strategy to isolate Washington in the region and in the
UN Security Council.
Scenarios Since 1998
If Iraqi cooperation with al-Qa`ida has increased
since 1998, both sides would certainly have taken
steps to mask it.
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Foreign nationals supported by Baghdad also could
play a role
� In Malaysia, where an Iraqi Embassy employee
assisted the Iraqi national airport facilitator who
met one of the hijackers in January 2000.
� And possibly in the Czech Republic, where
hijacker Mohammad Atta may have had dealings
with an IIS officer.
in
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