DCI'S OPENING STATEMENT FOR PIKE COMMITTEE 11 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01482463
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: September 11, 1975

Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
N
DCI's Opening Statement for Pike Committee
11 September 1975
As I understand the purpose of this hearing, it is to review
the performance of intelligence in predicting various events abroad.
I welcome this opportunity to address the substantive aspects of
intelligence and to discuss with you what I consider the primary
- purpose of intelligence This purpose is much broader than the
prediction of events abroad. It is to provide those officials in our
Government who are responsible for developing and implementing
national security policy with authoritative information and as
Of what is going on abroad so that they can do their jobs.
Who are these officials? In the first instance they are the
President and the other members of the National Security Council--
the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense: They include the members of the Staff of the Natfonal
Security Council and the appropriate staffs of the various members
of the Council itself. Members of certain committees of the Congress
are now being informed of foreign developments on a regular basis.
These committees include Subcommittees of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House and the
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the International
Affairs Committee of the House. Other Committees and Members
of the Congress are provided with intelligence on foreign develop-
ments in response to their specific requests.
The subject matter of intelligence has expanded from its
older focus on foreign military capabilities to include foreign
political dynamics, economic trends, scientific capabilities, and
sociological pressures. Todayrs intelligence deals with foreign
policy problems, ranging from the law of the seas to the oil boycott,
from defense policy to arms control.
Along with this expansion of the scope of intelligence has come
an increase in reliance on information acquired by sophisticated
technical devices and open literature and a shift in direction of
clandestine collection. Clandestine collection or espionage i�ow
reserved for the most important information which cannot be acquired
by other means. It is focused largely on the major closed societies,
that could threaten our security, that do not have a free press, and
that screen their military capabilities and much of their government
.process even from their own citizens.
-2-
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Few would argue that there have been no fundamental
changes in the world over the past three decades. So much has
been written about these changes that many of the descriptive
phrases have become cliches--the fragmentation of Stalin's
monolithic communism, nuclear parity, c.a era of negotiation
replacing an era of confrontation, shift from a bipolar
polar world, increased consciousness of the third world, the growth
of the nuclear club, international economic competition replacing
the threat of nuclear war, the food-population problem, the growing
power of the oil-rich nations, and international terrorism.
Hackneyed as these expressions may be, they evoke the images
of change that have occurred in the last quarter century.
Against this backdrop of a changing world, this nation needs
the best information and judgments about what is going on abroad so
that it can survive and prosper--and its intelligence structure should
be in a position to satisfy this need.. This nation needs a basic
understanding of the factors and trends that affect developments in
the world abroad. This must be based on research and analysis of
information from all sources, not just from secret and official sources
of information, but also from the cornucopia of open literature and
-3-
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
academic research available on much of the developed world. Much
of this information is highly fragmentary and much of the academic
research is highly specialized. The task for intelligence is to analyze
and integrate this material into assessments and judgments relevant
_
to our nation's concerns abroad.. From these assessments of the
past and present Must flow projections as far into the future as may
be needed to permit policy formulation and planning for negotiations
and aCtion. And, a continuous flow of timely information and analyses
is needed to update these assessments and projections and to alert our
policy makers to new opportunities or potential crises so that they can
plan accordingly.
In meeting these needs the Intelligence Community must measure
up to a number Of demanding standards. If intelligence is to provide
meaningful and timely support, its reporting and analysis must cover
and integrate all facets of foreign developments�military, political,
ecoriOrnic; scientific,, and sociological.
Intelligence must also be responsible�clear-cut; sharp; neither
alarmist nor complacent�if it is to serve as a reliable basis for
decision.
-4-
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Effective intelligence must also avoid the bureaucratic
penchant for ambiguities or delphic generalities which by
anticipating all possible eventualities frustrate meaningful
retrospective examination.
Finally, intelligence must be responsible by being
independent of partisan preference or loyalty to preconceived
judgments or purposely supportive of budgetary desires.
The forms intelligence
may take in giving the policy maker
the information he needs to do his job will vary. They range from
the dissemination of single raw intelligence reports to complex
analytical memoranda or national intelligence reports. They may
include oral briefings or daily publications on world-wide develop-
ments. In fast-moving situations the Intelligence Community may
issue special memoranda alerting the policy maker to an imminent
crisis. In actual crises special situation reports are issued as
frequently as developments warrant.
The critical test of intelligence, however, is not the reporting
of observed events, but rather its early identification of future events..
-5-
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
If it is doing its job intelligence should be able to identify
and describe the forces at work which are shaping the future.
And it should be able to do this far enough in advance so that
appropriate US policy or actions can be planned.
In looking at the future predicting specific events is only
one aspect of the intelligence process. The Intelligence Community
should not be judged by the exactitude of timing with which it
predicted a coup; for example, the occurrence of an unfavorable�
event without some form of prior alert is much more an indication
of an intelligence failure than is the failure to predict the precise
date of a specific event.
Equally the Intelligence Community should not be a Cassandra
who by overwarning about events dulls the sensitivities of consumers..
The overriding need in intelligence is to strike that careful
balance between alerting policy officials to pending developments
that will impact on our national interests and forecasting the precise
timing of such events-.
Since the members of the Intelligence Community are as
fallible as all mortals, we lay no claim to being soothsayers.. Our
judgments on the future are of necessity probabilistic.
-6-
We have and
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
------Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463.0
we will make errors, but as I review the performance of the
Intelligence Community I feel strongly that its overall record is
good and that it is serving its country well. I believe we are doing
well not only in the narrow task of prediction but more importantly
in the function of preparing our Government officials with an
understanding of the factors affecting foreign developments so
that they can formulate proper policies and take appropriate
actions 6.5-Ten in unanticipated situations
To give you some insight as to why I believe this I would
like to report to you on some representative problems examined
by the Intelligence Community over the past few years.
The remaining text will cover six functional areas of p"roduction,
as shown with text devoted to examples under each heading:
� Development of Soviet and Chinese Strategic Weapons
-ICBM Programs
-ABM Program
-SAM Systems
Soviet Space Program
-Apollo-Soyuz
-Soviet Lunar Program
-7-
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
7immumenswiumawasmoimiA p p roved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463
Deployment of Soviet and Chinese Strategic Weapons
-In the SALT context
-China Search Program
Science and Technology
-Africa/Middle East Locust Plague
-Soviet Computers
Political and Military. Affairs
-Indochina
-Portugal
-Cyprus
-Italy
Economic Developments
-International Monetary Crisis
-Oil
-East-West Trade
-Soviet Economy
-8-
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482463