COMMENTS ON DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11, SECURITY COMMITTEE (W/ATTACHMENTS)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01481963
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: April 23, 1975

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
(b)(3)
SECOM-D-59
23 April 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
: Comments on Director of Central Intelligence
Directive No. 1/11, Security Committee
: Your memo of 22 April 1975 to me (attached)
1. Attached is a memorandum, with a copy of DCID 1/11,
which can be utilized by Mr. Knoche as a talking paper in discussion
with personnel of the Rockefeller Commission with regard to their
concern that the wording of DCID 1/11 is such that it might constitute
a "hunting license" to conduct investigations.
2. While I am confident DCID 1/11 will not be utilized in
this manner, there are possible changes suggested in the attached
paper (not recommended, just possible). It might be well for
General Wilson or even the DCI to be consulted on this because
if these changes are suggested to the Commission they may very
well come back as a recommendation by the Commission.
Attachments
Chairman
This paper may be downgraded
to Unclassified when removed
from attachment.
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COMMENTS ON
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11
"SECURITY COMMITTEE"
PURPOSE
To respond to the concern expressed by the Rockefeller
Commission that DCID 1/11, which is the charter for the USIB
Security Committee, is so worded that it might constitute a "hunting
license" to conduct investigations.
BACKGROUND
DCID 1/11 (copy attached) was revised effective Z3 August 1974.
In connection with responsibilities of the Security Committee concerning
unauthorized disclosures or compromise of intelligence sources and
methods, three paragraphs of the Directive are pertinent:
"2. Mission
The mission of the Committee is to provide the means
by which the Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice
of United States Intelligence Board principals can:
d. Ensure that appropriate investigations are
made of any unauthorized disclosure or compromise
of intelligence or of intelligence sources and methods
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and that the results of such investigations, along with
appropriate recommendations, are provided to the
Director of Central Intelligence.
"3, Function
c. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence
to call upon departments and agencies to investigate any
unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intelligence
or of intelligence sources and methods occurring within
their departments and agencies; to report the results of
these investigations to the Director of Central Intelligence,
through the United States Intelligence Board. Such reports
will (1) assess the disclosure's impact on the US intelli-
gence process, and its implications for national security
and foreign relations, (2) describe corrective measures
taken or needed to prevent such disclosures in the
future or to minimize the adverse effects of the case
at hand, and (3) recommend any appropriate additional
actions.
"4. Community Responsibilities
b. Each USIB principal is responsible for
investigation of any unauthorized disclosure of intelli-
gence or intelligence sources and methods occurring
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within his department or agency. When investigation
determines that the possibility of compromise cannot
be discounted, and the interests of the USIB or another
USIB principal are involved or affected, the results of
investigation will be forwarded to the Security Committee
for review and possible remedial action as determined
appropriate by the Committee. "
COMMENTS
No investigation of unauthorized disclosures have been requested
by the Security Committee since the revised DCID 1/11 became effective
and none since I was appointed Chairman 9 July 1974. There has also,
been no occasion during this period for the Security Committee to
make a report to the DCI on unauthorized disclosures. I certainly
do not intend to utilize the DCID as any "hunting license" to conduct
investigations. It is noted that the Chairman of the Security Committee
from its inception until July 1974 was also the Director of Security,
CIA, and so had dual responsibilities. The Chairman now is attached
to the Intelligence Community Staff, serves under the Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community and the DCI and has no dual responsibility
with respect to CIA security.
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From a previous inquiry I believe the Commission is concerned
with the surveillance conducted by the CIA Office of Security of Jack
Anderson and Michael Getler. A copy of my memo to Mr. Alan E.
Brody, Office of the Inspector General, dated 21 March 1975, con-
cerning this inquiry by Mr. Roethe of the Commission, is attached.
If the Commission desires to make recommendation along these lines,
some changes could be suggested.
(a) In connection with paragraph 2(d), this is a general
statement of the mission of the Security Committee. It establishes
the body to which the DCI, with the advice of USIB principals, can
turn to ensure appropriate investigations are made. It does not
stipulate that the Committee will do any investigation on its own.
I would suggest no changes in this paragraph.
(b) In connection with paragraph 3(c), a change could be
suggested to require approval by the Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community or by the Director of Central Intelligence
before the Security Committee would "call upon departments and
agencies to investigate any unauthorized disclosure." This would
elevate the authority level required and require additional consideration
before any investigation is called for by the Committee. This could
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be done by changing the word "behalf" to "approval" in the first
line of paragraph 3(c). To limit the scope of any such investigation
and preclude any possible interpretation that the statement of
functions in paragraph 3(c) could serve as a "hunting license" an
additional sentence could be added to read:
"No investigation shall be conducted under the
authority of this Directive of any individual not
affiliated by employment or contract with the Executive
Branch of the Government."
(c) In connection with paragraph 4(b), it is believed every
USIB principal should rightfully be concerned with and responsible for
unauthorized disclosures within his department or agency and I,
therefore, do not believe paragraph 4(b) might be misconstrued to
give unwarranted authority.
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