ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01434860
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: July 22, 1975

Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
22 July 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission Recommendations
1. Mason Cargill and Tim Hardy, formerly of the Rockefeller
Commission Staff and now assigned to the Office of the President's
Counsel, came to see me at their request this morning. They are
the action officers involved in putting together the responses from
each of the departments and agencies to the President's request of
11 June asking for comments on the Commission's report.
2. Cargill and Hardy said they were calling on working-level
officers in each of the agencies to clarify the responses and to get
ideas before drafting proposed executive orders and/or Presidential
instructions.
3. They said there was no interest in the White House at this
point in time to seek new legislation. The primary aim is to look to
those actions the President can take soon to generate appropriate and
constructive changes in intelligence activities.
4. Cargill and Hardy started out by saying that the Agency's
response was the best one received in its clarity and its avoidance of
parochialism.
5. They questioned me about our concurrence with Recommendation
#2, generally prohibiting CIA collection about domestic activities. They
had thought that this would give us some pain and trouble. I said that
the language of an exerutive order on this point might cause us some
anguish but the recommendation as stated was generally all right.
They said they would be sure to check with us in advance on the language
of any proposed executive orders or instructions. They called particular
attention to the last sentence of Recommendation #2 which reads: "Any
modification of the (executive) order should be permitted only through
published amendments." They asked if unclassified amendments on
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
SECRET
this subject would give us trouble. I said I thouglt we could live with
classified or unclassified versions. The real problem exists at the
White House and the National Security Council Staff. It's there that
there may be real interest in insuring that directives remain classified.
The two visitors pointed out that the language was specifically chosen
by the Commission so that the Agency would have this further safe-
guard against any future abuse by the Executive.
6. We discussed Recommendation #5 concerning an enhanced
PFIAB. They indicated that PFIAB is not keen on picking up the
proposed new functions, though it is willing to be a sounding board
for the augmented CIA Inspector General. I said it was our feeling
that if PFIAB does not take on an oversight responsibility for CIA
some vehicle would have to be created within the Executive to do so.
7. They asked for elaboration on our response to Recommenda-
tion #8 concerning two deputies, one military and one civilian. They
said the insistence on a military deputy was largely that of General
Lemaiitzer backed by one or two others on the Commission. They
wanted to know how strongly we felt that one of the deputies should be
military. I pointed out that the two most recent Directors (Schlesinger
and Colby) both believed the IC Staff job should be I:leaded by a high-
ranking military officer. This seems to be the current view and is
likely to be the way of the future as well. Therefore, the military
deputy and the head of the IC Staff can be one and the same.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
-2-
CRET
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RET
9. We had some discussion of Recommendation #18 concerning
CIA's conduct of its own investigations of individuals presently or
formerly affiliated with it. I elaborated on "suitability of continued
access to sensitive intelligence" as a factor in employment and as
a factor which sometimes requires security investigation. They
seemed satisfied.
10. We also discussed Recommendation #19 concerning the
Security Committee. They said that the Attorney General had taken
strong exception to the recommendation that a Security Committee
finding would be binding on the FBI in undertaking an investigation.
We agreed that it seemed best to involve USIB in. any such considera-
tions and to arrange for the DCI as Chairman of USIB to take up with
the FBI, Attorney General and the President any matters at issue.
11. We discussed physical surveillance as described in
Recommendation #22. Contrary to our response, they believe that
surveillance during routine investigations as mentioned in our response
to Recommendation #18 should have the Director's prior approval,
otherwise our response gives them no problem. Here again, I said I
would arrange for them to discuss details with the experts.
12. We discussed Recommendation #23 concerning intercept of
wire or oral communications following the line of the Director's
testimony before the Committee. I recommended that they take care
to ensure that CIA and the FBI consult and coordinate on these matters
so as to avoid a tendency to concentrate either on counterintelligence
or on foreign intelligence. A blending is to be desired.
13. As for Recommendation #26 concerning a single channel
between the CIA and the White House covering the latter's request for
services, they are in agreement with the thrust of our response.
14. They explained that Recommendation #28 which would rule
out testing of equipment for monitoring conversations within the United
States. Cargill and Hardy said that this was a last minute addition to
the report. Most of the staff did not believe it should have been included.
-3-
SE
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RET
I said that it gives us problems because there is obvious need
to test new equipment in the U.S. and we thought the Director's
instructions of August 1973 were quite adequate. I pointed out
that the Senate staffers have already noted the problem and they
said they would work on a statutory remedy in view of this.
Cargill and Hardy seemed to agree that this would be left to us
and the Hill. None of the other recommendations or responses
were discussed; apparently there were no problems with them.
E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director
Distribution:
OGC
IG
1 Counsel to DCI
Review Staff
-4-
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
proved for Release: 2017/01/18 CO1434860
22 July 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:. Rockefeller Commission Recommendations
�,
1. Mason Cargill and Tim Hardy, formerly of the Rockefeller
Commission. Staff and now assigned to the Office of the President's
Counsel, came to see me at their request this morning. They are
the action officers involved ip. putting together the responses from
each of the departments and agencies to the President's request of
11 June asking for comments on the Commission's report.
2. Cargill and Hardy said they were calling on working-level
, .
officers in each of the agencies to clarify the responses and to get
ideas before drafting propos.ecrexecutive orders and/or PreSidentia.1
instructions. ,
� 3, They Said there was no interest in the White House at this .
point in time to seek new legislation. The primary, aim is to look to
those. actions the President can take soon to generate appropriate and
constructive changes in intelligence activities.
4� Cargill and Hardy started out by saying that the Agency's
response was the best one received iii its clarity and its avoidance of
parochialism. �
�
. . �
� 5. They questione-d-me ab77dut our concurrence with Recommendation
#2, generally prohibiting CIA collection about domestic activities. They
had thought that this would give us some pain and trouble. I said that
the language of art executive order on this point might cause us some
anguish but the recommendation as stated was generally all right.
They said they would be sure to check with us in advance on the language
of any proposed executive orders or instructions. They called particular
attention to the last sentence of Recommendation #2 which reads: "Any
modification of the (executive) order should be permitted only through
published amendments." They asked if unclassified amendments on
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
� this subject would give us trouble. I said I thougltwe could live with
classified or unclassified versions. The real problem exists at the
White House and the National Security Council Staff. It's there that
there may be real interest in insuring that directives remain classified.
The two �visitors pointed out that the language was specifically chosen
by the Commission so that the Agency would have this further safe-
guard against any future abuse by the r.*4cutive.
6. We discussed Recommendation #5 concerning an enhanced
PFIAB. They indicated that PFIAB is not keen on picking up the
proposed new functions, though it is willing to be a sounding board
for the augmented CIA Inspector General. I said it was our feeling
that if PFIAB does not take on an oversight responsibility for CIA.
some vehicle would have to be created within the Executive to do so.
7. They asked for elaboration on our response to Recommenda-
tion 178� concerning two deputies, one military and one civiliad. They
...
said the insistence on a military deputy was largely,that of General
Lernnitzer backed by one 6.1=Amo others on the Commission. They
wanted to know .how strongly 'We felt that one of the deputies should be
military. I pointed out that the two most recent Directors (Schlesinger
and Colby) both believed the IC Staff job should be headed by a high-
ranking military officer. This seems Act be the current view and is
likely to.be the way of the future as well.' Therefore, the military
deputy and the head of the IC Staff can be one and the same.
�
� 8. Our response to their Recommendation #16 (CIA should not
infiltrate dissident groups or other organizations of Americans) was
not entirely satisfactory in their view. They recognize that we would
like to have an ability-to .u.se4isident groups for cover purposes to
accredit agents for work abroad, but they seem to feel that there is a
narrow line involved here and that one cannot penetrate for such a
purpose without improperly impacting on the activities of the dissidents.
What they would like to know is how we might go about using dissident
credentials as cover without ruining the rightful activities of dissident
organizations. A more basic question is how essential is it in this day
and time to accredit agents with dissident credentials? I said I would
arrange for them to discuss this further with the experts.
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C0143486n
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
9. We had some discussion of Recommendation #18 concerning
CIA's conduct of its own investigations of individuals presently or
formerly affiliated with it. I elaborated on "suitability of continued
access to sensitive intelligence" as a factor in employment and as
a factor which sometimes requires security investigation. They
seemed satisfied.
r
10. We also discussed Recommen4ation. #19 concerning the
Security Committee. They said that the Attorney General had taken
strong exception to the recommendation-that a Security Committee
�4'1
finding would be binding on the FBI in undertaking an investigation.
We agreed that it seemed best to invc.,ive TJSIB in any such considera-
tions and to arrange for the DCI as Chairman of USIB to take up with
the FBI, Attorney General and the President any matters at issue.
. 11. We discussed physical surveillance as described in
Recommendation f22. Contrary to our response, they believe that
surveillance during routine investigations as mentioned in our.response
�- to Recommendation #18 should have the Director's prior approval,
otherwise our response gives them no problem. 'Here again, I said I
would arrange for them to discuss details with the experts.
12. We discussed Recommendation #23 concerning intercept of
� wire or oral communications following the line of the Director's
� testimony before the Committee. I recommended that they take care
to ensure that CIA and the FBI consult Ad coordinate on these matters
so .as to avoid 'a tendency to concentrate either on counterintelligence
or On foreign intelligence. A blending is to be desired.
13. As for Recommendation #26 concerning a single channel
between the CIA and. the White Rouse covering the latter's request for
services, they are in agreement.with the thrust of our response.
z-
14. They explained that Recommendation #28 which would rule
out testing of equipment for monitoring conversations within the United
States. Cargill and Hardy said that this was a last minute addition to
�the report. Most of the staff did not believe it should have been included.
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
I said that it gives us problems because there is obvious need
to test new equipment in the U.S. and we thought the Director's
instructions of August 1973 were quite adequate. I pointed out
that the Senate staffers have already noted the problem and they
said they ,would work on a statutory remedy in view of this.
Cargill and Hardy seemed to agree that this would be left to us
and the Hill. None of the other recommepdations or responses
were discussed; apparently there were 410roblems with them.
Distribution:
OGC
ecial Counsel to DCI
AD DCI
Review Staff
E. ie
Assistant to the Director
-4-
to!"0.1.MITAIV-
SECR T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/18 C01434860
?r/