IMPACT OF FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ON VC GUERRILLAS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01435115
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: March 6, 1967

Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01435115
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Saigony Vietnam
A.2354
6 March I9C7
MEMORANDUM rOR: The Ambassador
FROLI
l�
SUBJECT. : Impact of Friendly Operations on VC Guerrillas .
and Infrastructure
I am sending you this �memorandum in response to a request
which you made at the 27 February Mission Council meeting. It
is a summation of certain material vhich leads me to feel that
the overall U.S. effort is having a much greater Impact on the
overall capabilities of the Viet Congo including the guerrilla
effort, than is commonly realized.
Unfortunately, there seems to be an impression in many
quarters that we are winning the orthodox .war but failing in
"the other vary" as if the two aspects of the conflict were
somehow wholly separate and unconnected, On the, contrary,
they are of course intimately interdependent, and our mounting
successes in the orthodox phase of the war have profoundly
affected the VC guerrilla apparatus and political infrastructure.
A striking illustration of this is revealed in a recently captured
letter written by a VC Binh Dinh Province Cadre to his superior
on 20 January 1967{. It says thaty since the ARATH-RGK-U2i swoops
through Phu Cat and Phu My Districts in September abd early.
October last year, both the military and political structures
in these Districts have been in critical condition. It ends.
with an expression of hopa for a future revival of VC indluonce
in the area.
The demands of main-force units for an increasing flow of.
supply and manpower replacements has strained the infrastructure
severely, frequently beyond its capacity. Food and manpower are
inadequate in many areas and, according to recently captured
documents, guerrilla forces are shrinking. Morale is contegiousy
and. the spirit of the political' and support forces is suffering
along with that of the battered main-force troops.
cc: The Deputy Anb;t:3saac-
The Political Counsel
..ran.trevaWf
r"t
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A-23.54
In conjunction 'with the achievements of friendly armed
forces, pacification programs such as Revolutionary Development
and Chieu 1191 are making inroads on the VC/NFL organization.
And, less publicly, improved intelligence and the work of �
Census Grievance Teams, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, and
the Police 3pecial Branch are increasingly striking direct
blows at the infrastructure.
All of this adds up to an encouraging level of success
in "the other war." The enemy is hurting. not just in his
main-force military effort, but all down the line. This
conclusion is supported by a wealth of evidence from recent
clandestine reports and captured documents. A sampling of
such materials, nearly all received within the past two months,
is attached,
. Attachment:
Setbacks Suffered by VC
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SELECTED EVIDENCE: OF SETBACKS. SUFFERED BY
VC GUERRILLAS AND rNFRANTRUCTURE
There is not sufficient information available to permit a
comprehensive Province-by-Province, District-by-District
survey of the problems faced by the VC and their reactions
to the many setbacks they have suffered. The clandestine
reports acquired and documents captured in the past few months
dos however, provide a generous sozo)ling extending to every
major region of the country and nearly all levels of the VC
organization. This attachment consists of a digest of some
of the more significant reports and documents.
I. MORALE
In January, 27 VC and NVA prisoners in the National
Interrogation Center were interviewed regarding their,v/iews
on the ultimate outcome of the war in South Vietnam. 2! Vhereas
two years ago such a group would almost certainly al/ have
predicted a VC victory, now only 15 of the 27 did so. More
significantly, fevcrothan half of the 13 Party members in the
group expected a VC victory.
A 26 October 1566 communique from a VC regional security
section complains of lack of resistance to enemy heliborne
raids along Route 1. It says farther that the COLIMOA problem
among Village Cadres and guerrillas is fear of these raids;
they have become demoralized ad dispirited, and their
resistance plans are passive. 4/ In Quang Nam Province, a VC
District-level review of n66 operations said that of 70
military proselyting agents trained, 36 were captured or
exposed and the rest lacked the courage to conduct their
mission, or were simply passive in attitude. The people,
It said, lacked confidence in VC administrative activities. 3/
A VC notebook captured in Operation Cedar Falls says most
guerrillas of "111)" (possibly a cover name for a hamlet or
village in Cu Chi District of VC lIegion 4) are demoralized. 4/
A quarterly report from a VC Village unit in Tay Ninh says the
Lear of death and war hardships caused the civilian inhabitants
and oven the cadres and gut;rrillas to turn to the enemy. The
villagers "began to believe that the U.S. troops very/really
IA/ling to take care of the welfare of the people." 2l
The political officer of VC Dinh Dpong Province unit said
the cadres and people lacked determination to fight and were
afraid of U.S. weapons and of protracted war. Hamlet guerrillas
did not want to be assigned to village units and village guerrillas
refused to fight in district units. (il
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II. DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS
In Binh Thuan Province, an emergency VC District-level
meeting was held in December to develop appropriate measures
"to stop the day-by-day increase in defections and desertions"
among demoralized VC .cadres.7/ The Uen An Village Guerrilla
Unit of Binh Duong Province was inactivated because its members
wore AWOL, had returned to their families, or surrendered to
the GVN.b/
A VC Region
year,' there were
before and after
The report gives
(2) some cadres
by bombardments,
4 report of early 1937 says: "During the last
deserters from all agencies and units, especially
each battle. This is an important problem."
as reasons: (1) inadequate indoctrination;
act arbitratily; (3) "many were demoralized
shellings0 and fierce attacks; and (4) many
were influenced .by Chiou Uoi policy," The report implies that
those who defected to the GVN were only /4 percent of the total
deserters .!/
III. LOSSES IN POPULWION MTDER VC CONTROL
A VC domument dated June 1963 says: "A comparison with
early 1965 shows a decrease of 1,0000000 people in the rural
areas (under VC control) due to the presence of U.S. troops.
This reflects poor leadership on our part." It gives the
raid-1906 division of South Vietnares population as:
"in liberated areas, 50000,000
in enemy areas (rural), 5,000,000
in cities and towns, 4,004000." 10/
� A Phu Yen Province VC document says: "The ration of
population under our control in the whole Province is one-third
that of early 1963." It adds that they were to recruit 3,000
soldiers in Phu Yen, but got only 659. 11/
XV. DECREASING GUERRILLPI STRENGTH
A captured VC notebook says that in some areas guerrilla
warfare movements have decreased, combat aggressiveness and
continuous attacks against the enemy have, ceaseq,Ito develop,
and civilian organizations were disintegrated. 2!/ notebook
from a regional-level cadre of VC ILegiola 4 says guerrilla
strength in the region declined from a high of 3:559 in 1964
to 3,114 in 1965 and 20852 in 1DOS.. Losses for the. first ll
months of 1966 were given as,541 killed, 707 wounded, 43
captured, and 74 deserted. 24:2/ A document dated June 19(56 says,.
"Guerrilla/militia dropped to 180,000...The decrease of quantity
also involved a deeroafge in qually.� 10/
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3
RECRUITING PROBLEMS
"...we have net, despite our strenuous efforts, accomplished
satisfactory results with respect to the recruitment of civilian
labor force, volunteer youth, and draftees." 14/ "Majority 02'
young men in liberated areas were a2raid of difficuitiest enemy
airstrikes, and shollings. They did not want to enlist; thus,
during May 1963, all Districts (of Dinh Duong Province) succeeded
in recruiting only. 15 young men." 25/ A Cu Chi District report
says the VC In this area arc (late ii336) ;badly demoralized;
replacements canpoA be found to fill the gaps left by desertion
and fatalities. 12/ A report from the Military Affairs fAtb-
Committee of Region 4.says2 "Due to the shortage 'of recrUits
for'replacement ofeasualtles and development of units, we
encountered many difficulties..." 17/
VI. IMPACT OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS
A late, /033 VC Region 4 Party Committee resolution says:
"Pacification team operations resulted in demoralization of
the population and an increase in the .number of deserters and
dofectors."W �
There is amplo evidencc5 that this sort of thing is wide.
spread and that the VC are placing high priority on countering
Revolutionary Development, Census Grievance, Provincial.pi
Reconngissancet and Police Special Branch activities. ..!.&
In one District in Phu Yen Province, an RD team succeeded. �
in inducing the defection of an entire VC village organization.
In Queng Ngai Province, on 8 and 9 February another team
persuaded 23 VC to rally, including the Chief and Assistant
Chief of Hier) The Trung nam/et.
In Phu Yen Province, RD team popularity Is such that there
is a significant tendency for people to follow the teams. After
one RD group started working in a hamlet there, the population
grew from 30 families to about 1,200 inhabitants within, a month.
During January 1967 in Binh Duong Province, a single
Ram/et-love/ Census Grievance worlzer was responsible for the
defection of 32 VC guerrillas, soldiers, and cadres. This
took place adjacent to the VC "Iron Triangle" heartland.
The extent to which the CG activities are hurting the VC is
indicated in a )ac Lieu Province VC security ,sectioa report
which says: "The CG system is rapidly organizing and hard
working and iG dealing us deadly blows at our weakest points."
YO FOIZEIGN DvalEN
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Malt
SOURCES
are listed
Document Exploitation
5 -
by their
. NO ronmili DISS7,1
WS numbers and documents
Center (CDEC) numbers.
(b)(3)
Clandestine
by
reports
their Combined
1/
CDEC 01-2701-67
(b)(3)
3/
4/
CDEC 02-1112-G7
5/
CDEC 02-1598-67
6/
CDEC 02-1301-67
(b)(3)
7/
8/
CDEC 02-1440-67
9/
CDEC 01-2393-67
10/
CDEC 01-2552.47
11/
Phu Yen Doc 0012/07 (igha
`rng
translated locally
12/
CDEC 01-3465-67
13/
CDEC 01-3003-37
14/
CDEC 01-2304.67
in
CDEC 02-1276-67
10/
CDEC 02-1249-67
17/
CDEC 01-2983-67
13/
CDEC 01-;3239-67
19/
CDEC 08-1225-66p 01-3465-G7v 02-1269-67
(b)(3)
(Material on which Section VI is based is in OSA Tiles.)
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