DDCI STATEMENT ABOUT THE WATERGATE CASE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01430426
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: May 21, 1973

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EMPLOYET
BULLETIN
No. 359
DDCI STATEMENT ABOUT THE WATERGATE CASE
21 May 1973'
The following statement was made by Lieutenant General Vernon ',1a1ters
during a recent appearance before a Congressional Committee.
On 23 June 1972 1 was ordered by a phone message from my office
to be at the White House at about 1300 with Director Helms. I had
lunch with Mr. Helms and we went to Mr. Ehrlichman's office at the
White Pause. Pf?se,nt wPre t ur1icrr.
and myself. As I recall it, Mr. Haldeman said that the Watergate
incident was causing trouble and was being exploited by the opposi-
tion. It had been decided at the White House that I would go to
Acting FBI Director Gray and tell hip th,t r that t",flva
were arrested, furtner enquiries into the Mexican aspects of this
matter might jeopardize some of the CIA's covert activities in that
area. An appointment was made for me to see Mr. Gray at 1430 that
same day. I wcit over and told him that I ndo been directed by top
White House officials to tell him that furth2:-ir etintc th2
Mexican aspects of' the Watergate episode might jeopardize some of the
Agency's covert actions in that area. He said that he understood the
agretilent between the FBI and the Agency re9arding their sources but
that this 1-17 a c=plicatad case. n. OUId not violate a9recment
with CIA regarding sources. On my return to the Agency I checked to
see whether there was any danger in the Agency's covert sources if
the Mexican part of the investigation continued and ascertained that
no one believed that this was the case. No one had any knowledge of
the plan to bug the Democratic National Comittee.
On June 26 the Counsel to the President John Dean called me and
asked me to come and see him about the matter I had discussed with
Haldeman and Ehrlichman. He said I could check with Ehrlichman and
I did. He said I could talk to Dean so I went to Dean's office at
1145 on June 26.
I informed Dean that I had checked carefully to s,hthr'r
there was any jeopardy to the Agency's sources by a further investi-
gation of s�purc,?.s of thir -4 (-A t:=1
non.. a.31;r2.:1 et Cr tr:
Watergate episode without my knowing it. I said that this was not
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possible. I knew that the Agency had had no part In the operation
against the Democratic National Committee. I therefore could not
say that further investigation would jeopardize Agency sources. I
felt that someone had bungled badly and that the responsible parties
should be fired. He asked whether there was not some way in which
the Agency might have been involved. I said that I had checked with
Director Helms and was convinced it was not. Any attempt to stifle
this investigation would destroy the effectiveness of the Agency and
the,f4T, and wr be r."'''ZW': '".7F:?-172 '2 ttils '
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The following day I saw .Dean agf,Th in his office at-his request.
He again reviewed the Watergate Case saying that some witnesses were
getting Scared and were "wobbling". tbt r.o .ater how .scarad
they got, they could not involve CIA because it .was not involved in. �
the bugging of the .Wateroate. He than asked-ifthe CIA could not.
furnish bail and pay the suspects' salaries while they were in ,jail,
action furc:Is�-i'or this
I replied that this Was out of the question. ..It would implicate
the Agency in something in which it was not implicated. Any such
action by the Agency would 'imply an order from the highest level.. and �
I a party wicJ be
service to the President and the country and would destroy the CIA's
credltility with the Congress and tile people. i would resign rattler
than do this and, if to do it, T t'r;a�Prosij,.
to explain the reasons for my refusal. Furthermore, when the Agency
..'unds -In the U.S., e had. .s o c.no Oversight �
Committees of the Agency .in Congress. He was much taken aback .by this
and agreed that risks of im'.ilicat1n7 CIA .ard�F5',I in this matter �
would be enormous. I said that whet wc could.
become a mortal. one. What was now �."conventior.al_ explosion -could be
turned into a multi-megaton explosion". I again' advised him to fire
the responsible parties.
Again Dean sent for me on .the 2Eth of�Jur.e and 1 saw him � at his
office at 1130 that day:- he ha,j learned anything �
more about .CIA involvement. repl.ied t he,-2 was no 'involvement
of the Agency in the bugging of the .atrgate..- He then asked whether
I had any ideas and I said that had none which could be helpful. �
Perhaps the Cubans who were anti-Castro might have had a hand in it �
but the CIA did not.
0,1 July 5 1�received�a of thr?. FBt Gray
sayinc; that he could�n2,:. t.:,�ican �
aspects of this matter unless he hd..a� formal letter fronl the Director
rY5. nY' �
I
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I told him that I could not tell him that further investigation
would jeopardize the Agency's covert sources. I had checked on this
and it was not so. I had ascertained that General Cushman had initially
authorized the issuance of some equipment to Howard Hunt without knowing
its purpose other than it was, as I understood it, to shut off "leaks'.
This was long before the Watergate bugging. Since then I had carefully
checked and there was no other involvement of any sort by the CIA in the
operation against the Watergate,, I saidAkt I feltat t attempt
covr or -- c,
ars,
have
H.1
c, resig Lhis
iss I gave Gray a 0 it th. Agency hat'. 1-;!.!nt
and the account of our dealings with the former CIA employees up to the
termination of their employment with the Agency long before thPaterte
episode..
I saw Gray again on the 12th of July and gave him one additional
memorandum regarding the cont,:.ct f..!rri.sheri urt. 1!:1 thc
reiterating tho posi tic I said zilatI had tc..]c
Dean that the best solution would be to fire those responsible. Gray said
he had made the same recormendation. Once again we agreed that anything
that might damage the integrty of ',1@ FBI and CIA would be a grave dis-
service to the Frsident
In February 1973 shortly after Dr. Schlesinger becam? Director
told him of my conversations with Haldeman, Ehrlichmar and Dean. In
February Dean called Dr. Schlesinger to see if the Agency could get
Lac. from the FBI the mAtc=rial it ,:ento t'7,,
concerning our contact with Hunt-. Dr. Schlesinger and I agreed that
this could not be done. I attempted to contact Dean but he was in
Florida. On his return I saw Dean at his office on February 21 and
tat we could not as F.)r materia back. Inat woulo
serve to implicate the CIA and I could not and would not do it. I had
seen Acting FBI Director Gray that r.crning and told him of Dean's request
and our refusal. He agreed saying that he could not do such a thing.
Since that date I have had no further contact with Dean. Th above
represents my recollection of what occurred and the dates are checked in
my appointment book.
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