(EST PUB DATE) RECOMMENDATION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01435033
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: January 1, 1974

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Recommendation (1)
Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947 should be
amended in the form set forth in Appendix VI to this Report.
(Reproduced in full on following page.) ..These amendments, in
summary, would:
a. Make explicit that the CIA's activities must be
� related to foreign intelligence.
b. Clarify the responsibility of the CIA to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. (The Agency would be responsible for protecting
against unauthorized disclosures within the CIA, and it
would be responsible for providing guidance and technical
assistanee to other agency and department heads in
� protecting against urauthorized disclosures within their own
agencies and departments.)
c. Confirm publicly the CIA's existing authority to
collect foreign intelligence from willing sources within the
� United States, and, except qs specified by the President in
a published Executive Order', prohibit the CIA from
collection efforts within the United States directed at
securing foreign intelligence from unknowing American
citizens.
1The Executive Order authorized by this statute. should recognize
that when the collection of foreign intelligence from persons
who are not United States citizens results in the incidental
acquisition of information from unknowing citizens, the Agency
should be permitted to make appropriate use or disposition of
such information. Such collection activities must be directed
at foreign intelligence sources, and the involvement of American
citizens must be incidental.
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Note: Appendix VI of the Commission Report provides:
' In Recommendation (1), the Commission proposes that
50 U.S.C. Section 403(d) be amended to read (Additions are
italicized; deletions are marked through):
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the foreign
intelligence activities of the several government departments and
agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the
duty of the (Central Intelligence) Agency, under the direction of
the National Security Council--
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters
concerning such foreign intelligence activities of the
government departments and agencies as relate to national
security;'
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security
Council for the'coordination of such foreign intelligence
activities of the departments and agencies of the government
as relate to the national security;
(3) to collect, correlate and evaluate foreign
intelligence relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such foreign
intelligence within the government using where appropriate
existing agencies and facilities:
Provided, that except as specified by the President in a
eublished Executive Order, in collecting foreign
� intelligence from United States citizens in the United
States or its possessions, the Agency must disElose to such
citizens that such intelligence is being collected by the
Agency.
Provided further, that the Agency shall have no police,
� subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security
functions:
Provided further, that the departments and other
agencies of the government shall continue to collect,
'evaluate, correlate and disseminate. departmental
. intelligence:
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At provided further, that the Director ef ,Geittre4
Intelligence shall tire responsible fer protccting
intelligence sources -at4 methods from unauthorized
disclo3urc,
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing
intelligence agencies, such additional foreign intelligence
services of common concern as the National Security Council
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related
to foreign intelligence affecting the .national security as
the National Security Council may from time to time direct.
(6) ,:to be responsible for protecting sources and
methods of foreign intelligence from unauthorized
disclosure. Within the United States; this responsibility
shall be limited (a to lawful means used to protect against
disclosure by (i) present or former employees, agents or
sources of the Agency or (ii)- persons, or employees of
persons or organizations, presently or formerly under
contract with the Agency or affiliated with it, and (b) to
providing guidance and technical assistance to other
government departments and agencies performing intelligence
activities.
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Response
fully concur in the recommendation of the ComMission that
the National Security Act be amended to clarify the duties of the
Agency by inserting the word "foreign" before the word
"intelligence" at appropriate places in the Act. In fact, this
suggestion first arose at my confirmation hearing in 1973.
I concur with the added provisions clarifying the Agency's
role in the collection of foreign intelligence from US citizens.
I have reservations about the proposal of the Commission to
amend the Act to shift from the Director of Central Intelligence
to the Central Intelligence Agency, responsibility for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
The DCI, as head of the Intelligence Community, is well placed to
protect the Community's interest in sources and methods of
foreign intelligence, but CIA is less well suited to cover these
matters as they affect other agencies. The proposed amendment
could be read to diminish the DCI's coordinating function in the
Intelligence Community. I believe the purpose of the Commission
in recommending the change can be carried out by retaining some
of the limitations in the proposed subparagraph (6) but assigning
the responsibility to the Director of Central Intelligence.
In addition, changing the wording from "protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" to
"protecting sources and methods of foreign intelligence from
unauthorized disclosure" eliminates terminology which is well
recognized and for which there is judicial interpretation and
precedent in several cases.
I am also concerned that subparagraph (6) may not afford
sufficient authority to protectintelligencesources and methods_
information under the Freedom of Information Act. That Act
exempts from its mandatory exposure provisions matters -
"specifically exempt from disclosure by statute." Appropriate
language should be included in subparagraph (6) to make clear
that that subparagraph is an exemption statute for Freedom of
Information purposes.
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Recommendation (2)
�
The President should by Executive Order prohibit the CIA
from the collection of information about the domestic activities
of United States citizens (whether by overt or covert means), the
evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of analyses or reports
about such activities, and the storage of such information, with
exceptions for the following categories of persons or activities:
a. Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being
considered for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or
indirectly, or others who require clearance by the CIA to
receive classified information;
b. Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to
CIA facilities or personnel, provided that proper
coordination with the FBI is accomplished;
c. Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal
activities relating to foreign intelligence, provided that
proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished.
d. Information which is received incidental to
appropriate CIA activities may be transmitted to an agency
with appropriate jurisdiction, including law enforcement
agencies.
Collection of information from normal library sources such
as newspapers, books, magazines and other such documents is not
to be affected by this order.
Information currently being maintained which is inconsistent
with the order should be destroyed at the conclusion of the
current congressional investigations or as soon thereafter as
permitted by law.
The CIA should periodically screen its files and eliminate
all material inconsistent with the order.
The order should be issued after .consultation with the
National Security Council, the Attorney General, and the Director
of Central Intelligence. Any modification of the Order would be
permitted only through published amendments.
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131�-221-1�-f-
concur in this recommendation.
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Recommendation (3)
�
The President should recommend to Congress the establishment
of a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role
currently played by the Armed Services Committees.
Response
.As you know, I concur in this recommehdation.
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Recommendation (4)
Congress should give careful consideration to the question
whether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some
extent, be made public, particularly in view of the provisions of
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution.1
Response
�
In the past I have taken the position that this question
should be resolved by the Congress but that I could not in good
conscience recommend publication of all or part of the
intelligence 4udget. I believe I must now recommend that the
Agency budget and certain classified intelligence programs of' the
Department of Defense remain fully classified and nonidentifiable.
1 do this despite the recommendation of the Commission and its
reference to Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7, of the Constitution.
With respect to the constitutionality of the present
procedure, a recent attempt to litigate this question did not
reach the substance; the litigant having been defeated on the
issue of standing to sue. Richardson v. United States,
418 U.S. 166 (1974). There is, however, considerable historical
precedent for budget secrecy, going back to debates in the
Constitutional Convention, the use of a secret fund during the
administrations of Washington and Madison, and a secret
appropriations act in 1811. Congress most recently endorsed the
secrecy of intelligence budgets in June 1974 when the Senate
rejected an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act of 1975 which would have required that the total budget figure
for intelligence purposes be made public. In addition, I believe
that present procedures are fully in accord with the Constitution.
Agency appropriations are an integral part of appropriations made
by law and are reflected in the Treasury's Statement and Account
of Receipts and Expenditures in compliance with the cited
provisions of the Constitution.
1 �
. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence -
of Appropriations made by Law; and a "regular Statement and Account
of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall_be
published from time to time."
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On the merits of the question, aside from the
constitutionality, my belief that this budget should, remain secret
is based on the following:
a. Public disclosure of Intelligence Community budget
data, or the budgets of the individual agencies which make
up the Intelligence Community, could provide potential
enemies with considerable insight into the nature and extent
of our activities.
� b. Publication of part of the budget, as suggested by
the Commission, would raise, in my view, extensive
congressional debate as to what matters were included and
what matters were not included in the published totals, .
leading to a rapid erosion of the secrecy of the portions
withheld:
c. The same question would immediately arise with
respect to the 'publication of the total CIA budget, a total
Community budget, or any other figure covering
"intelligence." An immediate requirement would be levied to
explain precisely which of our intelligence activities were
covered in the published total and which were not. As you
know, this is a difficult matter to determine within
classified circles due to the difficulty of determining at
what point intelligence expenditures stop and operational
expenditures begin (the radar on a destroyer; tactical air
reconnaissance on the battlefield; the reporting as
differentiated from the representational and other functions
of attaches, foreign service officers; etc.)
d. Publication of any single figure with respect to
intelligence would, in my view, quickly initiate curiosity
and-investigation by the press and others as to exactly how
the figure was arrived at and what its component elements
were. This is suggested by the history of disclosure cif AEC
budget materials and related information by both the
Executive Branch and the Congress.
e. Publication of any figure with respect to
intelligence will result in questions and discussions of any
changes or trends developed in succeeding year figures. Any
change in the basis on which the figure was computed or any
change in its level will generatd a demand for explanation
and tend to reveal the details of the figure and programs
suppqrted by it.
Thus, I must recommend that the CIA budget and certain other
highly sensitive intelligence programs remain classified and
nonidentifiable in the Department of Defense budget.
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Recommendation (5)
a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the
CIA. This expanded oversight board should be composed of
distinguished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience.
It should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a
full-time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related
to the CIA should include:
1. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory
authority.
2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence
collectiap.
3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence
;
Assessing the quality of the organization of the
Assessing the quality, of the management of the CIA.
estimates.
4.
CIA.
5.
6. Making recommendations with respect to the above
� subjects to the President and the Director of Central
Intelligence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.
b. The Board should have access to all information in the
CIA. It should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA
expenditures and activities on its own initiative.
c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to
report directly to the Board, after having notified the-Director
of Central Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate.
.�
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Response
I fully concur with this recommendation. I have the highest
regard for the contribution the PFIAB has made to the improvement
of the intelligence structure of our Government to date, and I
look forward to the Board's specific supervision and independent
assessment of our performance and management in the future. I
also concur that the Inspector General of the CIA report directly
to the Board after notifying the Director of Central Intelligence
in any case which he deems appropriate. I have undertaken the
commitment to the PFIAB not only to be responsive to their
inquiries but also to raise with them matters of which they might
not be aware of which they should be informed. The
recommendation of the Commission would substantially increase the
role and super,yision of the Board, a step which I would. welcome.'
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Recommendation (6)
The Department of Justice and the CIA should establish
written guidelines for the handling of reports of criminal
violations by employees of the Agency or relating to its affairs.
These guidelines should require that the criminal investigation
and the decision whether to prosecute be made by the Department
of Justice, after consideration of Agency views regarding the
impact of prosecution on the national security. The Agency
should be permitted to conduct such investigations as it requires
to determine whether its operations have been jeopardized. The
Agency should scrupulously avoid exercise of the prosecutorial
function.
Response
I fully endorse this recommendation. The procedure in
effect since 1954, whereby the Agency determined whether there
were security considerations which would prevent a successful
prosecution, was abandoned in December of last year; the
Commission recommendation reflects the de facto situation since
then. It should be pointed out that the type of case envisioned
under the former procedure was the occasional embezzlement of
funds or falsification of vouchers, where to prosecute would
involve the divulging of sensitive intelligence sources and
methods. We appreciate that the guidelines for handling of
reports of criminal violations should be most carefully developed
jointly by the Agency and the Department of Justice to indicate
clearly the extent to which the Agency should properly be
authorized to conduct investigations-in order to determine
whether sufficient basis exists to submit reports to the
Department of Justice. Clearly the final decision as to whether
there should be a prosecution is solely the responsibility of the
Department of Justice, after consideration of the Agency's views
of the possible damage which would be done by revelation of
intelligence sources and methods in such a prosecution.
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�
Recommendation (7)
�
a. Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central
Intelligence should be individuals of stature, independence, and
integrity. In making this appointment, consideration should be
given to individuals from outside the career service of the CIA,
although promotion from within should not be barred. Experience
in intelligence service is not necessarily a prerequisite for the
position; management and administrative skills are at least as
important as the technical expertise which can always be found in
an able deputy.
� b. Although the Director serves at the pleasure of the
President, no Director should serve in that position for more
than 10 years,
� Response
I endorse this recommendation. I would add the suggestion
that such individual also not be a partisan political figure.
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Recommendation (8)
a. The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
should be reconstituted to provide for two such deputies, in
addition to the four heads of the Agency's directorates. One
deputy would act as the administrative officer, freeing the
Director from day-to-day management duties. The other deputy
should, be a military officer, serving the functions of fostering
relations with military and providing the.Agency with technical
expertise on military intelligence requirements.
b. The advice and consent of the Senate should be required
for the appointment of each Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence.
Response
I endorse this recommendation though I envision its
implementation in somewhat different fashion. With the
establishment of a Deputy Director charged specifically with CIA
management and representation responsibilities, the other
(military) Deputy could most effectively perform the functions
cited in the Commission Report if he were primarily concerned
with management of those Intelligence Community responsibilities
given to me under the President's letter of November 1971. Thus,
I would propose that the existing position of Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community be the basis for defining the
responsibilities of the military Deputy Director. Should
expected congressional consideration of the DCI's role within the
Intelligence Community produce significant changes in this role,
this recommendation will obviously be affected. While it might
be undesirable to specify this in legislation, I believe that the
Deputy Director principally concerned with management of CIA
should be both a civilian and a career Agency employee. Thi-s
last comment in no way reflects upon the high quality of the
military Deputy Directors who have served this Agency in the
past; it merely reflects the experience that such an outsider is
normally less able to conduct the detailed management of the
Agency contemplated by the Commission's recommendation than is a
career Agency employee. This is especially true in the case in
which a career Agency employee has been the Director, as in such
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� re
situations there has been a natural tendency for management
decisions to be made by the Director rather than delegated to the
Deputy. CIA has, however, been exceedingly well served by the
high quality of a number of Deputy Directors of military
background who have made a unique contribution in intelligence
matters for which they were particularly fitted as well as being
excellent helpers and independent advisors to the Director,
himself.
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Recommendation (9)
a: The Inspector General should be upgraded to a status
equivalent to that of the deputy directors in charge of the four
directorates within the CIA.
b. �The Office of Inspector General should be staffed by
outstanding, experienced officers from both inside and outside
the CIA, with ability to understand the various branches of the
Agency.
c. The Inspector General's duties with respect to domestic
CIA activities should include periodic reviews of all offices
within the United States. He should examine each office for
compliance wtth CIA authority and regulations as well as for the
� effectiveness of their programs in implementing policy
. objectives.
d. The Inspector General should investigate all reports
from employees concerning possible violations of the CIA statute.
e. The Inspector General should be given complete access to
all information in the CIA relevant to his reviews.
f. An effective Inspector General's office will require a
larger staff, more frequent reviews, and highly qualified
personnel.
g. Inspector General reports should be provided to the
National Security Council and the recommended executive oversight
body. The Inspector General should have the authority, when he
deems it appropriate, after notifying the Director of Central
Intelligence, to consult with the executive oversight body on any
CIA activity (see Recommendation 5). �
Response
I concur in this recommendation.
a. The status of the Inspector General can be raised as
recommended, although I believe the other recommendations
made by the Commission with respect to the functions of the
Inspector General are more fundamental.
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b. The Office of the Inspector General will be staffed
by officers of the types described, both from ipside the
Agency and from outside the Agency.
c. The Inspector General will develop a program of
periodic review of all offices within the United States as
proposed.
�
d. The Inspector General will investigate all reports
from employees concerning possible violations of the CIA
statute and other applicable laws. .
e. The Inspector General will be given complete access
by specific regulation to all information in CIA relevant to
his reviews.
f. The Inspector General is now studying the
recommended expansion of his office and program and will
develop a specific proposal for consideration.
g. Inspector General reports will be made available to
the NSC and the recommended executive oversight body, as
recommended.
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Recommendation (10)
�
a. The Director should review the composition and operation
of the Office of General Counsel and the degree to which this
office is consulted to determine whethenthe Agency is receiving
adequate legal assistance and representation in view of current
requirements.
b. Consideration should be given to measures which would
strengthen the office's professional capabilities and resources
including, among other things, (1) occasionally departing from
the existing practice of hiring lawyers from within the Agency to
bring in seasoned lawyers from private practice as well as to
hire law school graduates without prior CIA experience;
(2) occasionalqy assigning Agency lawyers to serve a tour of duty
elsewhere in the government to expand their experience;
(3) encouraging lawyers to participate in outside professional
activities.
Response
I concur in this recommendation.
Significant changes in the composition of the Office of
General Counsel and its relationship to all the activities of the
Agency are already under way. The General Counsel is a regular
participant in meetings of the Agency Management Committee and in
my own management discussions with the Deputy Directors of the
Agency. The General Counsel is in the process of reviewing all
Agency regulations to assure that legal consultation is required
in all sensitive situations and to assure that on policy
decisions the General Counsel is consulted td ascertain if there
are legal aspects to be considered. The Office of General
Counsel has been removed from direct managerial functions -
undertaken in previous years and restricted to the function of
independent legal advisor. The General Counsel is also taking
steps toward having an outside review of his office for the
purpose of developing recommendations on its size, composition,
and method of operation. The Agency, within the last 18 months,
has brought on board or has in process four lawyers from outside
the Agency. I believe there should be a balance between bringing
in lawyers from the outside and utilizing experienced officers
from within the Agency who are professionally qualified as
-
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The General Counsel has, in the past, looked into the
possibility of assigning lawyers to serve a tour of duty
elsewhere in the Government to expand their experience. This was
not found practicable, in part because of the reluctance of other
agencies to take on an attorney for a limited period knowing that
it would have to release him at about the time he was becoming
productive. Nevertheless, the General Counsel and I consider
this a desirable proposal, and we will again look into this
possibility. We will also look into the possibility of placing
Agency lawyers on sabbatical tours with private law firms.
I endorse the recommendation that Agency lawyers be
encouraged to participate in outside professional activities.
This has been the policy of the Office of General Counsel and
will continue to be so.
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Recommendation (11)
To a degree consistent with the need for security, the CIA
should be encouraged to provide for increased lateral movement of
personnel among the directorates and to bring persons with
outside experience into the Agency at all levels.
Response
� I concur in this recommendation but feel obliged to point
out certain difficulties which will limit the degree to which the
Agency will be able to conduct such programs. Over the past
seven years, the Agency has been reducing its overall strength.
This reduction has naturally limited the receptivity of employees
to the arrival of lateral entrees. The Agency has made -a
particular point of .ensuring the continued input of young People
into the Agency during this period, thus creating additional
pressures on the current levels. Nonetheless, in our Annual
Personnel Plan specific goals are set and audited as to lateral
entry into the component elements of the Agency of persons with
outside experience at upper levels. This has been particularly
pressed with respect to the entry of represenatatives of minority
groups.
With respect to lateral movement of personnel among the
directorates, the difficulty is raised less by security than by
the complex mix of skills within the Agency. The clandestine
case officer abroad, the analyst on economic or scientific
subjects, the engineer developing a-new technical system, and the
finance, security or logistics specialists are generally not
interchangeable. Despite this, the Annual Personnel Plan and the
Agency's Personnel Development Plan address particular attention
to a feasible level of rotation to break down parochialism and to
improve the leadership potential of our personnel. During 1974,
for example, 78 employees GS 14 and above and 87 employees in GS
Grades 7 through 11 were transferred from one career service to
another. Our goals for 1975 are higher.
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Recommendation (12)
a. The Agency should issue detailed guidelines for its
employees further specifying those activities within the United
States which are permitted and those which are prohibited by
statute, Executive Orders, and NSC and DCI directives.
b. These guidelines should also set forth the standards
which govern CIA activities and the general types of activities
which are permitted and prohibited. They should, among other
things, specify that:
-Clandestine collection of intelligence directed against
United States citizens is prohibited except as specifically
permitted. by law or published Executive Order.
-Unlawful methods or activities are prohibited.
-Prior approval of the DCI shall be required for any
� activities which may raise questions of compliance with the
law or with Agency regulations.
c. The guidelines should also provide that employees with
information on possibly improper activities are to bring it
promptly to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence
or the Inspector General.
Response
I concur in this recommendation: Present specific guide-
lines and regulations will be reviewed to ensure that they fully
reflect the points covered by the recommendation. CIA will
promulgate as regulations detailed guidelines specifying those
activities within the United States which are permitted and those
which are prohibited as specified in this recommendation. These
issuances will be incorporated in a revised Handbook of Employee
Conduct and Summary of Agency Authorities, which is circulated to
each employee on entrance into the Agency and annually
thereafter.
The new Handbook on Employee Conduct and Summary of Agency
Authority will include materials specified in this section of the
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recommendation and will specify, as it has since 1973, that
employees are to report immediately any possibly improper
activities to the Director of Central Intelligence or the
Inspector General.
4.
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Recommendation (13)
a. The President should instruct the Director of Central
Intelligence that the CIA is not to engage again in domestic mail
openings except with express statutory authority in time of war.
(See also Recommendation 23.)
b. The President should instruct the Director of Central
Intelligence that mail cover examinations are to be in compliance
with postal regulations, they are to be undertaken only in
furtherance of the CIA's legitimate activities and than only on a
limited and selected basis clearly involving matters of national
security.
Response
I concur in the intent of this recommendation, although in
form it is directed to the President rather than the Agency. It
is fully consistent with the instructions issued by me on
29 August 1973 and will be reflected in internal Agency
regulations as well as instructions.
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Recommendation (14)
a. A capability should be developed within the FBI, or
elsewhere in the Department of Justice, to evaluate, analyze, and
coordinate intelligence and counterintelligence collected by the
FBI concerning espionage, terrorism, and other related matters of
internal security.
b. The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint
intelligence committees to foreign intelligence matters.
c. The FBI should be encouraged to continue to look to the
CIA for such foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as is
relevant to FBI needs.
Response
I concur in this recommendation as it affects CIA,
reflecting current CIA practice. I defer to the Department of
Justice and the FBI with respect to the matters affecting those
agencies.
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Recommendation (15)
a. Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to
perform what are essentially internal security tasks.
b. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their
origin, to involve it again in such improper activities.
c. The Agency should guard against allowing any component
(like the Special Operations Group) to become so self-contained
and isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and
review are lost.
d. The files of the CHAOS project which have no foreign
intelligence value should be destroyed by the Agency at-the
conclusion of the current congressional investigations, or as
soon thereafter as permitted by law.
Response
I concur in the intent of the first two subparagraphs of
this recommendation and note that it reflects the commitment made
by me in my confirmation hearing.
'I fully concur with subparagraph (c) and note that certain
revisions have been made in Agency organization in the past two
years toward this goal.
I fully concur With subparagraph (d).
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Recommendation (16)
The CIA should not infiltrate dissident groups or other
organizations of Americans in the absence of a written
determination by the Director of Central Intelligence that such
action is necessary to meet a clear danger to Agency facilities,
operations, or personnel and that adequate coverage by law
enforcement agencies is unavailable.
� Response
I concur in what I understand to be the intent of this
recommendation,but suggest somewhat more precision in its
direction:
a. Recommendations 2 and 12(b) I believe should bar CIA
from any infiltration activities for the clandestine
collection of intelligence against United States citizens.
b. With respect to a concern about a clear danger to
Agency facilities, operations or personnel, I believe that�
in addition to a determination by the Director of Central
Intelligence, there should be a requirement for coordination
with the FBI or other appropriate law enforcement agencies
and that any CIA activity should be undertaken only in
support of the duly authorized activity of such agency.
c. As written, this recommendation could be read as
prohibiting CIA utilization of persons with either bona fide
or assumed status as dissidents "or other organizations of
Americans" even though the CIA activity might be directed
exclusively against foreign intelligence targets. I do not
believe that the use of American "cover" such as this should
be eliminated but, rather, that reporting on the American
activity in the process of building such "cover" should be
prohibited.
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Recommendation (17)
All files on individuals accumulated by the Office of
Security in the program relating to dissidents should be
identified, and, except where necessary for a legitimate foreign
intelligence activity, be destroyed at the conclusion of the
current congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter as
permitted by law.
Response
concur in this recommendation.
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d. Wien appropriate, the DCI will consult with
the Attorney General with respect to issuance of guidelines.
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Recommendation (18)
� a. The Director of Central Intelligence should issue clear
guidelines setting forth the situations in which the CIA is
justified in conducting 'Its own investigation of individuals
presently or formerly affiliated with it.
b. The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct
investigations of such persons only when the Director of Central
Intelligence first determines that the investigation is necessary
to protect intelligence sources and methods the disclosure of
which might endanger the national security.
C. Such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI
whenever substantial evidence suggesting espionage or violation
of a federal criminal statute is discovered..
Response
I concur in this recommendation. I suggest somewhat greater
precision in it, however, as follows:
a. The Director of Central Intelligence should have as
a base the same administrative authority over CIA employees
as any departmental or agency chief. This should give him
the right to conduct administrative investigations to
ascertain whether or not a substantial security or
management problem, may exist.
b. In cases in which evidence suggesting espionage or
violation of a Federal or State criminal statute is
discovered, the FBI or appropriate local authorities should
� be informed and the Agency should undertake a supporting
rather than primary role with respect to any further -
investigation.
c. Where the preliminary examination indicates the
possibility of a security problem not likely to involve
� espionage or violation of a criminal statute, but reflecting
on the suitability of continued access to sensitive
� intelligence sources and methods or suggesting corrective
action with respect to such access, the CIA should be
authorized to conduct an investigation using lawful-methods
of surveillance, provided.there is coordination with the
FBI.
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Recommendation (19)
a. In cases involving serious or continuing security
violations, as determined by the Security Committee of the United
States Intelligence Board, the Committee should be authorized to
recommend in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence
(with a copy to the National Security Council) that the case be
referred to the FBI for further investigation, under procedures
to be developed by the Attorney General. .
b. These procedures should include a requirement that the
FBI accept such referrals without regard to whether a favorable
prosecutive opinion is issued by the Justice Department. The CIA
should not engage in such further investigations.
Response
� I endorse the sense of this recommendation but have several
suggestions for modification:
� a. While the Security Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board could initiate a recommendation with
respect to any level of security violation, the US
Intelligence Board itself should be required to endorse a
referral to the FBI for further investigation if the FBI
thereby would be required to accept such referral without
� regard to whether a favorable prosecutive opinion is issued
by the Justice Department.
b. As noted in Recommendation 18, I believe a
distinction should be drawn between a possible violation of
law (including the espionage law) wherein the FBI or local
authorities should undertake the prima -ry role -man - -
investigation supported by the CIA and cases of apparent
security vulnerability not constituting a violation of law
wherein the CIA should be authorized to undertake the
primary role in coordination with the FBI. The latter
category should be restricted to CIA employees, contractors,
etc., in knowing contact with the CIA. Similar authority to
investigate employees of other intelligence agencies should
be given to the heads of those agencies for situations of
security vulnerability not amounting to possible violation
of a criminal statute. .
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Recommendation (20)
The CIA and other components and agencies of the
intelligence community should conduct periodic reviews of all
classified material originating within those departments or
agencies, with a view to declassifying as much of that material
as possible. The purpose of such review would be to assure the
public that it has access to all information that should properly
be disclosed.
Response
I concur in this recommendation. This recommendation
contains the same injunction as Executive Order 11652 which
provides for classification and declassification of national
security information and material.
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-e
Recommendation (21)
The Commission endorses legislation, drafted with
appropriate safeguards of the constitutional rights of all
affected individuals, which would make it a criminal offense for
employees or former employees of the CIA willfully to divulge to
any unauthorized person classified information pertaining to
foreign intelligence or the collection thereof obtained during
the course of their employment.
Response
On 23 Aprjl 1975 I submitted to the Office of Management And
Budget proposea legislation in line with this recommendation. I
had submitted similar legislation in January 1974, which was not
introduced, and I have vigorously pursued the objectives of this
proposal with the Congress, the Department of Justice, and other
interested departments and agencies since that time. It has been
evident to this Agency for many years that existing criminal law
is inadequate and provides virtually no enforceable sanctions
against disclosure of intelligence sources and methods to
unauthorized persons. This is because to prosecute under
existing law requires disclosure in open court of further
sensitive information as well as confirmation of the information
disclosed by the person being prosecuted. In very recent years,
with the Government's inability to prosecute in well known cases
of disclosure by former employees, the need for improved criminal
legislation has become evident to many outside of the
Intelligence Community. The legislation which I have proposed
meets, I believe, all of the standards of this recommendation
including particularly safeguards for the consititutional rights
of all affected individuals. It would permit prosecution only of
persons authorized to possess the information disclosed or who
possessed it by virtue of an association with the Government. It
specifically precludes prosecution of newsmen or other recipients
of information disclosed in violation of the law.
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4.
Recommendation (22)
The CIA should not undertake physical surveillance (defined
as systematic observation) of Agency employees, contractors or
related personnel within the United States without first
obtaining written approval of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Response
I concur in this recommendation, but note that the
requirement for the Director's prior written approval would apply
to some activities by the Agency which the Commission did not
find objectionlble. These include surveillance of Agency
employees in operational situations for their protection or to
detect countersurveillance, surveillance of individuals who. may
be carrying substantial sums of money, or surveillance during the
routine investigations mentioned in the response to
Recommendation 18. Thus, I believe that the intent of this
recommendation can best be met by adoption of detailed internal
procedures which define those situations in which DCI approval
for .surveillance is required and those in which authority can be
delegated to the Director of Security or other subordinate
levels.
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Recommendation (23)
In the United States and its possessions, the CIA should not
intercept wire or oral communicationslor otherwise engage in
activities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law
enforcement agency. Responsibility for such activities belongs
with the FBI.
Response
This recommendation suggests the prohibition within the US
and its possessions of two kinds of activity which raise
different consj.derations. The first is the interception-of wire
or oral communications, and the second is "activities that would
require a warrant if conducted by a law enforcement agency." The
latter is understood, to mean unauthorized entries onto premises
and all conduct other than the interception of wire or oral
communications which would amount to a search or seizure.
I concur in the recommendation that CIA not engage in
"activities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law -
enforcement agency." Since the Agency has no law enforcement
functions, its use within the US of unauthorized entry or other
methods which amount to a search or seizure is beyond its legal
authority. Cases where the Agency's legitimate interests may
call for such activities are infrequent and should be handled by
the FBI upon CIA's request (see Recommendation 19).
In regard to the recommendation that CIA be prohibited from
intercepting wire or oral communications within the US, I concur-
that responsibility for such activities belongs with the FBI. I
recommend, however, that CIA be authorized to support such FBI
activity in cases involving foreign intelligence approved by, the
Attorney General.
)As defined in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
18 U.S.C. Secs. 2510-20.
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In regard to possible intercept of communications in the
course of equipment testing or the training of operators, see
response to Recommendation 28.
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Recommendation (24)
.The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal
procedures governing access to federal income tax information.
Response
I concur in this recommendation. Agency regulations on
liaison with the Internal Revenue Service will be revised to
clarify the limits and procedures in dealing with the Service and
for obtaining income tax information.
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Recommendation (25)
CIA investigation records should show that eacH
investigation was duly authorized, and by whom, and should
clearly set forth the factual basis for undertaking the
investigation and the results of the investigation.
Response
concur in this recommendation.
�
_
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Recommendation (26)
a. A single and exclusive high-level channel should be
established for transmission of all White House staff requests to
the CIA. This channel should run between an officer of the
National Security Council staff designated by the President and
the office of the Director or his Deputy.
b. All Agency officers and employees. should be instructed
that any direction or request reaching them directly and out of
regularly established channels should be immediately reported to
the Director of Central Intelligence. �
Response
Given the concerns expressed in the chapter of which this
recommendation is a part, I understand the purposes of the
recommendation as being proper and desirable. The language of
the recommendation however would appear to restrict unduly a
number of normal relationships involving the provision of foreign
intelligence support by CIA to the White House. I believe that
the concerns expressed by the Commission would be adequately
protected if implementation of the recommendation provided that
rules and procedures be issued governing the provision of foreign
intelligence support to the White House. These should cover, for
example, such subjects as the normal exchange between the White
House Situation Room and the CIA Operations Center; MSC Staff
requests to the Directorates of Intelligence and Operations for
comments on or contributions to NSC studies; requests that CIA
provide communications for senior officials on foreign travels;
requests by the Secret Service for assistance in protecting
senior officials travelling abroad; and the normal interchange
between CIA and the NSC on agreements regarding employees,
professional and clerical, detailed to the MSC.
CIA officers involved in the provision of foreign
intelligence support as outlined above would be under direct
instruction to report to the DCI or the Inspector General any
White House request which does not fall within the agreed list of
activities as specified above.
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Recommendation (27)
In accordance with its present guidelines, the CIA should
not again engage in the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.
Response.
I concur in this recommendation, which reflects directives.
. issued by me on 29 August 1973.
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Recommendation (28)
Testing of equipment for monitoring conversations should not
involve unsuspecting persons living within the United States.
Response
While I endorse the intent of the Commission in making this
recommendation, I believe it is so simple'in form as to pose
serious difficulties as a guide for actual testing practice.
Many types of radio receivers for the collection of foreign
intelligence are developed and tested by the CIA, and our
personnel are trained in their operation. By their very nature,
these receivers are sensitive enough to monitor inadvertently
some US conversations in test situations and virtually nothing
can be done to prevent this. Adequate acceptance and suitability
testing of these systems requires that they be tested in
realistic circumstances, and inevitably some conversations will
be monitored, though no identification is made of the
participants. The building of large scale simulated
communications systems for test purposes would be expensive and
impractical.
. In my view, the guidelines for testing of equipment in the
US established by us in August 1973 meet the purposes of the
Commission's recommendation and serve as a more realistic guide
to such activities. These provide that testing of intelligence
equipment may be undertaken in the United States provided that no
use of the information collected shall in any way abrogate the
rights of US citizens as guaranteed under the Constitution of the
United States. If it is essential to test equipment on an
American communications system or other establishment, this may
be done provided that no recordings of the material are retained
or examined by any element other than the original test -
engineers. In this context the original test engineers
constitute the engineers under contract to perform the tests and
the Agency technical officers supervising the activity.
Knowledge derived from the tests that relates to equipment
performance but maintains anonymity of the data source may be
exchanged with other elements of the Agency.
'
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Recommendation (29)
A civilian agency committee should be reestablished to
oversee the civilian uses of aerial intelligence photography in
order, to avoid any concerns over the improper domestic use of a
CIA-developed system.
Response
I concur in this recommendation and urge that it be
accomplished speedily. .I should note here that--contrary to the
statement in the Commission's Report--a proposed agreement for
continuing support in this area of the Environmental Protection
Agency was not concluded because of that Agency's law enforcement
responsibilities.
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Recommendation (30)
1
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
FBI should prepare and submit for approval by the National
Security Council a detailed agreement setting forth the
jurisdiction of each agency and providing for effective liaison
with respect to all matters of mutual concern. This agreement
should be consistent with the provisions of law and with other
applicable recommendations of this Report..
Response
I concur tn this recommendation. A proposed National
Security Council Intelligence Directive which bears on this
subject has been submitted to the NSC for review. We will
continue to review this matter to determine if other directives
are appropriate to meet fully this recommendation.
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