ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON CANADIAN ASSISTANCE IN THE EXFILTRATION OF U.S. EMBASSY EMPLOYEES FROM TEHRAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01430787
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-00120
• Publication Date: July 27, 1988

Approved for Release: 2017/06/29 C01430787
S E E T
27 July 1988
SUBJECT: Additional Background Information on Canadian
Assistance in the Exfiltration of U.S. Embassy
Employees from Tehran
N.B. Given the extreme sensitivity over Canadian support
to our exfiltration efforts, several aspects of the operation
were not committed to paper. The information contained below
is primarily based on the recollections of Agency officers
involved in the initial planning of the exfiltration operation.
1. Although the Iranians seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran
on 4 November 1979, we were unable to reconcile the numbers of
U.S. employees being held captive. The Iranians claimed to be
holding 54 hostages: 51 at the EmbasSy and three at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If this figure were correct,
small number of employees were "missing".
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visited Headquarters on 16 November 1979. During the
visit, which had been arranged before the U.S. Embassy was
seized, 1 advised six Embassy employees had made
their way to the Canadian mission where they sought safehaven.
It was stunning and welcome news.
2 Upon learning this information,
Additional
officers representing Near East and European Divisions joined
Mr. Carlucci to discuss exfiltration planning with
The group adjourned to the Director's Dining Room
where adequate table space was available to spread out maps of
Tehran and Iran. During the ensuing discussion,
made it plain the Canadians would help in the exfiltration of
the Americans but knowledgeability of the presence of the
Americans at the Canadian mission and the Canadian assistance
must be extremely limited. Two DO participants independently
recalled stating "the information must not go
beyond this room or "beyond these four walls." Carlucci said
the Agency would respect this, but he asked for
approval to brief one other individual -- the President.
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agreed and reemphasized no one other than the
President should be aware of our joint planning. One
participant recalled specifically said the
information should not be passed to
The participant believed this unusual request
added additional weight to request for utmost
secrecy. While two of the DO officers recalled that
stipulated Congress not be informed, two other DO
officers did not recall a specific statement to this effect.
Rather, in subsequent discussions, the Agency officers agreed
that the "gentlemen's agreement" with contained the
implication that Congress not be notified.
3. Lives were at stake and the information was extremely
tightly held within the Agency. In addition, we were concerned
with wiolent retaliation the Canadians would experience at the
hands of the Iranian revolutionaries should they become aware
of Canadian assistance, extremely tight compartmentation was
instituted. The uncertainty of events in Iran land the Middle
East was underscored when, during the same time frame as the
Embassy seizure in Tehran, militant Muslims destroyed the U.S.
Embassy in Islamabad, killing an Army Warrant Officer in the
process, dependents were evacuated from Kabul because of the
instability of the Afghan regime, and the U.S. Embassy in
Tripoli was sacked.
4. In sum, offered us a
means of saving six Americans. He requested absolute secrecy
and we agreed. Former DDCI Carlucci took this caveat seriously
and specifically requested permission to brief
the President. Within this context it was clear to the
officers involved that Congress must not be briefed on the
exfiltration planning. The point is not whether a specific
document memorialized a Canadian request not to brief Congress,
but rather how experienced Agency officers interpreted
request. The recollections of those officers
involved in tne meeting indicated they believed
statements revealed a clear and consistent need to keep this
information on a "close-hold" basis, which was interpreted as
precluding Congressional notification.
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Approved for Release: 2017/06/29 C01430787