DECLASSIFICATION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01482288
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: December 7, 1971

Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482288
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.' AGENCY
� WA5H1is4GTON, 2006
07.710E OF TM.: DiiEC.Ta,1
:��}EZIORANLITli The Honorable John D. Ehrlichran
� Assistant to the President
(DarJestic Affairs)
SUBJECT: Declassification
I. Bill Colby told me of his lunch "frith you and -*
your discussion of declassification. We have prtiduced'
the attached outline summary of the problem and a pos-:-
sible solution for your consideration. It obviously
. uould require further detail if it were to be adopted.
The important thing, however9 is the 'degree to -which it
fits your general thinldng.
,20 ' If there is awthing else we can do to hels cn
prvb1-1:11,, .olease let tta
Richard HelviA
Approved for for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482288
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482288
SUI�ii,TZCT: De-classification
1, From the parochial perspective of an 5 Jate...Ilige.nce officer,
the major problem inherent in declassification relates to the risk of
compromising operational-sources and methods. A report several.
years old whose substantive content is no longer politically delicate,
for example, could nonetheless compromise a still producing source
who, indeed, might now be even better or more strategically placed
than he was when he provided the report in question. What an
intelli-
gence service needs.. (and strive..$) to protect are the techniques it �
employs in going about its business and the hu=.-,an-assets, especially
foreign nationals; it uses or has used. in the past. From an intelligence
officer's standpoint, therefore, a doclr-r.nt's sensitivity is a direct
function .of the extent to which that document could compromise sources.
or methods if it were to fall into unauthorized hands or pass into the �
public domain.
"?... When we address the issue of declassifying the intelligence
- contfeibutinn to major policy decisions or historical evens, we are
talking about atdeast three separate types of documents.
(a) Finished intelligence. This appears in the fo.im of
National intelligence Estimates or special mes.iloranda, drawn
from all sources, recounting the facts and assessing a situation..
In most cases, declassification of such documents:would not
jeopardize sources and methods, since the soces of the facts -
and assessments are usually not stated or are obscured so that
they are not apt to be disclosed by declassification of the
document. The documents may occasionally refer to the original
source of material contained therein, but such references could ..
Oze edited out or generalized so that the original source remains. -
protected. This would require of course careful review of any
such material prior to declassification with this thought in mind..
CO) Disseminated Lltell.17.,e,nce. .Some disseminated �
iniiigence, such as technical or communications intelligence,
reflects its origins in very specific terms so that -
CatiOri -would almost inevitably result in the disclosure of the
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Approved for Release: 2017./01/18 C01482288
source. In othe-r cases, such as clandestinely annul:red
intelligence, generalized source de.scriptions are used in
the disserninations, so that the exact identity of the source
remains concealed. In all these categories, the passage of
time may to some extent alleviate the damage caused by a
disclosure of the source, e.g., the fact that we were reading
junanese codes during World War ri is hardly a sensitive
matter any more. On the other hand, with respect to some:
of these sources, the passage of time may not relieve the
sensitivity of the matter, particularly on material provided
to us by a friendly foreign.ilstelligance service which expects
u3 to keen their relationship with us a pes.-manent secret, Thus
in the category a disseminated intelligence, a considerably
greater job of editing might be necessary to separate items
which could be declassified from those which should not be.
(c) Intelligence Operational Traffic. There is a.great
deal of this material which in almost all cases- sh:suld. not and .
can not be declassified without a kighly inapor.opr.iate disclosure
�of intelligence sources- and methods. The mate.T.;a1 itself is �
frequently written with special codp,.nsmes which. may be'.
valuable id the future. Also the methodology revealed may
show things about our service -which could be of advantage to
an unfriendly power. The true names of our agents and the
precise techniques of our operationa should in no event be
disclosed.even after ,m ny years.,
3� Cutting across the specific problems of declassifying intelli-
gence material is the way our government does business in these
times.. Thanks to the enormous improvements in.coimmunications
technology, the government utilises a flood of separate -papers and '-
documents in the course of doing its business. In order to make
these manageable at the key decision levels, these raw documents -
must be collated; s-lm-na."-i-ed and ancyzed in the form of over-all
reports, This of course is -what happens to raw intelligence material
through the National Lntellige.nce Estimates and similar documents.
.Decision-msaing on major national events is almost always based on -
the refined product rather than the raw. As noted above, the refined
product raises considerably fewer problems of declassification than
the raw, For the few cases in which raw documents are used in
decision-making, edited versions might be provided.
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Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482288
4. Another factor to be considered is the inter-agency nature
01 most such major events today. Thus no single department or
agency could give an over-all view of a major national event on the
basis only of material available to it. The 'Pentagon Papers display
this weakness.
-
5. A possible solution to the problem might lie !tn centralizing
tha production of official histories of selected major events. An
historian rrOglit be added to the .White House staff or the Archivist of �
the United States -r---5-Ight be assigned this reSponsi.bility This officer..
could serve as a point of cooi-dirtntion PnAl tasking of the various
deoa.,trnents and agencies to contribute to a national account of a major
event. Departrn.rat or agency contributions could thus be consolidated -
into a single over-all account. From the point of view of the intelligence. -
community, this would perrnit summarization of material considered
significant to the event to protect intelligence sources and methods,
rather than declassifying raw material. It would also put the focus -
of the account on the key documents actually used at the nati13.6vel
rathr than seel-dng the impractical aim of declassifying all raw
material.. Lastly, it would. orovide an over-all context-in which,
individual raw aocuments would find a proper place,- rather than
causing sensational Loisunderstandinzz, if and:When:they came to
public notice.
6* Such studies would not satisfy the history purists, of course,
but they could meet the leg,itirrtte needs of the general public--
Criticism could be made that an a4--)Inistration was writing its awn
histories. The proof of this pudding would be in the eating,
whether the resulting studies were truly objective. The Penton
Papers have not been subjected to this accusation nor are the,.'oreign -
Relations series produced by the Department of State or the studies
produced by the Office of Military 'History.
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Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01482288