LETTER TO WILLIAM E. COLBY FROM FRANK CHURCH RE TESTIMONY ON CIA PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01434856
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: November 7, 1975

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FRANK CHURCH. IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., MIN.
WALTER F.1 ONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. I. .DDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MOR6AN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
2Cniieb Ziatez -Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 14TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
November 7, 1975
The Honorable
William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Colby:
During your testimony before the Select Committee
last Friday on CIA paramilitary activities, you in-
dicated the Agency would answer additional questions
from the Committee on this subject. These questions
are attached.
You also indicated that the Agency would forward
a complete record of discussions of
forces in Laos with Members of Congress including times,
places, and summaries of what was discussed.
A response by Friday, November 14, would be
appreciated.
With kind regards,
Attachment
Sincere
nk Church
Chairman
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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QUESTIONS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REGARDING
PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
Indonesia
1. What roles, specifically, did individual leaders
of the 1957-1958 outer island dissidence play in the
political upheavals of 1965-1966?
2. What were the principal patterns--and the pace--
of Sukarno's relations with the PKI, Russia and China,
following the 1957-1958 outer island rebellion, and
how did these compare with the patterns and the pace
of such pre-1957-1958 events?
3. CIA documents made available to the Committee in-
dicate that in July 1959, General John E. Hull, who
was then the Chairman of the President's Board of In-
telligence Advisors, gave the DCI a post-mortem paper
which criticized the for
having been based on faulty military command structures
and procedures. Would you please comment on Gen. Hull's
criticisms.
4. Would you please inform us what the pattern and
content were of CIA meetings with Congressional and
Executive oversight in the Indonesian case.
The Congo
1. How did U.S. policy makers perceive the threat to
U.S. interests posed by political and military instabil-
ity in the Congo from 1960 to 1968?
2. In planning in the Congo,
did the CIA differentiate between internal rebellion
and rebellion supported externally by the USSR and the
Communist bloc?
3. At the time CIA began funding various moderate
Congolese politicians in 1960, did senior U.S. policy
makers and/or the CIA foresee the need for additional
as
L(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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W1711
4. When CIA Headquarters and State Department author-
ized in November 1962 to fly unarmed
Congo aircratt in support of the Central Government,
did they consider or foresee an eventual combat role
for these pilots?
5. At what point did U.S. covert action in the Congo
shift from psychological activities to major combat
operations? Was the change effected by the December
1962
and therefore precede the outbreak ot rebeliion in
1964?
Issue: Command and Control of CIA's Covert Actions in
the Congo
6. Air Operations: In June 1964,
in opposition to U.S. policy.
Some indicate that Ambassador Godley gave
the order; others cite Col. Dodds.
has testified that it is inconceivable that
either odley or Dodds ordered these officers to fly
missions without instructions from Washington.
Question: How and why did this breach of U.S. policy
occur?
7. Maritime Operations: In March and April 1965 the U.S.
provided equipment and personnel for
was formally changed to include this
maritime activity and 303 approval was given.
Question: Was there a specific 303 decision authorizing
CIA's maritime program prior to September 1965? If not,
by what authority did CIA
Angola
1. Was the CIA the dissenting voice in the "non-unanimous"
decisions on Angola? If so, why?
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2. Given that other so-called "Marxists" regimes in
Africa pose no "national security" threat to the U.S.,
why is the political complexion in Angola regarded as
important to our national security?
Laos
Thai nationals were involved in paramilitary operations
in Laos from 1960 onward, in three principal ways:
--as members of regular RTG military units;
e.g. artillery and infantry battalions;
--as "volunteers" making up guerrilla forma-
tions fighting as units.
With respect to each of these groups (and any other cate-
gory of Thai involvement in Laos), please describe:
1. Numbers of personnel involved and pay and
allowance costs annually, cowinencing in
1960;
2. The relationship of the Thai nationals to
the Thai government, the Lao government and
the CIA, before and after their entry into
Laos, including arrangements for their com-
mand and control, pay and allowances, future
employment rights and eligibility for veterans
benefits.
3. Dates of briefings provided members of Congress
on Thai involvement and scope of information
provided. The list of briefings provided to
the Committee suggests that no Congressional
Committee was informed of the Thai irregular
program before April 5, 1972, nearly two years
after the program began. CIA documents provided
the Committee indicate that Senator Symington,
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visiting Laos, raised the issue of "U.S.!
Thai involvement in Laos" in September 1970.
In view of your contention that this consti-
tuted consultation on the Lao irregular
program, please provide all Agency cables
reporting on the visit in any way.
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