DIARY NOTES

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: MHCHAOS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01430429
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2024
• Document Release Date: December 24, 2024
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: January 4, 1972

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SENDER. WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
J UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL 1
SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
IN IT Ls
Inspector General
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
'Attached in chronological order is that
which MAG has produced and papers related
to Management's reac..: 3n thereto on MAG's
concern re domestic activities. It is provided
for your review and comment to Mr. Colby.
This is our file copy and I would hope it could
be retrieved if required.
�
FOLD HEREgtvETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADOPt.e; AND PHONE NO.
DATE
.......**".:'�,4/
./.. '
0/ES/CIA MC/Ben Evans 7E24
18May73
UNCLASSIFIED I I CONFIDENTIAL SECRET -
fool xo. 237 Use previous editions
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DIARY NOTES
Executive Dircctor-Comptroller 4 January 1972
I. I met with the outgoing and incoming MAG Cochairmen. We
discussed a number of topics but concentrated particularly on their
two most recent memoranda concerning domestic activities. I ex-
pressed slight irritation with their second memorandum, which is a
shotgun approach to the problem, and asked them to be specific if
they have anything in mind. I said I understand they have heard that
we sent a surveillance team to the Democratic National Convention.
said thathe made this statement because an Office
of Security employee reported in his presence that he personally was
a member of a team which went to the Convention.' (I subsequently
raised this with Howard Osborn, who after investigating reported back
that the Secret Service asked us for two technicians during the Demo-
cratic National Convention. These technicians were formally detailed
to the Sec.ret Service and went to Chicago, where they did RF monitor-
ing under the supervision of the Secret Service. The Secret Service
apparently calls RF monitoring "audio surveillance," and it seems that,
during the discussion which took place at the Senior Seminar, those who
heard this assumed that "surveillance" meant actual surveillance of the
candidates, when actually the meeting rooms were being checked to
ensure they had not been bugged. I have reported all this to the Director
and shall discuss it with MAG when I have dinner with them on 11 January.)
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00434
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(...K.r..11: �
23 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
CIA's Domestic Activities
NAG Memoranda on same subject dated
March 1971 and November 1971
As requested, MAG met with the DDP on 21 December and
discussed with him the referenced memoranda on CIA's covert
domestic activities. Our exchange consisted primarily of
the DDP responding to the NAG memoranda as they related to
activities of the Clandestine Service alone. The DDP made
it clear that he spoke only for his Service. Since MAG's
initial concern over covert domestic activities extended to,
while not being restricted to, the Clandestine Service,
it recommends that the referenced memoranda be also brought
to the attention of appropriate senior officials in other
Agency components.
The Management Advisory Group
SECRET
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EXTENSION
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DATE
22 Dec 71
To: (Officer designatiol, room number, and
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DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number eac comment to show from whom
to whom, a me ccross mn after each comment.)
RECEIVED
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Executive Director
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21 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT: Meeting with IvilAG Group
1. I met with the MAG group this morning for little over
an hour, and I set forth as candidly as possible those counter-
intelligence and counterespionage responsibilities of ours overseas
which make it mandatory for us occasionally to take an interest in
American citizens overseas. I explained the requirements placed
on us by the Department of Justice for overseas checks, and also
the fact that our normal overseas operations against Soviets and
others some times produce leads to Americans in conspiratorial
contact with our Communist targets.
2. I was asked about our having sent Agency representatives
to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 and I
explained that I never hearo of such a thing and did not believe it.
I pointed out that, as they knew, the press had reported fully on the
Agency participation at the beginning of the sky marshalling program
and I assumed they saw nothing wrong with this. They agreed. I
also pointed out that, at President Kennedy's funeral, with scores
of important foreign personalities here, the Agency lent some assistance
to the Secret Service, and here again the group understood that this
was a legitimate function.
3. The group made it clear that their concern was over the
Agency image if the general public were aware that some of our
activities, wherever they took place, were targeted against Blacks.
I said that we did not target against Americans of any color in this
country, and that the 'Clandestine Service was color blind when it
came to cariying out its overseas CI responsibilities and it would
continue to be so.
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4. I agreed that the Director should be asked to speak a
little more fully and clearly on whether we "target against American
citizens" so that there is no ambiguity.
5. I told the group that we must expect all kinds of irrespon-
sible accusations in the press, such as the one in the January 1972
issue of RAMPARTS magazine in which Bob Kiley and Drex Godfrey,
it is suggested, are still in the employ of CIA working on a CIA
plan to improve police organizations in this country. I said that this
was palpably false as anyone who knows Kiley and Godfrey would
understand. The group mentioned Dick Ober's unit and said that
there was a lot of scuttlebutt that the purpose of this unit was to keep
book on Black Power adhered-4C. I denied this saying that our interest
was as I had explained it previously.
6. I do not know whether this is a fair assumption, but
Dick Ober's machine program is not handled in the Clandestine Service
and it is possible that someone is misreading and misinterpreting the
intent of Ober's program from fragmentary bits and pieces that may
be discernible from the handling of the machine program. I do not
state this as a fact because I have not examined it that closely.
7. I told the group that I had offered to enlighten it candidly
on what we do so that they � ->uld at least have the facts and I said
that I assume you would take it from here.
Thomas H. Karames sines
Deputy Director for Plans
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Al
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
THROUGH: The Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT: CIA's Domestic Activities
REFERENCE: MAG Memorandum, "CIA's Domestic Activities,"
March 1971
1. MAG is seriously concerned about possible reper-
cussions which may arise as the result of CIA's covert
domestic activities. Public revelation that CIA has become
involved in collecting information on U.S. citizens would
likely redound to the Agency's discredit and jeopardize
overall Agency programs.
2. MAG first expressed its concern-about' CIA's covert
domestic activities in a memo for the DCI, transmitted
through .the Executive Director-Comptroller in the Spring
of 1971 (Attachment A). MAG's concern has increased
recently because of such articles as, Vic Marchetti' s. UPI
interview (Attachment B) and the 10 October New York Times
article concerning rupture of FBI-CIA relatiorig-(Wtachment
C). Both hint at extremely sensitive Agency involvement in
domestic activities. Additionally, the DCI.addresses to
the American Society of Newspaper Editors (Attachment DO
and to the CIA Annual Awards ceremony (Attachment E) make
rather categorical denials of Agency covert targeting on
U.S. citizens. Agency employees aware of the various
sensitive operations in question know that there is
qualifying language explaining CIA involvement. However,
MAG believes that in the event of an expose, such esoteric
qualifiers will be lost on the American public and that
there is probably nothing the Agency could say to alleviate
a negative reaction from Congress and the U.S. public. It
is MAG's fear that such a negative reaction .could Seriously
damage our Chngressional relations, effect our .work against
priority foreign targets and have significant impact on the
viability of CIA.
�'�
3. There are indications that the Agency, in responding
to CE/CI requirements, is collecting information on selected
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U.S. citizen; both at home and abroad. In operational areas
which are highly sensitive and potentially explosive (e.g.,
domestic radical or racial groups) this Agency must carefully
weigh the needs and pressures for collecting and maintaining
this information against the risk and impact of revelation
should the operation become compromised or public knowledge.
We therefore urge that all domestic collection and action
programs be severely reviewed so that only those be continued
which are of the highest priority and which absolutely cannot
be undertaken by domestic agencies. CIA should not take on
requirements .of this type by default.
4. Not all of the members of MAG are privy to CIA's
direct or indirect involvement in domestic activities. Those
who are aware probably know only parts of the whole picture.
But our increasing concern and our intense interest in
maximizing the Agency's ability to do its proper job, impel
us to bring our serious apprehensions to your attention.
:THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP
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Attachments B, C, D and E
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*Attachment 3 - Vic Marchetti's UPI Interview, from U.S. News
and World Report, 1.1 October 1971:
�.''Fearing today that. .the .CIA may already have begun
'going against the enemy within!. the_Undte,d. States as they
may. conceive As,.. .dissident student groups and
civil-rights organizations..."
"Because the men of the Agency are superpatriots, he
said, it is only natural for them to view violent protest
and dissidence as a major threat to the nation, . The inbred
CIA reaction, he said, would .be. to. launch a clandestine
operation to infiltrate dissident groups.
That, said Marchetti, may already have started to
happen.
'I don't have very much to go on,' he said. 'Just bits
and pieces that indicate the U.S. intelligence community is
already targeting on groups in this country that they.feei�to
be subversive.
'I know this was being discussed in the halls of the CIA,
and that there were a 1Nt of people who felt this should be
done.' "
Attachment C - New York Times, 10 October, "FBI-CIA Relations:"
."Information generally exchanged between the F.B.I.and the
CIA might concern such subjects as officers of the Baack.
Panther party traveling overseas...and American youngsters
cutting sugar cane in Cuba."
Attachment D - DCI Address to the American Society of Newspaper
Editors:
"And may I emphasize at this point that the statute
specifically forbids the Central Intelligence Agency to have
any police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers, or any
domestic se.:urity functions. I can assure you that except
for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical
security or our own personnel, our facilities, and our
classified information, we do not have any such powers and
function; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any.
In short, we do not target on American citizens."
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carritAL BricaL.I.r.-GENCE Aa,767.
z.lanacarcont Advisory Gran
MEMRANDUZi F011: The Dire etor
THROUGH : The Executive Director
suarEcT
:. CIA Domestic Activities
25 March 1971
MAO is concerned that CIA avoid involteme; in the current
� expose of the do=stic int.-A.114;one:: activIties of tha A-ny and
:other federal ngencies. o boilece that there are CIA
activities strdiar to thoze na-.7 u= rctiny xi:ale:A could
cans() exeat enft,arrassiont to tIla /1.7,.ncy I:oasis:1 they apr.ear to
� exceed ths-scaso of the CIA ehartoz. E=apt for the Ageuzyla
- statutory CL/CI responsibilities, FAG opre'las azy Azar:fly
activity which could be constrcad Z3 taru4,-ad aGainat any per-
son vho enjoys the protection of the US Cmistittrtf.on --
� whether or not he resides ti the United States. Eznopt in
those cases clearly related to national sectultyp no US .
citizen should be the object of CIA operations. Wo roan=
� thab on occasion the Agency vral dovelop about
� some citizen who is cr.ge,&cd iu activitios inimical to the
interosts of the UnitoC Stateo. Such informotion ahaald cjuickly
be turned over to the preyer oz.-an:ion of Govarnmont for fur-
� ther action, even if it moana that comatimoa an eseentiall,7
home-oriented azency may be ash:4 to perf-a in a JA7mIted op� -
erational capacity overseen.
If we. do not purano =oh d correct, one day the public ,
and the'Congress vill co rza to have crave doubts about our rob
In coVernlant, and lony sovorely rogtrict cur. ability to per,.
. fort, those teaks .propu'rly assisnod to CIA,
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21 APR 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for intelliz,,--rica
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director. for Snpport
Deputy, Director for Science and Teem:1�102y
Heads of independent Offices
(For Distribution to Office/Division 'Chief
Laval Only)
SUB.T.EC.T
: CIA Activities in the United States
I. Froro.tir.-10 to time some of our emnicryees express concern over
various allegations or rumors of C.1.4. activities in tha United States. The
attached Yrryzandum. is designed to clarify this su'oj act so that super-
visors can authori.tively reply to any emoloyees i-ncl.-icathag such concern.
It is a statement of the facts 01 the situa6.on 11 incidents or activities are
reported which appear to conflict with this stateznen, they should be re-
ported to appropriate senior authority for resolution (or correction if un-
authorized acUvities might have occurred).
2. Because of the possible sensitivity ol this descrintion of the
Agency's methodology, tins mer...-,ors.n.dr.3zi is not being given the usual broad
circ-ala.tion of the "FY/ -- Allegations and Answers" series. Office and
Division Chiefs are -urged, however, to use it to izi.forrri Branch Chiefs so
that its paints can be readily available to supervisors to react to expre:s-
sions of enaplcrf ea concern..
1-1ttachraen.t
WEC:sic
Distribution:
0 - DDI
1 - Each Other Addressee:
DDP D/DCl/IC
DDS D/PPB
DDS&T
OGC
1 7:'o
1
ONE
OLC
n;
7s/ W. E. C:.-isf.'ox
W. E. Colby
T-'-;:ecutive Director-Comptroller
)
-r- PIA-
1 /DC-I (Thuermer)
vA
USIB Secretary
IG
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ALLEGATION:
In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is working witl,in
the United States, with particular attention to-extremist groups.
FACTS:
1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, subparagraph
D3, states, "The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement
powers, or internal security functions."
In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on
14 April 1971, the Director stated:
"I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities
for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our
facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any
such powers and tune-lions; we have never sought any; we do not
exercise any. In short, we do not target on Atherican cibizens."
In the Director's "State of the Agency' speech to employees on
17 September 1971, he said:
� "1 gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors
last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one. purpose. That
was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we've
all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And
you can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use
that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not
in the drug traffic, and that we're not trying to do espionage on
American citizens in the United States, and we're not tapping
telephone lines, and that we're not doing a lot of other th-ings
which we're accused of doing. One of the things that tends to
perpetuate some of these silly ideas are jokes that are made
about them, parlicnlerly about domestic espionage. Although
the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless give us a name
which we don't deserve. I don't say that that makes all that much
difference, but it does make some difference, and this tends to
spill over, so I would like to suggest that if you have it in. your
hearts to do so that you speak up when the occasion arises and
try and set the facts straight. "
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Z. From to time some employees have been concerned that
Agency activities might conni ct with these statements. They can be
assured that Agency activi.es do not. For clarification, some acvities
which may have been subje-ct to misunderstanding are listed as follows;
Dornesc Contacts. The Doraesue Conts.ct Service
establishes discreet but overt relationships with American pri-
vate citizens, coranue,-cial, academic and other organizations
and resider� aliens for the purposes of collecting on a voluntary
basis foreign intelligence information or soliciting their coopera-
tion in assisting the Agency to perform. its mission overseas.
Records of the iArlividuals and organizations cooperating with the
Agency are -rrn--1-1..ineci as a necessary practical element oi this
procesa.
b. Security LavestigaUons. Security investigations are.con-
clucleed on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants,.
and on security problems which arise. These investigations in-
volve a wide range of investigative procedures, incll,ding neighbor-
hood inquiries, checks with other C-overnment agencies, review of
credit reports, and interviews -with former employers and business
2.33ociates. This is eseenti.al to assure that our personnel possess
a high degree of personnl.integrity, sense of responsibility, and
competence and to- protect classified information and sensitive in-
telligence sources and methods. The resn.li-irisr�files are held sep-
arately by the Office ol Security and are not merged with other
Agency Elea
c. Foreign Resources. On some occasions, foreign citizens
.of interest to CIA are contacted and recruited in America for work'
abroad.. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the
Agency's foreign opera.blons.
d. Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a -wide variety of
contacts wirnirt the United States, assisting individuals interested
in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its em-
ployee fovce.
e. Contract:Iraq,. La the course of CIA business and operations,
a number oi contracts for procurement, research, or analysis are
made with a variety of U.S. companies and individuals. This in. no
way constitutes operations in the U.S. but rather secures the assist-
ance of these groups in carrying but the CIA mission against foreign
targets.
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f. Operations. The 1967 Kat.zenbach Corrz_nlittee report was
approved by the Director in March 1967 and is binding; on any of
our relations with American organizations today. It. specifically
prohibits covert ficial assistance or support, direct or indirect,
to any U. S. educational or private voluntary organization. Any
relationship or operation the Agency has with an American organi-
zation must be and is witH-, these guidelines.
g. Details or Loans. On rare occasions, details of technically
qualified CIA personnel, teeny-geed advice, or loans of CIA equip-
ment have been made available to other U. S. agencies at their
request to assist them to carry out their responsibilities. An
example is the skynaarshal progrn-t, in which some CIA personnel
were temporarily detailed to the FAA itt order to assist in a rapid
initiation of that program. Such personnel and equipment are under
the operational control of the receiving agency. Assistance of this
nature in no way constitutes an assumption of responsibility or
authority by CIA for the program.
h. Courtterintelligence a3ad Drugs. To carry out its responsi-
bilities for cotmterizttelligmace, CI-A. is interested in the activities
of foreign nations or intelligence ser.vices aimed at the U.S. To
the extent that these activities lie outside the U.S., includin,g a.ctiv-
ities aimed at the U.S. utthung U,..S. citizens or others, they fall
within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the
activities within the U.S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security
function. CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign
intelligence aspect of the prob1.7--f, and any action of a law enforce-
ment or internal security nature lies with the iftlI or local police
forces. (CIA's assistance to the U.S. Government program. against
narcotics and drugs is handled in the s1e fashion.)
1. OperationadStappori. To support CIA operations, arrange-
ments are made with various U.S. business or other entities to
provide cover or other support for CIA personnel or activities
abroad. This can include proprietaries formed or controlled by
CIA. While these may es-cist within the U.S., their purpose is to.
conduct or support operations abroad.
j. Defectors. As provided by 3zw,11S.7..1?1, oc@a:S-icia4117.- resettles
in the U.S.. defectors and other foreign individuals of operational
interest. This resettlement may involve a new identity, relocation,
employment, etc. Although this activity takes place in this country,
its purpose is the support of operations abroad..
00447
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L.L",5IFIE� I I 'Approv.ed -fcir:
ikelese: 202-471272-0CC;
-SLIP
-
. OFFICIAL ROUTING
' To
NAME AND ADORESS
DATE
!NI TIIALS
1
I 1�.1:AG Co-Chairmen
2
3
'
4
5
6
�
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROYAL
DISPATCH
'
RECOMMENDATION
cOM)4ENT
FILE
RETURNURR
CONcENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
For MAG review and return. Please
do not reproduce.
-
FOLD HERE TO RP-rt
tRN 70 SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS A
F.
0/Executive Director/BEvans
7.D5,9 �1,-
5 May 7,.
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED 1 CONFIDENTIAL I
;C" Ma� 9q7 Us: previotit editions
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00448
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zxNDUM FOR
:
Dir�ector for intelligence
iuty Dirt- ctor Zo ---3Tan3
f.) !..s.ty Director ..-Zor '-zu-ocort
12:eput-y :Director for Science an
General Counsel
Inspecto-r. General
_A-::sistant to the Director
e Lozy
SUBJECT Allegation of Agency Involvement in the IL S.
�
1. The Manage-re.erzt Advisory Group, 2,_=on others, has
re.port2...(1 on the concerns of some err.7loyee.1 that the .Agency is vul-
nerable to the charge of having an operational interest in U.S. citizens
or organiz.aaons in violation of the National Security Act. Attach.ed
is rny best understanding of the facts. U it is in error or incomplete,
I ask that you let. =4... know orally or in writing..
2. .1 have drafted the attached with two purpoies in mind: First,
as a basis for some tyoe of issuance that would advise the command
line and senior supervisors of policy and fac:a and, second, as a c,-t-_-,-,-
Lssue of "F-n Aliegaiions and A.nswera. " I look forward to your
comment in the not-too-distant future before it is formally distr.ibuted.
W. :7. 'in',
W. E. Colby
eitiv Director-Comptroller
i r_Avarks:31
Distribution:
07 D DI
1 - Each other addressee
1-1-) -
1-IR
\N�teL-c-L yv--2zr
\�"� Cp,
'4.4 V"-(1-.)
(A�..
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1.4II � ALLCATIONS ANSW.r.EtS �
March 1972
LLTre".2},er TON:
In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is workino� within the.
- �
United States, with particular attention to ext:-..arr.ist groups. A recent
ex7.,..-nole was in the 1,:tuicksilver Times of 20 Sanua.ry- 1972. (attachecl)*.
FACTS:
1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, sutspara.gra.ph D3,
states, "The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement
powers, or internal security functions. "
In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 14 April
1971, the Director stated:
"I can asiure you that except for the normal responsibilities
for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, bur
facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such
powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise
any. In short, we do not target on American citizens."
In the Director's "State of the Agency" Speech to employees on 17 Sep-
tember 1971, he said:
"I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors
last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That
was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we've
all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And you
can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use that as
any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not in the drug
traffic, and that 1.vz...ore not trying to do espionage on American citi-
zens in the United States, and we're not tapping telephone lines,
and that we're not doing a lot of other things which we're accused
of doing.. One of the things that tends to perpetuate some of these
*COMME1�TT: The two gentlemen cited are. former CIA employees.
�'1'..ither they nor the organizations with which they are currently associated
have. any operational connection with the Agency.
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Lar .y
dol.--.1eslic espionage. ,.-%Ithough the jokes have no oasis in fact they
dcssgive us a name v.--r.ich we don't 'deserve. I con: say
makes all that much dii:ference, but it does make some
difference, and this tends to spill over, so I would like to suggest
that if you have it in your hearts to do so that you speak up when
the occasion arises and try and set the facts straight."
2. From time to time sorne ernoloyc.:es have been concerned that
Aczency activities might conflict with the National Security Act and the
Agen.cy'-s statements. They can be assured that Agency activities do not.
For cla.rification, some, activities which may have been su'oject to iris-
understanding are listed as follows:
a) Security Investigations. Security investigations are conducted
on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants, They in-
volve neighborhood checks on the background of these individuals.
This is essential to meet the security requirements of the Agency.
The resulting inforrn.a..tion is held in separate security office files
and not merge.d in other Agency files.
b) Domestic Contacts. On an overt basis the' Domestic Contact
Service makes visits to American private citizens, firms,, and other
organizations, soliciting transmission to the Government of informa-
tion they have learned abroad. The purpose and content of the infor-
mation are restricted to foreign intelligence, i.e., intelligence on
developments abroad. The records of the firms and individuals as
sources are maintained as a purely practical element of this collec-
tion process.
c) Foreign Resources. A variety of foreign citizens of interest
to CIA visit or on occasion reside in America. Occasionally they are
contacted and recruited for Work abroad in the course of travels to
their homeland or for continuing collaboration With the Agency in
their homeland after their return from the U.S. 'The .purpose of this
activity is entirely restricted to the collection of foreign intelligence.
d) Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a wide vi-:_rie.ty of con-
tacts within the United States endeavoring to assist individuals inter-
ested in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its
employee force.
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e) �Contr-.-ctip.-../.. In the course. of CIA busi7.1e33 and operatlor.s,
P. number of contracts for procurem.ant, e. search, or analysis are
with variety of U.S. con-.2a.n1e3 and inc2.-/idt.lalS. This in no
constitute.3 op,-..ratior.....3 in the U.S. but rather secures the assist-
ance of these srouPs in carrying out the CIA :mission Of for_igta Intel-
1) C.)Perati-ons. The 19:37 Katz.e.-.e.bac.-h Committee report was
.a;.-aoroved by tb.e. Director in 1+;1arch .9o7 ana is bin-ding on any of our
relations with American orgar.izations today. It specifically prohibits
coiert financial assista.nce or support, direct or indirect, to an7 U. S.
educational or private voluntary organization. Any relationship or
oper.ation t1-...e...Agencsr has with an Ame.rican organiza.tion must be and
is within these guidelines.
Details or Loans. On rare occasions, details of technically
qualified CIA personnel or loans of CIA equipment have been. made to
other U.S. agencies to assist in the carrying out of their r.t.,..sponsibili-
ties. An e.3-.e.,mple is the skymarsb.al progra.--: to which some CIA
personnel were cletaild in order to 2.3313t in a rapid initiatio-oi that .
program.. Assistance of this nature in no way conatitutes an assul.-np-
tion of responsibility or authority by CIA for the program
h) Counterintelligence. To carry out its resp-onsibilitie 3 for
counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the a.ctivities of foreign na-
tions or intelligence services aimed at the U. S. To the extent that
the activities lie outside the U.S., including activities aimed at the
U. S. utilizing U. S. citizens or others, it fails within CIA's respon-
sibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the
13,3. lies with the FBI, as it involves an internal security function.
CIAls responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign 4.,ntalli-
gence aspect of the problem and any action of a law en_forcern. ent or
in-tea-721 security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces.
i) Defectors. As provided by law, CIA occasionally resettles
in the U.S. defectors and other foreign individuals of operation-41
interest. This r. >33 ettle.ment may involve their assumption of a new
identity, location of -employment, etc. Although this activity takes
1ace in this country, its purpose is the support of operations abroad.
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j) Covsr. As a pa of CIA ori-Atio broa.d, arrangn�alt-.0:3
In d a with a r.v....-rabe.r of U.S. entitie3 to serve as the osten3;'01-
3-..x):130: ab:r.oaci.. Th3.3 cam i_nclude bunnes3 -arat1ti-3
c)U2d by CL;, or. ?roprietari:_t 3. ;Vilna tafe.y may Xt within
2:1-ie the.ir l)tarpo-3e tO CO rid U.Ct support c.11.-,er.ation3 abroad,
-90453
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6.4.� I
-Approved for Release: 2024/12/20 C01430429vm
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CIA Headquarters in Virga
�
� -.I
� They met there with-Helms, were police. Both personnel
shifts
(4 3/a id. 1 a
6�T1 e ' shown around, and taken to the secret .cited by agency people to bols
, ,
training clmps. That was the beginnin fronts in the US, thistime, o:ov
of rumors within the agency that the into was given a new title race
CIA had; been _given the go ahead to making him head of all intellif
(r--1 move into domestic police operatioas. 'and presumably providing himvi
While. everyone denied it, tha theory- !legitimate interest in inzerna!
was that the CI Was told to get the :operations...But such suggestic
� '-bittcrly denied all arduad.
' radicals.
� Two recent personnel changes
The. Central iittelligence Agen-
. increased speculation. One.involved
Cl' always insists its men aren't in-
resignatioa of Helm's special as 5�
.volved in domestic police work .But in.
tant, Fobert Kiley-. Kiley handled the
Chicago CIA agents have been working
student operations through National
with the FBI and.Tresury. men in an -
Student Association facades. He re- '
effort to pin the bank bombings on �
. � . cently turned t..? as associate director
ra.lical groups.
� �
of the Police Foundation, a new grou2
Heretofore,elandestine CIA police
launched with a :530 million Ford
work within the US was centered around
Foun,iation grant. The money is meant
counter espionage.efforts aimed at tne
� -- to be used to 1:cprove local police.
Soviet KCil.CIA maintains 'secret bases The second personnel shift 'Involved
In oll'majer US cities.The agency ?Is:,
Drexel Godfrey; wl-o G; head of the
haa traininl: camps in Virginia and CIA's Office cf Current Intelligence.
the Carelinas.These are masked as reg- Po quit this hirh joh, turn..1
ular military bases.Sponks are irk in the narcotics bureau of the
:rained fnr e.:1,:y a h IL COrr.I.: