MEMO TO THE DIRECTOR FROM E. H. KNOCHE RE ASKED ABOUT THE ASSASSINATION BUSINESS AND YOU WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE ASKED BY SOME OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR YOUR VIEWS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND THE "ANGLETON RIF"

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01481964
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: April 23, 1975

Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01481964
23 April 1975
..,2067/
(b)(3)
IvZ\TORANDUM FOR: The Director
David Belin tells me that:you are not scheduled for another
appearance with the Con-mission after. NOnday, the 28th. .
You will be asked questions along the line of your depositions.
You will be asked about the assassination business and you
will almost certainly be asked by some of the Commissioners for
your views on counterintelligence and the "Angleton RD?.'
Since this is the last scheduled appearance for you, you will
want to 'take the opportunity to re-cap 'Whatever recommendations
you will want to make.
Some ideas for your recommendations follow:
a. Improved external controls
-Joint Cbmmittco
-Enhanced PFIAB (auditing function, plus an annual
issuance on the state of intelligence)
-An annual DCI report to the Presinent, perhaps
unclassified
-Perhaps GAO auditing (under security controls, but
in a.manner that makes CIA less exclusive)
b. New legislation
-foreign intelligence
-sources and methods
c. Improvement in defining CIA-FBI territory.. (NSCID #9)
d. Welcome Commission views on adequacy of internal
controls. Curs are based on '73-'74 directives,
regulations, chain of command, OGC and IG. Always
room for improvement, but help us avoid concentrating
so heavily on what must not be done that we lose
effectiveness in doing what we must do.
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e. Help define what is essential about- intelligence. Tto
us, it is vI1 that our policy-makers plan and act on
basis of knowledge and informed judgement. And it is
vital to have the capability to mount appicipiiate
covert action when diplcmacy lags or war seems an
alternative.
f. D3 not foreclose our ability to collect against foreign
targets in the U.S. This, if anything, should be
expandible. (Even more delicate issues are looming,
what is permissible for US intelligence in following
the activities and irrpact of multinational corporations?)
g. Define guidelines, develop philosophy and set limits to
intelligence activities, but avoid concentrating on
structural changes in CIA and the Community. Let such
changes evolve aunu the nature of your recommendations.
h. Aware of viv-idness of the Watergate experience and the
desire to curb Executive. excesses, but do not dilute
Presidential control of DCI and CIA. Creating controls
that make ECI and CIA Trore independent is not the
answer.
E.H.Enoche
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