(EST PUB DATE) HISTORY OF THE FI SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE GROUP

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01492639
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 182
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2022
• Case Number: F-2018-02617
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965

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HISTORY OF THE Fl SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
GROUP (1959-1965)
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SE T
The Scientific Intelligence Group
of
The Foreign Intelligence Staff
1959-1965
F�r
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Contents
Foreword
I. The Bissell Era, 1959-1961
A. Impact of the Inspector General's Findings
B. Programming for Scientific Operations. �
�
Page
iv
1
1
13
The Helms Era, 1962-1965
58
A. Proposal for a Centralized S&T Operational
Effort
58
B. Establishment of a Strengthened Scientific
Intelligence Group in Fl Staff
67
C. Staffing Problems
75
D. The Operational Role of SIG
89
E. Initiatives and Conflicts
111
III. The Fitzgerald Era, 1965-1967
132
Appendixes
A. Glossary of Abbreviations
163
B. Source References
164
Illustrations
�Figure 1. FI/SIG Personnel, September 1962
69
Figure 2. Table of Organization, February 1964. . �
�
79
Figure 3. FI/SIG Personnel, July 1964
83
Figure 4. FI/SIG Personnel, January 1965
84
Figure 5. FI/SIG Personnel, January 1966
88
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A.
B.
Inspector General's
Staff Study
Operations
Attachments
1959
Survey of Fl Staff,
on Scientific and Technical
C.
Draft CSN on Assignment of Indicators to
FI/SIG, 1964
D.
E.
Draft CSI on
Draft CSI on
Scientific Operations, 1965
1965
(W(1 )
(b)(3)
F.
Staff and Diviion Comments on Draft CSI on
Scientific Operations, 1965
G.
Fitzgerald Memorandum to Chiefs of Staffs and
Operating Divisions on Staff Coordination and
Support of Clandestine Collection of Scientific
and Technical Intelligence, March 1965
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FOREWORD
Up until the late Fifties in the Directorate of
Plans the Foreign Intelligence (Fl) Staff had been the
principal custodian of interest and the mainspring of
action in developing clandestine collection efforts
against important foreign scientific and technical pro-
grams. Under the impact of the Inspector General's re-
port on Fl Staff in 1959 and with the installation of
the new Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Richard Bissell,
on 1 January 1959, much of the responsibility for plan-
ning initiatives, research and development, and direct
operational action in response to S&T requirements, which
had hitherto been lodged in Fl Staff by explicit charter
or established practice, was for the most part placed
back upon area divisions and (for R&D in support of
operations) upon Technical Services Division.
During the "Bissell era" (1959-1962) the former
Scientific Operations Branch, now renamed the Scientific
Intelligence Group of Fl Staff, completed its trans-
mutation from a largely action-oriented collection
function to an advisory, support and coordinative role.
The following account picks up the chronicle of the
Scientific Intelligence Group from the onset of that
transition and carries it forward into 1966.
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I. The Bissell Era: 1959-1962
A. Impact of the Inspector General's Findings
The year 1959 in the annals of the Clandestine
Service (CS) was a year of transition and self-exam-
ination, brought on in no small measure by a deepening
concern about the impact of Soviet achievements in
military and space technology. To be sure, the stir-
rings of change and the need for better intelligence
on the Soviet Union had already been felt at all levels
of Agency management even before the electrifying
Sputnik successes in 1957. It was in this atmosphere
in the summer of 1958 that the Inspector General began
a survey of the Foreign Intelligence Staff, 1/ an im-
portant share of which was devoted to the Scientific
Operations Branch (hereafter referred to as the Branch).*
*Except for the initial use of "Scientific Operations
Branch" in the section heading by that title, the Inspector
General's Survey of Fl Staff uses throughout the abbre-
viation "SOD" in referring to the Branch. That abbre-
viation had remained in use from the time Scientific
Operations Division, as it was then known, was a part
of the Requirements Staff. Early in 1959 it was decided
by C/FI to drop the use of "SOD" and to adopt the abbre-
viation "SOB", in order to reflect clearly the subordina-
tion of the scientific staff element to Fl Operations
Division.
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Submitted in February 1959, this survey was generally
critical of the Branch while acknowledging the exem-
plary performance of its former chief.
Early in December 1958 Thomas Karamessines,
Acting Chief of Operations, directed the assignment
of
to the Branch as its new Chief;
the appointment was made effective 1 January 1959.
had just returned from a PCS assignment in
as Deputy Head of a
processing
unit, and as Chief of �its CIA element; this unit was
responsible for processing the product of a large
technical collection operation In
that position
had regular contact with the
representative of the Office of Scientific Intelligence
(OSI)
and with visitors from head-
quarters responsible for finished intelligence on
foreign scientific developments. In addition,
dealt with
officers responsible for scien-
tific information requirements and with officials of
In outlining
new responsibilities,
Karamessines took note of this experience and the
good relations
enjoyed with senior OSI
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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officials as a basis in part for his selection as
Chief of Scientific Operations Branch.
re-
minded Karamessines that he had no professional train-
ing or academic background in science and technology.
Karamessines assured
that this had been taken
into account and that it had not been considered im-
portant that the.chief of the Branch be a scientist
or engineer; on the contrary it was to be preferred
that he be operationally oriented, familiar primarily
with the mission and
managing technically
Survey, Karamessines asked
needs of the CS, and capable of
trained officers. Citing the IG
to give particular
attention to reorganizing and remotivating the Branch,
improving its relations with OSI*, strengthening S&T
training programs for CS officers, and stimulating
more vigorous area division actions to collect required
S&T information.
The early months of 1959 were devoted to reorgani-
zation and redirection of the Branch, essentially
along the lines recommended by the Inspector General.
*The IG had reported that the "relations between SOD
and OSI are among the worst in the Agency and must be
corrected by drastic action if the Agency is to improve
the collection of scientific and technical intelligence
information. 2/
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The IG Survey of Fl Staff had made 23 specific recom-
mendations concerning the Branch, in all but two of
which the DDP concurred either outright or with some
modification. One of the two recommendations in which
the DDP did not concur arose from a simple misunder-
standing on the part of the Inspector General which was
later resolved to his satisfaction. 3/* The other bore
on the question of rotation of officers between the
Branch and OSI. 4/ The IG felt that this would be bene-
ficial to both offices; but neither was happy with the
proposal, and in the end the DDP recommended that the
DCI disapprove the recommendations. 5/**
The twenty-one IG recommendations concerning
the Branch in which the DDP concurred tended to cluster
around seven objectives:
a. removal of the Branch from active engage-
ment in clandestine operations and overt collection
*This concerned 1ho nhvsioal division at headauarters
rolimall samples
for laboratory testing (WO)
(b)(3)
The Inspector General felt that dividing the sample
might be detrimental to analytical work on the material.
However, it was demonstrated, on evidence from the
laboratories themselves, that no such damage would occur.6/
**This issue will be treated in more detail in Section B
of this chapter.
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0.LA-1.111.1.
of scientific information;
b. greater emphasis on staff support and
guidance to area divisions in scientific operations;
c. development of comprehensive plans and pro-
grams for improving clandestine collection of required
scientific information;
d. disposition of the research and develop-
ment projects managed and controlled by the Branch;
e. wider use of OSI specialists for temporary
assignment to the Clandestine Service;
f. removal of the Branch from activities which
were properly the responsibility of other components,
such as processing of S&T requirements,
on S&T subjects, and presentation of training
courses;
g. revision of the mission, organization,
management, and future
Fl Staff. 7/
By March of 1959
Branch and its
and
status of the Branch within
authorized
T/O o
clericals; on board at the
had re-organized the
professionals
time were
professionals. 8/ Four sections were established
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instead of five. The former Admin Support Section
was dropped and its clerical staff was distributed
among other parts of the Branch. Section heads were
named for Sciences Section, Conference and Exchange
Section, and the Operations Support Section. The
Astrophysics Section which
had a T/O of
had established
professionals but no incumbents.
She had had great difficulty in finding qualified
guided missile and astronautics specialists for this
Section, even with the personal support and assistance
of the Directorcf Personnel. 9/ These recruitment
difficulties persisted well into 1959 and by mid-summer
the concept of an Astrophysics Section was dropped. 10/
Work on collection problems in that field was handled
by one or other of the officers in the Sciences Section,
as it had been all along. By late 1959 the Branch did
succeed in the external recruitment of a young mathe-
matician and physicist with some aeronautics experience;
he was assigned to Sciences Section, first to train
and later to provide
of the collection of
The problem of
staff guidance on some aspects
missiles and intelligence.
morale in the Branch, to which
the IG had alluded in his Survey, 11/ appeared to be
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satisfactorily resolved by the time this first re-
organization and allocation of section responsibilities
had been accomplished.
Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1959 most
of the other actions recommended by the IG were being
carried out. Officers in the sections had been strongly
admonished to give close attention to their staff support
and guidance responsibilities.* They had begun to divest
themselves in an orderly fashion of case officer chores
which could more appropriately be handled by area divi-
sion officers.** By direction of Chief, Fl the Branch
safehouse was turned over to the Special Operations
Group of FT Staff. Responsibility for supervising
collection of Soviet material was passed to SR Division.
were discontinued;
*In one of his most strongly worded criticisms of the
Branch the IG observed that "by its own overriding emphasis
on operations, SOD has on many occasions destroyed the
image of itself as a staff willing to advise and assist
the area divisions and instead has created an image of
itself as a malevolent staff competitor." 12/
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and the dissemination of FBI reports on scientific
matters was turned over to CI Staff. 14/ Procedures
were being established for coordinating overseas
travel of U.S. scientists with CIA missions, for the
review of individual scientific and technical require-
ments by RQM, and a good start had been made on the
development of S&T training methods and courses for CS
officers. 15/ A further recommendation of the IG,
affecting three R&D projects of the Branch, was about
to be implemented. These projects had been administered
by the staff since 1953 at an annual cost of around
they were designed to develop techniques for
collecting
It was the judgment of the IG that they should be trans-
ferred to TSS in order to free the Branch to perform
other more appropriate operational functions. 16/
By mid-1959 the Branch had begun negotiations with
TSS to effect transfer of responsibility for con-
tractual arrangements with and
for funding the projects. The Branch reserved respon-
sibility for providing operational guidance and
evaluating operational applicability of the techniques
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developed. By January 1960 technical and administra-
tive control of the projects had been effectively
lodged with TSS. 17/
In short, the Branch was well on its way toward
repairing one of the two major faults noted by the
IG, failure "to understand its paramount staff function." 18/
The other major fault was described as a lack of compre-
hensive planning for a CS-wide attack on the S&T
intelligence problem.
Instead of jumping from one activity to another,
SOD should survey the over-all DD/P scientific
and technical intelligence collection effort
and should systematically develop and recommend
action for the correction of deficiencies. 19/
This subject -- the effort of the Branch to establish
a broad CS-wide collection program -- will be treated
separately in the next section.
Before we go on to that subject, however, there
was one other point raised by the IG which needs
discussion. This concerned the status of the Branch,
that is, the question of its proper place within the
CS organization.
Following his inspection of Fl Staff the IG, in
February 1959, had suggested that Chief, Fl consider
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upgrading the Branch to division status, thus putting
it on a par with other Fl divisions. However, by
the time the IG had completed a further inspection
within the CS, this time a survey of the immediate
DDP area which was submitted in July, 20/ he had a
more radical plan to recommend, namely, the merger
of the Branch with TSS. By that time, almost a year
after he had begun the inspection of Fl Staff, the IG
was apparently convinced that reliance on existing
CS organizational patterns and operational approaches
were not enough to give the required impetus to CS
efforts to collect scientific and technical intelli-
gence information. The IG concluded that
The DD/P must break the conventional case
officer-agent approach to all clandestine opera-
tions and must aggressively seek the assistance
of science and technology if it is to meet
increasing responsibilities in this crucial
field...The first step in this direction should
be the merger of TSS and SOD. 21/
The IG rationale for this position was twofold:
lack of operational insight on the part of the numerous
TSS scientists and engineers, and "lack of adequate
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numbers of scientifically and technically trained
personnel in the Branch." 22/ It was the conviction
of the IG that merger of the Branch with TSS would
serve to correct these deficiencies. TSS would be
brought into closer daily touch with operational
realities, and the Branch, in its guidance and tech-
nical advisory functions, would be able to fall back
on the large number of trained specialists in TSS for
scientific and technical assistance. Underlying this
rationale was the deeper but vaguer conviction of the
IG that somehow the CS would have to gear itself to
make better use of the resources of science and tech-
nology to improve its operations, especially against
the Soviet Union.
The IG went on to propose that the merged unit should
seize the initiative in identifying problem areas in
S&T collection and in conceiving solutions', that it
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should make full use of the ideas and facilities of
OSI, and that it "must achieve a quantum leap in the
application of science and technology to the problems
of intelligence." 21/* The DD/P was enjoined to support
all measures to bring home to the entire CS "the im-
portance of science and technology in accomplishing
overall missions." 2...5/
After considerable study and discussion with Fl
Staff, and between the Staff and the DD/P throughout
the summer and early fall of 1959, the Chief, Fl in
comments to Chief, Operational Services on the IG
Survey of the DD/P, recommended against the merger
of TSS and the Branch. aq/ He argued that the Branch
had already been redirected in its functions and re-
organized along the lines recommended earlier in the
year by the IG and "that further experience with the
present role of Fl/SOD should be acquired and assessed
before further changes in its status are considered." 27/
*This ambitious and visionary goal turned out, in the
long run, to be beyond the means of the Clandestine Ser-
vices. The "quantum leap" envisioned by the IG became
the basis for the charter of a new directorate for
science and technology in the Agency -- the Deputy
Directorate for Research, established in February 1962
and later renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science
and Technology.
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The Fl Staff view prevailed and the merger did not
take place.
In January 1960 the Branch began to function as
a staff element reporting directly to Chief Fl and
was redesignated Scientific Intelligence Group. Its
functions were essentially those
had proposed
to the DD/P by memorandum in August; 28/ they were
approved by the DD/P in September. 29/ They underlined
the support and guidance role of the Branch (now to be
known as FI/SIG) and its emphasis on establishing
objectives and a program for collection of S&T informa-
tion. The statement of these functions was further
refined and eventually incorporated into the official
Instruction on Fl Staff in March of 1961. The Group,
which meanwhile had been reduced in size by direction
of the DD/P, 30/ functioned under this charter and
concept of its role until mid-1962.
B. Programming for Scientific Operations
Perhaps the most important work performed by
the Branch in the three years from 1959 through 1961
was in program development. For a decade before that
the Branch had functioned as a quasi-operations ele-
ment, while performing a variety of staff support
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and guidance tasks. But as the IG had noted, it had
"no long-range plan for improving scientific and tech-
nical intelligence collection in the Clandestine
Services." 31/ He went on to conclude that it should
direct its efforts toward "the development of specific
goals and implementing plans for DD/P-wide efforts..." 32/
By the summer of 1959 the Branch had mapped out
plans for a survey of area division collection activi-
ties directed toward procurement of S&T information.
Divisions were asked to begin assembling data on their
current programs for such collection; the stated ob-
jectives branch by branch, the types of requirements
guidance in use, operational activities underway or
under development, and manpower assigned to S&T
activities in the field and at headquarters.*
Several problems were encountered at the outset
of the survey. The annual program guidance from the
DDP/Projects and Programs Group referred only to
broad types of operational activity, such as positive
intelligence operations which were to be covered in
*These data requirements were discussed at length
with Fl representatives from all area divisions in a
special meeting convened by C/FI on 24 July 1959.
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the program statements. Nowhere in the guidance was
separate treatment of scientific and technical informa-
tion collection required. Divisions were simply not
accustomed to programming for S&T collection, as
they were for economic and political information. 33/
Early in the survey, also, it became clear that there
was disagreement and some confusion over terminology,
and over an acceptable means for counting manpower
assigned to S&T tasks.
As to terminology, a major stumbling block in
the way of coherent communication was the abbreviation
"S and T" itself, as applied to operations and to
intelligence. A strong and vocal school of thought,
particularly in what were then SR and EE Divisions,
held the view that there was no such thing as an S&T
operation, that "an operation was an operation,"
whether the collection objective was political, mili-
tary, economic, or scientific and technical informa-
tion. SR Division, particularly in its Reports and
Requirements Staff, took the position that it had all
along been emphasizing operational efforts to acquire
high priority, classified information on major Soviet
military capabilities and weapons technology. By
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implication at least, this meant that a special "drive"
or program in the CS to single out scientific and tech-
nical information objectives for attention was not
necessary. In the SR Division view what was lacking
was sufficient emphasis on the Soviet target as a
whole and the availability of adequate numbers of Soviet
specialists in the CS.* There was as yet no place in
the lexicon of SR, or other divisions for that matter,
A)27"S&T operations" or for "scientific operations"
in the sense that that phrase was used in and by
the
Scientific Operations Branch.
To be sure, the phrase "scientific operations,"
unless exactly defined, was ambiguous. As used in
the Branch it was of course intended to convey the
objective of the operation, not its technique, and it
is probable that area division officers who dealt often
with the Branch were not really confused by the locution.
The phrase "S&T operations" was more practically
troublesome because the included phrase "technical
*The basis for this position had been established by
a DD/P memorandum of 2 September 1959 to all Chiefs of
Division directing expanded action against the Soviet
target and the training of additional CS officers as
Soviet specialists by rotation into SR Division. 34/
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operations" already had currency in CS tradecraft
nomenclature (to refer specifically to
and technical collection was
already well understood to include SIGINT, photorecon-
naissance, and other, usually non-agent, collection
methods. It was therefore a legitimate demand of divi-
sion officers that the staff provide clarification of
these terms so that they could properly sort out the
activities they were expected to report on. It was
some time, however, before agreed and standardized
nomenclature became generally accepted in the CS.
Meanwhile, during the annual program exercises in early
1960 and 1961, operations to collect scientific and
technical intelligence were variously referred to as
"scientific intelligence collection," "scientific opera-
tions," or "S&T operations."
Finally, in March 1961, the terminology issue
came to a head on the occasion of a long memorandum
to Bissell from
then Chief of SR Division. 35/
memorandum was essentially a review of SR Divi-
sion operational philosophy as applied to clandestine
collection of scientific and technical intelligence.
In it
began by offering his definitions of
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scientific and technical intelligence and scientific
and technical operations. In his view, "S&T opera-
tions" should mean collection of scientific and tech-
nical intelligence, and "technical collection opera-
tions" should be used for collection employing special
techniques or methods (e.g. ELINT techniques). Fl
Staff proposed improvements on these definitions in
April. 36/ They were further refined in several meet-
ings with representatives of area divisions and later,
in June, were promulgated in a guidance paper prepared
by FI/SIG over Bissell's signature. 37/ The term
"scientific operations" was henceforth to be used for
collection activities "designed to satisfy require-
ments for scientific and technical intelligence," and
each of these two types of intelligence was separately
defined. 38/ In spite of the discussion and effort
which went into these definitions, they did not in
practice become standard, except in communications from
the staff and the office of the DD/P. Frequently
divisions lapsed back into the use of "S&T operations,"
but in general it was understood and accepted hence-
forth that this term did not cover technical collection
activities.
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OBUMET
The dispute over terms was not frivolous. A
lasting benefit from the tedious preoccupation with
definitions probably was to be found in the gradually
increasing awareness of case officers and division
management of this genre of operations and their place
in the CS mission. Also the dispute was symptomatic
of real and deeper concerns among CS operators; it
formed, as it were, an obbligato over the more funda-
mental themes of operational philosophy, the best ways
to use CS resources to answer increasingly urgent re-
quirements for scientific and technical information
from denied areas.
From the first day of the Bissell regime it was
clear that manpower requirements would be a crucial
issue in any plans of the DD/P to intensify the CS
attack on S&T information targets. Within the CS there
was a dearth of operations officers with up-to-date
scientific training and intimate acquaintance with S&T
information requirements. Within TSS there were many
scientists and engineers, but these were not operations
officers. Outside the CS the largest pool of scien-
tific and technical talent was in OSI. Early in 1959
attention was given to OSI as a possible source of
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manpower assistance in operations, rather than to
TSS, because of OSI's responsibilities for S&T intelli-
gence production and initiation of requirements.
But as we have seen, in the previous section, the IG
later in the year envisaged TSS as the in-house supplier
of the required S&T talent, this time arguing that the
full arsenal of science and engineering would be needed
to equip the CS for its new collection responsibilities.
Because of his close personal acquaintance with
Herbert Scoville and understanding of Scoville's re-
sponsibilities as AD/SI, it was natural that Bissell
should seek ways to make use of OSI specialists in
the CS. This became a recurrent subject for dis-
cussion within the CS and between the CS and OSI for
many months.
Bissell expressed himself as favoring some ro-
tation of officers between OSI and the CS, and of using
the inducement of higher rates of paypif necessary to
attract scientific specialists into the CS. He was
not in favor of a separate career service in the CS
for such specialists. 39/
The Bissell policy on manpower resources in-
cluded two related theses: one, that the CS should
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increase its effective case officer strength for use
in operations by intensive training, specialization,
and improved professionalism (this was what he so
aptly dubbed "capital formation"); the other, was the
conviction that the CS was "fat at home, lean abroad,"
and that more of its trained and ready officers should
be moved out of Washington to the operational theatres.
As this policy affected the Branch's staffing it meant,
first, that only the most able and scientifically
trained specialists should be sought to fill existing
vacancies, and second, that non-scientific positions
should, so far as possible, be eliminated. 40/ In terms
of numbers, this meant that the original Branch comple-
ment of
professionals was to be reduced to
Authorized strength remained at that lower
level throughout Bissell's tenure; but by the end of
1961, as a result of recruitment difficulties and trans-
fers out of the Branch, only professionals were
actually on board.
Bissell was early persuaded that the CS and OSI might
somehow agree on a rotational scheme beneficial to both
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parties.* There was much discussion, dispute within
the CS, and correspondence on this topic well into
1960. The Branch had given its views on the subject
to Bissell early in 1959, and its comments on the
first IG survey. 41/ The Branch argued that the tem-
porary assignment of OSI specialists to the CS would
tend to delay the formation of a strong permanent
cadre of operations officers with S&T experience and
specialization, but was not averse to transfer of
operationally promising OSI officers to the CS on a
more permenent basis. Bissell demurred:
I certainly agree that excessive reliance at
this stage on a rotation scheme would delay
the development of an adequate group of scien-
tifically competent personnel in the Clandestine
Service and that the development of such a group
must be pursued with vigor. If, however, we
firmly resolve to accomplish this purpose by
recruitment and training it would seem to me
that rotation between its members and OSI
*Probably resulting from his association with Scoville
as well as from the findings of the IG.
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would be feasible and mutually beneficial. 42/
In actual practice the Branch found that a case by
case consideration of its officers led quickly to the
conclusion that none could be spared for rotation
into OSI; there were already several unfilled posi-
tions in the Branch. Conversely, OSI had little en-
thusiasm for releasing numbers
even
fied replacements.
sion
for limited duty tours in
of its specialists,
the CS, without quali-
speaking for SR Divi-
but reflecting a wide-spread attitude of senior
officers, questioned the qualifications of DDI special-
ists tofunction effectively in operations; in the
event a scientific specialist was needed in the field,
on a particular case, it was
view that the
required expert should be dispatched TDY to the
station. 43/
Bissell again dissented, stressing once more
his conviction that specialist personnel, and more
particularly scientists, "might well add to our
operational capability" and he found it "hard to
believe that, with today's emphasis on scientific
intelligence, there is no help to be obtained from
scientists in the task of clandestine collection." 44/
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He continued to feel that such specialists could,
so to speak, be naturalized within the CS. Neverthe-
less,the
point of view was the one adopted in
practice. By the end of 1960 Fl Staff had succeeded
in having one OSI officer* transferred to the Branch
with CS career status; FE Division had accepted another
senior OSI officer as a scientific counselor in
and SR Division had assigned one of its offi-
cers to rotation duty in OSI. But the idea of a general
planned rotation system had slowly been fading and by
the end of 1961 was dropped as unworkable.
By the end of 1959 the influence of the Branch
on CS planning and programming had been exerted in
several related ways. First, through the survey,
the deficiencies in manpower and operations for use
against foreign S&T intelligence targets were high-
lighted for CS management. Second, the Branch pro-
jected itself energetically into S&T training for
headquarters case officers and returnees from the
field; Branch officers, from the Chief down,
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worked closely with OTR on improvement of the S&T
Operations Course and played an active role in lec-
tures, case presentation and analysis, and individual
briefings and indoctrination on S&T operational matters.
Third, attention of the divisions was focussed on the
need for the placement of more trained case officers,
with S&T specialization in the field and in key support
positions at headquarters. It was a year of educative
work and accommodation to the theses and intentions
of the new DD/P as they affected S&T matters.
Early in 1960 the Branch began to lay plans for
a more formal entry into the annual programming process.
In January it drew up, for John Bross, the DDP's
Senior Planning Officer, a detailed list of S&T col-
lection objectives which reflected overall intelligence
community requirements appropriate for CS action. 45/
These covered such major topics as Soviet guided missiles
and nuclear weapons developments, and BW and CW programs
in the USSR, along with a few other objectives of lesser
interest.
Through the winter, the Branch (now named FI/SIG)
prepared detailed comments and recommendations on each
area division draft operational program. Most
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attention was given to the SR, FE, and EE draft pro-
grams; in all three cases FI/SIG, commenting to Fl/Plans
Group, noted that evidence was lacking of specific
plans for developing operations against high priority
S&T information objectives in the Soviet Union and
China. 46/ In a later memorandum to Chief, Fl/Plans,
C/FI/SIG observed:
As you know, we have drawn up a set of intelli-
gence collection problems related to priority
scientific targets. As I have mentioned re-
peatedly before, I do not find in the 1961
SR program any plan of the division to address
itself to these problems by designing specific
projects or operations to solve them or to
attack a target of agreed high priority by any
continuing substantial operational effort. 47/
There were three information targets of high
priority which OSI identified during the first half
of 1960: research and development
In consultation with
FI/SIG, OSI prepared a detailed Collection Aid for the
CS on
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reluctant to invest its time in further collection
guidance unless the CS was prepared, for its part, to
plan and implement long-range clandestine collection
programs. Scoville wrote to Bissell in June of 1960
that he saw no clandestine collection effort underway
to match the extensive research and guidance efforts
of OSI which were undertaken on behalf of the CS. 48/
Meanwhile, Helms was writing to Chief, SR Division en-
joining the latter to step up the development of agent
operations and to make full use of the resources of
OSI to provide background data
Early in October Scoville sent to Bissell a
second Collection Aid on the
designed for use by CS case officers, but was
constrained again to give notice that OSI's future
production of such aids would depend on the ability
of the CS to put them to effective use in collection. 50/
*The Collection Aids prepared by OSI on priority S&T col-
m ril d ��ndtr
Operational plans and
actions based on the use of these OSI Aids were known,
in the CS, collectively as the
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Underneath the bland phraseology of Scoville's
transmittal letter was a concern -- indeed, a
skepticism -- about the scope and depth of CS ener-
gies dedicated to S&T intelligence objectives. In truth,
although WE and EE Divisions, at least, had made some
operational use of the data in the
Collection Aid, there were no immediate dividends in
terms of positive intelligence information.
The
even with the persistent
prodding and stimulus of FI/SIG on the CS side and of
in OSI, at best evoked only a limited (b)(3)
operational response in the CS. The area divisions
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
looked on the
of developing
concept -- that is, the concept
one among several available operational methods,
but a method not likely to bear early fruit. FI/SIG,
in an interim assessment of the method, addressed
to Bissell, agreed that quick results were unlikely
but that the scheme was operationally promising and
should be sustained. a/ The program continued well
�into 1961. In the summer of that year OSI sent to
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(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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the CS another Collection Aid, this one on
* But by that time OSI had long
since become persuaded that its campaign to generate
a more vigorous collection response in the CS would
have to be conducted on a broader base and at higher
levels.
A flurry of developments in the late summer and
fall of 1960 brought to a head a major issue between
the DD/I and the DD/P on the subject of scientific
and technical intelligence.
In a strongly worded, lengthy memorandum for
the DCI*Kwritten in August, Scoville concluded that
"the future for the collection of S&T intelligence
by clandestine means...was very dim" unless "serious
new approaches" were tried. 52/ His simmering im-
patience with what he considered to be the slow pace
of CS actions to address this problem are everywhere
*This is based on the recollection of the writer and on
internal evidence in documents available to him. There
is no remaining record in Fl Staff of this Aid or of
the dates of its preparation and submission to the CS.
**Scoville sent his memorandum through the DD/P who in
turn forwarded it to the DCI, but not until 17 October. 53/
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evident in this paper. As he saw them, CS opera-
tional responses to the intelligence challenges he
had so often presented were tardy, bureaucratic,
based on "business as usual" procedures, piecemeal,
and disappointing. FI/SIG obtained a copy of the
Scoville Memorandum and went to work at once to pre-
pare comments on it for Bissell, based on the Group's
own findings in its survey of CS S&T operations.
Meanwhile the DD/I had also expressed concern over the
lack of cooperation of SR Division with the DD/I
Guided Missiles Task Force, and
went on record,
in a report to Bissell, on his division's efforts to
up-grade the knowledgeability of SR officers in this
field, to cooperate with the DD/I on targetting prob-
lems, and to
At the close of his report,
"suspicions"
increase working-level contacts. 54/
acknowledged the
and "complaints" of the DD/I concerning
the SR position on S&T
In late September John Bross took account of
the ground swell of OSI and DD/I criticism. In a
note to Bissell he suggested that Bissell call a
council of the principally affected CS officers to
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(b)(3)
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consider the issue. 55/ The next day sub-
mitted to Bissell an account of FI/SIG findings
concerning the state of S&T collection in the CS. 56/
In it the Group presented factual confirmation of some
of the more generalized charges of OSI: lack of pro-
gramming for S&T collection, insufficient speciali-
zation in that field among CS case officers, too great
a dependence on field initiative, inadequacies in
the Related Mission Directives, persisting lack of
attention at CS management levels to the need for
special and concerted efforts in the divisions.
On 17 October Bissell convened the meeting suggested
by Bross and on 18 October directed
to draft
the CS comment on Scoville's August memorandum. 57/
draft, submitted a week later, 58/ briefly
reviewed CS actions to centralize staff support and
planning for scientific collection programs and, as
requested by Bissell, dealt with the specific prob-
lems which had created some friction and misunder-
standing between the CS and OSI. As directed by
Bissell, no basic organizational changes or alterna-
tives in CS operational methods and philosophy were
promised or proposed.
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In December Bissell met with Scoville and
of OSI to discuss Scoville's August memo-
randum and the CS comments on it. 59/* Bissell recorded
his own impression of that meeting and its results in
a six-page memorandum for Chief, Fl. 60/ In it he made
reference to the fact that he had chosen not to pass
on to the DCI the Scoville Memorandum but, with the
knowledge of Amory and Scoville, had attempted to
work out the difficulties in conference. The length
and detail of Bissell's paper are evidence not only
of the seriousness with which he took Scoville's
complaints, but also of his personal intent to provide
leadership and policy guidance within the CS on the many
vexatious issues surrounding the S&T collection problem.
It is apparent from this paper, and others written
by him which preceded and followed it, that Bissell
leaned toward the position of Scoville, of the IG,
and of Fl Staff on the central issue: the extent of
the CS effort against S&T targets. He expressed
*There is nothing in records available to the writer
to indicate whether draft comments were
actually shown to Scoville at this meeting, or at any
other time. It seems probable that Bissell used the
draft comments only as a basis for his own oral remarks.
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himself clearly on this point:
...the most serious charge which OSI makes
against us is that we have not given suffi-
cient recognition to the admittedly high priority
attached to requirements for S&T intelligence,
more specifically; that. we have not devoted
enough case officer time, enough ingenuity in
the development of operational techniques and
approaches, enough of our managerial drive and
energy to the fulfillment of this set of re-
quirements as against all the other require-
ments levied upon us...
I am afraid it is probably true that, if we
could measure in terms of man-hours the way
in which we have allocated resources to var-
ious Fl tasks, the record would show that
we are still devoting a
of our resources to the
than that task deserves
smaller proportion
task of S&T collection
in the light of the
very high priority assigned to it...
...The main conclusion that seems to me in-
escapable, whatever the justice or injustice
of my suspicion, is that operations officers
must henceforth be left in no doubt whatever
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about the priorities. We simply cannot
afford to allow opportunities for the col-
lection of such information to go unexploited
(or under-exploited) while we are turning out
a pretty large volume of political intelligence
which can only be described as low grade ore...61/
On the various secondary questions affecting
CS relations with OSI, Bissell declared his own im-
patience with what he called "unnecessary brokerage"
between analysts and collectors. FI/SIG he saw as
cast essentially in a trouble-shooting role, not as a
screen between case officers and OSI analysts. He
felt that the CS rule against discussion of sources
outside the CS should not be too rigidly applied,
expecially in non-sensitive cases where OSI assistance
could be improved by a little extra candor on the
part of the case officer. On requirements, he wanted
no change in the existing system of having these
served on CS through the IPC system, but thought that
OSI advice on the relative priority of requirements
submitted by other customers could at times be
valuable. On the much-argued question as to whether
the CS could afford to develop case officers with
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S&T specialization, Bissell declared:
...I am aware of and I subscribe to the view
that for the task of collecting S&T intelli-
gence, an officer must be first a good opera-
tor and only second a 'scientist or technician in
his own right. Nevertheless, I would argue
strongly that some scientific background not
only enhances the ability of the operations
officer but is apt to give him a strong personal
interest in the subject matter on which he is
asked to undertake collection. I believe,
therefore, we must continue to try to expand
the cadre of CS officers possessing this
capability...62/
Finally, he urged C/FI to consider "new procedural
devices to bring home at least to certain selected
branches in headquarters and stations overseas how
seriously we take the priority on S&T operations." 63/
He asked that his paper and report to him of
1 October be distributed to divisions and staffs for
comment.
This was a landmark document. It represented
the first occasion, of which the writer is aware,
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on which a head of the Clandestine Services addressed
himself so personally and comprehensively to the S&T
problem." In many ways it set the stage for a train
of events which was to culminate, twenty months later,
in a radical departure from the Bissell conception of
the FI/SIG role in the CS. It will be noted that
the real stimulus for the Bissell pronouncements in
his 6 January message to Lloyd George came not from
within the CS but from outside, from OSI. Similarly,
early in the regime of Richard Helms as DD/P, during
1962, the final impetus to attempt a long delayed
major transformation of the S&T effort in the CS
came once more from without, this time from the White
House and the USIB.
The events that led to that important change
in the destiny of FI/SIG can be rather briefly re-
counted. But first the state of affairs in the Group
up toihis point should be set down.
The assignment of to Fl Staff (b)(3)
as Deputy Chief on 2 October 1960 must be specially
noted as an event which was to influence the future
status and functions of FI/SIG.
to headquarters
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1.),11J.LJA
Chief
He had heard of the
efforts at headquarters to expand the S&T collection
effort and had taken a close personal interest, while
in the development of better materials
and instruction on S&T matters for use
He had met frequently with OSI officers
had listened to OSI complaints
about the backwardness of the CS in S&T matters, and
was himself early persuaded that CS responses to the
lecturing
challenge were tardy
reassignment
advice on
and deficient.
a proposal
Some
time before
solicited
had made to
serve as a senior liaison officer between OSI and
the CS.
minding
strongly advised against this, re-
that Scoville and Bissell were
both opposed to "brokers" between the two offices,
that institutionalized "liaison" would almost in-
evitably exacerbate the problem, and that a man with
interest and stature might better be employed
directly on CS scientific collection efforts. 63a/
Immediately after his appointment as DC/Fl,
began to take a direct interest in the affairs of
FI/SIG; these became his dominant preoccupation in the
Staff thereafter as we shall see.
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Another appointment of significance at about
this time was that of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, who was
made the DD/P's Special Assistant for Scientific
Affairs. He served in that position from 1960 until
Bissell's resignation. He devoted much of his atten-
tion to the problem of improving and extending the
applications of scientific research and technology to
clandestine operations, and to tapping influential U.S.
on
scientists and engineers for
behalf of the CS.
At the end of the year 1960 the Group had an
authorized
clericals,
addition,
strength of
including
and all positions had been encumbered. In
officers were assigned to duty in the
Group out of the Fl Staff Development Complement.
Early in the year the Group was further reorganized.
The deputy position was dropped and its incumbent,
was made head of a new Program (b)(3)
Section. Support and guidance to area divisions on
S&T operations was provided by the Operations Section,
which replaced the former Sciences Branch.
With the resignation in the summer of 1960 of
a microbiologist recruited by (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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of
the Operations Section was put in charge
a chemist with experience in
science writing who was also hired by
Others in the Section were
OTR officer who had helped to develop
S&T Operations Course;
analyst;
operational
Staff;
tician
a career
and manage the
a former OSI
a physician with
experience transferred from the Medical
an externally recruited mathema-
an 00 officer who had experience in its Science Branch;
and another physician with the
Medical Staff who had been on operational assignment
thereafter was brought into FI/SIG
on the Development Complement.
The work of the Operations Section was essen-
tially to provide staff support to the area divisions
on collection activities based on scientific intelli-
gence requirements in the fields of
The Section also handled several covert scientific contacts
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(b)(1)
most of whom had been recruited during
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
regime. Central management of these
assets was allowed by the DDP on the grounds that
they had usefulness in various geographic areas and
could not properly be made the responsibility of any
one division. The Operations Section also prepared
target analyses and preliminary operational plans on
behalf of divisions without experienced S&T officers;
and it assisted Program Section in gathering data for
semi-annual surveys of CS
The Program Section
including
scientific operations.
had
professionals,
secretary. The others
assigned to this Section were
specialized
who had
in international scientific conferences;
who had handled staff coordination
of Soviet materiel procurement and who assisted
on conference operations;
specialist on S&T cases, and
ferred from the International Communism
Staff to the Fl
with
a CE
trans-
Branch of CI
Staff Development Complement.
had served for several
As its name implied, Program
years
Section
was made responsible for conducting the surveys of
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3).
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area division operations and resources to collect
scientific and technical intelligence, and to draft
programs for such collection. Experience with the
operational programming in 1959 and 1960 had fully
convinced the Group that its piecemeal comments on
individual area division programs and RMD's had
little apparent effect on the amount of effort or
attention given to S&T collection in the divisions.
The Group soon became convinced that commonly agreed
collection objectives, a statement of desired man-
power allocations to the effort, and carefully selected
collection tasks for each area were essential ingred-
ients in any acceptable program.
Finally, on 13 January 1961, after months of in-
tensive work with all area divisions and with the
other staffs, FI/SIG presented for DD/P approval a
comprehensive Scientific Operations Program for FY 1962. 64/
The Program was intended by the Staff to be used
by divisions as a basis for planning that portion of
their respective FY 1962 operational programs allocated
to clandestine collection of foreign scientific informa-
tion. In three detailed annexes it prescribed objec-
tives, recommended allocations of full time S&T case
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officers at headquarters and at field stations, and
outlined a revised training plan. Except for a few
minor reservations on the case officer deployment
scheme, Bissell approved the Program on 8 February
1961, urging that FI/SIG "actively pursue this matter
�with the Divisions" and that the "Divisions should be
advised that I hope there will be a re-direction of
our personnel resources in order that the proportion
devoted to the task of collecting scientific intelli-
gence will be more nearly commensurate with the high
priority assigned to the task." 65/
The impact of this ambitious programmatic under-
taking by the Staff was, at best, unimpressive. From
the day the Program was distributed, and in spite of
Bissell's imprimatur, it encountered difficulties, if
not obstruction, in the divisions. Its mere existence
tended to kindle a suspicion that the Staff was about
to tread on authorities sacrosanct to the divisions:
the authority over personnel assignments and over
operational planning. The divisions were not really
persuaded that any such thing as a scientific opera-
tions program was necessary or possible in the CS.
Each division was used to, and resolved to protect,
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its own operational game plan and its own managerial
style. Consequently division responses to the Program
tended to reflect bookkeeping and not operational adjust-
ments of any real scope.
This reaction is rather subtly illustrated by
comments to Bissell on the latter's 6 January
memorandum; 66/ while not directly addressed to the
a_
Scientific Operations Program as such, remarks
apply a fortiori to the conceptions underlying that
document. He casts doubt on what he calls the OSI
position* that more S&T case officers and more S&T
operations were needed. "It is difficult to see," he
goes on, "how specialized 'S&T case officers' can be
efficiently used on a full time basis in the average
operational situation." 67/ His view was that there
should be an increase in Soviet operations of all
types, that SR had long since been on the alert for
S&T potential in any of its operations, and that
development of S&T competence in all SR operational
personnel was generally a better solution than the
*It was, in fact, emphatically the FT Staff position
as well, as Bissell later reminded him.
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full-time specialization of some. 68/ Though Bissell
disagreed with point about the requirement
for full-time specialists on S&T matters in the divi-
sions, he agreed with the rest of
comments and
suggested that they be circulated as guidance for the
CS. 69/
Later, in a memorandum to C/FI, FI/SIG observed
that it found no provision anywhere in the SR Program
for full-time concentration of any of its officers
on S&T collection problems, to meet quotas proposed
by the Staff. 70/ While supporting
appeal for (b)(3)
a greater CS effort against the Soviet target as a
whole, Fl Staff stressed its view that more full-time
S&T case officers should be committed to that objective.
In May it was finally agreed between the Staff and SR
Division that SR would attempt to work out with area
divisions the assignment of an additional
to Soviet operations and that
be sought as S&T specialists. 71/
The Chief, WE Division objected sharply to FI/SIG's
analysis of its efforts, arguing that the Division
had more "scientific case officers" in the field
than the Staff had reported, but ignoring the Staff's
officers
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point that only full-time specialists were being
counted. 72/ Nevertheless the mood of the Division
was cooperative and disagreements between it and the
staff on manpower allocations were later ironed out.
In general, WE was prepared to go farther and faster
in its S&T collection efforts than it did, especially
through the more active engagement of its many liaison
assets; but it was restrained by the influential dicta
of SR Division which generally advocated concentration
on
recruitments of
Soviet sources and de-emphasis on the role of liaison
in that effort. EE Division's initial reaction to
the Program recommendations was non-argumentative,
more neutral than compliant, reporting its S&T opera-
tional resources while avoiding commitments to shift
or increase them in line with FI/SIG suggestions.
FE was responsive,, and indeed sought FI/SIG assistance
later in the year in establishing an S&T section in
the China Operations Division. NE Division, in its
program, abstained from entering man-year estimates
of time devoted to S&T collection, although it was
known in the Staff that at least
NE officers in
were engaged almost full-time on S&T collection
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IX.; HET
requirements. Later in the year, James Critchfield,
Chief of NE Division, sharply questioned whether one of
these officers was being appropriately tasked by head-
quarters and whether his S&T efforts might not be
reduced. 73/ The question here was whether headquarters
requirements, issuing from SR, but prompted in part
by FI/SIG on the basis of OSI urgings, were suitable
for clandestine collection.
had complained
that it saw very little intelligence profit to be
had from the
scientists traveling to
the USSR equipped with elicitation requirements which
could more appropriately be satisfied by the Office
of Operations or other overt collectors.
This particular issue illustrates what was to
be a continuing conflict over operational philosophy
and method between FI/SIG and other parts of the Staff
on the one hand, and SR Division, namely, the relative
emphasis in operations to be placed upon current in-
formation objectives, using whatever sources and methods
which happened to be available, and concentration on
recruitment of human sources. The two views were of
course neither logically nor practically incompatible;
it was not impossible that different officers, or
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different stations, or different functional parts
of the CS could concentrate on one or the other,
so that both aims could be pursued simultaneously.
Yet it became a settled conviction in SR that con-
centration on the one precluded effective effort
on the other, that scientific information obtained
by elicitation or as a by-product of recruitment-
oriented operations was usually valueless, and that
the main resources of the CS should be marshalled
to acquire controlled Soviet sources with access
to classified information only. The impressive
resources of SR Division were early marshalled
to disseminate and, so far as possible, to enforce
this as the governing doctrine in all operations
directed at Soviet targets. It was carried by
dispatch and by word-of-mouth by SR travelers
into all operational areas, beginning in 1961
at the latest. Some area division chiefs and
several senior officers with experience in Soviet
operations
and elsewhere
in the European area during the late fifties and
early sixties shared this outlook and assisted
in its propagation. Its effect, whatever the
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ox,t,nr.41
authority behind the F1 Staff's proposed Scientific
Operations Program was to thwart, if not nullify, the
intentions of that �Program.*
It must be remembered that that Program had
two main elements: a statement of collection objec-
tives, area by area, specifying scientific intelli-
gence gaps requiring special operational attention,
and a deployment schedule for full-time scientific
operations specialists. Foremost in Bissell's mind
was this second element of the Program, which was by
far the more controversial of the two. SR and other
divisions did not ignore the call for greater effort
against S&T information objectives, as outlined by
the Staff. What they did resist was the Staff's ideas
as to how that effort should be programmed. It was the
steadfast conviction of the Staff that the proper or-
ganizational response of the CS to the magnitude of
the intelligence challenge had to be an identifiable
centrally managed program, staffed by specialists in
*In this connection, the author recalls a meeting late
in 1961 with David Murphy, then Acting Chief, EE Division
who expressed the view that regardless of what existed on
paper, there was and could be no such program in the CS.
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scientific operations in a strong organizational
entity with operational planning and directive authority.*
The first "Program" launched by the Staff, seen in
those terms, was defective and ambiguous. Area divi-
sion command prerogatives were left effectively un-
touched. The Program had only advisory force, and
since its main thrust was in the direction of Soviet
targets, it instantly encountered the programming
authority of SR Division, which was and remained con-
trolling throughout the troubled history of FI/SIG.
Perhaps the most profound influence militating
against the FI/SIG position and appearing to support
the SR operational outlook, was the extraordinary
intelligence windfall resulting from the Penkovskiy
operation. For a time, while the operation lasted
(well into 1962), CS management could show impressive
evidence of its capacity to seize and exploit a major
operational opportunity. The operation was not
*It will be recalled that at the point in 1959 when FI/SIG
first broached this idea, in a memorandum to COPS/DDP 74/,
the policy of Bissell was to reduce staff complements aTid
to keep FI/SIG, in particular, in an advisory, trouble-
shooting role. Within the Group it was felt that this
weakened Group leadership and authority at a time when
strong central direction of the CS S&T effort was most
needed.
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AJ 1-1�,
the result of deliberate planning; it bore no evi-
dent relation to a programmed effort of the kind
FI/SIG was sponsoring; and it tended to confirm the
SR view that the best use of CS resources -- in rela-
tion to Soviet intelligence targets -- was general
readiness, ability to capitalize on the unexpected,
and concentration on expansion of expertise in Soviet
operations rather than in a particular category of
intelligence interest such as S&T information.
Scientific information, in the SR view, was but
one of several necessary concerns which also included
political, economic, and military affairs. The division
did not separately program for "economic intelligence"
or "military intelligence" in its positive intelligence
operations, and argued that special programming for
"scientific intelligence" would not affect or improve
what it was already doing through all the various
operational avenues open to it:
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Thus the Staff initiative to establish an over-
all program, as a means of orienting area division
plans and organizing case officer resources, foundered
in its first year. Until mid-1962, FI/SIG continued
to acquire data on division scientific operations for
the semi-annual surveys. But further attempts to formu-
late CS-wide scientific operations programs were dropped.
Long before that happened, however,
and
were convinced that some more fundamental and
incisive action would be needed within the CS to meet
the rising pressures from OSI and other outside parties.
In July of 1961 Mr. Lawrence Hyland, a member of
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
met with Gottlieb
(b)(3)1
(b)(3)
at Scoville's suggestion. (b)(3)
Hyland had been looking into various aspects of the
Agency's scientific and technical activities. In the
course of his sessions with OSI he had asked about the
offices OSI dealt with and had been led on to a dis-
cussion of the collection problem, as Scoville, General
and others in OSI saw it. It was clear to (b)(3)
in this meeting with Hyland, (b)(3)
Gottlieb
that in his questions about OSI-CS relations and
about the apparent scarcity of officers with scientific
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education in SR Division, that he had assimilated
much of Scoville's concern on these and related
subjects. 75/
On 30 October 1961 General Cabell, Acting Director,
received from Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the White House,
a brief memorandum stating the recommendation of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that
the USIB "make an early assessment of the problem
with a view to improving the collection, coordination,
and analysis of intelligence concerning the scientific
and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc." 76/
General Cabell directed that the DCI's Assistant for
Coordination, General Desmond Balmer, undertake the
assessment and report to the USIB by 15 December 1961. 77/
On 9 November members of General Balmer's staff met
with Lloyd George,
to discuss
agent collection of scientific and technical informa-
tion in the CS. The Balmer group asked for data on
the DDP's scientific collection program and for figures
showing what proportion of the total Fl collection
effort was devoted to scientific information collection.
George later reported to Bissell his concern that the
way the Balmer group was going about its enquiry, that
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is, by focussing on agent collection only rather
than the total clandestine effort (including technical
collection of SIGINT and ELINT, and overhead recon-
naissance) might distort the total picture of the CS
scientific collection activities. 78/ In reviewing
for Bissell the state of agent collection activities,
noted that divisions had reported a sizeable
increase in part-time case officer efforts, but a
decline in full-time assignments to scientific col-
lection both at headquarters and in the field. 79/
Overall, he found the effort was "still substantially
below the level which we estimate as enough to do the
job required of us, as based on the community's agreed
requirements and urgent collection problems in this
field." 80/
At the close of 1961, Scoville addressed to
General Balmer a memorandum on clandestine collection
of S&T intelligence. 81/ Scoville sent a copy to Bissell
with a note explaining that the memorandum had been
prepared at General Balmer's request. In it Scoville
reiterated and reemphasized most of the points he had
made in a similar letter to the Director about eighteen
months before. 82/ His letter closed with a ringing call:
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...essential to the development of a capability
for effective collecting of raT7 information
vital to our needs is (1) a policy determina-
tion to develop a program with which to task
individual Clandestine Services components in
an orchestrated worldwide collection effort,
(2) a concomitant specific dedication of
Clandestine Services manpower resources to the
performance of assigned tasks, and (3) such
changes within the DD/P command structure and
the acquisition of such technically qualified
personnel as may be necessary to the effective
performance of those S&T tasks. 83/
In commenting to Lloyd George on Scoville's memorandum,
Bissell acknowledged that the CS might not yet be pur-
suing the S&T collection task with the required energy
and resources, basing this
provided by FI/SIG; and he
impression on data recently
asked George to keep him in-
formed on "the limiting factors on the scale of our effort
and of the specific steps we might be able
to take to
widen our effort or remove these limitations." 84/
During the year 1961 Bissell had been critically
occupied with the Bay of Pigs affairs and its aftermath.
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Allen Dulles had retired and Bissell at this time was
perhaps already preoccupied, to a degree, with his
own plans. He had heard many times the arguments of
OSI, yet balancing to some extent the criticisms of
Scoville was the manifest intelligence harvest being
reaped from the Penkovskiy operation. The blandness
of his reaction to Scoville's memorandum probably re-
flects the combined influence of these circumstances.
His last communication on the subject was on
9 February 1962, just before his resignation and the
appointment of Helms as DD/P. Commenting on General
Balmer's draft report for the Chairman, USIB, Bissell
objected, among other things, to the implication in
the report that the CS had no long-range program for
S&T collection* and that its activities in that dimen-
sion should remain under continuing scrutiny. 85/
He asserted that there was such a program, having in
mind the exertions of Fl Staff the year before. Yet
in terms of OSI expectations there was of course no
*A conclusion clearly carried over into the Balmer report
from the results of Scoville's analysis of the situation.
It should be noted that a former officer in OSI's Col-
lection Staff, was appointed to Balmer's
staff and took an active part in the enquiry.
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such program. The area divisions were in all
major respects going their various ways, under
very little effective control by the Fl Staff
over programming, doctrine, and use of resources.
At the end of the Bissell era the CS thus
found itself beleaguered from the outside on the
S&T problem, and with weakened and distracted leader-
ship on the inside. The principal complainant out-
side the CS was Scoville, who had the ear of the
DCI, of Dr. Killian, Chairman of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and of many
other highly placed officials in Defense, State,
the Atomic Energy Commission, and elsewhere. In
this author's judgment there can be little doubt
that the stimulus for the USIB enquiry ordered by
the White House was traceable to the persistence
and zeal of Scoville. Internally, the evidences
of the DD/P's earlier resolve to establish a strong
and organized S&T collection program were becoming
less and less distinct. At the time of Bissell's
resignation only
of the authorized
professional positions were encumbered. While
FI/SIG
the Group and its support were called on from time
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to time by area divisions and by the DDP, and while it
has some accomplishments to look back on,* its position
had become increasingly obscure and ambiguous within
the CS. Yet it kept its determination to find a viable
means of expanding the operational base for S&T collection
within the practical constraints of the CS command
structure. Moreover, with the announced appointment
of Helms as DD/P, there was a stirring of expectation
in the Group that new initiatives on the S&T front
might be given serious consideration.
*Apart from its demanding chores on the operations surveys
and the drafting of the scientific, onerations nrogrsm the
Grour, managed
Irom outside
the CS for placement in scientific operations, developed
and handled three common-concer7 oroierts (one of these
acquired from CI Staff included
prepared lead etting studies
for field stations under the CS-OSI Program,
coordinated a considerable number of OSI and other DDI
scientific travel cases involving intelligence missions
abroad, created the first central roster in the CS of
scientific consultants and contacts for operational use,
participated actively in OTR training courses (including
provision of case material), administered be on-the-job
S&T operational training of several Junior Officer Trainees
and two transfers into the Fl Development Complement, and
standardized definitions and nomenclature applicable to
scientific operations.
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II. The Helms Era: 1962-1965
A. Proposal for a Centralized S&T Operational Effort.
The Balmer report was not submitted to USIB until
21 May 1962. Meanwhile, it was clear that Helms was
prepared to listen carefully to a reasoned staff analysis
of the situation and any staff proposals which gave
promise of effectively upgrading the CS S&T operational
effort.
In January, in a paper drafted by George
sent to Bissell his comments on "the limiting fac-
tors" Bissell had referred to in the latter's 19 Decem-
ber memorandum to George. 86/ There is no record of
Bissell's reaction to this C/FI paper which for the
first time proposed a centralized attack on the S&T
target directed by a headquarters unit specially con-
stituted for that purpose. The paper found its way
to Bross who returned it to Helms on 19 February 1962
with the remark:
� ...for your further consideration
whenever you get a chance to think about it." 87/
Helms returned it to George the following day with a
request for further clarification concerning "the
problem in re
(b)(3)
existing staff and its placement".88/ (b)(3)
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From that point,
taking
heed not only of Scoville's long-standing complaints
and the implications of the Balmer enquiry but also
of their own conviction as to the obligations of
the CS, began to shape their conceptions of a new
and bolder approach to the S&T issue within the CS.
The idea of a central scientific operations com-
ponent with action authority began to take concrete
form early in 1962. In late April, George sent back to
Helms, via Karamessines, under a covering memorandum, 89/
the 8 January 1962 memorandum he had prepared in answer
to Bissell's earlier request, but this time adding a
draft statement of functions and a T/O for a completely
reconstituted and strengthened Scientific Intelligence
Group. 90/ The Chief of the new FI/SIG would be respon-
sible for directing all operations of the CS with capa-
bility of producing S&T information. Prominent outside
scientists would be called upon as advisors in this
program. A permanent cadre of scientific operations
officers would be collected, managed, and assigned by
the new unit.
headquarters and
field positions under the control of FI/SIG were re-
quested with 1 July 1964 set as the target date for
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the full staffing of the headquarters organization
and the overseas deployment of the field case officers.
Karamessines found this plan overbold and too ambitious.
(b)(3)
After discussion with
who,
had
(b)(3)
composed the plan, he
returned
the
papers in June
(b)(3)
with the request to that
the plan be drafted
along less radical lines before
submission to Helms.
91/
(b)(3)
While this re-drafting was underway
had
occasion to discuss with an officer of EE Division,
of David Murphy,
in FI/SIG.
had
Chief,
with the knowledge and approval
EE, a possible assignment for
then Deputy Chief of the
served with OSI and also had considerable operational
experience on S&T cases during a duty tour
the Fl Staff plans for an ex-
outlined to
panded, staff-directed, S&T operational program. When
reported his discussion with
to Murphy, 92/
the latter immediately sent a memorandum to George ex-
pressing not only his reluctance to release
duty in Fl Staff but also seriously questioning "the
feasibility and the wisdom of attempting to establish
a new operational unit of this sort in the DDP." 93/
Murphy sent a copy of his demurrer to C/SR.
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for
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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thereafter talked with both Murphy and
C/SR, pointing out that nothing had yet been settled
with Karamessines and that
had given an exag-
gerated impression of the size of the projected organi-
zation and of its possible impact on division authority.
But the word was out of new schemes afoot in Fl Staff,
with opposition developing in the divisions even before
a plan acceptable to the DDP had been drafted.
In late July General Balmer held an interagency
meeting to discuss and resolve some of the main points
of contention in the draft report of his staff which
had been circulated for comment prior to submission to
USIB. Reporting on this meeting to Helms and Karamessines, 94/
noted two issues of Special interest to the CS
which were discussed at Balmer's meeting: one, the
subject of
Contacts Division in the
Office of Operations; the other, establishment of a long-
range CS program to collect S&T information. On the
latter point
reminded his addressees:
...that the implication that we have such a
program is based on the assumption that certain
recommendations the Fl Staff has been discussing
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with ADD/P will be implemented at a level
sufficient to make them effective. Unless this
is done, I do not believe it is defensible to
say that we have a long-range program under way. 95/
General Balmer's draft report had included the recom-
mendation that
CIA should develop and carry out a long-range
program for the clandestine collection of scien-
tific and technical information from the Soviet
Bloc. 96/
This wording clearly implied that the CS had no such
program and Helms, as in the case of Bissell before
him, could not accept this implication. The view of
top CS management and of SR Division was that strong
efforts were being made to improve agent collection
against the difficult Soviet targets, that the scope
and shape of this effort might not be visible in the
form envisaged or desired by OSI, but it had been going
on, had been producing, and was to continue. The DDP
insisted that the wording of the Balmer recommendation
be changed to read "CIA should continue and emphasize
a long range program etc." This was done and in his com-
ments* to the Director on the Balmer Report Helms stated
*Drafted by
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This recommendation is of particular interest
to me. I am in full accord with its argument. 97/
Yet internally the Fl Staff was convinced that the
diffused activities of the divisions, which were essen-
tially unfocussed and without central direction, did
not constitute a program and did not measure up to
the dimensions of the problem.
Pursuing this conviction, prepared another
paper, 98/ addressing the reservations which Karamessines
had expressed to him earlier about the engagement of
staffs in operations and possible conflicts with area
division authorities if the initial plan
presented were to be carried out.
had
assured
Karamessines in this paper that the intention of the
Staff was to cooperate with the divisions, not to
dominate or interfere with them in the development of
scientific operations. The work of FI/SIG would com-
plement, not displace, the related collection activities
of the divisions, would be confined initially at least,
and for the most part, to developing access to foreign
scientific target personalities
and would
not attempt to duplicate the work of SR Division in
handling and directing recruited agent assets. The
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new mission of FI/SIG would be to enlarge the S&T
operational effort by adding its own case officer
efforts to those of area divisions, and to focus and
coordinate the
returned
agreement with
overall operational program. Karamessines
paper on 6 September indicating his
it and
In September
views on the content of a
requesting "active follow up."
developed at length his
staff study which had
promised to the DD/P This study was completed and
submitted by
to the DD/P on 20 September. Helms
approved it the same day, authorizing an increase in
FI/SIG from during FY 1963, and a further
increase to for FY 1964. 99/ On 21 September Helms
sent a brief memorandum to Scoville, now Deputy Director
(Research),* reiterating his concurrence in the Balmer
recommendation concerning a clandestine collection
program and. stating that
*Scoville was appointed to this new post in February 1962.
DCI Action Memorandum, No. A-48 of 18 Sep 1962, signed by
Kirkpatrick as Executive Director, designated the DD/R as
action officer to coordinate replies to a request of Gen.
Balmer on 27 Aug 1962 that each agency provide estimates of
manpower and funds required to implement actions recommended
in the Balmer report. 100/
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Clandestine Services have formulated plans for
reinforcing and reorienting the program of
clandestine S&T collection. Every effort will
be made to implement this plan within the re-
sources presently available. 101/
Helms sent a copy of this note to the D/DCI on 1 October
and in a covering memorandum gave details of the plan
for upgrading the CS effort and enlarging the mission
of FI/SIG. 102/ drafted this memorandum, in-
eluding in it figures on total CS manpower devoted to
the S&T collection effort, full time and part time,
and the planned manpower and operational budget estimates
for FI/SIG. Helms memo stated that these details were
not provided to the DD/R since "I do not consider it
desirable to have the resources of the Clandestine
Services discussed or debated in the USIB." 103/
In the staff study he prepared for Helms,
had emphasized the weakness of an area-oriented approach
to the S&T collection problem, the need for a strong
cadre of case officers with scientific and technical
backgrounds and interests, the importance of sustained
developmental work by trained specialists to assess
and approach scientific agent candidates, and the
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.EUtChT
necessity for central management and coordination
of all CS S&T collection efforts, paper con-
cluded that
...simple addition of manpower to present
efforts of area divisions and pursuit of the
area-oriented approach to scientific operations
will not bring about the required improvement
and reinforcement of these efforts. We conclude
that improvement can be made by development of
a centralized capability for effective operational
guidance in a unit equipped both to provide
badly needed fundamental analysis and planning
and tp perform operational tasks as required. 104/
The new program to be administered by FI/SIG included
responsibility for mastery of pertinent S&T require-
ments, collection and analysis of target data, selection
of target personalities for cultivation as support
agents or as reporting sources, operational planning,
conduct of operations, preparation of S&T reports,
guidance and support of division S&T operations, and
development of operational assets within the scientific
community. It was an ambitious program, requiring new
construction almost from the ground up.
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B. Establishment of a Strengthened Scientific
Intelligence Group in Fl Staff.
At a meeting with Helms attended by George,
on the day he approved the new
charter for FI/SIG, it was agreed that the Group
should begin at once to assemble and train the addi-
tional personnel required, and to reorganize according
to the plan outlined in the staff study. It was further
agreed that until the Group had established itself and
had acquired additional officers trained and ready to
function, it would be prudent not to assert too early
the new authorities granted to the Group or to accept
responsibility for operations which it was not yet
equipped to handle effectively. Also, it was decided
that issuance of a Clandestine Services Instruction
for the Group could be deferred until it had gained
some experience with its new mission.
The plan of organization, with the posi-
tions authorized during FY 1963, called for creation of
an Operations Section to contain
officers,
an Intelligence Assistant, and a secretary. The
Office of the Chief had.
Secretary, and
positions: Chief, Deputy,
Clerk-typists. The latter were to
be available, on a pool basis, for clerical assistance
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ing in chemical engineering
ience in
had joined
transferring from FE Division.
sub-section.
During the last three months of 1962 the numer-
ous practical details of reorganization and recon-
struction of the Group, to equip it for its greatly
expanded responsibilities, occupied most of the time
to the Operations Section. That Section contained
four sub-sections: Physical Sciences, Life Sciences,
Earth Sciences, and Space Sciences.
were allocated to Physical Sciences,
Sciences, and
positions
to Space
each to the other sub-sections. On
board to occupy these positions in September 1962
were only
officers, a secretary, and a clerk-typist
(see Figure 1). Two of the officers,
a nuclear physicist, and
a medical doctor, were qualified to head up the Physical
Sciences and Life Sciences sub-sections respectively.
They were immediately appointed
to those positions.
an officer with academic train-
and with operation exper-
the Group in February 1961,
He was assigned to
of
as Chief,
as Deputy Chief, and
as prospective Chief of Operations.
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Figure 1
FI/SIG Personnel, September 1962
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Job descriptions had to be written for all positions.
Requisitions specifying desired qualifications of
candidates sought for the various grade levels had
to be prepared and discussed with Agency recruiters.
Plans for providing training and cover for new recruits
had to be drawn up. New space had to be acquired at
a time when there were other high priority claims on
available office accommodations by other Agency elements.*
with previous management experience in the
National Security Agency and in FI/D and with
extensive field experience in the conduct of S&T opera-
tions, brought a unique combination of talents to
bear on these diverse planning and organizational
tasks. Along with
both officers had urged
for years the establishment of a strong central authority
within the CS for developing and coordinating S&T opera-
tions. Both approached the challenges of the new FI/SIG
mission with verve and total dedication, as did the other
*Notably the new Special Operations Division and Domestic
Operations Division in the DD/P, and the DD/R (re-named DD/S&T
In August 1963) which had begun to expand during this period.
Enlarged quarters for the Group were obtained on the ground
floor of the Headquarters Building in the northwest area.
This space was refitted in the early, weeks of 1963 and
finally occupied by the Group in April where it remained
until August 1966.
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officers in the Group.
carried most
of the day-to-day work load of current staff support
activities and also assisted in the formation of plans
for the new organization.
was new to the,
Group, having recently returned to Headquarters after
several years on assignment in Europe as
A specially tailored
worked out for him,
arrangement was
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From the beginning of 1963 a determined effort
was made to locate qualified officers for assignment
to the Group. First attention was given to CS officers
known to have some scientific or engineering background
and some experience with S&T cases. The first and pre-
dictable problem to be faced by the Group was the fact
that any of these officers, with a good operational
pedigree, were already well-situated in an area division
or on assignment overseas and not likely to be dislodged.
Yet the news that a new operational campaign in the S&T
field was about to get underway did reach the ears of
some officers who had a natural interest in that field
or who, one way or another, had acquired an interest
in S&T operations from previous case experience.
It was early apparent, however, that the numbers
from which to choose within the CS would, for a variety
of practical reasons, be small indeed. The DDP directed
the Chief of Operational Services to negotiate with
area divisions for the release of certain designated
officers for assignment to FI/SIG. The Group intended
to use this authority sparingly, preferring to locate
and then induce a desired officer to accept assignment
to the Staff with the agreement of his parent office.
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ozunta
As it happened, however, Chief, Operational Services
approached SR Division before the Group could pave
the way for effecting voluntary changes of assignment.
The result was an immediate broadside by
then Chief, SR, against the whole idea of having FI/SIG
authorized to increase its staff and to function as
an operational unit. 105/
argued that FI/SIG
was not and could not be in a position to implement an
S&T collection program, that it lacked both S&T and opera-
tional expertise, that SR and other operating divisions
were the only locations in which new recruits in the
S&T effort could function effectively, and that FI/SIG
should remain in a staff support role. "This,"
concluded, "is the job which it was designed to do and
can do. To bring it, instead, into direct competition
with, or as a replacement for, one important aspect of
the fundamental task with which the Clandestine Services
is charged would not produce the results anticipated
but would bring additional confusion and a most un-
desirable dispersion of productive operating capacity." 106/
memorandum went to Karamessines who called at
noting on the
once for a meeting with
routing sheet that "I'm sure we
views with our needs." 107/
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There is no evidence available to the author
that Helms ever saw
memorandum though it is
most unlikely that Karamessines would not have briefed
him on its contents and on the outcome of the meeting
with
There is no record of that
meeting; however, later in January
met with
to assure him that FI/SIG
had no intention of displacing SR Division's S&T
efforts, and obviously could not do so; the main
objective of FI/SIG, they explained, was to supple-
ment the CS operational capacity against S&T targets
in any way it could and, hopefully, in close colla-
boration with SR and other divisions. Some accord
was reached on the respective missions of the two
elements and a little later
visited
with a proposal to detail one of his officers to
FI/SIG for a trial period and, if mutually agreed at
the end of that period to extend the assignment to
a full two-year tour in the Staff. The designated
officer, did in fact serve in the Group
for about six months and then was returned to SR
Division. Another former SR Division officer,
was later assigned to the Group following
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CHET
his return in December 1963 from a field assignment
The accord between FI/SIG and SR Division was,
at best, uneasy. The attitude toward the Group, the
conception of its place and role as expressed in
letter, persisted in the Division* but did not
flare again into an open challenge to the Group's
mission and authority until early 1965.
C. Staffing Problems
During 1963, with considerable assistance from
Fl/Support Group and Office of Personnel, FI/SIG began
an intensive search for officer candidates outside the
Agency. Blind advertising was placed in newspapers and
professional magazines in several major cities. There
were numerous responses to these ads over a period of
about eighteen months. The Group received and reviewed
about six hundred applicant files including those re-
ferred to the Group by OSI, which was engaged simul-
taneously in a similar talent hunt. Applicants who
*Notably in the Reports and Requirements Staff. As we
shall see later, good relations developed between FI/SIG
and the S&T Branch of SR Division's Collection Group,
which David Murphy established soon after he became
Chief. SR in the autumn of 1963. This harmony lasted through
term as Chief of the SR/CG/S&T Branch.
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oxA,nr,1
appeared most likely to be qualified and suitable
were first contacted by Agency recruiters who prepared
interview reports for review by FI/SIG. A small propor-
tion of these pre-screened applicants were found to be
apparently qualified and were then interviewed by
the Group, with the objective either of direct hire
into the Staff or of operational use on the outside
as scientific support assets. The numbers so chosen
for internal staff assignment were extremely small; only
officers were thus obtained: one during 1963 and
the others during 1964-65.
At the end of calendar year 1963 officers
intelligence assistants had been added to the
Staff. One of the
fresh from college
the other were
the field and only one of these,
on S&T cases.
officers was an outside recruit
with an engineering physics degree;
CS officers recently returned from
was experienced
The total FI/SIG complement
was professionals and
Thus, fifteen months from the time the
mission was approved, the Group was far short
its reduced authorized strength of
at year's end
clericals.
new FI/SIG
even of
In consequence
its professional competence, operationally and in S&T
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expertise, was still far from adequate. Only
of the
professionals had any experience
immediately applicable to S&T cases and much of
their time was necessarily devoted to training and
supervising the other
In addition, the re-
quired and lengthy OTR training for the new and in-
experienced officers subtracted further from the
effective strength of the Group. It was clear that
the identification, selection, and clandestine
training of scientists or engineers with no previous
intelligence experience would be a painfully slow,
expensive, and laborious process.* The Career
Trainee (former Junior Officer Trainee) Program was
specifically designed to do this to meet the Agency's
long term needs for professionally qualified officers,
including scientists and engineers. At year's end,
1963, the Group had increasingly turned its attention
to that Program as a source of acceptable if inexperienced,
*In August 1963 Helms requested the DDCI to approve
Scientific Pay Schedule positions for the CS. 108/ is
was to allow advanced salary rates for specia1177ualified
scientific personnel recruited outside the Agency. FI/SIG
was allowed one of these positions but it was never used.
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quarters positions
accommodated a staff agent
funded by the Group. This
rather than the originally
recruits.* Yet the very fact that this was a long-
term solution to the personnel recruitment problem
meant only enforced delays and deferment of actions
by the Group which a more fully experienced opera-
tions staff would have been prepared to carry out.
As 1964 began, the approved table of
tion of the Group (see Figure 2) included
field position;
organiza-
head-
the latter
project administered and
total of
positions,
authorized strength of
came about as the result of mandatory Agency-wide
ceiling reductions during 1963. It was understood,
however, that the secretarial positions were flexible,
that is, they would be allowed to accommodate addi-
tional secretaries as the Group approached its maximum
professional strength.
young trainees were temporarily detailed to the
Group during the late fall of 1963 for a few weeks, prior
to scheduled operations training. This brief duty afforded
the trainees a glimpse of the S&T efforts of the Group
and of the CS as a whole and was intended to motivate
them toward selection of an S&T specialization in opera-
tions. It was not expected that they would be able to
provide more than routine assistance in the short time
they were available.
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Figure 2
Table of Organization, February 1964
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OEUAET
During 1964 the staffing pattern was constantly
changing. Yet in spite of that some functional im-
provements did occur, new personnel were
assigned to the Group. One arrived in April,
more entered during July and August, and the other
in October and November.
were secretaries. Of the
of the new arrivals
new professionals,
had previous Agency experience:
(briefly), and with the
only one, had
S&T operations. The other
with DD/S&T
CS. Of the latter
any direct experience with
tially green recruits and
from Office of Training prior
with a CS component, were not
of the Group.
Partly
departures: by death,
resignation and
eluded
officers were essen-
of these, on detail
to permanent assignment
carried on the rolls
offsetting these increases were
Group less than a
by retirement,
by transfer. These losses in-
who had been assigned to the
year before but who resigned in
September to accept an attractive offer from North
American Aviation Corporation.
by
had been acting
as Chief of the Space Sciences Section while the
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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search was going on for a more senior officer to serve
as permanent chief. Chief of
Life Sciences Section, who had been with FI/SIG since
May 1960, requested transfer to the DD/S&T in June 1962
to accept a position of more responsibility than the
Group was prepared to offer. His departure, and that
of in May 1964, his assistant, left the
Life Sciences Section entirely vacant for more than a
year. One of the most promising of the JOTs, who
had served with the Group for several months after com-
pletion of the Operations Course and was finally entered
on the rolls in August, decided to resume his academic
studies in Earth Science and resigned in September.
The death in May of
an experienced CS intelli-
gence assistant who was to direct the Research and Re-
ports Unit, and the resignations of
other young
intelligence assistants, disrupted the work of that unit
and diminished the support it could provide to the opera-
tions officers for several months.
At the close of FY 1964 (30 June 1964), the point
at which the Group was to have reached its maximum
authorized strength of
strength was
officers,
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or,umni
secretary, and
clerk-typist (see Figure 3).
positions were occupied in Physical Sciences
Section and
in Space Sciences. The other sciences
sections were empty.
positions were occupied in
the Research and Reports Unit. All
officer posi-
tions were occupied in the Office of the Chief.
By the end of calendar 1964, the situation was
somewhat improved. Research and Reports Unit had been
reorganized and renamed Operations Support Unit. All
of the positions allotted to it were encumbered.
a CS professional with exten-
It was headed by
sive experience in WH Division. The Life Sciences and
Earth Sciences Sections at this point
Physical Sciences Section was
including
Space Sciences,
down to
were vacant.
officers (not
positions vacant;
headed by its new Chief,
(previously with SR Division), had all of its
posi-
tions occupied. The complete staffing of this section
and its development into an effective team under
leadership represented a qualitative improvement in the
Group's ability ID function operationally during 1964
and early 1965 (see Figure 4).
Counting the occupied positions in the Office of
the Chief, there were at year's end assigned
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OXA.,A.C11
Figure 3
FI/SIG Personnel, July 1964
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otA�nr.J.
Figure 4
FI/SIG Personnel, January 1965
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professionals in the Group though only
of these (b)(3)
had any significant experience with S&T operations, as
compared with
with such experience at the start
of the year. Also, the
JOTs on detail but not
assigned to the Group had to be supervised and kept use-
fully employed. This added to the strains on the more
senior officers who were attempting to develop operations
while coping with the management of a suddenly enlarged
group of willing, eager, but almost wholly inexperienced
assistants. The disproportionately large flux of per-
sonnel gains and losses during the year -- a total of
changes in a T/0 of only
had a necessarily interruptive and sometimes disquieting
effect on managers and managed alike; this was perhaps
the most important single factor impairing operational
efficiency and progress in the Group at the time. Never-
theless, the increased numbers of occupants in the Group
young, busy, and hopeful -- served to elevate the morale
of the office and to create an esprit which was to con-
tinue for a short time into 1965, and then quickly fade.
The reasons for this unfortunate turn of events will be
discussed later.
In February, a dynamic and productive
officer with abundant S&T experience in the Western
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Europe area, joined the Group and remained with it
until December 1968, first as head of the Earth Sciences
Section and later, after transfer to FE Divi-
sion (at his own request), as head of the combined
Earth and Space Sciences Section. Later in the year
who had resigned from the Agency
(out of OSI Life Sciences Division) to join the National
Science Foundation several years before, was rehirdd
in October for placement in FI/SIG as Chief, Life
Sciences Section.
A relatively strong staffing situation persisted
from February into the early summer. But by that time
the Group was facing serious obstacles to the development
and pursuit of its program. Morale had begun to decline
in the spring, *h face of persistent challenges by
area divisions to the authority of FI/SIG, to the
validity of its charter, and to the value and propriety
of its operational efforts. In April a new DD/P
Desmond Fitzgerald -- was appointed, replacing Helms.
Within the Group and Fl Staff as a whole speculation
was rife as to Fitzgerald's conception -- and intended
use -- of his Staffs. As resistance to the SIG program
began to loom larger on several fronts, the spirit of
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the Group sagged and a number of its most able officers
began to look and move elsewhere. From July on a
parade of transfers and resignations took place.
Twelve persons left the Group beginning in March 1965
and only four were replaced from then until the end of
the year. By the end of December 1965
remained in FI/SIG,
officers
intelligence assistant, and
secretaries (see Figure 5).
Early in 1966
after years
of resolute effort to help establish a viable, centrally-
managed S&T program in the CS, regretfully resigned
from the Agency to become
He must be counted among the few officers in the CS with
that unique combination of rare talents: operational
flair and mastery of an important field of scientific
enquiry. Late in 1966 a promising young oceanographer,
hired in 1965, transferred to FE Division preparatory
to field assignment. Also during 1966, three secretaries
moved on and one was hired. Only one officer was added
to the staff in that year,
physicist hired directly from a university.
this time the charter of FI/SIG had changed,
a young
But by
at Fitzgerald's
direction. The reasons for this change and the events
leading up to it are discussed in the succeeding pages.
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ohumml
Figure 5
FI/SIG Personnel, January 1966
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D. The Operational Role of FI/SIG.
During 1963 and most of 1964 about a third of the
Group's time (not counting that spent on personnel
matters and training new arrivals) was used on required
staff work for the DDP and other management levels.
The rest was used for operational research, operational
planning, and project development.
as Deputy Chief in the Group, was given
specific responsibility for handling the various staff
support matters that the Group became responsible for.
These included; coordination of the travel of OSI and
other DD/S&T representatives who were planning to brief
CS field stations on recent intelligence developments
and producer needs;
arrangement for travel
officials
to U.S. research and development installations; perio-
dic surveys of area division S&T operations and S&T
officer assignments; preparation of data and the FI/SIG
responses to annual program calls. In addition
served as FI/SIG security officer and, with the assistance
of a young analyst borrowed from Records Integration
Division, set up a new records system for the Group
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during the early months of 1963. He handled, besides,
a variety of ad hoc staff matters which from time to
time were referred by the DD/P or C/FI to the Group
for action.
This pattern of staff support activity persisted
through 1963 and 1964. The Group became much more
actively involved in guidance and coordination of area
division S&T activities than it had hitherto. The
writer, as Chief of the Group, had frequent direct
access to Helms and Karamessines; and for a time, par-
ticularly in the early months of this period, all
FI/SIG officers felt a sense of engagement in, and
responsibility for, important affairs of the CS.
On the operational side it was agreed with
that the Group should first attempt to build up its
research and planning capabilities, and establish re-
quired files and records on scientists according to
their qualifications for operational tasks. A Research
and Reports Unit was immediately established to assist
the officers in this basic work. It was further
understood that, as time llowed, the operations officers
would proceed to expand their contacts in the U.S.
scientific and engineering communities, in order to
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build up gradually a network of scientific assets
for operational assistance on clandestine collection
tasks.
FI/SIG was at pains to confine itself to these
pursuits during the early months of its new mission.
The watchwords were professionalism and careful planning,
especially while the Group was so heavily occupied with
acquiring and training new staff. At the same time the
Group was resolved to establish the closest possible
working relations with area divisions at both manage-
ment and case officer levels, to provide them with
timely support when requested, and to gain their confi-
dence and active cooperation.
Good rapport and understanding were soon worked
out with WE Division. Under
direction,
and from September 1965 under Rolfe Kingsley, the Division
was generally responsive to FI/SIG proposals and frequently
called on FI/SIG for guidance and suppor-0,
were on friendly, cooperative terms from
the outset. Early in July 1963
as Chief
*A large percentage, perhaps two thirds, of the opera-
tional work of FI/SIG from 1963 on was conducted with
or on behalf of WE Division.
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.E(.;.111;1'
of Operations in FI/SIG, met with
Chief,
(b)(3)
WE/Fl to outline and discuss FI/SIG
(b)(3)
plans.
to the idea of
(b)(3)
found receptive, in principle,
having FI/SIG develop a few carefully selected scien-
tific agents to be placed in the WE area and controlled
from Headquarters rather
The Group already
position, a young physicist
than by stations.
had a candidate
who had been
109/
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
for one of th4se
recruited by
in mid-1962. He was offered to
FI/SIG by
in December 1962,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
for use as a scientist staff agent after completion of
his operations
training in January 1963.
(b)(1)
The candidate
had an excellent academic
(b)(3)
background in
chemistry, mathematics
and physics, had
(b)(3)
earned an M.S. degree and accumulated several course
credits toward Ph.D. requirements, and had five years
experience with General Electric Corporation. His moti-
vation toward intelligence was influenced in part at least
by his father, who had served with OSS. 110/
The case is interesting historically because it
illustrates the type of long-term S&T collection capabili-
ties which the Group hoped to develop and concentrate
on. In 1962 there were few
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
-- perhaps
at the most -- who could
be said to be focussed essentially on collection of
S&T information. None of these had a scientific pedigree
remotely comparable to
Furthermore9 and unique
to this case in the Clandestine Service, he was handled
and his work was planned and directed at headquarters
by an officer,
who himself was a
professional nuclear physicist and an operations officer
with several years experience
tist staff agent
He took over the
of
in the late 50's as a scien-
preparation and management
which was to fund the costs of
activities and, hopefully, of others like him
who could be acquired as
In September 1963
with his family,
time went on.
was dispatched to
The plan was to
have him earn his doctorate in theoretical physics within
the
university system, master the language, and
naturalize himself in the
environment. During
*Established as an Fl Staff project and approved by
Karamessines in June 1963.
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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this period he was to acquaint himself with other for-
eign students
where he
was enrolled, and to report his observations from time
to time.
obtained his doc-
torate in March 1966, meanwhile having received a tem-
porary appointment in 1965 with a large
concern holding government
search and development. A
and applications, on which
industrial
contracts on classified re-
specialist in laser research
he wrote his thesis (in
during his industrial employment ob-
tained access to, and reported on, technical progress
in laser development up to the time of his return
to the
in
thesis;
U.S. for home leave and reassignment in April 1966.
He was unable to return to the industrial firm
where he had worked while completing his
the firm was unable to make an acceptable offer
for permanent employment. After
leave and
a period of re-training during the summer, FI/SIG and
continued the intensive efforts which had
begun early in the year to find a permanent assignment
for him in
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which his scientific background would appear suitable.
It was unfortunate that no European assignment had
been worked out by the time
academic stint
was finishedd. As the summer
wore on, he and his wife became seriously concerned
about the schooling of their children. The plan they
most favored was to remain in the United States through-
out the academic year so that the children could enroll
in the fall and remain for the entire academic year
without further disrupting their education.
Despite the best efforts
and of
could be worked out, for
of the Group
no suitable position
overseas employment, which
he found acceptable. In his own searches he had, during
the latter half of 1966 and early 1967, received one
or two offers at salaries substantially beyond the grade
level (GS-11) he had reached in the Clandestine Service.
One of these offers proved too attractive to spurn and
he resigned from the Agency in June 1967.
five year career as a scientist-staff
agent illustrates a dilemma which had plagued the CS
for years: how to retain persons with high scientific
qualifications in clandestine operational work. In
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retrospect it could be argued that the CS had arranged
to over-qualify him in science
earn his operational spurs.
ing the planning focH
before he had time to
dur-
reassignment, predicted
at one point that he would succumb to the temptations
of
as
of
better pay and better personal status in industry
a scientist and would leave the Agency. In the view
it would have been better to have used
him on contract after he had found a positiondto his
taste on the outside. 111/ A year later both judg-
ments proved to be correct.
Soon after
a long time career agent,
arrived in the Group
was turned over to FI/SIG by WE Division for operational
direction and targetting.
a mechanical en-
gineer over a period of years had acquired a wide range
of foreign contacts in scientific fields. Because
of the variety of nationalities and target areas to
which he had developed access, the Division felt it
appropriate to have FI/SIG assume operational responsibility.
*Hired in 1948.
**The Division retained control of the position and
handled all salary and administrative matters.
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Also,
had handled him in Europe and was intimately
familiar with the case.
status and action were excellent; he was assistant to
112/ FI/SIG had been developing
high level, cooperative contacts within that society
for several years. As an outgrowth of this long-term
staff developmental work with
the Group was able to have
head of its European office thus
officials of the society,
established as
serving the purposes
of the society, and at the same time extending
His opera-
tional activities were mainly confined to spotting,
assessing and cultivating these personalities, based
on guidance and feed-back from headquarters. But along
with this work he also handled an important
agent
Except for this agent-handling responsibility,
his other activities had come under increasing scrutiny
by WE Division. as Deputy Chief for WE,
asked FI/SIG to give particular attention to the
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intelligence resulting from the numerous contacts
which
was growing
the product
had been cultivating. 113/ There
doubt in the Division as to the value of
in relation to project costs, along with
concern for the integrity of
so many years in agent status.
This case differed from that of
in
several respects. The theater of operations for
was already well established. He was thoroughly seasoned
as an operative and was functioning smoothly within
with no reassignment imminent at the point
when the Group took him over. But the Division was
losing confidence, not so much in the purpose of his
intelligence dforts as in their results. His contacts
and targets were scattered and diffuse. His reporting
was voluminous but often unfocussed. There were few
important scientific recruitments traceable to his
efforts, if that importance were to be measured in terms
of positive intelligence product. To be sure, there
were no
work, but
he had produced well-evaluated positive scientific
information in the short time he was active. Also,
kept him on a tight rein and provided
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guidance based on a scientist's critical appraisal of
the relevant requirements.
on the other hand
had managed over time to function much more inde-
pendently; he became an "old hand" at the operational
game and in the later years of.his twenty-year career
as an agent no doubt strongly influenced and tended
to lead his own operation. As
a scientist, and
case officer,
was foremost
both scientist and practiced
as
were those who handled him. By the time he was placed
under SIG auspices it was too late to retrieve the
operation on the terms set by WE. The Group was already
beset with other problems, and the major problem of
redirecting and rehabilitating the once promising
operation demanded more resources and atten-
tion than the Group could provide at the time. The
demands on
mentor, were
already far beyond reasonable limits, since he was drawn
into field handling of
great importance right
needed to reorient and
Although
another WE agent
at the time when
rejustify
operation of
he was most
work.
knew the operation best, it was decided
late in 1966 to have
take a more active hand
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in its management, especially during frequent (b)(3)
and extended temporary duties abroad.
The hopes of the Group that the operation might
be rescued and made productive never were fulfilled.
After the merger of EE
the accession of
Division, the operation came
from the Division. Finally,
conversations between
ject,
recall
and WE in the spring of 1966 and
as Deputy Chief, Europe
more and more under fire
in July 1967 after several
on the sub-
announced Europe Division's decision to
and reassign him in the U.S under
administration. 114/
One other officer,
who
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
had served the CS on contract from 1951 and then as
(b)(3)
staff agent from 1955, was referred to FI/SIG by
Lloyd George
for possible use in S&T collection.
was employed first in air operations in the
(b)(3)
Far East,
where George came to know him, but later
engaged in mapping and geodetic assignments under WH
Division auspices. It was this latter activity which
(b)(3)
had suggested to George that
might better be
managed centrally and focussed
on S&T
objectives. The
(b)(3)
case was assigned to
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to career agent status under indefinite contract,
and a project
was drafted and approved in
August 1961 to cover the employment and funding of
to financial troubles, somewhat evasive, disorganized,
and chronically unable to inspire confidence in his
customers. The case made considerable inroads on
time and attention. The various contracts
was able to arrange and make good on did produce
information useful to the
customer. Yet as
as sole
noted in June 1965 at the
time of project termination,
Although the project succeeded in procuring
a modest amount of ground control information
in North Africa
and in Central America, it did not
succeed in making real progress toward collecting
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clined and, on project termination,
this sort of information from areas close to
the Chinese or Russian frontiers.. .The potential
of the project for supplying information of
intelligence value was never fully exploited.114a/
had proposed to DO Division several times that
might better be administered by DO's
But on review of all factors DO de-
was turned
over to Special Operations Division, Air Branch, for
subsequent handling as a career agent.*
An officer recruited by FI/SIG in 1959 was later
converted to staff agent status after transfer to FE
Division:
a nuclear physicist. He
was expected to devote his main efforts to Communist
Chinese S&T targets. He served first and later
but did not come under direct FI/SIG in-
fluence or direction during his staff agent duty.**
as we have noted earlier, served as a
staff agent before taking up headquarters duties in
*Retired on 30 April 1968.
**Retired on 31 March 1970.
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FI/SIG. Both he and
had worked in the
Nuclear Energy Division of OSI before joining the CS.
Thus, in contrast with
their
These cases are recited to illustrate what was
to have been a principal occupation of the Group, under
the concept:
...the recruitment, training, and placement
abroad of operations officers
...it was the idea that a few
scientific assets would be handled initially
from Headquarters, would not have contact with
the Station, and would be supported long enough
to naturalize themselves in the foreign scien-
tific environment. FI/SIG was to be the
central Headquarters element responsible for
at least initial operational management of these
scientific assets, working closely with and, in
effect, as the agent of
. . 115
There was nothing startlingly new in this concept in
the tradecraft sense except the special qualifications
demanded of the actor: authentic scientific credentials
and commitment to a long-term clandestine intelligence
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or,umni
mission. Karamessines confirmed his belief in the
validity of the
resignation.
cludes:
He /Raramessine-g7 stressed the importance he
attaches to the long range value of a staff agent
concept in a meeting with
a few months before
record of the conversation
con-
with such solid scientific background under secure
long term acting as an intelli-
gence collector himself on important targets in
a difficult operational environment. He wishes
to insure that this long range potential will
not be dissipated by agent handling functions
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
of short range
Agency has many
value. He
case officers
stressed that the
who can handle agents,
but few viable
assets of this type.
116/
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Staff
retained its belief in the soundness of the
concept, 117/
but by 1965 the dwindling resources
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
of the Group were not sufficient to carry the idea beyond
a single trial.*
The other operational tasks of the Group, up to
about November of 1964, were numerous and varied in
*Its future, if it has one, appears unpromising unless worked
out somehow, within the larger context of (W(1)
problems as a whole. (b)(3)
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relation to the fluctuating and rarely adequate officer
resources at hand. The Physical Sciences Branch, in
addition to handling
provided the bulk of
technical support and operational guidance
on targets in
Operations conducted by
perienced S&T case officer
collection of physical samples near
diffusion plant, in direct response
requirement.
a
a gifted and ex-
resulted in the
gaseous
to a headquarters
was busy directing several
in coordination
with SR and EE Divisions. In addition,
was
investigating, for possible operational targeting, a
sizeable number of Soviet researchers in their laser
R&D programs and attempting to identify Western laser
specialists with access to or in communication with
some of those targets. In January of 1964
joined with two specialists from the
on a delicate mission to inspect
nuclear reactor and other atomic
He prepared the
and other
the
energy installations
secret report on this mission
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selected recipients in the USIB community. He took in
a second inspection of
later.
about a year
was engaged in handling two long-time
who were in constant touch with
Soviet neurologists and other medical researchers.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
continued this for several months.
The Space Sciences Branch, after a late
start,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
began to build up systematically a network
of
opera-
(b)(3)
tional assets in the aerospace
sciences.
travelled frequently
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
on
this quest, pursuing leads to industrial as well as
academic sources in touch with foreign aerospace develop-
ments. Among the assets this Section developed and
handled were an ethnic
access to
Bloc scientists;
aerodynamicist with
missile developments and to Soviet
widely acquainted,
through former professional associations
with
scientists; and a former
missile technologist who was returning to
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(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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after a period of work with NASA. All three of these
contacts were targetted from time to time
against designated foreign scientists, usually on the
occasion of their attendance at international scien-
tific conferences (e.g. meetings of the International
Astronautical Federation which provided abundant
opportunities for spotting, assessing and cultivating
foreign scientific personages of intelligence
In addition the Section expended considerable
over a period of many months developing
space scientist
interest).
effort
who was doing post-doctoral
research in California. With the help of
and through close
collaboration with DO and NE Divisions, he was brought
to the point of signing a secrecy agreement, accepting
secure communications arrangements, and agreeing to
cooperate with U.S. intelligence. His motives for
cooperating were rooted in anti-Communist,
sentiments and not so much in a willingness to perform
clandestine collection tasks against military
research and development programs. His main drive
was to undermine
politically
and the risks he was willing to take were
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related to that objective, as it turned out, and not
so much to S&T information collection.
were operationally active on
and, after his
direction.
this case which originated with
resignation, was carried on under
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
stayed with
the Group only a little more than
(b)(1)
interested in a field assign-(b)(3)
a year. He was strongly
ment. In the fall of 1964 he was engaged by EE and
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NE divisions on an operational assignment
targetted against a
engineer;
he was re-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
leased to FE Division in mid-1965 for posting
to work against
Communist S&T targets.
was active operationally in this period,
having picked up on contract a former asset, a zoologist,
whom he had handled
and who had returned to
the U.S. This experienced asset in turn succeeded over
a period of two or three years in spotting, developing
and recruiting
biology and
asset of CI
ecology.
scientists in the fields of
also handled a former
Staff, a physicist in
in close
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
association with a resident Soviet researcher in his
(b)(1)
department;
representative of a
aviation
(b)(3)
firm holding
and two
(b)(1)
military contracts;
(b)(3)
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0EA,nni
assets in an American professional scientific asso-
ciation.
Besides handling operational
support work included development of operations (inde-
pendent of
formation
for acquisition
of geodetic in-
guidance and assistance to divisions
(mainly FE and WE) on plans for clandestine collection
and ad hoc operational assist-
ance to WE Division on
With the help of its varying supply of Junior
Officer trainees the Group had established contact
with about scientists and engineers by the
autumn of 1964. Contacts with these assets were nor-
mally made
Meetings and communica-
tions were secure. The initial aim of this work was
to establish a wide range of assets, familiar with
the Group's intelligence objectives, in technical
fields such as acoustics, astrophysics, computer
technology, electronics, geodetics, medical research
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and nuclear engineering. Special emphasis was
placed on the search for those in direct touch with
Soviet Bloc scientists either by correspondence, by
attendance at international scientific meetings, or by
association with resident Soviet researchers at U.S.
laboratories or at foreign scientific institutes
The Group's work in cultivating and recruiting
scientists for operational use required fre-
quent coordination and consultation with DO Division.
The latter raised no serious objections to that work,
insisting only that DO be kept informed and that wherever
and whenever possible its case officers be used to handle
FI/SIG assets. DO wished to establish the principle
should
that its field component,
take the operational action on all cases
analogous to the responsibility placed on
station.
any field
On the other hand, DO expected that FI/SIG
would provide Headquarters direction and technical
guidance to DO case officers on cases involving foreign
targets in scientific fields.118/
This arrangement worked fairly smoothly through
mid-1964. Thereafter the problems FI/SIG encountered
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with area divisions as it began to use its scientific
assets more actively against foreign targets deserve
separate treatment. They will be discussed in the
following section.
E. Initiatives and Conflicts.
Whatever was accomplished by the Group of sig-
nificance or. value, in the period treated in this history,*
was done for the most part in connection with non-Soviet
personalities and information targets. Yet it must
be remembered that the main thrust of the FI/SIG pro-
gram, as conceived and set forth in the staff study
approved by Helms, was toward the Soviet target. The
study cited "the acquisition of information on Communist
Bloc progress in the adaptation of basic scientific
research to the design and development of advanced
weapons" as "one of the highest priorities in the
intelligence community" and went on to stress the need
for radically improved agent operations aimed at the
recruitment of Bloc sources of scientific information. 119/
The study concluded that the basis for that improvement
lay in the "development of a centralized capability
for effective operational guidance in a unit equipped
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both to provide badly needed fundamental analysis
and planning and to perform operational tasks as re-
quired." 120/
The explicit language of the study carefully
limited the staff to guidance, analysis, planning, and
performance of required operational tasks* in coordina-
tion with area divisions. But the weaknesses recited
in the study of the traditional area division approaches
to the S&T collection problem and the recommended opera-
tional program farFI/SIG clearly implied fundamental
changes in the relations between FI/SIG and area
divisions. More to the point, it implied a dual
authority in operations and, as the main information
objective was the Soviet Union, it implied a challenge
to the hitherto exclusive authority of SB Division
over operations directed against the Soviet target.
However adroit the phrasing of
paper, it could (b)(3)
not skirt or conceal his principal contention: a
central group -- in this case, Fl Staff -- could and
*This was left intentionally ambiguous, to include opera-
tional tasks the staff was asked or directed to perform,
as well as those it judged itself required to perform
by charter.
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should do what SB could not do, that is, guide, plan
and coordinate clandestine agent S&T operations
world-wide. The clear logic of this contention
spelled collision with SB. If a central unit were
to coordinate, let alone guide and support, "all CS
agent operations directed against S&T targets or em-
ploying scientist personnel" 121/ then conflict with
SB at almost any turn
important S&T targets
over Soviet targets.
was inevitable. The most
were Soviet; SB had authority
How was the authority over those
targets to be reconciled with that over S&T targets?
One might have thought that this was the first issue
to be met and resolved by Fl Staff planners.
It was not, and deliberately so. The attempt to
find a formal solution to this implicit conflict was,
in effect, shelved or, more precisely stated, explained
away. In his comment to Karamessines on the forth-
coming staff study, about which Karamessines had reser-
vations,
wrote
You have expressed concern about operations on
the part of the staffs, and possible conflict
with or duplication of the activities of the
area divisions in the implementation of these
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proposals. In fact they are designed to
complement the work of the area divisions in
S&T operations. In their execution there will
be frequent contact by FI/SIG with the various
divisions, but they should be contacts of
cooperating elements...not contacts of contention
over rights and prerogatives. 122/
In short the informal solution of any latent conflict
between the divisions and FI/SIG was to be found in
good will and the mutual respect of parties aware of
their overlapping authorities but intent on colla-
borating in work toward identical goals. The spirit
of the cause, not the letter of charters, was to
prevail.
Early in 1964 this spirit found expression in
a short internal notice circulated within SR Division
and signed by David E. Murphy. 123/ When Murphy became
Chief of the Division in September 1963 on
reassignment as Deputy Director of Security, he set
out almost immediately to establish an S&T operations
element in the Collection Group of the Division. It
was designated SR/CG/S&T and
(b)(3)
became its (b)(3)
Chief. He and officers of FI/SIG took counsel at once
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to work out the terms of a modus vivendi which would
in effect divide the labor and thus head off possible
causes of friction.
The information objective of the SR program, as
explained in the notice, was data on Soviet weapons
systems in the planning and development phases. The
operational objective was recruitment of Soviet sources
with direct access to that information, or failing that,
to sources with indirect access. The CI objective was
to counter the Soviet S&T espionage effort against
Western military research and development. KGB and GRU
S&T officers were singled out as "prime targets" for
recruitment. The method of the SR program required
concentration on Soviet scientists and technicians
living abroad for an extended period or travelling fre-
quently outside the Soviet Union. 124/ FI/SIG had no
quarrel with this program, with one exception: the
Group believed that while RIS officers engaged in S&T
collection were certainly valid recruitment targets,
the program should not ignore the operational can-
vassing of any accessible Bloc scientists having some
acquaintance with Soviet scientific programs. Further-
more,
demurred somewhat at the emphasis -- in
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his view, over-emphasis -- in the SR Notice on counter-
intelligence concerns, fearing that these could dampen
attempts "to exploit positive intelligence opportuni-
ties." 125/
The means of implementing the SR program were set
forth in a passage of the Notice dealing explicitly
with functions of FI/SIG, as �SR Division understood
them. The functions of the SR S&T section will in
many respects parallel and complement those of FI/SIG.
Unlike FI/SIG, whose mission covers wider responsibili-
ties and whose targets are not limited to the Soviet
Union, SR Division's S&T unit will concentrate solely
on the USSR. It will be interested in operations designed
to recruit Soviet scientists as clandestine sources.
Since this. objective is also included in FI/SIG's
mission, the two units will coordinate closely on all
matters relating to contact with or information on
Soviet scientists. Both units will attempt to
contact operations with Soviet S&T personnel
abroad, and each will coordinate
develop
such operations with the appropriate CS divisions and
staffs as well as with each other. In very general
terms it is expected that FI/SIG will approach the
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ort�nLI
problem primarily through its study of free-world
scientific institutions and individuals who have
access to Bloc targets. Conversely, SR will devote
its initial and primary attention to the study of
Soviet target individuals, to the Soviet scientific
community as such, and to the CI aspects of the
Soviet
program.
cruit a Soviet
In operations
individual,
involving an attempt to re-
SR Division will, in accord-
ance with
assume headquarters action respon-
(b)(1)
sibility.
126/ The Notice
went on to state that SR/CG/S&T
(b)(3)
operations
against "Soviets
in scientific and technical
fields on TDY status abroad,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
would be coordinated with FI/SIG.
127/
FDDM the Fl Staff point of view this was a landmark
document.
field and
authority
It acknowledged FI/SIG's
appeared to recognize the
in most matters affecting
charter in the Soviet
principle of dual
S&T collection except
actual recruitment attempts involving Soviet citizens;
in than cases SR Division was to have undivided control
and responsibility
jurisdiction over
to be numerous in
way appeared open
. FI/SIG was not concerned about
those cases, which were not expected
any event. Much more important, the
for combined action to broaden
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the scope of Soviet S&T operations. In forwarding
copies of the SR Notice to FI/SIG wrote in
his transmittal letter that
Our officers have all been advised about your
account of your organization and plans and your
offer of help and assistance and we all look
forward to mutually beneficial cooperation. 128/
At the time the SR Notice was in preparation
FI/SIG was considering the issuance of a similar CSN
on SIG responsibilities. More than a year had passed
since Helms had authorized the expansion and redirection
of SIG and the papers showing that authorization had
never been distributed to area divisions. By late
1963, of course, all divisions were aware of the
reorganization and relocation of SIG, but no formal
notice had been disseminated in writing specifying
the range and limits of SIG's mission. The Group was
still in a formative stage, training its staff, getting
its bearings, laying its foundations. Within the Staff
it was thought that 'a formal declaration of intentions
and statement of responsibilities might be premature,
but the formation of SR/CG/S&T inclined the Staff to
come forward with an announcement of its own. It
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was decided to float a draft CSN on FI/SIG first
within the elements of Fl Staff, for critical review,
and then to one division, WE, to test its reactions.*
There were no problems
through Fl Staff,
FI/RQM concerning
except for
references
with the draft as it moved
one or two caveats within
to the handling of require-
ments. But WE Division, after review of the draft,
demurred; its officers worried about the seeming im-
pingement on area division responsibilities of state-
ments referring to SIG operating functions. There was
no objection to having SIG operate in the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(which was not under WE jurisdiction in any case);
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
the concern was with what
might happen overseas. 129/
Oddly, WE Division
had raised
no objections to SIG's
operation of the
project and in general, as we
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
have noted earlier, cooperated freely on other opera-
tions proposed by SIG affecting WE territory (the
case is a later example). In FI/SIG the
WE reaction was thought to be symptomatic of the likely
attitude of other divisions. So long as the Group's
*Unfortunately no copies of this draft could be
found among FI/SIG records or elsewhere in Fl
Staff.
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few operational initiatives could be worked out on
a case by case basis with each division there was no
real problem. Apprehensions arose only when SIG moved
to document de jure the basis for its de facto opera-
tional functions. The Group therefore decided to
drop the idea of publishing its charter, for the time
being. The SR notice indirectly was serving the same
purpose and in the division of major concern to the FI/SIG
program.
In trying to exercise its coordination responsibility
the Group needed to be kept well informed of area divi-
sion S&T collection activities. In the first eighteen
months of its new program, SIG attempted to do this
through its various contacts in the divisions rather
than through written instructions. But as time went
on it was clear that some more formal procedures would
be necessary to help insure that relevant cable and
dispatch material on S&T operations were brought to
SIG's attention or coordinated with the Group before
release, when important actions were being planned.
The need for information and action indicators, to be
assigned to SIG for use on communications involving
scientific matters, became apparent. These were
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assigned by RID, at FI/SIG's request in June
1964. 130/ 131/
The Group began at once to use both indicators
and in
November 1964 drafted a CS Notice explaining the purpose
and intended use of these indicators (see attachment C).
After a long delay the draft was finally circulated
by DDP/Publications in March 1965. FE and SR Divi-
sions concurred in the use of the action indicator but
objected to the assignment of an information indicator,
FE on the grounds that it was not needed "to insure
proper flow" of S&T correspondence to FI/SIG, 132/, SR
because it did not accept the Group's definition of
scientific operations and did not agree with "the con-
cept of a staff element receiving duplicate copies of
all cable and dispatch traffic of operations for which
divisions have action responsibility..." 133/ EE ob-
jected that the draft was "too vague" and that a staff
should coordinate but not try to take action respon-
sibility for operations. 134/*
*As we shall see presently, EE reversed itself seven
months later, concurring both in the right of SIG
to operate and to take action responsibility, for S&T
cases.
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In the face of these objections on what was a
derivative issue, SIG dropped the attempt to publish
a separate CSN on indicators. Meanwhile much more
serious troubles had been brewing and the test on
assignment of indicators was merely symptomatic of
these.
We have run a little ahead of our narrative and
now need to look back a bit to trace the causes of the
problems. Within Fl Staff it was recognized both by
Lloyd George and
that early evidence of opera- (b)(3)
tional achievement by the Group, of a kind that would
be impressive to the DD/P, was unlikely. The FI/SIG
plan, to succeed, required a commitment by management
to see it through and so far as possible to regulate
organizational and functional changes in the CS that
might thwart or undermine this plan. Under the best
of circumstances, with full and willing cooperation
of all divisions, including contributions of a few
of their most experienced officers, at least two years,
more realistically three, would have been required to
assemble enough competent staff and develop the kind
of central collection and operational support capability
envisaged in the
staff study of 1962. (b)(3)
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orA�mni
The deficiencies
paper, and the
called forihndamental,
described to the DD/P in
thrust of the Balmer enquiry,
not cosmetic, changes in the
CS approaches to its S&T collection responsibilities.
The wording of the 1962 program for SIG, approved
by Helms, proposed fundamental changes and SIG,
interpreting it so, set out for the long haul to
implement those changes. The question in the Group
was whether management minds and commitments would
change before the program had a chance for a fair
trial.
As we shall see later, minds did change through
a combination of
occurring during
fluence of David
causes and a series of events
1964 and 1965, First was the in-
Murphy and his Division's approach
to S&T collection problems. Second was
impatience to see FI/SIG become effectively opera-
tional. Third was Karamessines' misgivings about
relations of FI/SIG with divisions, especially with
SR and
Finally, there was
Desmond Fitzgerald's new look at the role of FI/SIG.
These were the main influences bearing on the destiny
of the Group and during 1965 they were all interacting.
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To the extent possible we shall try to deal with them
seriatim.*
The accord with SR/CG/S&T, as seen from the
FI/SIG standpoint, worked well during
tenure. By nature bland, quiet, not fractious or
easily ruffled, and sincerly interested in smooth
relations with the Group, he made it possible, on
his side, for officers of his unit to cooperate with
SIG. But there were no illusions in SIG that his
rather relaxed attitude toward SIG's operational ini-
tiatives was widely shared in SR. Among SIG officers
it was felt at the time that the Notice on SR's S&T
program was not likely to alter the attitude of the
Requirements and Reports staff in SR (SR/RR) toward
*We stress these as the main influences. There were
of course others which will be mentioned in the
succeeding narrative: The attitude toward SIG of
FE Division, the rapidly growing capabilities of the
DDS&T in this period, and the relations of area
divisions with that Directorate and especially with
OSI. Up to 1965 FE took a rather complacent view of
SIG's activities since the number of cases involving
Communist Chinese personalities were extremely few
compared with Soviet cases. The history of CS rela-
tions with OSI and the DDS&T perhaps deserves to be
written but lies outside the scope of this paper
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EC lila
SIG operational efforts in the Soviet field. That
staff had always had a strong, if not decisive voice,
in SR operations and were in a position to exercise
considerable control over the selection of Soviet
targets and over actions directed against them, whether
by SR case officers or by those in other operating
elements. Also SIG officers were convinced that it
was Murphy's intention to keep firm control over SR's
S&T efforts and operational domain, and that the
SR/CG/H/S&T unit, created in part as a reaction and
counter-weight to FI/SIG, by its existence and stated
program was meant to test the validity and practicability
of a central S&T authority. Nevertheless, SIG's manage-
on cases in which Soviet
ment of its
scientific personalities
bus friction until late
figure proceeded without ser-
November 1964. At that time
a curious incident occurred which set off a chain of
events leading quickly to direct and open confrontation
with SR. Division.
as a strong sponsor within the Fl Staff of the
SIG program and in a sense its underwriter, was im-
patient with its slow development. He was acutely
aware of the threatened erosion of SIG's claim
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to a central position within the CS on S&T matters in
the face of SR's aggressive and wide-ranging actions,
overseas. He had chafed
at the many delays and obstacles which for two years
had stood in the way of planned staffing. Now, late
in 1964, the Group was approaching at least numerical,
if not effective operational, strength. Early in
November he had occasion to talk with a rather senior
secretary who had been assigned to SIG in July but
who, for reasons of ill-health, had decided to resign.
She had only a few weeks of acquaintance with the
Group and during that time had been asked to devote
most of her attention to rearrangement and purging of
files. In her exit interview with
he asked her,
among other things, about her observations of SIG
and its work. In recounting these she left with
the impression that the Group was plodding and inactive,
that it needed "firing up." In discussing her remarks
later with acknowledged that she was
in no position, during her brief stay, to know in any
detail the outside operational activities of SIG or to
give a balanced appraisal of the Group's pursuits.
Nonetheless he felt, he said, that the build-up and
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preparatory work of the Group was now ready to be
put to more direct operational use, especially against
Soviet target personalities
He felt
there were enough of these to go around, that con-
certed SIG assessment efforts directed against one or
two of them would begin to establish an operational
place for SIG in that field before it was wholly pre-
empted by SR and DO Divisions.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
directed that the (b)(3)
Group proceed at once to identify suitable targets and
draw up operational plans for his review. 135/
called a meeting of SIG officers to con-
vey directive. The officers set about to select
targets and compose plans. The targets chosen were
three post-doctoral Soviet scientists in residence at
concurred in the plan (W(1 )
(b)(3)
and the operation, which was initially targeted
against one of its Soviets only, began in early
December. The immediate impact of this effort is
described in a memorandum from
written two months later.
In late November 1964, FI/SIG requested Cl/Liaison
by memorandum with copies to SR and DO Divisions
to inform the FBI of SIG's intention to operate
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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point
against a Soviet post-doctoral student at the
using as a starting
a young professor at
in the same field as the Soviet. Both Area
Divisions reacted immediately. They complained
because FI/SIG had not routed the memorandum
through them and they alleged that an Agency-
Bureau agreement prohibited the CS from con-
ducting Fl operations against Soviet students
The Bureau, however,
posed no objections to the operation and asked
simply to be kept informed. Since then, FI/SIG
has encountered continual harassment...over
questions of jurisdiction and coordination.
These recent events suggest that fundamental
policies about scientific operations are in
dispute. At issue are the role of specialists
in scientific operations and how the Clandestine
Services should organize and manage resources
to meet their responsibilities in S&T intelli-
gence. With FI/SIG now at a point where it
must either get on with its work or deteriorate,
the present situation of uncertainty and conflict
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is critical. Any meaningful resolution of
this situation will inevitably affect the future
development of scientific operations and policies
within the CS. Such a major decision is needed. 136/
The case
cites began to bring into the (b)(3)
open, first with DO Division and later with SR, the
conflicts implicit in a dual operational authority.
The Soviet scientists SIG had targeted were chosen
because they happened to be within range of a SIG asset
at the same university and were naturally accessible
to him. The asset, untrained in assessments, could
begin to acquire experience in this aspect of opera-
tional support. But almost as soon as the case got
underway DO began to raise questions about SIG's pro-
cedures, who should be in overall charge of directing
assets, and whether the activity should be undertaken
at all.
Karamessines had gotten wind of these difficul-
ties. In January he asked
to see him to
discuss the progress of FI/SIG and its relations with
area divisions. In the course of the meeting he
explained that officers of DO Division had recently
mentioned to him some areas of disagreement with
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FI/SIG, which he thought were relatively minor; yet
he felt there was room for clarification of respective
fields of responsibility between FI/SIG and DO, indeed
between FI/SIG and area divisions in general. He felt
that these disagreements over jurisdiction and functions
should be worked out soon before they widened and a
good way to get at them was to issue as soon as possible
a fairly detailed instruction setting forth the re-
spective responsibilities of FI/SIG and the
for collection of S&T intelligence. 137/
completed a first draft of a CSI on Scientific
divisions
Opera-
tions in March. It was then extensively revised after
much discussion within Fl Staff and submitted
it to A/DDP for review in early June. Karamessines
asked that it be further revised; this was done but
not until November was it finally sent to divisions and
other staffs for coordination.
Meanwhile the CS was under new direction: Helms
had become Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
and on the day he was sworn in, 28 April 1965, Desmond
Fitzgerald moved into the chair as DD/P. Among the
various internal problems to which he gave immediate
attention, the relations of SIG and of Fl Staff as a
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whole with area divisions must, if judged by the
volume of paper and discussion expended on it, have
been rather high on the list. The course of FI/SIG's
evolution through the first year of his regime is
reviewed in the next and final chapter of this history.
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III. The Fitzgerald Era, 1965-1966
In the first twelve months of Desmond Fitzgerald's
incumbency as DD/P the Group began to feel the full
weight of area division resistance and active opposition
to its operational role. Just before Fitzgerald took
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
office SIG was at the high point in its staffing. It
(b)(1)
had developed a wide variety of
assets for
(b)(3)
operational use. It was successfully
handling
(b)(1)
scientific staff agent
and attempting
(b)(3)
to resolve problems bequeathed to it by other operating
elements in the handling,and termination of two other
controversial staff agents. It was doing productive
work against important nuclear energy targets
was collecting valuable geodetic data
And by direction, it
was beginning to move operationally against Soviet
targets through concerted use of its scientific assets.
But at the moment that work got seriously underway --
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(b)(3)
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work designed to complement and reinforce the SR/CG/S&T
effort -- the ground began to shift perceptibly under
SIG's position.
Among divisions SR, and David Murphy personally
as its chief, took the lead in bringing the issue to
a head. The issue, as he was later to describe it,
was quite simply who should exercise responsibility
"for the selection and pursuit of the Soviet target." 138/
SIG claimed authority by its charter to guide and
coordinate "all CS agent operations directed against
S&T targets" as well as to plan and execute operations
of its own supplemental to those conducted by area divi-
sions. 139/
From the first there was never any doubt in SIG
that SR/RR would not tolerate SIG guidance of SR opera-
tions. Support to their operations was another matter;
so long as SIG assets were used as SR wished and against
targets selected and approved by SR, there were no
conflicts. It was SIG's "selection and pursuit" of
Soviet scientific personalities who, in SIG's judgment,
deserved operational attention that caused the rub.
SIG was exercising a judgment based on its estimate of
the S&T intelligence potential of the target; its
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officers were S&T, not Soviet, specialists. But SR
did not recognize any S&T authority within the CS with
power to guide or influence SR operations except that
embodied in its own SR/RR and SR/CG/S&T components. In
SR terms its internal Notice of early 1964 spelled
only acceptance of support, not guidance or prior coor-
dination of its operations, from SIG. In February 1965
Murphy moved on three fronts simultaneously to preserve,
undivided, the authority of SR Division over operations
against Soviet S&T targets: in the DD/S&T, in DO
Division, and in the office of the DDP. He had already
established a formal basis for the strong stand he
was to take on the issue of FI/SIG's involvement in
those operations. Early in 1964 he had issued with
DDP approval a new CSI on Soviet Operations (50-21), 140/
and another on Organization and Functions of SR Divi-
sion (1-11). 141/ Both documents make clear the respon-
sibility of SR Division for clandestine activities
against Soviet targets.
in particular states
that SR will "assume headquarters responsibility for
directing all operations aimed at the recruitment or
defection of any Soviet individuals, whether in the
USSR or elsewhere..." 142/ Nowhere in either document
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is a special staff role in operations recognized or men-
tioned except for certain
"or through other non-SR in-
strumentalities." 143/ Nowhere in either document is
scientific and technical intelligence identified or
mentioned as a category of special importance, or
as the object of a special or distinctive opera-
tional effort. But when these two instructions
appeared an S&T collection unit had already been estab-
lished by SR Division. This was to give visible evi-
dence of SR's intention to experiment, for a while at
least, with a program concentrating on scientific tar-
gets. Thus by the time SIG, at urging, had
moved more openly into operational use of its assets
on Soviet targets, Murphy was well-prepared for the
challenge.
On the same day in February 1965 Murphy sent out
two important memoranda, one to the DD/S&T and the other
to Karamessines as ADDP. Both concerned S&T collection
activities.
The memorandum for the DD/S&T, sent via the DDP,
reviewed in considerable detail SR's experience over
the years with various sources of information on
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Soviet military research and development. It con-
cluded that
...the best focus of our effort seems to be
the Soviet scientists or technicians who are
order to further these efforts we would appreciate
receiving from your office as soon as possible,
and on a continuing basis
The memorandum went on to ask also for any evidence that
might show whether Soviet scientists who are allowed
Murphy finally suggested cooperation
between SR and DD/S&T offices on development of informa-
tion
the Soviet Union. 145/
FI/SIG received a copy of Murphy's memorandum,
but was not consulted during or on its preparation.
April Murphy met with the DD/S&T and ADVSI to discuss
the memorandum and OSI's reaction to it. Reporting
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the session to KaraMessines, Murphy noted OSI's willing-
ness to provide the support requested and said he was
gratified "to find no basic disagreement with SR's con-
cept of a Soviet military research and development pro-
gram
146/ Again in June he reported progress to
the ADDP, this time reviewing the first of a series of
meetings he had planned with OSI divisions. 147/ SR kept
FI/SIG informed of these conferences with DD/S&T but
did not ask SIG to take part in or comment on them. The
responses of the DD/S&T divisions to SR were treated
as privileged information and the Group never had access
to them.
The second memorandum Murphy wrote in February
1965, concerning S&T issues, was addressed to ADDP with
a copy for C/FI; it reported discussions on the planned
collaboration of SR and DO Divisions "in the Soviet S&T
field." 148/ Chief, Fl received a copy of the memorandum
and referred it to FI/SIG. The agenda for the meeting
had previously been sent to ADDP for information but not
to Fl Staff. SR did not consult FI/SIG before these
meetings and did not invite the Group to attend, thus
underscoring the point that in the SR view the Staff
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had no place in those discussions, in spite of the
fact that major plans and important policies and pro-
cedures affecting Fl collection were involved, as they
had been
In reviewing his discussions with
with the recent Soviet-oriented
no doubt very much on his mind,
cooperativeness of
in the discussions on DDS&T suppport.
activities of FI/SIG
Murphy applauded the
and his own intention to see to
it that "participation /of SR officers7 in Soviet S&T
operational activities
necessarily be consonant with the
has for operations
He pledged to keep
must
full responsibility
informed of
activity of SR's S&T officers and to
communications on SR S&T activity
11
operational
coordinate all
with DO
Division. There were other words in his memorandum
caught the particular attention of FI/SIG officers:
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and
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
149/
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
which (b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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SIG officers did not miss the implications of references
to
But much more significant was the stated intention to
with SR S&T officers.
The prospects for pursuing and keeping viable a
SIG operational program under those conditions appeared
slender indeed. The SIG program had depended in large
part on freedom to acquire and develop
of the SR-DO agreement seemed clearly designed to thwart
that effort, if not to put it out of business. The
*Author's italics.
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or.A..nr,1
dilemma of SIG, and its boundary relations with area
divisions, were sharply pointed up by
in a (b)(3)
February memorandum setting forth his views on the cru-
cial situation faced by the Group:
One should scarcely be surprised that juris-
dictional problems are latent in the clear and
accepted (by the DDP) overlapping between SIG and
area divisions. The judgment as to whether an
operation warrants central rather than area divi-
sion direction has, in practice, been left to
SIG which has focussed its attention initially
upon
certain scien-
tific organizations. Since in all cases the ul-
timate purpose of SIG's activities has been the
acquisition of foreign intelligence...concerning
the foreign state's capabilities or intentions,
it was always evident that the moment a SIG
would be concerned. But with the creation of
all areas were -- so to speak -- occupied.
Thus, no person in the world remained unclaimed
potential for some area division. 151/
As we have seen from his memoranda-s Murphy was
making his case for central management and coordination
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sEURET
of Soviet S&T operations (a phrase he finally came to
use in his own correspondence) directly to Karamessines
and, when he took office as DDP, to Fitzgerald. Since
the Soviet S&T operations were at the time the most
important, the case for a limited central management
or direction of other operations, targeted elsewhere,
could safely be left to other strong divisions (such as
FE) to resolve. What had to be settled was the SIG
claim to be a central S&T authority in the CS; on
Murphy's terms it could not be and on every issue drawn
to test that claim, from early 1965 on, he prevailed.
The impact of Fitzgerald's views on the place and
mission of SIG were not felt until the early summer
of 1965. In the course of briefings which Lloyd George
and
had given him on Fl Staff he began to raise
questions about the operational role of SIG, its accom-
plishments, and its relations with divisions. In passing
on Fitzgerald's questions and comments to
said he had the clear impression that Fitzgerald
was likely to take quite a different view of SIG's opera-
tional role than Helms had taken. 152/
suggested that
prepare a detailed
briefing paper on SIG for Fitzgerald's information.
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The paper was completed on 29 July and sent to Fitzgerald
on 17 August. 153/ In it
reviewed the course
of SIG development under the Helms charter, summarized
staff support and operational activities over a period
of nearly three years, and commented on the scientific
and operational qualifications of SIG officers.
Fitzgerald was particularly interested in this latter
point; in later discussions with George,
and
he often expressed himself on the need for
more officers in the CS with some first hand knowledge
of the state of current
technology. In concluding his review observed
hopefully
Although about half of our present complement is
operationally inexperienced, and although much
of the energy of the Group has been applied to the
search for, selection, and training of promising
scientific operations officers, I think we have
research and
a good foundation
the first time in
makings here of a
for a permanent cadre. For
15 years I think we have the
Group with solid technical
depth and the necessary operational know-how to
team up effectively with the area divisions in
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OrAUAXJ1
scientific collection activities and to conduct
other operations competently which can best
be carried out by the central unit. I hope that
the new Clandestine Services Instruction on Scien-
tific Operations, which we have drafted with much
care and thought, will be recognized by the area
divisions as a genuine constructive effort to
chart the way toward effective working relations
and a sensible division of labor between the
operating elements and our Group. I would hope
also that this Instruction, which we have dis-
cussed at length with Mr. Karamessines, can be
expeditiously coordinated and published. 154/
Fitzgerald made no written comment on the paper, return-
ing it to
with the remark that he wished to con- (b)(3)
sider the whole problem further and discuss it with
some division chiefs.
The work of the Group went on in this uneasy
atmosphere through the remainder of the summer. The
leadership in the SR S&T unit had meanwhile changed (in
April);
replaced
and the
unit was redesignated SR/CG/S. Relations of SIG with
the SR unit, under
were at best formal and
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EC;
had been carrying
toward Soviet targets
coordinated with SR Division.
aware that
the request of
that division;
also,
businesslike; much of the contact was through memoranda,
rather than personal, and consisted mostly of informa-
tion to SR/CG/S of FI/SIG activities affecting Soviet
Bloc targets; after the spring of 1965 rarely were SR
S&T operational matters coordinated with SIG.
Disagreements between SR, and SIG over operational
jurisdictions and procedures sharpened during the
summer. One example was the question of responsibility
for operational management of CS
had written to
complaining that one of SIG's officers,
on activities which were directed
155/
and were not
had not been
TDY during August had been taken at
and had been funded by
plans for contacting an
asset in whom SR had an interest had in fact been
coordinated with SR.
reviewed the facts of the
case in a memorandum for Murphy, expressed SIG's willing-
ness to cooperate with SR in collecting S&T information
and noted that
...a good basis for such cooperation was worked
out some time ago in a number of discussions
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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between SIG and officers of your Division. The
terms of agreement...reached at that time are
very well set forth in the SR Division notice
No. 64-4 which you issued on 7 February 1964.
I suggest we give the formula so thoughtfully
prepared.., a fair chance to work and succeed. 156/
Early in May
lish "policies and
Services in
Attachment E) The
responsibility for conducting
had drafted a proposed CSI on
the purpose of which was to estab-
responsibilities for the Clandestine
operations." (See
draft reserved to the divisions full
operations and
providing requisite thipport. The staff (FI/SIG) was to
be responsible for representing CS interests in dealing
with other CIA elements
matters; it was also to provide
Staff guidance, and to coordinate on correspondence
relating to
operations. Among staffs and divi-
sions only SR objected to the proposed CSI and refused
to concur on grounds that "it appears to allocate to
a staff element functions which are normally the respon-
sibility of area divisions." 157/
appealed the
issue to Karamessines, 158/ emphasizing that the intent of
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the instruction was "to enhance not to weaken the
effectiveness of Division efforts; to retain control
over clandestine techniques within the Clandestine
Services..." 159/
noted that "the fears ex- (b)(3)
pressed by SR are without foundation" and concluded
that "Such small alarms should not be allowed to
deter management from repairing a demonstrated weakness
in the control of the affairs of the Clandestine
Services." 160/ Yet the appeal failed and the CSI was
never published.
Murphy took account of these long-standing
differences with SIG in a four-page EYES ONLY memorandum
to Fitzgerald on 23 August 1965. 161/ He documented his
case by attaching
earlier strictures on the (b)(3)
subject, 162/ his February memorandum to the DD/S&T, 163/
and an SR paper on The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defama-
tion Campaign. 164/
In the memorandum, which he characterizes as
"informal," he refers to a recent conversation with
*On the Routing and Record Sheet the routing shown is to DDP
then CSR. There are no initials or other markings on the
sheet to show how the memorandum was handled after it was
received in the office of the DDP. Fitzgerald gave it to
who in turn passed it to (b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Fitzgerald concerning FI/SIG, and proceeds to review
what he considers to be "the specific areas of disagree-
ment." 165/ Murphy states that he "cannot agree that
FI/SIG should have operating responsibility for, or should
direct assets against, Soviet targets unless this is
done within the framework of an SR Division operation." 166/
He is willing to accept SIG operational support and agrees
that SR's "operational activity against S&T targets should
be properly coordinated with FI/SIG, providing that...the
need-to-know principle is strictly adhered to." 167/*
*Author's italics. As noted earlier, very few of SR's
S&T operations were "properly coordinated" with FI/SIG, in
SIG's interpretation of coordination. That would have
meant discussion with SIG in the planning and conduct of
S&T collection activities, did this on occasion, (b)(3)
but it was the strong conviction in the Group that SR's
application of the need-to-know principle effectively
excluded the important and productive SR S&T cases from
the coordination process. Indeed, Murphy cited the
Penkovskiy case as an illustration of the Staff's necessary
ignorance of the extent of SR's S&T effort: "Since the
proponents of the FI/SIG concept were not privy to the
full details of this case, the end impression may well have
been that SR Division did not in fact operate against Soviet
scientific targets." 168/ The Staff, of course, enter-
tained no such impresgra and was well aware, all along,
of the general extent of SR's collection efforts against
S&T objectives, if not specific details of individual
cases.
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The major point of contention with FI/SIG, as Murphy
views it in his paper is over "two separate and mutually
exclusive operational philosophies." 169/ SR's program
is "carefully pinpointed," "tightly disciplined," "selec-
tively targeted," using assets "extremely well trained"
in "Soviet requirements, realities, and tradecraft,"
with "stature" in their scientific fields, and "managed
against the background of the Clandestine Services'
total experience in Soviet operations, which rests in
SR Division." 170/ By implication, the SR S&T program
has in it all the elements and qualities which FI/SIG's
program does not and cannot have. More explicitly,
Murphy later associates the FI/SIG program and methods
with what he characterizes as "a random, shotgun approach
to Soviet scientists with too wide use of insufficiently
trained American scientists as access agents;" and he
worries about the flap potential of that approach. 171/
A further aspect of the FI/SIG program to which he takes
exception is its willingness to pursue Soviet Satellite
scientists as possible sources of required information.
In SR's view these scientists have no access to important
information on Soviet military research and development
and in consequence are not targets of the SR S&T effort.
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At the end of his paper Murphy acknowledges that
SIG may play a role in supporting other divisions which
do not have S&T units of their own, for example, in "cover-
age of such subjects as nuclear proliferation." 172/ But
the purpose of his paper has been to establish what he
considers to be "absolutely fundamental," that is,
the sufficiency of SR Division to handle clandestine
collection against all Soviet targets, and the ancillary,
if not entirely dispensable role of FI/SIG in that effort.
This paper and the review of SIG's activities which
had prepared in July, 173/ were to form the
basis of discussions with Fitzgerald. These were not
held, however, until much later -- early in 1966.*
Through the autumn of 1965 the ability of the Group
to continue its operational program steadily declined.
A number of its officers had sought, or were seeking,
assignments elsewhere; those who remained were occupied
more and more with purely staff duties, and the decreasing
operational work was almost exclusively confined to
support of collection activities outside the domain of
*There is no written record of the date of this
meeting. It is the author's recollection that it
occurred sometime during January.
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SR. In September
was reassigned and replaced
as Deputy Chief of Fl Staff by
As
had been a strong, vocal, and persistent advocate
and in many ways the architect -- of FI/SIG's opera-
tional role, his reassignment at this critical juncture
was seen in the Group as a further portent of basic
changes in the Group's mission.
On
arrival in the Staff, Fitzgerald
asked him to look closely into the question of SIG's
status and its relations with area divisions, and
to report back.
did this first by taking
soundings informally in some divisions; then he asked
to re-draft the CSI on Scientific Operations
had sent to Karamessines in June. The
which
re-drafted CSI was sent to each division and staff
for review on 1 November 1965; their comments were
returned during November and early December. Finally
was ready to report to Fitzgerald, which
he did by memorandum on 10 December, attaching the
draft CSI and the comments received from divisions
and other staffs. 174/ On the same date
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(by (b)(3)
this time in WE Division, preparing for assignment
addressed another memorandum to
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Fitzgerald* attaching two rather lengthy papers which
were, in his words, "the distillation of a great deal
of thought that I have devoted to this problem over the
last several years." 175/
in his memorandum, reviewed the work of SIG
since September 1962: its attempts to obtain well quali-
fied staff, its contacts and operational assets in the
U.S. scientific community, its staff agent operations, its
technical guidance to area divisions (other than SR), and
the variety of its staff functions. He recounted the
results of his talks with area divisions concerning the
proposed CSI and observed that only SR and FE Divisions
took exception to it, declaring themselves "unwilling to
accept a definition of FI/SIG functions which includes
responsibility for all or any part of an operation." 176/**
concluded, after his fresh and dispassionate look
*His "swan song" on S&T Operations, as he later described
the paper to
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
**Area division and staff comments on the proposed CSI (Tab B
of memorandum) may be found in Attachment F of this (b)(3)
history. The lengthy objections of essen- (W(1)
tially repeat, in different language, the objections to (b)(3)
FI/SIG operations so often expressed by SR Division.
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at the situation, that there was a need for a specialized
S&T unit in the CS to exert a "measure of central
management interest and direction" in the complex
field of S&T collection activities. He found that
This requires a strong, competent staff element...
such competence, if acquired...at great expense
of time and effort, should not be used ex-
clusively on intermittent staff chores...It is
presumed that we all agree that we are far
from having all the new ideas, energy, labor,
and results in this difficult field that we
need...divisions should be prompted...to get
on with this problem,..they should welcome
and encourage the professional partnership of
the staff specialists in a positive, mature
team effort. 177/
The tone of paper was sober, measured, and (b)(3)
temperate. It took due account of Fitzgerald's "con-
cern about SIG operational functions which seem to
compete or interfere with division responsibilities." 178/
Yet he believed that differences between SIG and area
divisions could be resolved "given a spirit of accommo-
dation on the part of SR and FE Divisions" and a
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definition of SIG's'i.esponsibility for constructive
operational activity. .which will complement,
compete with, the work of other components."
then recommended publication of the
long-delayed CSI.
two concurrent papers were entitled (b)(3)
"The Case for the Scientist-Case Officer" and "The
Case for Centrally Guided S&T Operations in the Clan-
destine Services." With some changes in emphasis and
organization, they covered essentially the same ground
treated in his September 1962 staff study. In his
covering memorandum for the two papers, appealed (b)(3)
for "strong support from the DD/P" for the
program he had been espousing. If that was forth-
coming and the program was vigorously pursued he fore-
saw that "the time will come when its detractors
will readily recognize its value and recant...if it
is deferred, we only destroy what little now remains
of three years hard work, and postpone the day when
we will start over from scratch." 180/
Karamessines initialled the routing slip which
and not
179/
much-argued, (b)(3)
used to transmit his and
paper, (b)(3)
but there is nothing on the slip or the various
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papers to show that Fitzgerald ever read them.
In early January 1966 Murphy wrote the last
in his series of memoranda for the DD/P on S&T opera-
tions. 181/ By this time he had concluded that SR
Division's program to obtain important information
by attempted approaches to Soviet scientists was
essentially unproductive. He declared his intention
to reduce the effort against
retain his "S&T Headquarters Branch because we cannot
afford to permit its expertise in the Soviet S&T field
to be dissipated." 182/ He appended a lengthy review,
prepared by
of his Branch's S&T collection
efforts over a six month period. Again, the original
of Murphy's memorandum reached
from Fitzgerald's
office, and again without evidence that Fitzgerald had
seen it.
At the January 1966 meeting in Fitzgerald's office
Karamessines, Murphy (and others from SR), George,
were assembled. Murphy presented, orally,
the main elements of the arguments he had used in the
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various earlier papers he had submitted to Karamessines
and Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald asked
to review (b)(3)
the operational work and accomplishments of SIG. There
was considerable discussion of the merits and demerits
of using professional scientists within the CS on opera-
tions -- a subject of particular interest to Fitzgerald.
He expressed himself as being persuaded that good scien-
tists were not likely to remain viable for long in
operations, that the best course for the CS was to
make effective use of the variety of scientific talent
available in the DDS&T, but that he was not opposed
to retaining a few scientific specialists for general
use in operations at a central staff location. After
a full hearing of the SR and the Fl Staff positions,
he stated his conclusion that operations by a staff
element should be held to a minimum, and that they
should be developed mainly to assist and "pilot" divi-
sions without much S&T experience. He felt that SR
was well equipped to handle its own S&T program, but
wanted the Fl Staff nevertheless to play an effective
coordinating role in operations, and to stimulate
the development and expansion of S&T collection acti-
vity throughout the Clandestine Services. He asked
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that Fl Staff prepare a paper for him reviewing
the points and concepts just discussed in the meet-
ing, and to draft another paper based on those con-
cepts which he might issue in place of the CSI pro-
posed by the Staff.
In mid-March these papers were completed after
much discussion and re-writing within the Fl Staff.
The memorandum drafted for Fitzgerald's signature, to
go to staffs and divisions, was prepared by
then edited and reworded in some passages by
in the office of the DDP. The "philo-
sophy" statement which Fitzgerald had asked for was
worked up by Both papers
were submitted under a covering memorandum from
Lloyd George to Fitzgerald, recalling the "long session
in your office some time ago when you tried to resolve
the differences principally between the SR Division
and the FI/SIG group." 183/
The philosophy paper reviewed several functions
which Fl Staff felt SIG ought to perform. First,
it "should serve as a repository of knowledge and
experience concerning agent and related technical
collection operations to acquire S&T intelligence." 184/
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Divisions had frequently neglected to make use of
this accumulated experience, or had too often chosen
to turn to OSI for counsel. Second, the Group should
be able to "provide authoritative S&T guidance to
operating branches and stations.. .especially to most
area division elements which have little experience
in S&T cases." 185/ The conduct of clandestine
was cited as a notable
example of the need for central guidance and the DDP
was once again urged "to consider early approval" of
the long-deferred CSI on the subject. 186/ Third,
SIG "should do more on-the-desk training of new
officers (primarily Career Trainees) during a tour
of duty in SIG," and the Staff saw "distinct advan-
tages" in acquiring "a few officers specially com-
petent in a scientific or engineering field who at
the same time have a taste and talent for operations."
Fourth, it was urged that "Before-the-fact consultation
with SIG on the major S&T operational plans and actions
of the Clandestine Services is essential." 188/ This
had long been one of the most serious problems faced
by the Group and, in the meeting with Fitzgerald,
and other Fl Staff officers had attempted to impress
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187/
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01.11%,1142J1
him with its importance. The philosophy of the Staff
on this subject was summarized in the paper as follows:
...we cannot assure the best application of
our knowledge to an operational problem unless
the divisions feel willing to inform SIG before
the fact of divisional S&T activities. This
applies especially to preparatory planning. It
should not be necessary for staff officers, with
assigned responsibilities in the S&T field, to
go sleuthing among divisions for occasions to
use their abilities. These officers should not
be left in the position of patching up pre-
ventable errors, or pressing unwanted guidance
and advice on inexperienced desk officers. If
the staff must be alert and active in seeking
opportunities to help, the divisions must have
a reciprocal obligation to make the best use
possible of existing S&T expertise available
inside the CS. That expertise will not improve
or even survive unless it is constantly called
upon, activated by important as well as trivial
cases, and not repeatedly by-passed or ignored
in favor of outsiders. 189/
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Fifth, the Group should have knowledge of the various
desk-to-desk contacts of area divisions with OSI
officers on operational matters and should provide
counsel during those contacts, both to preserve good
operational security and to avoid "the development of
OSI as the knowledgeable staff on CS operational
matters..." 190/ Sixth, there was a useful function
for the Group in serving as a central point of contact
with various U.S. agencies on S&T operational matters. 191/
The controversial issue of SIG's role in opera-
tions was, somewhat resignedly, resolved in the blandly
worded conclusion of the paper that
At this point in time, SIG would probably be
more helpful if it confined its operational
activity to cooperative assistance to area
divisions when and where this can be effectively
utilized. 192/
This language, which was carefully chosen by Lloyd
George, reflected acceptance of the Fitzgerald point
of view; but in a parting comment on the issue George
observed that he saw little hope for cooperation of
divisions with the Staff unless the DDP himself pro-
vided "some stimulus...which will admonish divisions
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to inform centrally and to use SIG as the knowledge-
able S&T staff in the CS." 193/
This paper was an acknowledgement and recog-
nition by Fl Staff that the Helms charter of 1962
had been terminated. Formal notice of this was given
in the relatively brief memorandum drafted for Fitzgerald's
signature, which was to go to all staffs and divisions
(see Attachment G).
The subject of the memorandum clearly indicated
Fitzgerald's intention as to how he wished to use
FI/SIG; it stressed "staff coordination and support"
of S&T collection activities. At the same time, divi-
sions were expected "to consult with FI/SIG on S&T
operational problems or objectives before seeking coun-
sel or support outside the Clandestine Services" and
to coordinate their communications and correspondence
on S&T matters "with the Group to the maximum extent
feasible." 194/ The Fitzgerald memorandum stated flatly
that
FI/SIG will have no operational responsi-
bilities except for those which it may from
time to time perform in collaboration with
an area division, or to carry out operational
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or developmental tasks which may transcend
divisional area responsibilities. 195/
Fitzgerald signed the memorandum on 17 March 1966;
copies were distributed to every staff, every
and every country branch in the CS.
With that action FI/SIG reverted to the
division,
staff
role it had performed under Bissell. In June 1966
on the eve of his departure for
wrote one
last paper on the subject "to which," in his words,
"I have given so much of my time and interest in the
last five years..." 196/ He deplored the "negative
statement" in Fitzgerald's memorandum on SIG's opera-
tional responsibilities and the lack of attention in
the paper -- "a major weakness"
S&T requirements in clandestine
and he clings to his conviction
-- to the problem of
collection operations;
that .
."there are
types of operational activity that can be conducted
more economically, more effectively,
by a central unit." 197/
Through the remainder of Fitzgerald's regime,
until his death in July 1967, and on into the period
of Karamessines' incumbency as DDP, FI/SIG functioned
under the terms of Fitzgerald's 1966 memorandum. The
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or,unzi
number of officers in the staff dropped to
by
the end of 1969. In May, 1970, during Peer de Silva's
tour as C/FI, the Staff as a whole was re-organized.
FI/SIG was abolished. Its personnel and functions
were incorporated into a revived Fl Plans Group, and
became Chief of that new Group. The develop- (b)(3)
(b)(3)
ments leading up to that change, covering the period
1966 to May 1970, must form a separate and later portion
of this history.
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Appendix A
Glossary of Abbreviations
AD/SI -- Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence.
OSI -- Office of Scientific Intelligence.
TSS -- Technical Services Staff (later Technical
Services Division).
BW --Biological Warfare.
CW -- Chemical Warfare.
IPC -- Inter-Agency Clandestine Collection Priorities
Committee.
00 -- Office of Operations
of the Directorate of
Intelligence.
JOT -- Junior Officer Trainee (later Career Trainee).
NIH -- National Institutes of Health.
CERN -- European Organization for Nuclear Research.
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Appendix B
Source References
1. CIA. Inspector General's Survey of the Foreign
Intelligence Staff, Feb 1959, IG/DCE-18482. TS.
(hereafter referred to as "The IG Survey of FT
Staff").
2. Ibid., p. 39.
3. Op. cit. (1, above), p. 37, Recommendation 9(c).
4. Ibid., p. 39, Recommendation 10.
5. Memorandum, DD/P for DCI, 22 Jul 1959, sub:
Inspector General's Survey of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Staff, and attachments, CIA Control No. 170776.
TS. Attachment 10.
6. Memo, C/FI/OPS/SOB for C/FI, 30 Apr 1959, sub:
Report of the Inspector General on Scientific
Operations Branch, SO Memo No. 5965. S. Para 1,
comment /9/.
7. Op. cit. (5, above), Attachments 2-8, 9 (para-
graphs (a) and (b)), 11-13.
8. Memo, C/FI/OPS/SOB for C/FI/OPS, 9 Mar 1959,
sub: Organization and Staffing of Scientific
Operations Branch, SO Memo No. 5903. S.
9. Memo, Director of Personnel for Chief, Personnel
Operations Division, 10 Oct 1958, sub: Scientific
Operations Branch. C.
10. Memo, C/FI/OPS/SOB through C/FI for Chief of
Operations, DDP, 28 Jul 1959, sub: Staffing Con-
cepts for Scientific and Technical Collection
in the Clandestine Services (II), SO Memo No. 6042.
11. Op. cit. (1, above), pp. 46 and 47.
12. Ibid., p. 27.
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13. Ibid., p. 22.
14. Memo, C/FI/OPS/SOB for C/CI, 30 Apr 1959, sub:
Recommendations of Inspector General Concerning
Transfer of Certain Functions from Fl to CI
Staff, SO Memo No. 5966. S.
15. Op. cit. (5, above), Attachments 2-13.
16. Op. cit. (1, above), p. 36.
17. T.W.Easton, Memo for Record, 14 Jan 1960, sub:
Turnover of Research Projects to TSS. S.
18. Op. cit. (1, above), p. 44.
19. Loc. cit.
20. CIA. Inspector General's Survey of the Immediate
DDP Area, Jul 1959, pp. 71-76, Section M. The
Scientific and Technical Problem, TS 172417 (here-
after referred to as "The IG Survey of the DDP").
21. Ibid., p. 73.
22. Ibid., p. 72.
23. Ibid., p. 73.
24. Ibid., p. 75.
25. Lob. cit.
26. Memo, C/FI for C/OPSER, 17 Nov 1959, sub: IG
Report on the DD/P Area, with Attachments, CIA
Control No. 175020. TS.
27. Ibid., Attachment 1, p. 7.
28. Memo, C/FI/OPS/SOB through C/FI for Chief of
Operations, DDP, 31 Aug 1959, sub: Staffing
Concepts for Scientific and Technical Collection
in the Clandestine Services (II), SO Memo No. 6065.
S.
29. Memo, DD/P for Chief, SOB, FI/OPS, sub: Staffing
Concepts for Scientific and Technical Collection
in the Clandestine Services (II), 17 Sep 1959,
DD/P-4-8280. S.
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30. Ibid.
31. Op. cit. (1, above), p. 44.
32. Ibid., p. 45.
33. Memo for Chiefs, CS Divisions and Staffs, 18 Jan
1960, sub: Detailed Instructions for the Opera-
tional Program for FY 1961, with Appendixes.
Appendix A, para 2, and Appendix C, Part IV. S.
34. Memo, DD/P for Chiefs of Divisions, 2 Sept 1959,
sub: Operations Against Soviet Targets. S.
35. Memo, C/SR for DD/P, 30 Mar 1961, sub: Clandestine
Collection of Scientific and Technical Intelligence,
w/Eyes Only Attachment. S.
36. Memo, C/FI for DD/P, 19 Apr 1961, sub: Clandestine
Collection of Scientific and Technical Intelli-
gence. S.
37. Memo, DD/P for Chiefs, Operating Divisions, 30 Jun
1961, sub: Clandestine Collection of Scientific
and Technical Intelligence: Definitions and
Guidance, with Attachments. S.
38. Ibid., Attachment A.
39. Memo, DD/P for COPS, DD/P, 22 May 1959, sub:
Staffing Concepts for Scientific and Technical
Collection in the Clandestine Services. S.
40. Op. cit. (29, above).
41. Op. cit. (6, above).
42. Op. cit. (39,above), para 1.
43.
44.
Memo C/SR for DCI. 22 Sep 1959,
16. S.
Memo. DD/P for C/SR 12 Oct 1959,
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45. Memo, C/FI/SOB for DDP/SPO, 19 Jan 1960, sub:
Problems in Scientific Collection. S.
46. Memo,C/FI/SIG for C/FI/Plans, 7 Apr 1960, sub:
EE Draft-Operations and Activities Statement
FY 1959, SIG Memo No. 6235. S. /Note: The date
1959 in the subject line of this TiTemo is obviously
in error and should read 1961.7
47. Memo, C/FI/SIG for C/FI/Plans, 20 May 1960, sub:
Notes on the Planning System, SIG Memo No. 6274. S.
48. Memo, AD/SI for DD/P, 17 Jun 1960, sub: Future
Scientific Intelligence Fields Requiring Priority
Collection. S.
49. Memo, COP/DDP for C/SR, 17 Jun 1960, sub: Agent
Operations Against the USSR. S.
50. Memo, AD/SI for DD/P, 11 Oct 1960, sub: Scientific
Intelligence Collection Aid on Soviet Nuclear
Weapons Program. S.
51. Memo, C/FI/SIG for DD/P, 17 Oct 1960, sub: Scien-
tific Intelligence Collection Aid on Soviet Nuclear
Weapons Program.
52. Memo, AD/SI for DCI through DD/I and DD/P, 19 Aug
1960, sub: Clandestine Collection of Scientific
and Technical Intelligence. S.
53. Memo, DD/P for DCI, 17 Oct 1960, sub: Clandestine
Collection of Scientific and Technical Intelligence,
with Attachment. S.
54. Memo, C/SR for DD/P, 27 Sep 1960, sub: Relations
with DD/I Guided Missiles Task Force. S.
55. Memo, DDP/SPO for DD/P, 30 Sep 1960, sub: Scien-
tific Intelligence. S.
56. Memo, C/FI/SIG for DD/P, 1 Oct 1960, sub: Scien-
tific Operations in the Clandestine Services. S.
57. Memo, DD/P for C/FI/SIG, 18 Oct 1960, sub: Clan-
destine Collection of S&T Intelligence.
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58. Memo, C/FI/SIG for DD/P, 7 Nov 1960, sub: Clan-
destine Collection of S&T Intelligence, SIG
Memo No. 6384. S.
59. Memo, C/FI/SIG for DD/P, 22 Dec 1960, sub: Clan-
destine Collection of S&T Intelligence, SIG
Memo No. 6432. S.
60. Memo, DD/P for C/FI through COP/DDP, 6 Jan 1961,
sub: Clandestine Collection of S&T Intelligence,
DD/P-1-0067, with Attachment. S.
61.
62.
63.
63a.
Ibid., pp. 4 and 5.
Ibid., p. 6.
Loc. cit.
Author's recollection of consultation with
probably during the summer of 1960.
64. Memo, C/FI/SIG for DD/P through DDP/SPO, 13 Jan
1961, sub: DDP Scientific Operations Program for
Fiscal Year 1962 with Annexes A, B, C, SIG Memo
No. 6436. S.
65. Memo, DD/P for C/FI/SIG through C/FI, 8 Feb 1961,
sub: DD/P Scientific Operations Program for
Fiscal Year 1962, DDP-1-0641. S.
66. Op. cit. (35, above).
67. Ibid., para 4d.
68. Loc. cit.
69. Memo, DD/P for C/SR via C/FI, 5 Apr 1961, sub:
Clandestine Collection of Scientific and Technical
Intelligence, DDP-1-1775. S.
70. Memo, C/FI/SIG for C/FI, 12 Apr 1961, sub: Comments
on SR and WH Programs, SIG Memo No. 6479. S.
71. Memo, C/FI/OPS for C/FI, 18 May 1961, sub: Recom-
mendation for Long Range Improvement of Clandestine
Services' USSR Intelligence Collection Effort,
Including the Deployment of S&T Specialists. S.
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72. Memo, C/WE for DD/P, 10 Mar 1961, sub: WE Divi-
sion Scientific Operations Program. S.
73. Memo, C/NE for DD/P, 25 Jul 1961, sub: U.S.S.R.
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Collection
Using Indian Officials, Scientists and Tech-
nicians. S.
74. Op. cit. (10, above).
75. Memo, C/FI/SIG for C/FI, 24 Jul 1961, sub: Meet-
ing with 20 July 1961. S.
76. Memo, McGeorge Bunday for Chairman, USIB, 30 OCT
1961, sub: Scientific and Technical Intelligence -
General (Recommendation No. 15 of the Oct 4, 1961
Report to the President by the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board). S.
77. Memo, A/DCI for the USIB, 30 Oct 1961, sub: Scien-
tific and Technical Intelligence, USIB-D-34.4/1. S.
78. Memo, C/FI for DD/P, 14 Nov 1961, sub: Review of
DD/P Scientific Intelligence Collection Effort,
with Attachment. S.
79. Memo, C/FI/SIG for DD/P, 14 Nov 1961, sub: USIB
Review of Scientific and Technical Intelligence
in the U.S. Intelligence Community, SIG Memo
No. 6587. S.
80. Ibid., para 6.
81. Memo, AD/SI for Ass't for Coordination/DCI,
13 Dec 1961, sub: Clandestine Collection of S&T
Intelligence. S.
82. Op. cit. (52, above).
83. Op. cit. (81, above).
84. Memo, DD/P for C/FI, 19 Dec 1961, sub: Clan-
destine Collection of S&T Intelligence,
DD/P 1-6825. S.
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85. Memo, DD/P for Asst for Coordination, DCI, 9 Feb
1962, sub: Draft Report Prepared by the Assistant
for Coordination to the Chairman of the United
States Intelligence Board, dated 15 December
1961, subject: Scientific and Technical Intelli-
gence-General, DD/P 2-0635, with Attachments. S.
86. Memo, C/FI for DD/P, 8 Jan 1962, sub: Proposed
Changes in Management of Agent Scientific Opera-
tions. S.
87. Memo, to Helms, 19 Feb 1962, sub: Collection
of Scientific Intelligence. S.
88. Note on routingslip from Helms to George, 20 Feb
1960, covering memo to Helms (87, above).
No classification shown.
89. Memo, C/FI for DD/P via A/DDP, 26 Apr 1962,
sub: Centralized Scientific Operations Plan,
with Attachments. S.
90. Ibid., Attachment B.
91. Note on routing sheet (89, above), Karamessines
as Acting DD/P for DC/Fl, 6 Jun 1962.
92. Memo, DC/EE/P for C/EE, 19 Jun 62, sub:
Proposed Organization of S&T Operations Program
within Fl Staff. S.
93. Memo, C/EE for C/FI, 19 Jun 1962, sub: "S&T"
Operations. S.
94. Memo, DC/Fl for DD/P and A/DDP, 26 Jul 1962,
sub: Recommendations of General Balmer on S&T
Intelligence. S.
95. Ibid., para 4.
96. Memo, Assistant for Coordination, DCI for Chairman,
USIBI 21 May 1962, sub: Scientific and Technical
Intelligence-General (Recommendation No. 15 of
the 4 Oct 1961 Report to the President by the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board),
USIB-D-34.4/2. S.
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97. Memo, DD/P for DCI via Secretariat, USIB, 18 Aug
1962, sub: Scientific and Technical Intelligence-
General, USIB D-34.4/3, 6 Aug 1962, Attachments
A, B, and C, DD/P 2-3852. S.
98. Memo, DC/Fl for A/DDP, 22 Aug 1962, sub: Scien-
tific and Technical Operations. S.
99. Memo, DC/Fl for DD/P, 20 Sep 1962, sub: Scientific
and Technical Operations. Attachment: Staff Study,
"Scientific and Technical Intelligence Collection."
7 pp. with three Tabs. S.
100. Memo, Assistant for Coordination, DCI for USIB
Members, 27 Aug 1962, sub: Scientific and Technical
Intelligence-General, ER 62-6283, DD/P 2-4308. S.
101. Memo, DD/P for DD/R, 21 Sep 1962, sub: Office of
the DCI Action Memorandum No. A-48, dated
18 Sep 1962. S.
102. Memo, DD/P for D/DCI, 1 Oct 1962, sub: Scientific
and Technical Intelligence-General, DD/P 2-5170. S.
103. Ibid., para 1.
104. Op. cit. (99, above), p. 5.
105. Memo, C/SR for DD/P through ADD/P, 9 Jan 1963,
sub: Proposed Establishment of FI/SIG as a new
DD/P Operating Component in the S&T Field. S.
Eyes Only.
106. Ibid., para 6.
107. Ibid., handwritten note by Karamessines on Routing
and Record Sheet, 11 Jan 1963.
108. Memo, DD/P for DDCI, 8 Aug 1963, sub: Requirements
for Scientific Pay Schedule Positions for Fiscal
Year 1964. C.
109. Memo for the Record,
sub: Discussions with
sion regarding FI/SIG Plans. S.
171 -
12 Jul 1963, (b)(3)
of WE Divi-
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110.
Memo for the Record.
11 Dec 1962,
(b)(3)
sub:
111.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
112.
Memo, C/FI/SIG for C/FI, 29 Jul 1965, sub: Scien-
tific Intelligence Group
ties. Annex B, page
- Operational Activi-
1. S.
(b)(3)
113.
Conversations between
on the
(b)(1)
Scaglion case in early
1965.
(b)(3)
114.
Memo, C/FI/SIG for DDP, 18 Oct 1967,
sub:
1828 (IN 73961) of 17 October 1967.
Telep one
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
114a.
Memo, DC/FI/SIG through
C/FI for DDP/PG,
21 Jun
1965, sub: Termination
of
S.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
115.
Memo, Chief FI/SIG for
ADD /P. 25 Oct
1967, sub:
Termination of Project
SIG
Memo No. 8656.
S. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
16 Mar
116.
Memo for the Record,
1967. sub: The Assignment
of
(b)(3)
117.
p. 3.
(b)(1)
Op. cit. (115, above),
(b)(3)
118.
Op. cit. (112, above),
p. 5.
119.
Op. cit. (99, above),
p. 1 and passim.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
120.
Ibid., p. 5.
121.
Ibid., p. 7.
122.
Ibid., p. 1.
123.
SR Division Notice No. 64-4, 7 Feb 1964, sub:
SR Division Program for Collection of Soviet
Scientific and Technical Information. S.
124.
Ibid., paras 1 through
5.
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126.
127.
128.
Ibid.,
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hand-written comments on p. 4.
for Chief, FI/SIG,
(b)(3)
Ibid.,
para 6.
para 7.c.
Chief, SR/CG/H/S&T
Ibid.,
Memo,
14 Feb 1964, sub: Transmittal of SR Division S&T
Notice. S.
(b)(3)
129.
Memo, WE/SPO
for C/FI/SIG, 27 Feb
1964, sub: Draft CSN,
Scientific Intelligence
Group, Foreign Intelligence Staff. S.
130.
Memo, Chief, FI/SIG for Chief, RID through
Chief, Fl, 22 Jun 1964, sub: FI/SIG Routing and
Action Indicators. SIG Memo No. 7071. S.
131.
Memo, Chief, RID for Chief, FI/SIG, 29 Jun 1964,
sub: Assignment of Indicators. S.
(b)(3)
132.
Notes on
cations by
Routing and Record Sheet for DDP/Publi-
(b)(3)
C/FE/FI, 19
Mar 1965. A.
(b)(3)
133.
Memo farDDP/Publications
from Chief, SR
acting), 22
(b)(3)
Mar 1965, sub. Comment on
Concerning
Assignment of
Draft CSN
S.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
134.
Memo, Chief, EE for DDP/Publications, 30 Mar
1965, sub: Assignment of SIG Indicators.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
between early
135.
Discussion
Nov 1964.
No written record available.
(b)(3)
136.
Memo, Chief, Operations FI/SIG for Chief, FI/SIG,
12 FEB 1965, sub: Problems in Scientific Opera-
tions. S.
137.
Discussion,
with Karamessines,
roxi-
(b)(3)
-January,
mately mid
1965, as recalled by
No written record.
138.
Memo, Chief, SR for DD/P, 23 Aug 1965, sub: FI/SIG-
(b)(3)
Soviet S&T Operations: with Attachments. S. Eyes
Only-By Hand.
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139. Op. cit. (99, above), pp. 6 and 7.
140. CSI No. 50-21 (Operations-General), 27 Jan 1964,
Soviet Operations. S.
141. CSI No. 1-11 (Organization), 27 Jan 1964,
Organization and Functions of SR Division. S.
142. Op. cit. (140, above), p. 3.
143. Ibid., p. 5.
144. Memo, Chief, SR Division for DD/S&T, 24 Feb 1965,
sub: Request for DD/S&T Support of Clandestine
Services Collection Efforts Against Critically
Important SovietScientific and Technical Targets.
S. P. 10.
145. Ibid., p. 11.
146. Memo, Chief, SR Division for ADDP, 13 Apr 1965,
sub: Discussion with DD/S&T of OSI Support for
SR Division's S&T Effort, with attached Memo for
the Record, 13 Apr 1965, same subject, signed
by Chief, SR Division. S.
147. Memo, Chief, SR Division for ADDP, 23 Jun 1965,
sub: Status of DDS&T Support of CS Collection
Efforts Against Soviet S&T Targets. S.
148. Memo, Chief, SR Division for ADDP, 24 Feb 1965,
sub: Discussion with DOST Officers on Soviet
S&T Operations. S.
149. Ibid., para 1.
150. Ibid., para 3.
151. Memo, 4 Feb 1965, sub:
Comment on the Organization of the Clandestine
Services for Scientific Operations. S.
152. Discussion between
July 1965, as recalled by
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153. Memo, C/FI/SIG for C/FI, 29 Jul 1965, sub:
Scientific Intelligence Group-Operational Acti-
vities, with three Annexes. SIG Memo No. 8294. S.
154. Ibid., para 5.
155.
Memo, C/SR/CG/S for C/FI/SIG, 25 Aug 1965
(SR/CG/S 65-467), sub: Responsibility for Opera-
tional Management of Coverage of the Soviet Target
156. Mem, C/FI/SIG for C/SR, 7 Sept 65, sub: Memo-
randum for C/FI/SIG from C/SR/CG/S, dated
25 Aug 1965 (SR/CB/S 65-467). S.
157. Memo, C/SR for ADDP, 26 ,71 65 sub. SR Comments
on 12 May 1965 Draft CSI
(Received 9 July 1965). S.
158. Memo, DC/FI/�TG fnr ADDP 7 Set, 1965, sub: Pro-
posed CSI on Two Attach-
ments: A. CSI on B. Com-
ments on SR Memorandum. SIG Memo No. 8324. S.
159. Ibid., Attachment B, para 1.
160. Op. cit. (158, above).
161. Op. cit. (138, above).
162. Op. cit. (105, above).
163. Op. cit. (144, above).
164. The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign,
dated September 1965. No author. U.
165. Op. cit. (138 above), p. 1.
166. Loc. cit.
167. Ibid., p. 2.
168. Ibid., p. 1.
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169. Loc. cit.
170. Ibid., p. 2.
171. Loc. cit.
172. Ibid., p. b.
173. Op. cit. (153, above).
174. Memo, DC/Fl for DDP through ADDP, 10 Dec 1965,
sub: Role of the Fl/Scientific Intelligence
Group (FI/SIG) in CS Operations. With attach-
ments. S.
175. Memo, for DDP, 10 Dec 1965, sub:
Clandestine Services S&T Operations. With
attachments. S.
176. Op. cit. (174, above), para 4.a.
177. Ibid., para 5.
178. Ibid., para 8.
179. Loc. cit.
180. Op. cit. (175 above), para 2.
181. Memo, C/SR for DD/P, 6 Jan 1966, sub: Status
Report, SR Collection Group Scientific and Tech-
nical Branch Activities, May-November 1965. S.
By Hand.
182. Ibid., paras 2 and 3.
183. Memo, C/FI for DDP, 15 Mar 1966, sub: Scientific
Intelligence Group. Attachments: (1) Memo for
DDP from C/FI, 18 Feb 1966, sub: Responsibilities
of FI/SIG. S; (2) Draft Memo, DDP for Chiefs of
Staffs and Operating Divisions, sub: Staff Coordina-
tion and Support of Clandestine Collection of
Scientific and Technical Intelligence. S.
184. Ibid., Attachment 1, para 2.
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185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
Ibid., para 4.
Loc. cit.
Ibid., para 5.
Ibid., para 6.
Loc cit.
Ibid., para 8.
Ibid., para 9.
Ibid., para 12.
Loc. cit.
Op. cit. (183, above), Attachment 2, para 5.
Ibid., para 6.
196. Memo, for DDP via ADDP, 8 Jun 1966,
sub: DDP 6-1130, Staff Coordination and Support
of Clandestine Collection of Scientific and
Technical Intelligence. S.
197. Ibid., paras 3 and 4.
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