LETTER TO NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER FROM W. E. COLBY RE THE NET JUDGMENT IS THAT THE DIRECTIVES HAVE HAD ONLY LIMITED IMPACT ON THE OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES OF THE AGENCY (W/ATTACHMENTS)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01481980
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: March 22, 1975

Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C61481980
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
The Honorable Nelson A. P,ockefeller
Glair-man, Carmission on CIA Activities
Within the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Nit: Vice President:
Exacutiva Registry
22 11AR 1975
In my last appearance before the Commission, you asked me whether
or not CIA had lost any effectiveness as a result of directives I issued
in 1973 and 1974 with respect to Agency activities.
I attach atTab,A a paper that summarizes a response to this question
from the individnAJ directorates within the Agency. The net judgment is
that the dii;ectives have had only limited impact on the operational capa-
bilities of the Agency. However, I do not want to convey an overly optimistic
impression in sending you this assessment. The continuing public disclosures
and clamor concerning intelligence mattPrs are having an effect on the
willingness of many of our agents and other collaborators to run risks.
Attached at Tab B are some details that stow this.
As I responded to you when you asked Re about our effectiveness, it is
my own judgment that the 1973-74 directives were issued in the hest Interests
of the Agency and our Government. That assertion, however, must stand the
test of outside review and we will velcome the Commission's judgment on this
important question.
Atl-F)chments a/s
cc: Mr. David W. Plin
Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States
Respectfully,
W. E. Colby
Director
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Impact of the 29 August 1973 and 5 June 1974 Instructions on
- CIA Operations
I. The instructions that were issued to the CIA directorates on
29 August 1973 and 5 June 1974, covering the wide range of questioned
activities now subject to inquiry, appear to have had little effect on the
operational capability of CIA. While there may be some modification of
this judgment over a longer period of time, at present the negative
aspects of the restrictions imposed by the instructions appear to be
limited. A summary by directorates is below:
Directorate of Operations
In general the Agency's basic capability to conduct foreign
intelligence operations has not been impaired, either abroad or within
the U.S. A limited number of activities are affected, the most signifi-
ant of which are noted below:
(b)(1)
�(b)(3).
(b) The restriction on categories of files on U.S.
citizens is expected to make more difficult CIA access
to potential agents or collaborators; this should not,
however, affect substantially the Agency's counter-
intelligence mission.
(b)(3)
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- J 1 � �
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(b)(1)
_(b)(3)
(e) Careful scrutiny now required for the content
of communications intercept Programs abroad, to ensure
that they exclude coverage of U.S. citizens or U.S.
companies, sometimes results in elimination, of relevant
information on foreign targets for which the operations
were intended. Processing problems arising from
definitional questions (e. g., a "U. S. firm" as
distinguished from a foreign subsidiary). renders the
processing of intercepted intelligence more time
consuming and inefficient.
Directorate of Intelligence
There has been no unfavorable impact on the execution of
the responsibilities of this direct orate as a result of the instructions.
Directorate of Administration
To date there have been no instances in which the instructions
have interfered with the directorate's meeting its responsibilities and. the
requirements levied. on it.
There is concern that there may be some erosion in the
support received in the past from various law enforcement agencies and
police departments within the U.S., resulting from decreased responsive-
ness on the part of CIA to their requests, e. g., name tracing, training,
loan of specialized equipment, etc. It remains to be seen to what extent
restrictions may inhibit CIA's timely follow-up in situations in which the
protection of intelligence sources and methods is at stake.
While not directly attributable to the subject instructions':
the current expose of police CIA relationships has severely jeopardized a
very effective Office of Security
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Directorate-of Science and Technology
This directorate has found that with one exception the
instructions have not hindered the effectiveness of its operations.
In fact, the existence of the instructions in explicit-form has
simplified the making of clear decisions in some instances,
providing a basis for declining to provide requested support to
other agencies or components in situations where it otherwise
would be difficult to do so.
The single exception to date, in which there has been an
adverse effect from the instructions, involves information formerly
obtained on mail characteristics from the mail intercept Drograrrt
2. At preseht the most troublesome consideration is.not the
inhibiting effect of the subject instructions, but the impact on
foreign intelligence operations of public disclosures of sensitive
operational information, which is expected to increase over the next
year.. Foreign intelligence and security services, with which CIA
conducts significant overseas activity in both foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence work, may be expected to assume a reserved
position towards an intelligence organization that cannot protect its own
proper secrets, or theirs. Foreign agents, and prospective agents, may
undergo a new level of reservation and resistance to collaboration with
the U.S. intelligence organization. American citizens, who have
cooperated with CIA in the past for patriotic reasons, -may find critical
publicity and the risk of exposure something that they do not wish to
undergo. Such developments seriously will impair U.S. foreign
intelligence operations for an extended period.
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