CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY: RECORD OF PARAMILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT OF CUBA 17 MARCH 1960 - MAY 1961

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01410807
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 90
• Document Creation Date: December 17, 2024
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2024
• Case Number: F-2018-01028
• Publication Date: May 5, 1961

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CS Historical Paper
No. 105
CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY
RECORD OF PARAMILITARY ACTION
AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT
OF CUBA
17 March 1960 - May 1901.
Controlled by:
Date prepared:
Written by :
�
WH Division
5 May 1961
Colonel J. Hawkins,
1.1SMC
H
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
SUMMARY
I. PURPOSE . . . ... � � � �......... 1
2. ORGANIZATION WITHIN C.I.A. FOR COVERT
ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT'
3. ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES AT HIGHER .
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT FOR DETERMINATION
OF POLICY GOVERNING THE PROJECT . . , .
4. EVOLUTION OF PARAMILITARY CONCEPTS . 5
5. RESULTS OF THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE PROGRAM:
September 1960 to April 1961 � � � � � 7
6, DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRIKE FORCE 9
7. PREPARATIONS FOR TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS: . Ii
8. SEA FORCES . . .... .. ... . 13
9. EFFORT OF PARAMILITARY STAFF TO OBTAIN
RESOLUTION OF MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS �
January 1961 . . . . . ..... . . 14
10. THE PREFERRED PLAN (TRINIDAD) . .... 16
11. POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN
REGARD TO THE TRINIDAD PLAN 19
12. REJECTION OF THE TRINIDAD PLAN 19
13. THE STUDY OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATE LANDING
AREAS 20
14. THE AIR FORCE DEFECTION PLAN 21
15. THE DIVERSION PLAN . . � .. . 22
16. THE FINAL OPERATIONAL CONCEPT SUBMITTED
TO THE PRESIDENT . . . � . . . . . 23
17. :SUCCESSIVE DELAYS OF D�DAY
24
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SET
18.
19.
20.
. TABLE OF CONTENTS cont'd)
PAGE
FORCES AVAILABLE FOR THE ZAPATA OPERATION .
MAJOR FEATURES OF THE ZAPATA PLAN . � . � �
EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION � � � � . . �
25
26
31
21.
AIR STRIKES ON D-2 (15 April 1961) . .
32
22.
THE DIVERSION OPERATION
32
23
THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE OPERATION AT
ZAPATA
33
24.
RESCUE OPERATIONS
40
25.
INTELLIGENCE FACTORS . . ..... � � � �
40
26.
POLICY RESTRICTIONS WHICH LIMITED THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS.
42
27.
CONCLUSIONS
45
28.
REFERENCE LIST
49
29.
ENCLOSURES (Five)
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE
This monograph is based upon and primarily consists
of a Memorandum for the Record, entitled "Paramilitary
Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba: Record of,"
May 5, 1961, prepared by Colonel J. Hawkins, U.S. Marine
Corps, who was detailed to the Agency, and as such,
served as Chief of the Paramilitary Staff Section of
Branch 4, Western Hemisphere Division. In this capacity,
he participated in the planning and execution of the
ZAPATA Operation, more commonly known as the Bay of Pigs
Operation.
Colonel Hawkins' paper records significant information
concerning preparation for and execution of paramilitary
operations against the Castro Government of Cuba and draws
conclusions based upon this experience, which as a back-
ground and reference document, he hoped, would serve a
useful purpose for the future.
Although not written at the request of the CS Historical
Board, this paper meets the basic requirements of a histor-
ical paper and has been included in the Catalog of CS
Histories, as a segment of the WH Division history.
Kenneth . Addicott
Executive Secretary
CS Historical Board
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SUMMARY
Colonel J. Hawkins, U.S. Marine Corps, has furnished in
his Memorandum for the Record an account of the preparation -
.for, the planning and execution of the paramilitary Opera-
tions against the Castro Government of Cuba in 1961. The
period covered is the latter part of the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration and the first six months of President Kennedy's term.
Basically, the theme is the paramilitary story and is intended
to cover only these facets of the operation. It documents
�the events leading up to, during and following the Bay of
Pigs Operation of April 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1961.
In recounting the facts, policies are reviewed on which
the Task Force Headquarters, organized within the Western
Hemisphere Division of the Clandestine Services of.CIA., based
its plan for action. The Task Force contained staff sections
for planning and supervision of activities in the intelligence,
counterintelligence, propaganda, political, logistical, and
paramilitary fields. The need for liaison with the Department
of State and the Department of Defense was apparent from the
beginning. It had been determined early in the Eisenhower
Administration that the highest levels of government would
determine policy governing the Cuba project; thus, constant
liaison should have been mandatory. CIA was represented on
the Special Group (5412), which reported to the President,
[i]
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and it was to this Group that CIA presented operational
matters for policy resolution.
No machinery existed for coordinating the project
related work of governmental departments and agencieS other
than .through the Special Group, during most of the life of
the project. There was never a formal Task Force arrange-
ment.which included representation of all departments and
agencies which were or should have been concerned, such as
the CIA, Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S.
Information Agency, and the Department'of Commerce. ,Instead,
the project was the endeavor of CIA in liaison with other
departments.
Intelligence information and estimates had indicated
substantial resistance within Cuba to the Castro regime,
Agents had reported the development of a widespread under-
ground Organization extending from Havana into all the
Provinces. Obviously, if the efforts of these disaffected
Cuban leaders, with their followers and other sympathetic
individuals in the country had been successful, the'effort
would have been unnecessary. Realizing that it was not
effective, and to circumvent Castro's plan to crush the
guerrilla movement, action was begun in November 1960 to
organize a strike force, the paramilitary part of which, for
tactical reasons was divided into air and sea force operations.
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This strike force would now begin'to recruit, organize,
equip and train a larger ground force than the contingency
force which was originally contemplated. The bulk of the
attached paper describes in a wealth of detail the training
camps (based in the U.S. and in friendly third countries) and
support programs necessary for the ultimate implementation'
of the operation.
In a considered evaluation of the operation and in his
Capacity as Chief of the Paramilitary Staff of Cuba Project,
Colonel Hawkins sets forth aseries of conclusions, and
presents realistic recommendations for future planning based
upon his experiences which were often frustrating. He points'
out in a disenchanted fashion, more in sorrow than in anger,
that experience indicates that political restrictions upon
military measures may result in destroying the effectiveness
of such efforts. The end result is political embarrassment
coupled with military failure and loss of prestige in the
world. If political considerations are such as to prohibit
Ado.>
the application of those military steps required to achieve
the objective, then such military operations should not be
undertaken.
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5 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government
of Cuba; Record of
1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this memorandum is to
record significant information concerning preparation for
and execution of paramilitary operations against the Castro
Government of Cuba, and to draw conclusions based upon this
experience which, it is hoped, may be useful for the future.
2. ORGANIZATION WITHIN C.I.A. FOR COVERT ACTION AGAINST
THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT.
a. For purposes of this action, a task force head-
quarters was organized within the Western Hemisphere Division
� of the Clandestine Services of the Central Intelligence Agency.
This task force contained staff sections Aer planning and
/supervision of activities
(
L ,
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supervision of activities in the intelligence, counter-intelligence,
propaganda, political, logistical and paramilitary fields. The
undersigned served as Chief of the Paramilitary Staff Section.
The line of command within C.I.A. Headquarters for control of
the CUban operation was from the Director of Central Intelligence,
Mr. Allen Dulles, to the Deputy Director (Plans), Mr. Richard M.
Bissell, to the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Mk. J. C.
King, to the Chief of the Task Force, Mr. Jacob D. Esterline.
b. The Task Force Headquarters did not include an
integral air staff section, although air activity was a con-
tinuing and essential requirement throughout the operation.
The Air Staff, with its headquarters in a separate building
remote from Task Force Headquarters, was responsible directly
to the Deputy Director (Plans), although in October, 1960,
the Chief of the Air Section, in addition to his other duties,
was placed under the direction of the Task Force Chief for
matters concerning the project.
c. Major field activities as finally established
included:
(1) A forward operating base at Miami, Florida,
with a satellite communications center for relay of communica-
tions between Headquarters and the field and facilities in the
Florida Keys for launching boat operations to Cuba. Recruiting
was handled by the Miami Base.
(2) A base at the former Opa Locka Naval Air
Station, which was used for storage of arms and munitions
and for originating "black" passenger flights to Guatemala
with Cuban recruits.
(3) An infantry training base and an air base
in Southwestern Guatemala.
Nicaragua.
logistical
Depot, New
(4) An air and staging base at Puerto Cabezas,
(5) Air facilities at Eglin Air Force Base for
flights to Guatemala and Nicaragua.
(6) A training base at Belle Chase Naval Ammunition
Orleans (used briefly in March and April, 1961).
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(7) A small maritime training base at Vieques,
Puerto Rico.
d. The Chief of the Task Force did not exercise
command over field activities, and had authority to release
cables concerning operational matters to the Forward Operating
Base in Miami only. Cables and other directives to the field
were normally released at the level of Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division, while some directives dealing with major policy
questions were released at the still higher level of the Deputy
Director (Plans). The Chief of the Air Section was authorized
to release air operational cables to any field activity, and
in that sense had greater authority than the Task Force Chief,
himself.
e. An additional echelon of command and control was
interposed betweeriiieadvities in foreign
countries in that in each country (W(1)
the responsibility(b)(3)
for all C.I.A. activity within that country, including in
particular, the responsibility for liaison with the host
government. Communications personnel and facilities were
provided by the C.I.A. Office of Communications, under the
Deputy Director (Support), one of the three major subdivisions
of C.I.A. Headquarters. The Deputy Director (Support) also
provided logistical support for the oper4Ition.
f. �The Paramilitary Staff Section of the Task Force
included subdivisions for intelligence, logistics, maritime
operations, internal resistance operations and military
operations. The table of organization prolAdcd a staff of
37 officers, but the average strength was about 24 of whom
6 were military. The undersigned, as chief of this staff
section, had no command authority nor authority to release
cables or other directives to the field.
3. ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES AT HIGHER LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT FOR DETERMINATION OF POLICY GOVERNING THE PROJECT.
a. The Special Group (5412).
(1) During the administration of President
Eisenhower, this Group normally met once a week to consider
matters concerning covert activity in various parts of the
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world, including Cuba. Principal members of this Group were the
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
Mr. Gray;, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,. Mr. Douglas; the
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Dulles; and, the Under Secte,
tary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Merchant. The Department
of Defense was represented for a time during the life of the Cuban
project by the Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs, Mr. Erwin. 'Other representatives of Departments and
Agencies concerned met from time to time with the Group. Mt. Thomas
Mann, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs,
attended on occasion when Cuba was to be discussed.
(2) It was to this Group that policy matters con-
cerning Cuban operations were submitted by the C.I.A. for resolu-
tion during the previous administration.
(3) In regard to the Cuban project, the Special
Group proved to be a slow and indecisive vehicle for determination
of policy. It did not have authority itself to make important
policy decisions, nor did it have a formalized procedure for
reaching an agreed Group position on any given question. Disagree-
ment by one member of the Group could prevent approval of a pro-
posed action. Proceedings were verbal, and no master record of
minutes was kept. Instead, each Department or Agency kept its own
minutes as desired, and sometimes there were misunderstandings
later as to just what had been said or agreed upon at previous
meetings. No written, signed policy directives were ever forth-
coming after Group meetings for guidance of the Cuban project
within C.I.A. In fact, throughout the life of the project there
were no written policy directives approved at the national level
to guide the project other than the original policy paper approved
by the President on 17 March 1960, whichAvas general in content.
b. Liaison with Department of Defense. The point of
contact for C.I.A. within the Department of Defense for Cuban
matters was the Office of Special Operations until 4 January 1961.
At that time, a special committee headed by Brigadier General '
D. W. Gray, U. S. Army, was established within the Joint Staff
for purpose of liaison with C.I.A. in regard to the Cuba project.
c. Coordination of Governmental Departments and
Agencies. No machinery existed for this purpose, other than
the Special Group, during most of the life of the project,
although for a time during the previous administration
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Ambassador Willauer was appointed by the President to serve as
a coordinator of the Department of State and the C.I.A. There
WAS never a formal task force arrangement including representa-
tion of all Departments and Agencies which were or should have
been concerned, such as the C.I.A., Department of State,.Depart-
ment of Defense, U. S. Information Agency, and the Department of
Commerce. Instead, the project was 4 more or less exclusive
endeavor of C.I.A., in liaison with other Departments.
d. Policy Determination During the Present Administration.
During the present Administration, policy 'questions concerning
the Cuba project were considered directly by the President himself
in meetings which normally included, among others, the Secretary ,
of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.
4, EVOLUTION OF PARAMILITARY CONCEPTS.
. a. The only approved, written policy governing
paramilitary action against Cuba is contained in paragraph 2d
of the Policy Paper approved by the President on 17 March 1960.
This paragraph is quoted as follows:
"d. Preparations have already been made for the
development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba,
together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of
covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre
of leaders will be 'recruited after careful screening and trained
as paramilitary instructors. In a second,phase a number of
paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside
of the U. S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into
Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited
there both before and after the establishment of one or more
active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability
will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to
eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply
and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under
C.I.A. control and can be rather easily expanded if and when
the situation required. Within two months it is hoped to
parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep
cover as a commercial operation in another country."
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b. Early concepts for paramilitary action to implement
this approved policy involved:
(1) The recruitment, organization and training of
a number of CUban paramilitary �agent teams These teams were
to include radio operators and personnel for the development
and direction of intelligence, sabotage, propaganda, political.
and guerrilla activity within the target country.
(2) The introduction of these agent teams into
the target country by clandestine or legal means.
(3) The development within the target country,'
through the medium of agents, of a large scale resistance
movement, including sabotage, propaganda, political, and
guerrilla activity.
(4) The organization and training of a Cuban air
transport unit for use in supply overflights and other air
operations.
(5) The supply of military arms and equipment
to guerrilla and other resistance organizations by air drop
or maritime delivery.
(6) The organization and training of a Cuban
tactical air force equipped with B-26 light bombers.
c. Action was undertaken immediately to implement all
of the above plans. Consideration was als2.�given to the
possibility of forming a small infantry force (200 to 300 men)
for contingency employment in conjunction with other paramilitary
operations.
d. During the period June through October, 1960, as
the Soviet Bloc poured over 40,000 tons of military equipment
into Cuba and Castro organized and equipped large forces of
militia and established an effective Communist-style security
system, the paramilitary staff studied the possibility of
organizing an assault force of greater strength than the small
contingency force previously planned. It was contemplated that
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this force would be landed in Cuba after effective resistance
activity, including active guerrilla forces, had been developed.
It should be noted that the guerrilla forces were operating
successfully in the Escambray Mountains during this period. It
was visualized that the landing of the assault force, after
widespread resistance activity had been created, would,
precipitate general uprisings and widespread defection among
Castro's armed forces which could contribute materially to his
overthrow.
e. The concept for employment of the force in an
amphibious/airborne assault was discussed at meetings, of the
Special Group during November and December. The Group took
no definite position on ultimate employment of such a force
but did not oppose its continued development for possible
employment. President Eisenhower was briefed on the concept
in late November by C.I.A. representatives. The President
indicated that he desired vigorous continuation of all activities
then in progress by all Departments concerned.
5. RESULTS OF THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE PROGRAMt SEPTIMER
1960 to APRIL 1961.
a. Introduction of Paramilitary Agents. Seventy
trained paramilitary, agents, including nineteen radio operators,
were introduced into the target country. Seventeen radio
operators succeeded in establishing communication circuits with
C.I.A. Headquarters, although a number were later captured or
lost their equipment.
b. Air Supply Operations. Thesewoperations were not
successful. Of 27 missions attempted only 4 achieved desired
results. The Cuban pilots demonstrated early that they did
not have the required capabilities for this kind of operation.
A request for authority to use American contract pilots for
these missions was denied by the Special Group, although
authority to hire pilots for possible eventual use was granted.
c. �Sea Supply Operations. These operations achieved
considerable success. Boats plying between Miami and Cuba
delivered over 40 tons of military arms, explosives and equip-
ment, and infiltrated/exfiltrated a large number of personnel.
Some of the arms delivered were used for partially equipping
a 400 man guerrilla force which operated for a considerable
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time in the Escambray Mountains of Las Villas Province. Much
of the sabotage activity conducted in Havana and elsewhere was
performed with materials supplied in this manner.
d. Development of Guerrilla Activity. Agents introduced
into Cuba succeeded in developing a widespread underground
organization extending from Havana into all of the Provinces.
However, there was no truly effective guerrilla activity
anywhere in Cuba except in the Escambray Mountains, where an
estimated 600 to 1,000 ill-equipped guerrilla troops, organized
in bands of from 50 to 200, operated successfully for over six
months. C.I.A. never succeeded in establishing a direct radio
link with any of these forces, although some communications
with them were accomplished by radio to Havana and thence by
courier. A C.I.A. trained coordinator for action in the
Escambray entered Cuba clandestinely and succeeded in reaching
the guerrilla area, but he was promptly captured and executed.
Other small guerrilla units operated at times in Provinces of
Pinar del Rio and Oriente, but they achieved no significant
results. Agents reported large numbers of unarmed men in all
provinces who were willing to participate in guerrilla activity
if armed. The failure to make large-scale delivery of arms to
these groups by aerial supply was a critical failure in the
overall operation.
e. Sabotage.
(1) Sabotage activity during the period October
1960 to 15 April 1961 included the following:
(a) Approximately 300,000 tons of sugar cane
destroyed in 800 separate fires.
(b) Approximately 150 other fires, including
the burning of 42 tobacco warehouses, 2 paper plants, 1 sugar
refinery, 2 dairies, 4 stores, 21 Communist homes.
(c) Approximately 110 bombings, including
Communist Party offices, Havana power station, 2 stores,
railroad terminal, bus terminal militia barracks, railroad
train.
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(d)- Approximately 200 nuisance bOmbs inl
Havana Province.
(e) Derailment of 6 trains, destruction of
a microwave cable and station, and destruction of numerous '
power transformers.
, (f). A commando-type raid launched from the
sea against Santiago which put the refinery out of action for
� about one week.
(2) These sabotage activities had considerable
psychological value but accomplished no significant results
otherwise.
f. Communist-Style Security Measures. As time went
on, the police-state security measures imposed by Castro became
increasingly effective, and agents and other resistance elements
were hard pressed to survive. Many were captured, including
three of the most important leaders under C.I.A. control. By
stationing large numbers of militia and police throughout the
country, by imposing curfews, by utilizing block wardens and
security check points, and by seizing control of real estate
in the cities through the Urban Reform Law, Castro was able to
restrict the movements and activities of resistance elements
to a crippling extent.
6. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRIKE FORCE.
a. Action was begun on 4 November 1960, to recruit,
organize, equip, and train a larger gratin force than the small
200 to 300 man contingency force originally contemplated. It
was planned at that time that this force would reach a strength
of about 1,500 men. As this "Strike Force", as it came to be
known, was developed over the ensuing months, many difficulties
were encountered as a result of slowness in recruiting, political
bickering among Cuban exile groups, lack of adequate training
facilities and personnel, uncertainties with regard to whether
Guatemala could continue to be used as a base, and lack of
approved national policy on such questions as to what size
force was desired, where and how it was to be trained, and
whether such a force was actually ever to be employed. Some
of the major problems encountered are described briefly below.
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b. Base for Training.
(1) The base available in Guatemala consisted
of a small shelf of land on the side of a volcano barely large
enough for comfortable accommodation of 200 men. Camp
facilities were non-existent until the Cubans themselves, under
American direction, threw up a few rude wooden buildings. As
the population of the camp increased, living conditions became
intolerably crowded, posing a serious morale problem among the
troops and threatening the health of all. The only approach to
the camp was over a narrow dirt road which wound its way up the
mountainsides. In the dry season, the trip to the camp from
the air base at Retalhuleu required about two hours by truck.
In the rainy season, the road washed out frequently and became
impassable to wheeled vehicles, while the camp itself was
literally engulfed in the clouds. In the autumn of 1960,
supplies had to be hauled up the mountain with tractors.
There were no areas for infantry maneuver, but weapons could
be fired at the camp site. Mortars were set up in the company
street and fired over the buildings of the camp into impact
areas on adjacent ridges.
(2) It appeared for a time in late 1960 that
even this inadequate base would be lost, as the Department of
State advanced the opinion that the presence of these activities
in Guatemala would undermine the government of President Ydigoras
and perhaps cause his overthrow. While the State Department
urged withdrawal from Guatemala, it offered no alternative as
to where the troops could be relocated. The possibility of
using remote, unoccupied military facilities in the United
States were raised, but this idea was opposed by the Department
of State and was not approved by the Speetal Group. For a
while, consideration was given to moving the troops to the
C.I.A. base at Saipan, but this idea was abandoned on the
valid grounds that the project would be delayed and logistical
problems magnified. It was finally decided to remain in
Guatemala, since this appeared to be the only possible solution.
c. Instructor Personnel. The only qualified instructor
personnel available for training at the infantry training base
consisted of four CIA civilian employees until November, 1960,
when two Army officers and one non-commissioned officer from
the Project Paramilitary Staff at Headquarters were sent to
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Guatemala as a stop-gap measure pending assignment of Army
Special Forces training teams. These teams had been requested.
by the Paramilitary Staff on 28 October 1960, but there were
long delays while policy governing this question was established,
and it was 12 January.1961 before the 38 Special Forces personnel
reached Guatemala. It would have been impossible for C.I.A. to
train the Strike Force without the assistance of these Army
personnel.
d. Logistical Support for Training. Most of the
materials used for support of the infantry training base,
including weapons, equipment and training ammunition, had to
be lifted to Guatemala by air. This was a great logistical
problem, considering the number of aircraft available and
distances involved. Shortages of equipment and ammunition
sometimes hampered training.
e. Recruiting.
(1) Recruiting in Miami was very slow until the
end of 1960, as a result primarily of political maneuvering
among the members of the Frente Revolucionario Democratic�
(FRD), the political front for the project. Each member of
the FRD desired to accept only recruits loyal to his own
political group, and all members of the FRD objected to
recruitment of any former Cuban soldier who had served
during the regime of Batista. Thus, personnel with previous
military experience were for the most part denied to our
use. All recruiting stopped for about four weeks during the
confusion of an abortive revolution in Guatemala in November.
There was continuing uncertainty as to oitether sufficient
recruits could ever be obtained to form a Strike Force of
even minimal size until early January 1961, when 500 men
had been obtained and recruits began arriving at a more rapid
rate 4s a result of action taken to break the Cuban exile
political barriers, which were delaying recruitment.
7. PREPARATIONS FOR TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS.
a. Selection of Aircraft. The decision was reached
to use the B-26 light bomber prior to the time when the under-
signed joined the project on 1 September 1960. Aircraft of
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this type had been distributed to various foreign countries,
including some in Latin America, and would, therefore, satisfy
the requirement for non-attributability insofar, as the United
States was concerned. The Navy AD-6 was considered for a time
as being superior to the B-26 for project purposes but these
aircraft had not been placed in the hands of Latin American
governments and, therefore, could not meet the non-attributability
requirement.
b. Tactical Air Base Problem.
(1) The air base constructed by C.I.A. at
Retalhuleu, Guatemala, was at too great a distance from Cuba
(750 miles from the central part of the Island) to serve for
tactical air operations employing B-26 aircraft. The possibility
of using a tactical air base in Mexico or in the Bahamas was
explored with negative results. For a time, the President of
Mexico indicated a willingness to permit use of the air field
at Cozumel for limited staging operations over a 48 hour period.
This was, of course, unsatisfactory for project purposes. The
British were understandably reluctant to permit use of their
territory for origination of tactical air strikes in connection
with a United States-supported venture when the United States
itself was unwilling to make similar use of its own territory.
(2) In October 1960, a C.I.A. delegation consulted
with President Somoza of Nicaragua, who agreed to assist the
project in any feasible way providing he received assurance
from proper governmental authority that he would be supported
politically by the United States if the vestion of Nicaraguan
participation should ever be brought up Eir consideration by
the Organization of American States or the United Nations.
Such assurance was never given to the knowledge of the under-
signed, but President Somoza nevertheless permitted development
and use of Puerto Cabezas as an air and staging base.
(3) The use of facilities in Nicaragua was not
looked upon with favor by the Department of State for political
reasons, and for some months there was doubt as to whether the
base would actually be used. Preparations at the base continued,
however, and it was ready for use when the strike operations
were launched in April 1961.
10JLUM.
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(4) The air base at Puerto Cabezas was within
500 miles of central Cuba, within marginal striking range for
the B-26 aircraft.
c. Tactical Pilots. By the end of December 1960,
ten B-26 aircraft were available to the project. This number
was later increased to fifteen on recommendation of the
Paramilitary Staff. Five Cuban B-26 pilots were considered
proficient by this time, and six others were in training but,
had not reached a state of acceptable proficiency. The
undersigned expressed reservations in writing in January 1961,
concerning the ability and motivation of the Cuban tactical
pilots to accomplish what would be required and recommended
use of American contract pilots in addition to the Cubans.
This recommendation was considered by the Special Group,
which authorized the hiring of American pilots but reserved
the question of their actual employment for later decision.
d. Air Crew Training. Adequate U. S. Air Force
personnel were available early in the life of the project for
training Cuban B-26 as well as transport pilots. About 150
Air Force personnel were involved in the project, performing
such duties as training, maintenance, air base management,
logistical ferry work, etc.
8. SEA FORCES.
a. The acquisition of ships and craft for execution
of the amphibious operation proved to be one of the most
difficult problems encountered. How this problem was solved
is described briefly in following paragrtphs.
b. Landing...Craft. Four LCVP and three LCU, recon-
ditioned by the Navy, and C.I.A. ("1)
personnel were trained at Little Creek, Virginia, in their (13)(3)
use. The Navy moved these craft to Vieques, Puerto Rico,
where the C.I.A. operators trained Cuban crews. Utilizing
a landing ship dock, the Navy was to deliver the landing craft,
pre-loaded with vehicles and supplies to the objective area for
the amphibious operation.
c. Transports. For acquisition of transports for
troops and supplies, two possible courses of action were
considered:
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(1) To purchase ships outright and recruit
Cuban crews for them, or
(2) To charter ships.
d. As an initial experiment with the first course,
two LCI's were bought and refitted through a ship broker in
Miami, and mixed crews, including American contract masters
and key officers along with Cuban crewmen, were placed on
board. The use of American personnel in this capacity
required approval of the Special Group. As a result of
the inordinate delays and difficulties experienced in
readying these two ships for sea, the idea of acquiring more
ships in this manner was abandoned.
e. The way was opened to pursue the second course
through contact by a member of the Paramilitary Staff with
Mr. Eduardo Garcia, a Cuban national who, with his father
and brother, owned a shipping company incorporated in Panama.
Mr. Garcia agreed to charter any or all of the six ships owned
by his company for project purposes. Five Garcia ships were
eventually chartered for the operation, including two 1,500
ton motor vessels and three 2,000 ton steamships. The civilian
crews of these merchant ships were for the most part Cuban or
Spanish. Mr. Garcia made adjustments of all crews, dismissing
members who did not wish to participate in the operation or
were suspected of being Castro sympathizers and replacing these
with Cubans recruited in Miami. Prior to execution of the
operation, each of these ships was furnished with six 19 foot
aluminum boats with outboard motors for use as auxiliary
landing craft.
f. Later, two additional ships were chartered
United Fruit Company for follow-up delivery of
and equipment after the assault phase.
EFFORT OF PARAMILITARY STAFF TO OBTAIN RESOLUTION
OF MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS - JANUARY 1961.
from the
supplies
9.
a. By the end of 1960, the development of land, sell
and, air forces for the amphibious/airborne assault had preceeded
to an extent which permitted firm planning for conduct of the
operation. The Paramilitary Staff by this time had developed
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a concept in some detail for employment of the force, although
the invasion area had not been finally decided upon. Several
major questions of national policy having important bearing
upon the operation were as yet unresolved, however. These
were
(1) Whether the national government would permit
execution of the strike operation.
(2) Whether the national government, if .agreeable
to the conduct of the operation, would permit its execution
not later than 1 March 1961, which was the latest date con-
sidered desirable by the Paramilitary Staff.
(3) Whether adequate tactical operations would
be permitted in conjunction with the amphibious/airborne assault.
(4) Whether American contract pilots could be
used for tactical and logistical air operations over Cuba.
.(5) Whether the base at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua-,
could be used for tactical air operations and staging.
.(6) Whether an air base in the United States could
be used for logistical flights to Cuba
b. In an effort to cause resolution of these questions,
the undersigned, on 4 January 1961, forwarded to superior
authority within C.I.A. a memorandum which outlined the current
status of preparations for amphibious/airborne and tactical air
operations against Cuba and set forth t1 requirement for' policy
decisions on all of the questions listed above. Enclosure (1)
is a copy of this memorandum. It should be noted in particular
that the undersigned, in this memorandum, recommended:
(1) That the air preparation commence not later
than D minus I Day.
(2) That any move to curtail the number of aircraft
to be employed from those available be firmly resisted.
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(3) That the operation be abandoned if policy
does not provide for use of adequate air support.
c. None of these policy questions, in the end, was
resolved in the manner recommended by the undersigned, except
in regard to use of the base at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.
10. THE PREFERRED PLAN (TRINIDAD).
a. Reasons for Selection of Trinidad as the
Preferred Landing Area:
(1) Extensive study for four months of the
entire littoral of Cuba, including the Isle of Pines, led
the Paramilitary. Staff to select the Trinidad area of Las
Villas Province as by far the best area for purposes of the
amphibious/airborne landing. This area offered the following
advantages:
(a) Good landing beaches with suitable
routes of egress from the beach.
(b) An excellent drop zone for parachute
troops near a terrain feature which dominated the town of
Trinidad.
(c) Good defensive terrain dominating all
approaches into the area:
(d) Excellent possibilities of isolating
the objective area from approach by vehitalar traffic. Mountain
barriers protected the area from the north and west. The east
flank was protected by an unfordable river with only two access
bridges, one highway and one railroad, which could be destroyed
by air or parachute demolition teams. The only other approach
was along a coastal road from the west which crossed several
bridges. Destruction of three key bridges could prevent the
movement of truck convoys, tanks and artillery into the area.
(e) The area contained a hard surfaced
3,500 foot air strip usable by C-46 aircraft (but not by
B-26 light bombers) and a port facility at Casilda.
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(0 The town of Trinidad contained a
population of 18,000, offering the possibility of immediate
expansion of the landing force by volunteers. The people of
Trinidad and of the entire area of Las Villas were known to
be sympathetic to the anti-Castro guerrilla activity which
persisted in the Escambray Mountains for many months.
(g) The objective area was immediately
adjacent to the Escambray Mountains, the best guerrilla
country in Cuba except for certain mountainous areas in
Oriente Province of Eastern Cuba. If unable to hold a
beachhead, the landing force would be able to retire to
the mountains for guerrilla activity. In these mountains
tanks and artillery could not be used against them.
(h) Cooperation could be expected from
guerrilla forces, estimated at 600 to 1,000 men, which were
then operating successfully in the Escambray Mountains.
(i) Expansion of activity in the mountains
of Central Cuba offered the possibility of severing the island
in the center.
(2) Members of the Joint Staff, of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in an independent study of Cuba arrived at
the same conclusion reached by the Project Paramilitary Staff
-- that the Trinidad area was the best possible site for
landing of a Cuban insurgent force.
b. Concept of the Trinidad Operation. The concept
of the operation as developed by thetaramilitary Staff during
January 1961, is contained in Enclosure (2).
c. Evaluation of the Plan and of the Force by. the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(1) A team of officers of the Joint Staff
headed by Brigadier General D. W. Gray, U. S. Army, evaluated
the complete operation plan for Trinidad during the period
31 January to 6 February 1961. This evaluation resulted in
a favorable assessment of this plan by the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff. Reference (a) is a report by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on their evaluation of the plan.
(2) The report mentioned above recommended
evaluation of the invasion force by a team of officers
representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was done at
the training base in Guatemala in late February and resulted
in a favorable evaluation of the force's combat capabilities.
Reference (b) is the Joint Chiefs of Staff report of this
evaluation.
d. Major Features of the Plan:
(1) Plan for Landing. The landing plan provided
for simultaneous landing at first light on D-Day of two
reinforced rifle companies of approximately 200 men each over
two beaches southwest of Trinidad and the parachute landing
of a company of equal strength immediately north of Trinidad.
The remainder of the force was to land over one of the two
beaches in successive trips of landing craft.
(2) Naval Gunfire. Two LC1 each mounting eleven
50 caliber machine guns and two 75mm recoilless rifles were to
provide naval gunfire support at the beaches.
(3) Tactical Air Operations. The plan provided
for a maximum effort surprise strike (15 B-26) at dawn of D-1
on all Cuban military airfields followed by repeated strikes
at dusk of the same day and at first light of D-Day against
any airfields where offensive aircraft were yet operational.
Immediate post strike photography was provided for in the
plan. Tank, artillery, and truck concentrations known to
be at Managua were also to be attacked on D-1 as were the
Havana power plants, in order to deprive the capital of
power and interrupt communications. Naval craft in or near
the objective area were also to be attacked. On D-Day, a
beach strafe and a bombing, strafing attack on the parachute
drop zone were also planned as well as attacks on three key
bridges. Armed reconnaissance and all approach roads through-
out D-Day and thereafter was also to be provided. The first
and primary objective of planned air action was to eliminate
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completely all opposing tactical aircraft.
(4) Scheme of Maneuver. The landing force was
to seize and defend terrain features east, north and west of
Trinidad dominating all approaches to the area. If unable to
hold the beachhead, the force was to withdraw to the northwest
into the Escambray Mountains to continue operations as a
powerful guerrilla force supplied by air.
11. POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN REGARD TO TOF,
TRINIDAD PLAN.
a. The Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary
of State for Latin American Affairs consistently opposed the
Trinidad Plan on the grounds that the operation would have the
appearance of a U. S. World War II invasion and would be too
obviously attributable to the United States. These officials
expressed the opinion that execution of the Trinidad Plan would
cause reactions adverse to the United States in Latin American
and in the United Nations, and would possibly cause counter-
moves by the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Laos, Berlin or elsewhere.
Mr. Rusk on one occasion stated that the possibility of air
attack by Castro forces against the United States could not
be discounted.
b. Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Mann
objected in particular to the conduct of any tactical air
operations. Mr. Mann took the position that there could be
no tactical air operations unless the tactical aircraft were
actually based on Cuban soil. He proposei,on one occasion
that a landing be made in Oriente Province witnout air support
and that an airfield be built by the landing force to receive
tactical aircraft, whereupon air operations could codimence.
12. REJECTION OF THE TRINIDAD PLAN. After careful
consideration of the Trinidad Plan, the President decided on
or about 11 March 1961 that it should not be executed, and
directed that possible alternative methods of employing the
Cuban forces be studied. It was the understanding of the
C.I.A. officials concerned that any alternate plan produced
should have the following characteristics:
a. The landing should be made in a more quiet
manner, preferably at night, and should not give the appearance
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of a WOrld War II type amphibious assault. It was desired that
the operation insofar as possible appear as an uprising from
within Cuba rather than an invasion.
b. It would be necessary to seize an airfield capable
of supporting B-26 operations, to which any tactical air operations
conducted could be attributed. No tactical air operation's were to
be conducted until such a field had been seized.
13. THE STUDY OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATE LANDING AREAS.
a. During the period 13 to 15 March 1961, the Paramilitary
Staff, pursuant to verbal instructions from the Deputy Director
(Plans), conducted an intensive study of possible alternate areas
in which a landing could be made in such a way as to satisfy the
limiting requirements mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The
entire littoral of Cuba was again examined in the search for an
airstrip capable of supporting B-26 operations, which could be
seized and defended by the Cuban assault force. In particular,
the Provinces of Oriente, Pinar del Rio, Las Villas and Matanzas
were examined, and the Isle of Pines was re-studied. Asa result
of this study, the Paramilitary Staff concluded that the only
airstrips in all Cuba capable of supporting B-26 operations Ohich
the Cuban force could have any hope of seizing and holding were
the Soplillar field and a new field at Playa Giron) both in the
eastern half of the Zapata Peninsula of Central Cuba.
b. In accordance with the instructions of the Deputy
Director (Plans), three concepts for possible operations were
drawn up. These concepts, which in the short time available
for preparation (about three days) could be developed only to
the extent of sketching a tentative scheme of maneuver on an
operations map and preparing brief notes, were based on the
following areas:
(1) The Preston area on the north coast of
Oriente Province.
(2) The south coast of Las Villas between Trinidad
and Cienfuegos.
(3)
The Eastern Zapata area near Cochinos Bay.
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c. It was recognized by the Paramilitary Staff that
the first two concepts mentioned above did not satisfy the
requirements for a B-26 airfield, and therefore could not have
been executed within established policy parameters unless
attempted entirely without air support. The Paramilitary
Staff advised higher authority within C.I.A. at this time, as
it had consistently done in the past, that no amphibious operation
could be conducted without control of the air and adequate
tactical air support.
d. These three concepts were evaluated by General
Gray's group from the Joint Staff. Their assessment, as
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was that of the three
alternatives evaluated, the Zapata concept was best, but
that none of the three alternatives was as militarily feasible
or likely to accomplish the objective as the Trinidad plan.
Reference (c) is the report of this evaluation by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
e. The Paramilitary Staff recommended the Zapata
Plan to the Deputy Director (Plans) as being the best of the
three alternatives, and the only one of these which offered
any possibility of conducting tactical air operations within
the limits of established policy. The Deputy Director (Plans)
was advised, however, that some way would have to be devised
to knock out Castro's air force before this or any other
landing was attempted.
14. THE AIR FORCE DEFECTION PLAN.
a. In an effort to find some w acceptable to the
Department of State and to the President in which air attacks
could be conducted for the purpose of destroying the Castro
air force, the undersigned with Mr. Bissell and his assistant
Mr. Barnes, developed a plan along the following lines:
(1) Prior to D-Day, a B-26 aircraft painted
with Castro air force markings would be flown to Miami by a
Cuban who would land soon after dawn and represent himself
as a defecting pilot of Castro's air force. He would state
that he, with certain companions, had executed a defection
plot, and had attacked other aircraft on the fields from which
they had flown.
�
i,:;�st.o.
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(2) At dawn on the day of the defection, B-26
aircraft would attack the three principal military airfields
in Cuba, where all fighters and bombers were believed to be
located as 'a result of photographic reconnaissance. A
limitation on numbers of aircraft to be employed was imposed
by the Deputy Director (Plans), who reasoned that the Department
of State would not accept a plan involving a larger number of
aircraft than could reasonably be attributed to the defection
plot. He decided to propose that a total of six aircraft be
employed, with two attacking each of three principal fields,
Campo Libertad, San Antonio de los Banos, and Santiago. The
total number was later raised to eight on recommendation of
the undersigned.
b. It was believed that this attack, followed by
dawn attacks on ID-Day against these and all other military
airfields, would have a good chance of destroying all of
Castro's operable fighters and bombers, which were believed
(correctly) to number no more than from fifteen to eighteen.
15. THE DIVERSION PLAN.
a. The desirability of conducting a diversionary
landing in an area remote from the main landing had long been
recognized by the Paramilitary Staff. However, sufficient
troops for this purpose could not be raised, it appeared,
except at the expense of the main landing force which had not
yet reached desired strength. A development in Miami in late
March 1961, provided an opportunity to raise a small diversionary
force. Nino Diaz, a Cuban exile leader in Miami, expressed a
desire to lead a small force composed of4lis immediate followers
into Cuba. It was decided to send Diaz and 170 men to the
recently acquired training base at Belle Chase, New Orleans,
where they could be organized, equipped and given minimal
training. This was done in great haste, and the company was
formed at Belle Chase over a period of about two weeks prior
to its embarkation for the operation.
.b. Arrangements were made by the Forward Operating
Base in Miami for a Cuban vessel to lift Diaz's group to the
objective. The plan provided for staging Diaz through the
Naval Air Station at Key West and loading the force out of
Stock Island in the Florida Keys.
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c. A beach 30 miles east of Guantanamo was selected
for the Diaz landing. A C.I.A. paramilitary team with ten men
and a radio operator were operating in this area, and this team
was to be instructed to act as a reception party for Diaz at the
beach. This team was in contact with a 100 man guerrilla group
operating in the mountains adjacent to the landing area, and it
was planned that Diaz would join forces with this group. Diaz
was known to have a large political following in Oriente Province.
16. THE FINAL OPERATIONAL CONCEPT SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.
a. The final concept submitted to the President in late
March 1961, provided for:
(1) The defection operation, combined with surprise
dawn air attacks on D-2 against the three principal military
airfields. No more than two aircraft were to be visible at any
one place at one time.
(2) The landing of the Diaz group east of
Guantanamo during the night of D-2.
(3) The landing of the main force at three widely
separated landing points in Eastern Zapata during the early
morning hours of D-Day. The landing was to be followed by air
attacks on airfields and other military targets at dawn of D-Day,
by which time the airfield in the objective area was expected to
be in friendly hands. These D-Day air attacks were to be
represented, if necessary, as coming from the field seized in
Zapata, although plans provided for having only two B-26 aircraft
operate from that field, while the remaireter of the air force
was to continue operations from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.
b. The President directed that all preparations for
the operation, including the staging and embarkation of troops,
should continue, but that actual execution of the operation would
be subject to his final decision twenty-four hours before scheduled
commencement. The President also directed that plans be formulated
for diversion of the ships with troops embarked in the event that
he should decide to cancel the operation. Pursuant to these
instructions, C.I.A. planned to divert the ships, if required, to
New Orleans or to Vieques, Puerto Rico, where the force would be
disbanded in increments.
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17. SUCCESSIVE DELAYS OF D-DAY.
a. The date originally selected by the Paramilitary.
Staff for execution of the Trinidad. landing Was 4 March 1961.
This date was chosen on the basis �of the following factors:
(1) The Government of Guatemala had expressed its.
desire to have the Cuban force removed from that country not later
than 1March.
� (2) It was desired to execute the operation at the
earliest possible date in view of the rapid military build-up in
Cuba. Great quantities of military equipment, including field
artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, and tanks, had been delivered
to Cuba by the Soviet Bloc, and it was estimated that Castro's
forces, under the tutelage of Bloc advisors, would soon achieve
proficiency in the use of this equipment. It was also estimated
that Castro could acquire a jet air capability by April, 1961.
Unconfirmed reports were received indicating that crated MIG
aircraft had been delivered, and by April, 1961 Cuban pilots
known to be in Czechoslovakia would have had time to complete
jet training.
(3) It was desired to land in the Trinidad area
before guerrilla forces operating in the adjacent Escambray
Mountains could be eliminated by Castro's ever-increasing
pressure against them.
(4) The night of 4 March provided suitable conditions
of moonlight to facilitate operations in the transport area in
preparation for the landing at dawn.
b. After rejection of the Trinidad Plan, the Paramilitary
Staff recommended 3 April 1961, as D-Day for the landing in
Zapata. Moon conditions would again be favorable at that time,
and 3 April appeared to be the earliest date by which necessary
operation and administrative plans could be prepared and other
necessary preparations made for the Zapata operation. This date
proved to be unacceptable, however, since it coincided with a
planned visit to the United States by the Prime Minister of
Great Britain. In view of this visit, the President did not
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desire to conduct the operation before 10 April. That date
was accordingly programmed, although it was made clear to all
concerned by the Paramilitary Staff that the lack of adequate
moonlight would increase the difficulty of the night landing.
Later, D-Day was again postponed until 17 April in order, it
was understood, to allow observation of further developments
in the Laos situation and in the United Nations with regard
to Cuban charges against the United States. The night of
16-17 April would be in the new moon phase with no moonlight.
18. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR THE ZAPATA OPERATION.
a. Ground Forces (1,511 men)
(1) The Cuban Brigade included:
Headquarters and Service Company
Heavy Weapons Company
Five Infantry companies
One Airborne Infantry Company
- 156
- 114
- 175 (each)
- 177
Tank Platoon - 24
(These men were trained in a
highly secure and satisfactory
manner at Fort Knox.)
Boat Operator Section 36
Intelligence/Reconnaissance
Company 68
(h) Surgical Team - 18
(i) Supernumeraries 43
(2) Major items of equipment included: 108 Browning
Automatic Rifles; 49 30 caliber machine guns; 14 50 caliber
machine guns; 22 60Mm mortars; 20 81mm mortars; 7 4.2" mortars;
18 57mm recoilless rifles; 4 75mm recoilless rifles; 47,3,5U rocket
ALELLE
7.71-a7
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launchers; 9 flamethrowers; 5 M41 tanks; 12 23 ton trucks;
one 3,000 gallon aviation gasoline tanker truck; one tractor
crane; one dozer; 2 400 gallon water trailers; 11 k ton
trucks and 9 k ton tractors.
b. Air Forces. The Cuban Air Force, based at Puerto
Cabezas, Nicaragua, included fifteen B-26 light bombers, ten C-54
transports and five C-46 transports.
c. Sea Forces. Sea forces included:
(1) Two LCI, each mounting eleven 50 caliber machine.
guns and two 75mm recoilless rifles. (These craft were for use
primarily as command and naval gunfire vessels, although each
carried a 1000 man paramilitary pack in its hold). Each LCI
carried two high-speed boats.
(2) Three LCU, each mounting two 50 caliber machine
guns.
(3) Four LCVP, each mounting a 50 caliber machine gun.
*(4) Seven chartered commercial freighters (average
2,000 tons).
*NOTE: Freighters in the assault mounted two to three 50 caliber
machine guns. Only four of these ships were to participate in
the assault phase. The additional ships were loaded with follow-
up supplies for both ground and air forces.
(5) One 165 foot Cuban Coaetal� steamer.
19. MAJOR. FEATURES OF THE ZAPATA PLAN.
a. Staging and Embarkation. The plan provided for
airlifting Brigade troops less the airborne company, under cover
of darkness, from Guatemala to. Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua; during
three successive nights. Upon arrival, troops were to be moved
immediately to the Puerto Cabezas dock near the airfield for
embarkation before dawn. Supplies were pre-loaded in assault
shipping at New Orleans prior to proceeding to Nicaragua.
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b. llmsmt_c_o_11L_Ie0b'ective.. Ships of the task force
were to proceed independently over separate tracks in order not
to give the appearance of a convoy, and were to arrive at a
rendezvous point about forty miles off the Cuban coast at
1730 in the afternoon of 0-1. From this' point they were to
proceed in column under cover of darkness to the transport area
5,000 yards off the beach, making rendezvous at this point at
2300 with the U. S. Navy LSD lifting the three pre-loaded LCU and
four LCVP. One transport, escorted by an LCI, Was to continue
independently into Cochinos Bay for landing troops at the head of
the Bay. As a deception measure, two United Fruit Company ships
were hired to enter Puerto Cabezas harbor during the night the
assault shipping sailed. The presence of these ships plus the
one follow-up Garcia vessel lying off the harbor would, it was
hoped, conceal the fact that the operation had been launc�e(1.
This deception was apparently successful, for available intelligence
indicates that Castro was not aware that an invasion force had
left Nicaragua until after the landing.
c. The Plan for Landing. The plan provided for landings,
commencing at 0200 17 April,. at three widely separated beaches as
follows:
(1) Red Beach. (Head of
of beachhead). Two reinforced infantry
were to land from one transport at this
19 foot and four 14 foot aluminum craft
Cochinos Bay; left flank
companies, about 400 men,
beach, utilizing six
with outboard motors.
' (2) Blue Beach (Playa Giron; center of the beachhead;
about 18 miles from Red Beach). The main body, about 700 men,
including two infantry companies, the her weapons company less
detachments, the headquarters and service company, tank platoon
and motor transport platoon, were to land here utilizing LCI' s,
LCVP's and eighteen 19 foot aluminum boats from three transports.
Reserve supplies (10 days) were to be unloaded at this beach.
(3) Green Beach (Right lank of the beachhead;
about 18 miles east of Blue Beach). One reinforced company, about
200 men, was to land at this beach from an LCI utilizing one LCVP
and the two launches available in the LC'.
d. Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) Plan. UDT swimmers
were to reconnoiter and mark each beach with lights prior to the
landing of troops.
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e. Naval Gunfire. One,LCI, mounting eleven 50 caliber
machine guns, five 30 caliber machine guns and two 75mm recoilless
rifles, was to support the landing at Red Beach, while the second
similarly armed craft was to support at Blue Beach prior to
departing that area for the purpose of landing troops on Green
Beach to the east.
f. Airborne Landing. The airborne company was to land
at dawn by parachute from five C-46 aircraft in five drop zones
for the purpose of sealing off the roads crossing the Zapata
swamp into the beachhead area from the north.
g. Scheme of Maneuver.
(1) The beachhead area consisted of a belt of dry,
scrub-covered land, about forty miles in length from east to west
and from three to six miles in width, separated from the interior
of Cuba by a vast swamp impassable to foot troops. The only
approaches to the beachhead from the interior of Cuba consisted
of three roads crossing the swamp from the north, and a coastal
road leading to the east flank of the beachhead from Cienfuegos.
Movement off the roads in the swamp area was impossible, while
the coastal road from the east led through a narrow strip of land
between the swamp and the sea.
(2) The scheme of maneuver was designed to seize
and defend positions dominating the exposed, canalized routes
across the swamp and blocking entry into the beachhead at the
narrow neck of dry land at the east flank. Outposts beyond the
swamp on the three roads leading from theAaorth were to be
dropped by parachute.
h. Air Plan.
(1) Dawn attacks on D-Day were planned against
all airfields revealed by photography to have fighters or bombers
still operational after the surprise attacks on D-2. Attacks
were also to be launched at dawn on naval craft in or near the
objective area and against other military targets. Two B-26
aircraft, after completing their attacks, were to land on the
airfield near Blue Beach and continue flying interdiction and
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support missions, using ordnance which WAS to be promptly landed
over the beach by an advance aviation party and fuel from the
3,000 tanker to be landed early from an LCU. All available
aircraft were to phase back to the beachhead in afternoon
sorties for interdiction, close support and other attacks as
necessary.
(2) Enclosure (3) is the target list for D-Day
extracted from the Zapata plan. Some of these targets were
removed from the target list at the last moment in view of the
injunction from higher authority that air attacks on D-Day would
have to be more limited. The targets removed from the list were:
Managua Military Base (where tanks and artillery were parked);
Playa Baracoa Air Base (used mainly by helicopters and transports);
Bauta International Broadcasting Station; Topes de Collantes
Military Base. (Succeeding paragraphs describing the actual
operation, will show that none of these attacks planned for fl-Day
were carried out as a result of orders from higher authority.)
I, Communication.
(1) The internal radio communication system of
the Brigade was similar to that of a reinforced United States
infantry unit of similar size, but was more extensive in amounts
of equipment and number of nets employed. Portable radios with
a voice range of 30 miles were used for communication between
Brigade Headquarters and the various companies of the Brigade.
Nets for tactical and administrative purposes, mortar spotting
and air-ground control were provided.
(2) For communication with Headquarters in the
United States and the air base in Nicaragua, the Brigade was
equipped with two communication trailers which were to be landed
from two separate ships. In addition, it was provided with six
man-portable sets (RS-1) capable of communication with Headquarters
in the United States or Nicaragua. Mechanical cifer equipment
and one-time pads were available for encryption and decryption.
(3) The command ship and alternate command ship
(LCI's) had direct CW radio links with the United States and
Nicaragua, and voice nets for naval command, boat control, and
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ship-to-shore liaison and logistical purposes. Tbe Brigade
Commander could relay messages to the United States or
Nicaragua through either of these ships.
(4) Each troop transport was provided with a
direct radio circuit to the United States and Nicaragua.
j. Supplies.
(1) Assault Shipping.
(a) The equivalent of two basic loads of.
ammunition for all units was deck loaded aboard the transports
lifting the units concerned. Individuals were to land with
three days emergency-type rations and all the ammunition they
could carry.
(b) Seven Vi ton trucks, lifted in the three
LCU, were pre-loaded with ammunition of all types.
(c) Paramilitary arms packs (arms, field
equipment and limited ammunition for outfitting guerrilla forces)
were available in assault shipping (2 LCI; ATLANTICO) for 4,000
men. .
(d) Ten days supply of Classes I, III and V
was loaded in the holds of one of the assault ships (RIO ESCONDIDO).
(2)- Follow-up Shipping.
(a) One transport (LANE CHARLES) with ten
days of supply, Classes I, III and V, was scheduled to arrive
at the objective area on the morning of 1)1-2 from Nicaragua.
(b) A second follow-up ship (ORATAVA)
with twenty days supplies, Class I, III and V, for the landing
force, was to be on call in the Caribbean Sea south of Cuba.
This ship, in addition to the above, carried 21,000 bulk
rations, medical supplies, aviation gasoline and 30 days aviation
ordnance for the entire Cuban air force.
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(c) A third follow-up ship (LA PLAYA)
with arms and ammunition for 15,000 men, plus vehicles,
communication equipment, medical supplies and POL was also
to be on call south of Cuba.
(3) Air Delivery.
(a) Three days supply of Classes 1, III and
V were available at the airfield at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua,
for air landing or parachute delivery.
(b) Paramilitary arms packs for 3,000 men
were available for air delivery at three airfields in Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and Opa Locka.
(4) Additional Backup. Arms, equipment and
supplies for 15,000 men were positioned by the Defense Department
at Anniston, Alabama, as additional backup. Sufficient of the
above for 2,000 men was prepared for air drop.
k. Evacuation.
(1) Establishment of a rear medical facility for
receipt of casualties evacuated from the objective area was a
problem which defied solution until a few days before execution
of the operation. Authority could not be obtained for use of
a facility in the United States. There were no usable facilities
at bases in Guatemala or Nicaragua, and, in any event, the
governments of those countries did not wish to have Cuban
casualties evacuated there.
(2) Finally, it was decided that the Department
of Defense would establish a field hospital at Vieques, Puerto
Rico, to be operational by M-5. This plan was abandoned, however,
and it was agreed in the end that casualties would be evacuated
by air ot sea to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico.
20. EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION. A summary of the more
significant events of the actual operation is recorded in
following paragraphs.
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21. AIR STRIKES ON D-2 (15 APRIL 1961).
a. The purpose of these strikes was to destroy Castro's
tactical aircraft, all of which were believed from photographic
interpretation to be based at San Antonio, Campo Libertad and
Santiago. Three B-26 were programmed against each of the first
two of these fields and two against the third. Each aircraft
carried ten 250 pound fragmentation bombs, eight 5 inch rockets
and full ammunition for eight 50 caliber machine guns.
b. The attack was executed at dawn, as planned.
Returning pilots reported destruction of 50 percent of tactical
aircraft at Campo Libertad, 75 percent at San Antonio and 100
percent at Santiago. The readout of photography taken immediately
after the strike indicated that pilot reports were optimistic,
and a conservative estimate was that only about 50 percent of
Castro's original tactical air force of 15 to 18 serviceable
aircraft had been knocked out.
c. Antiaircraft fire from 50 caliber and 12.7mm guns
was reported as heavy at Campo Libertad and San Antonio. One
friendly aircraft was disabled and crashed in the sea north of
Havana. Two other aircraft landed at friendly bases low on
fuel. The aircraft and crews were recovered.
22. THE DIVERSION OPERATION.
a. The Diaz Group of 170 men was staged and
embarked on schedule and proceeded to its objective area
thirty miles east of Guantanamo in the Cuban coastal vessel
(SANTA ANA) chartered for the operation. The Group failed to
land during the night of 14/15 April as planned, however,
reporting that difficulty had been encountered in finding the
beach and the reconnaissance boat and two rubber landing craft
had been lost.
b. Prior to launching the Diaz operation, the radio
man and several other members of the ten-man C.I.A. team which
was to meet Diaz at the beach were wounded in an accident with .
a hand grenade, and Headquarters contact with the intended
reception party was lost.
c. Upon learning of Diaz's failure to land, Head-
quarters ordered him to land on the following night, but again
he failed to do so giving a number of excuses. The Undersigned'
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decided at this time that the real reason for not landing was a
failure of leadership, and it was believed that Diaz would never
land as ordered. Accordingly, he was instructed to proceed to
Zapata where he WAS to join the main force. Diaz did not
immediately comply with these sailing instructions, but eventually
reached the Zapata area too late for the operation.
d. This abortive effort illustrated one truth in
regard to the entire operation -- the forces involved were
composed of volunteer foreign nationals, all based, with the
exception of Diaz's group, in countries outside the United
States, and consequently the United States exercised no legal'
authority over them. All the Cuban forces except Diaz's,
however, voluntarily complied with all instructions issued by
C.I.A. Headquarters.
23. THE AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE OPERATION AT ZAPATA.
a. Embarkation and Movement to the Objective.
(1) These operations were smoothly executed
according to plan. (See paragraph 19.) The ships formed
column at the planned place and time and made rendezvous on
schedule at 2300 with the Navy LSD carrying the three LCU
and four LCVP, about 5,000 yards off Blue Beach (Playa Giron).
The transport HOUSTON, led by the radar-equipped LCI BARBARA J,
proceeded onward into Cochinos Bay enroute to Red Beach.
(2) There is no evidence to indicate that the
Cuban Government was aware of the approachof this force until
the landing was commenced.
b. Cancellation of the Air Attacks Against Cuban
Military Airfields and Other Targets Planned for 0540R on
D-Day. (See paragraph 19h.)
(1) At about 2215 on the night of 16 April, I
was informed at the Command Post by Mr. Esterline, the Project
Chief, that these attacks had been cancelled by order of the
President on recommendation of the Department of State. Upon
hearing this, I immediately telephoned Mr. Bissell, the Deputy
Director (Plans), who was at the Department of State, and
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urged in the strongest terms that the President be immediately
requested to reconsider this decision and that the possible
disastrous consequences of cancelling these attacks be
explained to him. I offered the prediction at this time that
shipping, with the essential supplies on board, would be
sunk, possibly to the last ship, on the following day, since
it was known that Castro still possessed a dangerous fighter
and bomber capability. I stated also at this time that if the
decision to cancel the air attacks had been communicated to
the Command Post a few hours earlier, I would have strongly
urged that the shipping be withdrawn without attempting to
land the troops. But as it was, the ships were already closely
approaching the transport area off the beaches, and by the time
a message could reach them, the landing operations would be
underway.
(2) Mr. Bissell, and General Cabell, the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, conferred with
Secretary of State Rusk about the matter, but did not see
the President. It is my understanding that Secretary Rusk,
after talking with General Cabell and Mr. Bissell, telephoned
the President and recommended that the decision to cancel the
air attacks remain unchanged. The President accepted this
recommendation.
(3) After it was learned at the Command Post
that the decision had not been changed, a message was sent
to the task force at 0149 warning that Castro's air force
had not been destroyed. The task force was ordered to expedite
unloading during the night and to sail all,transports, except
the RIO ESCONDIDO, to the south at best speed. The RIO ESCONDIDO
was to remain at Blue Beach to continue unloading its vital
reserve supplies under protection of the guns of the two LCI,
BARBARA J and BLAGAR.
c. D.-Day Operations at Blue Beach (17 April).
(1) UDT Reconnaissance. A reconnaissance boat
with UDT personnel and the C.I.A. operations officer from the
Command Ship BLAGAR, Ni7. Lynch, landed at Blue Beach shortly
.after midnight and marked the beach with lights. A coral reef
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about one-foot beneath the surface was discovered about
100 yards off the beach. Members of the UDT team were
forced to fire on a jeep which approached their position.
Three trucks promptly arrived carrying troops who engaged
in a fire fight with Lynch and his party. Lynch called for
fire support from the BLAGAR, which closed to 400 yards and
drove all opposition from the beach in ten minutes of firing.
Lynch then called for troops to land.
(2) Landing of Troops.
(a) Troops commenced landing at 0100.
There was no opposition in the immediate beach area, but
about one hundred militia were encountered in the town of
Playa Giron immediately inland. Seventy of these were
captured, and the remainder fled leaving their weapons
behind. Troops continued to land without serious opposition.
(b) At daylight, a channel through the
coral reef was located and marked, and LCU's began to land
vehicles at 0600.
(3) Enemy Air Attacks. Enemy air attacks
against the invasion force commenced at 0630 and continued
all day. B-26, Sea Furycand T-33 aircraft participated in
the attacks, with no more than two aircraft appearing at any
one time during the day. The BLAGAR shot down one Sea Fury
and two B-26 (assisted in one of these kills by a friendly
B-26).
(4) In view of the enemy air attacks, the
Brigade Commander decided to land troops scheduled for
Green Beach with the main body at Blue Beach, thus avoiding
the danger of loss at 'sea. By 0825, all troops, vehicles
and tanks were ashore at Blue Beach.
(5) Loss of RIO ESCONDIDO. This ship, with
ten days reserve supplies on board was sunk by enemy air
attack at 0930. All crew members were rescued.
(6) Enemy air attacks against the ships
continued as they withdrew to the south.
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d. Operations at Red Beach.
(1) UDT Reconnaissance. Mr. Robertson, the C.I.A.
operations officer with the LCI BARBARA J, led a UDT team to Red
Beach shortly after 0100 on 17 April and marked the beach. The
reconnaissance party silenced enemy automatic weapons fire coming
from the left flank.
(2) Landing of Troops. Troops commenced landing
without opposition, but encountered fifty militia immediately
inland, forty of whom were captured. Several trucks which
approached the beach within the first half hour were successfully
attacked and driven off by gunfire from the BARBARA J. Captured
militiamen offered to fight against Castro.
(3) Loss of the HOUSTON. The HOUSTON was hit by
rockets from enemy aircraft at 0630, and beached on the west
side of Cochinos Bay. One infantry company, less its weapons
platoon, was still on board. These men, with the ship's crew,
went ashore but never reached the Red Beach area.
(4) One enemy B-26 was shot down by machine gun
fire from the UDT boat.
(5) Combat Action. At about 1000, about 500 to
600 militia attacked the Red Beach force from the north and
were driven off with heavy casualties. Tanks accompanying
this force were either destroyed or stopped by friendly
aircraft. A tank and two ammunition trucks arrived from Blue
Beach in time for action against the next attack at 1400
by an estimated 1,500 militia. These trod, who arrived in
open trucks and semi-trailers, were ambushed by the Red Beach
force, employing the tank, 57mm recoilless rifles, 3.5 rocket
launchers, machine guns, and other available weapons. Enemy
troops were caught by this fire before they could dismount,
and friendly survivors have estimated that fifty percent of
these enemy troops were killed or wounded. The next attack
came in the evening and lasted all night. Five enemy tanks
were knocked out by the Red Beach force during the night.
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(6) The BARBARA J was strafed by an enemy.
Sea Fury during the day, and two engines were disabled.
A near miss with rockets opened her seams slightly and she.
began taking water.
(7) Retirement to Blue Beach. On the morning
of WA, the Red Beach force, being almost out of ammunition,
retired in good order to Blue Beach, utilizing captured
trucks, and took up positions in the Blue Beach perimeter.
They were not pressed by the enemy during this retirement.
(8) Cooperation of Civilians. Forty civilians
in the Red Beach area volunteered to assist the invasion force
and were employed as truck drivers and laborers.
e. Airborne Landing. The airborne company landed
in all but one of five scheduled drop zones at 0730. Light
resistance was encountered. Little is known of further actions
by the airborne company, except that the force which landed
north of Blue Beach held positions successfully until iY-2,
the final day of the operation.
f. Continued Action at Blue Beach.
(1) Air Supply. During the night of 17/18 April
one C-54 drop of ammunition was made at Red Beach and three
C-54 drops at Blue Beach. Three C-54 drops were made at Blue
Beach during the following night, but only two were received.
(2) Combat Action. Reports have indicated that
the Blue Beach area was quiet during the morning of M-1, but
the enemy attacked from west, north and east in the afternoon,
employing tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The battle continued
throughout the night of 18/19 April.
(3) Attempt to Land Supplies. Orders were issued
from Headquarters for ammunition and supplies to be offloaded
from the transports CARIBE and ATLANTIC� into the three LOU
which were to be escorted to the beach during the night of
18/19 April. The LCU's were not able to rendezvous with these
transports until the evening of 18 April. The LCU's were
loaded and the run to the beach was coramenecd, but the BLAGAR
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reported that due to the slow speed of the LCU's, the craft
could not arrive at the beach until after daylight. Enemy
fighters by this time were over the beach continuously during
daylight hours, and it was considered a certainty that the
craft would be sunk before they could reach the beach to
unload. Accordingly, the mission was cancelled by Headquarters,
and instructions for air supply during the night were issued
to the air base in Nicaragua.
(4). Evacuation Attempt, A message was sent to
the Brigade Commander on 18 April stating that ships. and craft
would be moved to Blue Beach to evacuate troops that night if
he so recommended. He replied that he would never be evacuated,
At 1300 on 19 April, the two LCI and three LCU headed for the
beach, in accordance with orders from Headquarters, to evacuate
troops, but the convoy reversed course upon learning that the
beachhead had fallen.
(5) Final Day of Battle (19 April). The enemy
continued to press Blue Beach from three sides with tanks,
infantry and artillery during the day. In the morning, a
counter attack was launched to the west along the coastal
road by about 90 men and two tanks. The tanks returned later
in damaged condition, but the infantry force was not heard
from again. In the course of the day's battle, ammunition
supplies were exhausted, and at about 1600 in the afternoon
organized resistance ceased. Survivors have stated that
the lines did not collapse until all ammunition was expended.
g. Summary of Friendly Air Actin.
(1) p-Day.
(a) Eleven B-26 were phased over the
beachhead for close support and interdiction during the day.
These aircraft attacked ground targets, sank a patrol escort
ship (3 inch gun) near the Isle of Pines, and one aircraft
attacked the airfield at Cienfuegos. Only three of these
eleven aircraft returned to base. Four were shot down, while
the remaining four landed at other friendly bases. Some of
these four aircraft, and all the crews, were returned to
base late the next day.
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(b) Four Four new B-26 arrived at Nicaragua
from the United States that night. During the night, three
B-26 were launched against the San Antonio airfield where
D-Day photography had revealed the opposing aircraft were
based. This mission was unsuccessful due to haze and poor
visibility.
(2) DA.'
(a) Five aircraft flew missions over the
beachhead during the morning and attacked ground targets.
(b) In the afternoon, a highly successful
attack was launched by six aircraft (two flown by Americans)
against a 20-mile-long truck and tank column approaching Blue
Beach from the west. Several tanks and about twenty large
troop-laden lorries were destroyed by napalm, bombs, rockets
and machine gun fire. (It is noteworthy that an enemy report
intercepted on this date indicated that he had already suffered
1,800 casualties, mostly from air attack.)
(c) This column was attacked again during
the night by six B-26.
(d) Four additional new aircraft reached
the base in Nicaragua during the night.
(3) D1-2.
(a) Five aircraft (four with American crews)
were sent in early morning sorties over tte beachhead. Three,
including two piloted by Americans, were shot down by T-33's.
Additional sorties were flown during the morning as aircraft
could be readied.
(4) It is estimated that only three enemy T-33
and two Sea Furies were left in action after D-Day. These
fighters were sufficient, however, to keep almost continuous
cover over the beachhead, making it almost suicidal to attempt
operations in the area with B-26 aircraft, which were virtually
helpless against fighter attack.
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(5) It seems reasonable to conclude that the
attacks on military airfields originally programmed for 0540
on D-Day, but which had to be cancelled, would have had an
excellent chance of eliminating Castro's offensive air
capability or of reducing it to ineffectiveness. If this
had been done, friendly B-26 operations could have been
maintained over the beachhead area and the approaches
thereto continuously, during the day, and ships could have
unloaded the supplies needed to sustain the Brigade. This
could have turned the tide of battle, since Castro's road-
bound truck columns proved highly vulnerable when friendly
B-26 were able to locate them, and the Brigade, itself,
was not defeated until its ammunition supplies were exhausted.
24. RESCUE OPERATIONS. Mr. Robertson and Mr. Lynch, with
five Cuban UDT men, operated from United States destroyers for
several days after collapse of the beachhead and rescued twenty-
six survivors from the coastal area west of Cochinos Bay.
25. INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.
a. The ultimate success of strike operations against
Cuba in causing the overthrow of Castro depended upon the
precipitation by these operations of large-scale uprisings
among the people of Cuba and widespread revolt within the ranks
of Castro's armed forces. The invasion force was never intended
to overthrow Castro by itself, and no representations were ever
made by the Central Intelligence Agency that the force had such
a potential.
b. There was much evidence from alwilable intelligence
sources, including agent reports and debriefing of persons
recently coming out of Cuba, to indicate that the.country was ripe
for revolt. An analysis of actual and potential anti-Castro
resistance in Cuba made by the Paramilitary Staff, in March 1961
is contained in enclosure (4). After this was written, reliable
intelligence was received indicating that the entire Cuban Navy
was plotting a revolt, which was to take place at about the
same time as the planned invasion.
c. The low estimate by the Paramilitary Staff of
the fighting qualities and potential of Castro's militia was
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based upon accurate knowledge of militia performance against
guerrilla forces in the Escambray Mountains over a period of
six months. Some of the guerrilla leaders from the Escambray
were exfiltrated and debriefed by the Central Intelligence
Agency after resistance in these mountains collapsed. There
can be no queStion of the fact that the militia performed very
poorly in the Escambray, and demonstrated ]ow morale, lack of
efficiency and a marked reluctance to close in decisive combat
even with small, poorly armed guerrilla forces. The guerrilla
forces in the Escambray were reduced by seize, which cut off
food supplies, and not by direct combat.
d. The military proficiency demonstrated by the
militia at Zapata indicated that great progress had been
made in integrating Bloc equipment and in the training of
Castro's hard-core Communist followers during the early months
of 1961. There was also reason to suspect that militia
operations were being directed by European military personnel.
The tactics employed were Communist-style, and enemy voice
transmissions in a strange tongue, not Spanish, were intercepted
by the Brigade. Intelligence indicates that these "elite'
militia forces suffered extremely heavy casualties during
the three days of fighting, and they were not able to overcome
the Brigade until the latter was out of ammunition as a-result
of our inability to supply the force against the opposition of
Castro's five remaining fighter aircraft. It would' seem
reasonable to conclude that if the Castro Air Force had been
eliminated at the beginning so that uninterrupted unloading
of supplies could proceed at the beach and our B-26 aircraft
could operate effectively, the Brigade would have had an
excellent chance of breaking the hard-core thtlitia, which
obviously was what Castro used in the bdttle. Casualties in
the number being experienced by the militia (estimated 3,000
to 4,000) ,could not have been sustained more than a few more
days without collapse. The breaking of the hard-core militia
would probably have been the signal for revolt of the Rebel
Army and remaining elements of the militia, who were known to
be of dubious loyalty to Castro. In this regard, it is significant
that the 150 Militia prisoners captured by the Brigade offered
to fight against. Castro, and the majority of able-bodied male
civilians in the invasion area did likewise. It is also
PE nr."
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significant that no known Rebel Army units participated in the
battle, indicating Castro's lack Of. faith in their loyalty.
It is also significant that Castro's Navy did nothing of
importance against the invasion force,
e. The theory that uprisings and revolt would
be triggered did not receive an adequate test in the operation.
Agents throughout Cuba were warned shortly before the invasion
to make all preparations for action, but the exact invasion
area and timing could not be revealed to them in view of the
known propensity of all Cubans to tell secrets. There was
also a possibility that one or more agents would, unknown to
us, be doubled (controlled by the enemy). It would not be
reasonable to expect revolts to develop within a period of two
or three days which turned out to be the extent of life of
the invasion force, nor could revolt be expected until the
invasion force had demonstrated that it had a good chance
of enduring on Cuban soil. There is conclusive evidence that
Castro feared revolt in the fact that he promptly arrested
30,000 persons throughout Cuba. One C.I.A. agent reported
that 2,500 men had requested arms from him immediately after
the invasion took place, but the invasion did not last long
enough to permit supply of arms.
26. POLICY RESTRICTIONS WHICH LIMITED THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS.
a. The most significant policy restrictions which
hampered the preparation for and conduct of effective para-
military operations are listed below.
lor,
(1) The restriction prohibiting use of bases
in the United States for training, paramilitary forces.
(Adequate training base could not be obtained in other countries.)
(2) The restriction prohibiting use of an air
base in the United States for logistical overflights in support
of guerrilla forces and of the strike force when landed. (The
Guatemalan base was the only base available for several months,
until Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, was put into use shortly before
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the invasion in April 1961. Both were too distant from the
target for effective, large-scale logistical flights with the
aircraft available (C-54 and C-46). Missions could have been
far more efficiently flown and supported from the United States,
with fewer logistical problems, and possibly with less
publicity than that which resulted from Guatemalan operations.)
(3) The restriction prohibiting use of American
contract pilots for aerial supply of _guerrilla forces. (Cuban
pilots demonstrated at an early date their inability to perform
these missions. American pilots, on the other hand, have
proved their ability in this field in many areas of the world,
working with a variety of indigenous forces. The failure to
supply guerrilla organizations was a critical failure in the
overall operation.)
(4) The restriction prohibiting use of a base
in the United States for tactical air operations in support of
the amphibious landing. (About nine hours were required to
turn around a B-26 for a second mission over the target from
Nicaragua, and pilots were physically unable to fly more than
one mission per day. In the actual operation, numerous aircraft
were forced to land in the United States or British territory
due to fuel shortage, and were out of action during the critical
period. From a base in Florida, the number of sorties flown
could have been doubled or tripled, and fighter aircraft could
have been used to protect the bombers. Location of bases in
third countries also complicated security and logistical
problems and increased the likelihood that use of the bases
would be denied soon after commencement of operations.)
Aloe,
(5) The restriction prohibiting use of American
contract pilots for tactical air operations. (Authority was
granted to hire American pilots, but not to use them. Some
American pilots were thrown into the amphibious operation
during the second and third days as an emergency measure.
Use of adequate numbers of highly skilled, combat-experienced
American pilots in the initial air operations could have
spelled the difference between success and failure.)
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(6) The restriction preventilv use of more
effective tactical aircraft than the B-26 bomber.
(7) The restrictions preventing the full
application of the tactical air power available. (The
preferred plan presented by the Paramilitary Staff called
for full-scale air attacks by all available aircraft on
military airfields, as well as against tank, artillery and
truck parks, commencing at dawn of D-1 and involving another
maximum effort at dusk and continuation of full-scale operations
on D-Day and thereafter. Pressure by the Department of State
against the use of tactical air resulted in the watering down
of this plan. See paragraphs 11, 12 and 14. The initial air
strike on D-2 was made against three airfields only, and only
eight of the fifteen available bombers were permitted to
participate.
(An initial full-scale raid by all fifteen
of the available bombers would certainly have had a much greater
destructive effect than the raid by eight aircraft, and might
have eliminated Castro's tactical air force at one blow.
(Restrictions on the employment of napalm
also reduced the effectiveness of operations. Use of this
weapon against concentrated aircraft, tanks, artillery, and
trucks clearly visible in up-to-date aerial photographs could
have been a decisive factor. For example, one photograph
revealed a concentrated tank park with 36 tanks and a truck
park with 150 trucks. Napalm could have eliminated these,
as well as other tank, truck, and artillery parks revealed
by other available photography. By limiting the number of
aircraft in the initial surprise strike, and leaying these
. important targets untouched, Castro was given the opportunity
to disperse these concentrations.
(Cancellations at the last moment, while
the troops were already off the beaches preparing to land,
of the air attacks planned for 0540 on D-Day against Castro's
remaining tactical aircraft, doomed the operation to failure.
See paragraph 23b.
.(Restrictions which prevented the full
application of available airpower in accordance with sound
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tactical principles must be regarded as primarily responsible
for failure of the amphibious operation.)
b. The Department of State was the principal advocate
of the restrictions listed above. The rationale of these self-
imposed restrictions rested upon what proved to be an unrealistic
requirement, impossible of fulfillment under the circumstances,
to conduct operations in such a way as to be non-attributable
to the United States, or, at least, plausibly deniable. In the
interest of non-attributability, the requirement for operational
effectiveness was so completely subordinated that the end
result was "too little, too late", and the United States had
ta bear publicly the responsibility for a failure rather than
the responsibility for a success. The price paid by the United
States in terms of public clamor by our enemies was high enough
to have covered the cost of additional measures that could have
been taken to ensure success. It seemed to this writer through
the many months of this effort, that the United States was
trying to achieve a very important objective at a very small
cost to itself, while it would have been in the national
interest to act more boldly and openly and accept more risks
as might be necessary to ensure that every needed measure would
be taken to win the objective, which had to be won, and still
must be won, and soon, if all Latin America is not to be lost
to Communism.
27. CONCLUSIONS. The following conclusions are based
upon my experiences of the past eight months as Chief of the
Paramilitary Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency Cuba
Project: SAims
a. The Government and the people of the United
States are not yet psychologically conditioned to participate
in the cold war with resort to the harsh, rigorous, and often
dangerous and painful measures which must be taken in order
to win. Our history and tradition have conditioned us for
all-out war or all-out peace, and the resort tb war-like
measures in any situation short of all-out war is repugnant,
to the American mentality. In order to win the cold war,
this inhibition must be overcome.
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b. In a cold war paramilitary operation, there is
a basic conflict of interest between considerations of military
effectiveness on the one hand and political considerations on
the other. Since in the cold war national survival does not
seem to be immediately at issue (although this writer would
deem that it is), political considerations tend to dominate,
with the result that military measures are progressively
restricted and subordinated. Experiences of the past few
years indicate that political restrictions on military measures
may result in destroying the effectiveness of the latter, and
the end result is political embarassment coupled with military
failure and loss of prestige in the world.
c. Paramilitary
conducted on a ration-card
considerations are such as
military measures required
military operations should
operations cannot be effectively
basis. Therefore, if political
to prohibit the application of all
to achieve the objective, then
not be undertaken.
d. Civilian officials of the Government should not
attempt to prescribe the tactics of military or paramilitary
operations.
e. For an effort of the kind made against Cuba,
detailed policy guidance, in writing, is required from the
national level. A national plan should be written at the
outset, setting forth the responsibilities and tasks of every
Department and Agency concerned. An organization must be
provided for directing and coordinating the�Actions by all
Departments and Agencies in the economic, political, psychological
and military fields.
f. In pursuing an operation of the kind conducted
against Cuba, governmental machinery must be established for
prompt, decisive resolution of policy questions as they arise.
g. Paramilitary operations of any appreciable size
cannot be conducted on a completely covert basis, and the
requirement for non-attributability introduces tremendous
complications in the accomplishment of what would otherwise
be simple tasks. Since paramilitary operations on an increasing
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scale will probably be required as we face years of cold war
in the future, the United States should be prepared to operate
more boldly and overtly in this field, as do our enemies of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc.
g. The Central Intelligence Agency does not have
required organization, equipment, procedures, bases, �facLlities
nor staff for the planning and conduct of paramilitary operations.
It cannot conduct such operations without relying heavily upon
the Department of Defense for personnel, equipment, supplies,
facilities, and other support.
i. Primary responsibility for all paramilitary
matters, including the organization, equipping, training,
operational employment and support of indigenous guerrilla
forces, should be assigned to the Department of Defense,
which has vast human and material resources and proper
organization and procedures for accomplishment of these
functions.
j. All military operations of any kind, including
those of a paramilitary nature, should be under the direction
and control of the Unified Commander in whose area the
operations are to take place. It would be advisable to form
a special task force within the Unified Command, with representa-
tion from Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and C.I.A. as
required, for conduct of paramilitary operations.
k. Within the Department of Defense, the responsibility
for ground paramilitary matters should be'dssigned to the Army
Special Forces, since these brces are especially trained and
organized for such missions.
1. It would be advisable for all members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to attend meetings with the President
and Cabinet Officers at which any military matters are to be
discussed. It cannot be expected that any single military
officer can advise adequately on all the technical aspects
of air, sea, and ground warfare. The Cuban operation was
essentially a seaborne invasion. Such operations are a
specialty of the Navy and Marine Corps. Therefore, the Chief
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of Naval Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
if present at all meetings, would have been able to contribute
invaluable advice at the proper time.
m. A Communist-style police state is now firmly
entrenched in Cuba, which will not be overthrown by means
short of overt application of elements of United States
military power. Further efforts to develop armed internal
resistance, or to organize Cuban exile forces, should not
be made except in connection with a planned overt intervention
by United States forces.
t/f
J. HAWKINS
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
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28. REFERENCE LIST
(a) �JCS Memo 57-61 of 3 February 1961, to Secretary
of Defense; Subject: Military Evaluation of
the C.I.A. Paramilitary Plan, Cuba.
(b) JCS Memo 146-61 of 10 March 1961, to Secretary
of Defense; Subject: Evaluation of C.I.A.
Cuban Volunteer Task Force.
(c) JCS Memo 166-61 of 15 March 1961, to Secretary
of Defense; Subject: Evaluation of .Military.
Aspects of Alternate Concepts of C.I.A.
Paramilitary Plan, Cuba,
NOTE: Above references are not available for
attachment to this paper. If the reader
desires to read these attachments, approval
must be obtained from the following:
Colonel M. R. Olson, USMC
Executive Officer, SACSA
Room 1 E 9629
Pentagon
Code 11-5-3051
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CREF
4.7r
29. ENCLOSURES
1. Copy of Colonel Hawkins Memo of 4 January 1961
tO Chief; WH/4; Subject: Policy Decisions
' Requested for COnduCt of Strike Operations
Against Cuba
2. ,TRINIDAD (Concept of Operation)
3. Appendix 1 (Target List) to Annex E (Tactical
Air Support) to Operation Plan, ZAPATA
4. Anti-Castro Resistance in Cuba: Actual and
Potential, dated March 16, 1961
5. "Cuba: The Record Set Straight", Charles J. V.
Murphy, Fortune Magazine, September 1961,
pp. 92-237
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COPY
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4
SUBJECT:
ENCLOSURE 1
4 January 1961
Policy Decisions Required for Conduct
of Strike Operations Against Government
of Cuba
1. Purpose:
The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the
current status of our preparations for the conduct of amphi-
bious/airborne and tactical air operations against the
Government of Cuba and to set forth certain requirements for
policy decisions which must be reached and implemented if
these operations are to be carried out.
2. Concept:
As a basis for the policy requirements to be pre-
sented below, it would appear appropriate to review briefly
the concept of the strike operations contemplated and outline
the objectives which these operations are designed to accomplish.
The concept envisages the seizure of a small lodgement
on Cuban soil by an all-Cuban amphibious/airborne force of
about 750 men. The landings in Cuba will be preceded by a
tactical air preparation, beginning at clewn of D-1 Day. The
primary purpose of the air preparation will be to destroy or
neutralize all Cuban military aircraft and naval vessels con-
stituting a threat to the invasion force. When this task is
accomplished, attacks will then be directed against other
military targets, including artillery parks, tank parks, mili-
tary vehicles, supply dumps, etc. Close air support will be
provided to the invasion force on D-Day and thereafter as long
as the force is engaged in combat. The primary targets during
this time will be opposing military formations in the field.
Particular efforts will be made to interdict opposing troop
movements against the lodgement.
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The initial mission of the invasion force will be to
seize and defend a small area, which under ideal conditions
will include an airfield and access to the sea for logistic
support. Plans must provide, however, for the eventuality that
the force will be driven into a tight defensive formation which
will preclude supply by sea or control of an airfield. Under
such circumstances supply would have to be provided entirely by
air drop. The primary objective of the force will be to survive
and maintain its integrity on Cuban soil. There will be no
early attempt to break out of the lodgement for further offen-
sive operations unless and until there is a general uprising
against the Castro regime or overt military intervention by United
States forces has taken place.
It is expected that these operations will precipitate a
general uprising throughout Cuba and cause the revolt of large
segments of the Cuban Army and Militia. The lodgement, it is
hoped, will serve as a rallying point for the thousands who are
ready for overt resistance to Castro but who hesitate to act
until they can feel some assurances of success. A general revolt
in Cuba, if one is successfully triggered by our operations,nay
serve to topple the Castro regime within a period of weeks.
If matters do not eventuate as predicted above, the
lodgement established by our force can be used as the site for
establishment of a provisional government which can be recog-
nized by the United States, and hopefully by other American
states, and given overt military assistance. The way will then
be paved for United States military intervention aimed at paci-
fication of Cuba, and this will result in the prompt overthrow
of the Castro Government.
While this paper� is directed to the subject of strike
operations, it should not be presumed that other paramilitary
programs will be suspended or abandoned. These are being
intensified and accelerated. They include the supply by air and
sea of guerrilla elements in Cuba, the conduct of sabotage opera-
tions, the introduction of specially trained paramilitary teams,
and the expansion of our agent networks throughout the island.
3. Status of Forces:
a. Air. The Project tactical air force includes ten
B-26 aircraft currently based in Guatemala and at Eglin Air
Force Base. However, there are only five Cuban B-26 pilots
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available at this time who are considered to be of high
technical competence. Six additional Cuban pilots are
available, but their proficiency is questionable.
It is planned that seven C-54 and four C-46 trans-
ports will be available for strike operations. Here again,
the number of qualified Cuban crews is insufficient. There
is one qualified C-54 crew on hand at this time, and three
C-46 crews.
Aviation ordnance for conduct of strike operations
is yet to be positioned at the strike base in Nicaragua.
Necessary construction and repairs at this base are now
scheduled to commence, and there appears to be no obstacle
.to placing this facility in a state of readiness in time for
operations as planned.
Conclusions:
(1) The number of qualified Cuban B-26 crews
available is inadequate for conduct of strike operations.
(2) The number of qualified Cuban transport crews
is grossly inadequate for supply operations which will be
required in support of the invasion force and other friendly
forces which are expected to join or operate in conjunction
with it in many parts of Cuba. It is anticipated that multiple
sorties will be required on a daily basis.
b. Maritime. Amphibious craft for the operation,
including three LCU's and four LCVP's are now at Vieques,
Puerto Rico, where Cuban crew training La..progressing satis-
factorily. These craft with their crews will soon be ready
for operations.
The BARBARA J (LCI), now enroute to the United States
from Puerto Rico, requires repairs which may take up to two
weeks for completion. Its sister ship, the BLAGAR, is outfit-
ting in Miami, and its crew is being assembled. It is expected
that both vessels will be fully operational by mid-January at
the latest.
In view of the difficulty and delay encountered in
purchasing, outfitting and readying for sea the two LCI's, the
decision has been reached to purchase no more major vessels,
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but to charter them instead. The motor ship, RIO ESCONDIDO
(converted LCT) will be chartered this week and one additional
steam ship, somewhat larger, will be chartered early in February.
Both ships belong to a Panamanian Corporation controlled by the
GARCIA family of Cuba, who are actively cooperating with this
Project. These two ships will provide sufficient lift for troops
and supplies in the invasion operation.
Conclusion:
Maritime assets required will be available in ample
time for strike operations in late February.
c. Ground. There are approximately 500 Cuban personnel
now in training in Guatemala. Results being achieved in the FRD
recruiting drive now underway in Miami indicate that extraordinary
measures may be required if the ranks of the Assault Brigade are
to be filled to its planned strength of 750 by mid-January.
Special recruiting teams comprised of members of the Assault
Brigade are being brought to Miami to assist in recruiting
efforts in that city and possibly in other countries, notably
Mexico and Venezuela. All recruits should be available by mid-
January to allow at least -four to six weeks of training prior to
commitment.
The Assault Brigade has been formed into its basic
organization (a quadrangular infantry battalion, including four
rifle companies, and a weapons company). Training is proceeding
to the extent possible with the limited number of military in-
structors available. This force cannot be adequately trained for
combat unless additional military trainers are provided.
Conclusions:
(1) It is probable that the Assault Brigade can reach
its planned strength of 750 prior to commitment, but it is
possible that upwards of 100 of these men will be recruited too
late for adequate training.
(2) Unless U. S. Army Special Forces training teams
as requested are sent promptly to Guatemala, the Assault Brigade
cannot be readied for combat by late February as planned and
desired.
(3) The Assault Brigade- should not be committed to
action until it hai received at least four and preferably six
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weeks of training under supervision of the U. S. Army teams.
This means that the latter half of February is the earliest
satisfactory time for the strike operation.
4. Major Policy Questions Requiring Resolution:
In order that planning and preparation for the strike
operation may proceed in an orderly manner and correct posi-
tioning of hundreds of tons of supplies and equipment can be
effected, a number of firm decisions concerning major questions
of policy are required. These are discussed below.
The Concept Itself.
2.111pcj_iss3.-on. The question of whether the incoming
administration of President-elect Kennedy will concur in the
conduct of the strike operations outlined above needs to be
resolved at the earliest possible time. If these operations
are not to be conducted, then preparations for them should
cease forthwith in order to avoid the needless waste of great
human effort and many millions of dollars. Recruitment of
additional Cuban personnel should be stopped, for every new
recruit who is not employed in operations as intended presents
an additional problem of eventual disposition.
Recommendation. That the Director of Central
Intelligence attempt to determine the position of the President-
Elect and his Secretary of State-Designate in regard to this
question as soon as possible.
b. Timing of the Operation.
If Army Special Forces tralang teams are made
available and dispatched to Guatemala by mid-January, the
Assault Brigade can achieve acceptable readiness for combat
during the latter half of February, 1961. All other required
preparations can be made by that same time. The operation
should be launched during this period. Any delay beyond
I March, 1961, would be inadvisable for the following reasons:
(1) It is doubtful that Cuban forces can be main.
tamed at our Guatemalan training base beyond 1March 1961.
Pressure upon the Government of Guatemala may become unmanageable
if Cuban ground troops are not removed by that date.
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(2) Cuban trainees cannot be held in training
for much longer.. Many have been in the camp for months under
most austere and restrictive conditions. They are becoming
restive and if not committed to action soon there will probably
be a general lowering of morale. Large-scale desertions could
occur with attendant possibilities of surfacing the entire
program.
(3) While the support of the Castro Government
by the Cuban populace is deteriorating rapidly and time is
working in our favor in that sense, it is working to our dis-
advantage in a military sense. Cuban jet pilots are being
being trained in Czechoslovakia and the appearance of modern
radar throughout Cuba indicates a strong possibility that Castro
may soon have an all-weather jet intercept capability. His
ground forces have received vast quantities of military equip-
ment from the Bloc countries, including medium and heavy tanks,
field artillery, heavy mortars and anti-aircraft artillery.
Bloc technicians are training his forces in the use of this
formidable equipment. Undoubtedly, within the near future .
Castro's hard core of loyal armed forces will achieve technical
proficiency in the use of available modern weapons.
(4) Castro is making rapid progress in establishing
a Communist-style police state which will be difficult to unseat
by any means short of overt intervention by U. S. military forces.
Recommendation. That the strike operation be
conducted in the latter half of February, and not later than
1 March 1961.
c. Air Strikes.
The question has been raised in some quarters as
to whether the amphibious/airborne operation could not be
mounted without tactical air preparation or support or with
minimum air support. It is axiomatic in amphibious operations
that control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely
required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of
opposing our landing Must be knocked out or neutralized before .
our amphibious shipping makes its final run into the beach. If
this is not done, we will be courting disaster. Also, since our
invasion force is very small in comparison to forces which may
be thrown against it, we must compensate for numerical inferiority
by effective tactical air support not only during the landing but
thereafter as long as the force remains in combat. It is
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essential that opposing military targets such as artillery
parks, tank parks, supply dumps, military convoys and troops
in the field be brought under effective and continuing air
attack. Psychological considerations also make such attacks
essential. The spectacular aspects of air operations will go
far toward producing the uprising in Cuba that we seek.
Recommendations.
(1) That the air preparation commence not later
than dawn of D minus I Day.
(2) That any move to curtail the number of air-
craft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted.
(3) That the operation be abandoned if policy ,
does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support.
d. Use of American Contract Pilots.
The paragraph above outlines the requirement for
precise and effective air strikes, while an earlier paragraph
points up the shortage of qualified Cuban pilots. It is very
questionable that the limited number of Cuban B-26 pilots
available to us can produce the desired results unless augmented
by highly skillful American contract pilots to serve as .section
and flight leaders in attacks against the more critical targets.
The Cuban pilots are inexperienced in war and of limited tech-
nical competence in navigation and gunnery. There is reason
also to suspect that they may lack the motivation to take the
stern measures required against targets in their own country.
It is considered that the success of the- operation will be jeo-
pardized unless a few American contract B-26 pilots are employed.
With regard to logistical air operations, the
shortage of Cuban crews has already been mentioned. There is no
prospect of producing sufficient Cuban C-54 crews to man the
seven C-54 aircraft to be used in the operation. Our experience
to date with the Cuban transport crews has left much to be de-
sired. It is concluded that the only satisfactory solution to
the problem of air logistical support of the strike force and other
forces joining it will be to employ a number of American contract
crews.
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Recommendation.
That policy approval be obtained for use of
American contract crews for tactical and transport aircraft
in augmentation of the inadequate number of Cuban crews
available.
e. Use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.
The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is essential for
conduct of the strike operation unless a base is made available
in the United States. Our air base in Guatemala is 800 miles
from central Cuba--too distant for 13-26 operations and for air
supply operations of the magnitude required, using the C-46 and
C-54 aircraft. Puerto Cabezas is only 500 miles from central
Cuba--acceptable, although too distant to be completely de-
sirable, for B-26 and transport operations.
Puerto Cabezas will also serve as the staging area
for loading assault troops into transports much more satis-
factorily than Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, which is exposed to
hostile observation and lacks security. .It is planned that .
troops will be flown in increments from Guatemala to Puerto
Cabezas, placed in covered trucks, loaded over the docks at
night into amphibious shipping, which will then immediately
retire to sea.
Conclusion:
The strike operation cannot be conducted unless
the Puerto Cabezas air facility is available for our use, or
unless an air base in the United States Is made available.
Recommendation.
That firm policy be obtained for use of Puerto
Cabezas as an air strike base and staging area.
f. Use of U. S. Air Base for Logistical Flights.
An air base in southern Florida would be roughly
twice as close to central Cuba as Puerto Cabezas. This means
that the logistical capability of our limited number of trans-
port aircraft would be almost doubled if operated from Florida
rather than Puerto Cabezas. Logistical support of the strike
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force in the target would be much more certain and efficient
if flown from Florida.
There is also a possibility that once the strike
operations commence, conditions would develop which would force
us out of the Nicaraguan air base. Without some flexibility of
operational capability including an additional logistical support
air base with pre-positioned supplies in the United States, we
could conceivably be confronted with a situation wherein the
Assault Brigade would be left entirely without logistical air
support. Supply by sea cannot be relied upon, for the Brigade
may be driven by superior forces from the beach area. Such a
situation could lead to complete defeat of the Brigade and failure
of the mission.
It seems obvious that the only real estate which
the United States can, without question, continue to employ once
the operation commences is its own soil. Therefore, an air base
for logistical support should be provided in the United States.
This will offer the possibility of continued, flexible operations,
if one or both of our bases in Guatemala and/or Nicaragua are lost
to our use.
Recommendation.
That policy be established to permit use of an air
base in southern Florida (preferably Opa Locka which is now
available to us and has storage facilities for supplies) for logis-
tical support flights to Cuba.
J. Hawkins
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief, WH/4/PM
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ENCLOSURE 2
TRINIDAD (CONCEPT OF OPERATION)
I. MISSION. Commencing at H-hour on D-day, the Assault
Force lands, seizes, occupies, and defends a lodgement
in the TRINIDAD-CASILDA area in order to establish a
base from which further land and air operations can be
launched against the Castro government of CUBA.
2. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.
a. On D-day the Assault Force conducts an amphibious/
airborne landing in the TRINIDAD area.
b. Prior to D-day, sabotage activities are directed at
reducing and destroying the GOC ground, air and
naval capability throughout CUBA, with particular
emphasis on air, communications, transportation,
armor, artillery and POL. Propaganda activities
are intensified in order to obtain active support
of the Cuban populace.
c. On D-1 tactical support aircraft attack major GOC
air force installations in order to destroy aircraft
on the ground and to inflict maximum damage to runways
and control and communications facilities. Attacks
are also launched against tank parks, artillery parks,
motor transportation, and other military targets.
d. At about H-6 hours a tactical deception operation is
conducted in the LA FE area of PINAR DEL RIO in order
to cause movement of enemy forces away from the area
of intended actual operations.
�Immediately prior to and following 14-hour on D-day,
tactical support aircraft provide air support for the
Assault Force in landing and seizure of objectives,
with particular attention to enemy defensive instal-
lations and troop.formation in the immediate objective
area. Major rail and highway bridges west and north-
west of TRINIDAD and along the coastal road toward
CIENFUEGOS are bombed in order to isolate the objective
area. Daily armed reconnaissance missions are continued
in order to prevent movement of enemy forces against the
lodgement.
f. Commencing at H-hour, the Assault Force lands by landing
craft (LCVP and LCU) over designated beaches, (Beaches 1
and 2), and by parachute in designated drop zone, seizes
objectives A, B, and C, and on order of Assault Force
Commander, seizes objectives F and F. (Annex D6--
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� Operation Overlay).
g. After seizure of initial objectives, the Assault Force
attempts to obtain cooperation, assistance and good-will
of the local populace in the TRINIDAD-CASILDA area.
Combat inside the City of Trinidad is avoided.
Facilities such as the hospital in TRINIDAD and the
port facilities and petroleum supplies at CASILDA
are converted to Brigade use.
h. After consolidation of the lodgement, Assault Force
coordinates operations with local guerrilla leaders
and civil leaders in the area making maximum efforts
to organize, equip and employ additional forces and
incorporate them under command of the Brigade Commander.
i. Upon seizure and preparation of the airfield at
TRINIDAD, transport aircraft (C-46) utilize this base
for supply and evacuation operations.
j. Follow-up logistic support is provided by air landing,
air drop and seaborne means on a scheduled basis and
in response to call of Brigade Commander.
k. In the event the TRINIDAD area cannot be held, the
Assault Brigade, on order of the Brigade Commander,
withdraws to the ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS in order to
continue resistance operations against the Castro
government. Support for these operations will he
provided by aerial means.
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3StFetfrgi.i.�
ENCLOSURE
Appendix 1 (Target List) to Annex E.(Tactical Air Support) to
Operation Plan (ZAPATA)
1. On D-day, the following targets will be attacked:
a. San Antonio de los Banos Air Base (2252N-8231W)
b. Campo Libertad Air Base (2305N-8227W)
c. Santiago de Cuba Air Base (Antonio Maceo) (1957N-7551W)
d. Managua Military Base (2258N-8218W)
e. Santa Clara Air Base (2229N-7955W)
f. Playa Baracoa Air Base (near Havana)
g. Cienfuegos Air Base (Jaime Gonzalez) (2209-8025W)
h. Naval craft at or near Cienfuegos Naval Station
i. Naval craft at or near Batabano Naval Station
j. Nueva Geron Airfield (Isle of Pines) (2150N-8247W)
k. �Bauta International Broadcasting Station (2259N-8232W)
1. Topes de Collantes Military Base.
m. San Julian Air Base - Jose Marti Imternational Airport
Camaguey Airfield.
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ENCLOSURE 4
16 March 1961
Anti-Castro Resistance in Cuba: Actual and Potential
1. There are now from 2,500 to 3,000 persons in Cuba
engaged in active resistance against the Castro regime. It is
our estimate that a well-organized, well-armed force, successful
in securing a lodgement on Cuban soil, would receive the active
support of 257. of the Cuban populace and would be opposed, at
the maximum, by no more than 20% of the people. (Of the re-
maining 657., the majority would adopt an attitude of neutrality
until such time as there was a strong indication of which side ,
had the better chance of victory.)
2. While Castro has been able to disperse small groups of
poorly-armed insurgents, he has been unable to eliminate them or
to prevent a general increase in resistance activities throughout
the island. Las Villas, with 600 active guerrillas, remains the
principal center of resistance, but Oriente (380 actives), Cama-
guey, and Matanzas are increasingly hostile to the regime. In the
past six weeks, insurgent groups have been reported from three
points in Oriente, one in Camaguey, and three in Matanzas. In
Havana itself there was an attempt to assassinate Ernesto Che Guevara
and attacks were made on a refinery, several tank trucks, and two
large stores. A plan is underway in Pinar-del Rio for seizure of
a major air base with the assistance of Army and Navy personnel from
Castro's own forces. Sabotage is occurring at a steadilynounting
tempo, with cane fields burning at the rate of 15,000 tons per week.
At Santiago de Cuba an attack on the refinery was mounted success-
fully by an agent team within the harbor of Raul Castro's stronghold.
3. The forces which remain loyal to Castro are, for the most
part, younger students, Communists, and those who have a stake in
the regime. The latter consists of government officials, persons
who have benefitted from the distribution of seized properties, and
those who have received, or believe they will receive, various
benefits (such as new housing and employment). Castro is opposed
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by former property holders, business and professional people,
the clergy, students in Catholic schools, most of those persons
originally in his own movement, and, increasingly, by the very
classes he professes to champion - the laborers and the peasants.
Reasons for this opposition are many. The increasingly virulent
attacks on the Catholic Church are disturbing a people 90% Catholic,
even those who are only nominal members. Workers have seen their
unions become instrumentalities for Communist propaganda, and
their leaders, including many non-Communist leftists, imprisoned
and denounced. All classes are aware of the economic deterioration.
There are shortages, not only of luxuries, but of such essentials
as soaps, fats, automotive parts, salt, eggs, rice, and beans. The '
increased numbers Of Soviet Bloc and Chinese Communist "advisors"
and the regime's uncritical acceptance of the international Commu-
nist line have alienated, not only the conservatives, but also the
non-Communist left and those intellectuals unwilling to serve as
toadies to a foreign ideology. The regime's disregard for objective
justice and the rule of law, the increase in the arbitrary powers
and the arrogance of the Security Services, the drum-head execution
of young counter=revolutionaries, have convinced many Cubans that
beneath the propaganda myth Castro's regime is little different from
that of Batista.
4. General discontent disillusionment, however, are ineffective
against a loyal, disciplined armed force. The people are ready to
support a new regime, but they will not enjoy that opportunity if
the bulk of Castro's military forces will fight for him. It is our
estimate that those forces, if confronted by a trained opposition
element with modern weapons and a unified command, will largely
disintegrate. It is significant that most of the leaders of anti-
Castro insurgent groups are Army officers who once fought with Castro
against Batista. The Army has been systematically purged, and most
of it is now serving in labor battalions q,. on routine garrison duty.
There is great resentment in the Army at this down-grading, the
subordination to the Militia, and the imprisonment of such popular
leaders as Huber Matos. The Air Force has lost nearly all of its
better pilots and navigators and does not constitute an effective
combat force. All of the few senior Navy officers and many of the
younger ones would welcome an opportunity to desert Castro. We
estimate that a significant portion (35 to 40%) of the Army would
join an opposition force if given the opportunity, and that the
remainder would not fight. The Air Force would likely defect en
masse. This would leave as Castro's chief reliance,the Militia.
5. The Militia is well-armed with individual weapons (rifles
and submachine guns) and is receiving increasingly effective
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training. 'Within it .are the "hard-core" of Castro supporters.
Despite this, it is our estimate that not more than 5,000 to 8,000
mould fight to the end for Castro, and then only if they were .
united in elements made up of similar die-hards, Which, except in
Havana, they are not. While some Of the Militia Joined for the
glamour of a uniform, most members became so because they had no
other choice. In the EscaMbray one Army commander urged Castro to
withdraw all the militia because of their ineffectiveness. And it
is significant, that when the fighting became more serious in that
area, three Army battalions were called, in despite the presence of
40,000 militia who were opposed by no more than 800 insurgents.
Reports of heavy militia casualties have spread throughout the
Island. Where terrain is faverable and opposition light, the militia
can be effective through sheer weight of numbers, e.g., against
Captain Clodomiro Miranda and only thirteen followers, Castro emr. ,
ployed six battalions. In rough terrain or against determined oppo-
sition that effectiveness becomes minimal.
6. In summary, it is our estimate that conditions within Cuba
Are now favorable for the overthrow of the regime if an effective,
well-armed opposition force' can secure a lodgement on the island,
that the active resistance to Castro will increase rapidly from the
present 2,500 to' 3,000 to a .figure at least ten times that size once
a landing is effected, and that the, Castro military forces, faced
with such opposition, will not exceed a maximum of 8,000 to 10,000
effectives. It is out further estimate that even the har&core'pro-
Castro 'forces.wilinot be effective outside the area of Havana, and
that any opposition force that can advance as far 'as Havana will
accrue to. it such defectors from the Castro military as will give it
superiority in numbers.
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ENCLOSURE 5
Cuba: The Record Set Straight *
by Charles J.V. Murphy
Not long ago, at President Kennedy's daily staff meeting,
the special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge
Bundy, opened the proceedings by noting, "Sir, we have four
matters up for discussion this morning." The President was
not in a zestful mood. "Are these problems which I inherited?"
he asked. "Or are they problems of our own making?" "A lit-
tle of both," was Bundy's tactful answer.
The exchange revealed a new and saving humility. Some
days after this incident, Kennedy addressed the nation on the
subject of Berlin. The ebullience, the air of self-assurance
that marked his first months in office had gone. He spoke
earnestly to his countrymen but his words were also aimed at
Premier Khrushchev, who up to this point had appeared not to
be listening. This time Kennedy did get through to Moscow;
and any lingering doubt about the American determination to
defend Berlin was dispelled by the response of the American
people. The President's will to stand firm was clear, and
the nation was with him.
Nevertheless, in any full review of John Kennedy's first
months in office, there must be reported a failure in adminis-
tration that will continue to inhibit and trouble American
foreign policy until it is corrected. tVis failure raises a
fair question: whether Kennedy has yet mastered the govern-
mental machinery, whether he is well and effectively served
by some of his close advisers, and whether they understand
the use of power in world politics. The matter is of vital
Importance; in the crises that will inevitably arise around
the world--in the Middle East, in Africa, in the Far East, in
Central Europe--the U.S. Government must be in top form, and
'possibly even, as Kennedy himself suggested, act alone.
* Fortune, September 1961, pages 92 - 237, passim.
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Administrative confusions came to light most vividly in
the Cuban disaster. That story is told here for the first
time in explicit detail. It is told against the background
of the U.S. reversal in Laos, which in itself should not be
underestimated: Laos, once in the way of becoming a buffer
for its non-Communist neighbors, is all but finished; now, in
South Viet-Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, a stout friend of the U.S., is
under murderous attack by Communist guerrillas; the U.S. loss
of face is being felt from the Philippines to Pakistan, and
in the long run the damage may prove to be even more Costly
than that caused by Cuba.
Let us turn back then to the train of events, beginning
with Laos, that culminated in the disaster in the Bay of Pigs.
FORTUNE is publishing the account for one purpose--to set
the record straight for concerned Americans.
Kennedy, from the day he took office, was loath to act
in Laos. He was confident that he understood the place and
use of power in the transactions of the nation, but he was
baffled by this communitrof elephants, parasols, and pagodas.
Then, too, he brought to office a general surmise that our
long-range prospects of holding the new and weak nations of
Southeast Asia in the Western camp were doubtful in the ex-
treme. In this respect, he was leaning toward the Lippmann-
Stevenson-Fulbright view of strategy. This school holds that
U.S. power is overcommitted in Southeast Asia, and that the
proper aim for U.S. diplomacy there should be to reduce local
frictions by molding the new states as true neutrals.
The U.S. position in Laos had become acute while Dwight
Eisenhower was still in office. Eisenhower must therefore
bear a considerable part of the blame for the U.S. failure;
he let a situation go from bad to worse, and indeed he apolo-
gized to Kennedy for leaving "a mess," and that it might take
the intervention of U.S. troops to redgam it. There had been
a moment when the struggle in Laos had turned in favor of the
pro-U.S. forces under General Phoumi Mosavan, the former De-
fense Minister. In a series of small but decisive engage- ,
ments, more by maneuver than by shooting, Phoumi eventually
took the capital, Vientiane, early in December, but at this
point the Russians intervened openly on the side of the Com-
munist faction, the Pathet Lao. In concert with a large-
scale push by well-trained troops from North Viet-Nam, they
introduced a substantial airlift into northern Laos (an opera-
tion that still is continuing).
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The collapse of the Royal Laotian Army then became
inevitable unless the U.S. came in with at least equal weight
on Phoumi's side. One obvious measure was to put the .airlift
out of business. �The job.could have been done by "volunteer"
pilots and the challenge would at least have established, at
not too high an initial risk for the U.S., how far the Rus-
sians were prepared to go. Another meausre would have been
to bring SEATO forces into the battle, as the SEATO treaty
provided..
In the end, Eisenhower decided to sheer away from both
measures. The State Department was Opposed to stirring up
India and the other Asian neutrals.. Secretary of State
Christian Herter agreed in principle that the independence of
Laos had to be maintained, yet he was unable to bring to heel
his own desk officers and the policy planners, who were appre-
hensive that even a limited military action would wreck the
possibility of some kind of political accommodation with Mos-
cow. The policy shapers, especially in State, hung back from
any sequence of actions that might have committed U.S. policy
on the central issue: that Laos was worth fighting for. -
Even the modest additional support that the Defense Department
tried to extend to Phoumi's U.S.-equipped battalions in the
field during the last weeks of the Eisenhower Administration
was diluted by reason of the conflict between Defense and
State. Under Secretary of Defense James Douglas was later to
say, "By the time a message to the field had been composed in
Washington, it had ceased to be an operational order and had
become a philosophical essay." And a vexed Phoumi was to ex-
claim that the reasoning of the American Ambassador, Winthrop
Brown, was beyond his simple Oriental mind. "His Execllency
insists that my troops be rationed to a few rounds of ammuni-
tion per man. He tells me that I must not start a world var.
But the enemy is at my throat."
After the responsibility passed to Kennedy in January,
Phoumi's position was still not completely hopeless, if he
had been able to get adequate help. }lilt. early in March a sud-
den Communist descent drove him off a position commanding the
principal highway in northernLaos. That unfortunate action
was the turning point in his part of the war. For the rela-
tive ease with which it was done raised in Washington the
question of whether Phoumi's troops had the will to fight.
By then Kennedy was committed to the Cuba operation. He
therefore now had to reckon with the very real possibility,
were U.S. forces to become involved in Laos, of'having to
back off from Cuba.
At this juncture .Kennedy's foremost need was a clear
reading of Soviet intentions. For this he turned to his
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"demonologists," the New Frontier's affectionate term for its
Soviet experts. The most influential among them--Charles E.
Bohlen State's senior SovietolOgist, and Ambassador
Llewellyn Thompson at Moscow--were agreed that Khrushchev per-
sonally had too much respect for U.S. power to stir it into
action', as Stalin had carelessly done in Korea. Yet, while
Khrushchev was plainly indulging his preference for "salami"
tactics, it was impossible to judge how big a slice he was
contemplating or whether he was, being pushed by Mao Tse-tung.
The only reading available to Kennedy was, in a word, ambigu-
ous. Maybe Khrushchev was moving into a vacuum in Laos just
. to keep out Mao. If so, then the least chancy response for
the U.S. was to assume that Khrushchev would be satisfied with
a thin slide in Laos, and to maneuver him toward a compromise--
a neutral government in which, say, the Pathet Lao would have
some minor representation.
This course was.urged by Secretary of State Dean Rusk
and also was being pressed by Prime Minister Macmillan in
London. It came to be' knoWn as Track Two. It was intended
to lead to a cease-fire followed by negotiation. Oppositely,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff still believed, as they did under
Eisenhower, that the military challenge demanded a military
showdowni action by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiation,
under which a mixed allied force, including Americans, would
move into Laos and take over 'the defense, of the. important
cities, thereby freeing the Royal Laotian Army :to move into
the field.without risk of being sapped by subversion in the
rear. This option was labeled Track One, and it was favored
as well by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and his deputy,
Roswell Oilpatric,
While Kennedy favored Track Two and supported a comAlia
tory note that Macmillan sent to Moscow, he decided he also '
had to make a show Of starting. down Track One, in case the
political 'gamble tailed. He permitted himself a dramatic ges-
ture. At his televised press conference On March 23, he,
addressed himself somberly to a map of Ll000s--a country "far
away" but in a world that is "small." Its indePendence, he
went on, "runs with the safety' of, us all," and in language
that all but told Khrushchev that he was in for a fight,. he
implied that the U.S. was preparing to go to its defense.
There was, meanwhile, a tremendous deployment of U.S. forces
in the Far East, involving the Seventh Fleet and Marine combat
units on Okinawa. The Army's strategic-Strike units in the
U.S. were made ready. A belated effort was made to buck up
Phoumi's forces with an increased flow of fighting gear. U.S.
military "advisers" went into the field with his battalions,
Against this background, on March 26, Kennedy went to Key West
and met Macmillan, who was on a visit to the West Indies. The
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Prime Minister made it clear that Britain considered Laos
hardly worth a war, and wanted no part in a SEATO action.
(De Gaulle, in a separate exchange, had told Kennedy flatly
that France would not fight in Laos.)
From that point on, the idea of a military showdown in
Laos looked less and less attractive to the. President. He did
issue one warning to the Russians that might have been con-
strued as having a military tone. Soviet Foreign Minister.
Andrei Gromyko called at the White House�and Kennedy took him
into the rose garden, beyond earshot of his staff, and said,
"The U.S. does not intend to stand idly by while you take over
Laos." But that was the last run along Track One.
By then, Rusk was in Bangkok for a meeting of the SEATO
powers, still hoping to extract from the meeting at least a
strong statement that would condemn the Soviet intervention
in Laos and reassert the determination of the SEATO powers to
defend the new nations of Southeast Asia. In this mission
Rusk failed: None of the ranking Democratic Congressmen, or,
Republican, spoke up in favor of intervention. Moreover, when
Kennedy pressed the military chiefs for specific recommenda-
tions, he got divided answers. General Thomas White 'then
Air Force Chief of Staff, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, then
Chief of Naval Operations, were both confident that the Com-
munist penetration could be defeated and Laos saved. They
said that since the Communists could throw far more manpower
into the battle, the U.S. war plan would have to include the
possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on a limited scale.
They maintained, however, that a clear U.S. resolution to em-
ploy nuclear weapons, if there was a need, might in itself
discourage further Communist penetration. General Lyman L.
Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen-
eral George H. Decker, Army Chief of Staff, had much less con-
fidence in the U.S. ability to stop the Communists. Lemnitzer
expressed the apprehension that U.S. military action in Laos
might be matched by Red China and Russia in a fast reopening
of the war in Korea. Two such wars, by*ftls calculation, might
require no fewer than twenty U.S. divisions, more than the
Army had in its entire order of battle, as well as general
mobilization to support them.
"In effect," Kennedy demanded, "you're telling me that I
can't do anything--without starting a nuclear war?" This, he .
'swore, he'd never do, which by itself was a startling reversal
of a fundamental premise of the Eisenhower strategy: that
U.S. forces would have recourse to nuclear tactical weapons on
whatever scale' the pursuit of U.S. objectives required. The
White House, while conceding to the Communists the option of
uninhibited escalation, would not tolerate �even a limited es-
calation on the nuclear side by our own forces. Any military
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move in Laos therefore seemed hopeless.
� The fear of the nuclear escalation factor became the
sanction for the policy that was pursued thereafter. In light
� of this, the scene of Kennedy addressing himself to the map of
Laos, in his first public appearance as Commander-in-Chief, is
now memorable for its fleeting revelation of a spirited man
who was eager to present himself as a strong President, but
who all too quickly turned unsure of his principal resource of
power.
The chiefs, although they took different views of the
risks of the Laos situation, were fundamentally agreed on a
central point. And that was that the U.S. had to be prepared
to employ tactical nuclear weapons. But Kennedy and his civil-
ian strategists, moving away from the nuclear base of the
Eisenhower strategy, read into their professional differences a
bankruptcy of means and doctrine. The low esteem in which .
Kennedy began to hold the military leaders whom he inherited
from the Eisenhower Administration has not been concealed.
Secretary of Defense McNamara is rewriting the Eisenhower
strategic doctrine, in collaboration with the political
scientists at the White House and State. The backing away
from nuclear strategy, which ended in the U.S. retreat in Laos,
.is now being formalized by McNamara. (His prescription will
call for a conventional base for NATO strategy in the defense
of Berlin.)
So there was, by early April, even as Laos was slipping
farther and farther below Kennedy's horizon, a breakdown of
communication between the political and the military sides of
the government, and this would contribute largely to the fail-
ure of Kennedy's next venture.
The Cuba affair has been called the, American Suez. In
the sense that Suez, too, was an utter fiasco, the bracketing
is wryly accurate. There is, however, a clear difference be-
tween the two operations. Ill-managed as it was, the Suez in-.
vasion would have succeeded had not Eisenhower used the influ-
ence of the U.S. to bring three Allies�Britain, France, and
Israel--to a humiliating halt. (It should be recorded that
neither Britain; France, nor Israel made any critical comment
on the U.S. excursion in Cuba.) In Cuba the defeat was wholly
self-inflicted. Even as the expedition was creeping into the
Bay of Pigs, just before midnight of April 16, the political
overseers back in Washington were in the process of knocking
out of the battle plan the final, irreducible element needed
for victory.
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If the U.S. military are without a peer in any one
technique of warfare, it is in putting forces ashore across a
hostile beach. For the Bay of Pigs, all the necessary means
were at Kennedy's hand. It was, by the standards of General
David M. Shoup's Marines, an elementary amphibious operation
in less than battalion strength. And, indeed, � as a tactical,
exercise, it was well devised and daringly and successfully.
led. But after the strategists at the White House and State
had finished plucking it apart, it became an operation that
would have disgraced even the Albanians. When Kennedy looked
around for the blunderer, he found him everywhere and 'nowhere.
Practically everybody in his inner group of policy movers and
shakers had been in on the planning. Only after the disaster
was upon them did he and his men realize that a venture which
was essentially a military one had been fatally compromised
in order to. satisfy political considerations. One not un-
friendly official who also served under Eisenhower was later
to observe: "Cuba was a terrific jolt to this new crowd be-
cause it exposed the fact that they hadn't really begun to
.understand the meaning and consequences of action--the use or
misuse of power, in other words. They had blamed Ike's ap-
parent inaction on indecision and plain laziness. Cuba taught
them that action, any kind of serious action, is hard and cer-
tainly no safe business for amateurs."
The idea for the invasion had taken root during the early
summer of 1960. By then, thousands of defectors from Castro's
Cuba were in, the U.S. Many of them were professional soldiers.
The job.of organizing and training them was given to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, as the government's principal mech-
anism for mounting covert operations of this sort. It. became
and remained to the end the specific responsibility of one of
the CIA's top deputies, Richard M. Bissell, a former econo-
mist who is also a highly practical executive. Among his
other first-class accomplishments, Bissell had masterminded
the 1J-2 operation, which was, until it finally missed, as one
day it had to, the most economical and comprehensive innova-
tion in espionage in modern times.
Training camps for the exiles were set up in a district
in western Guatemala offering some privacy. The original
idea was to feed the recruits back into Cuba, to reinforce
the several thousand anti-Castro guerrillas already established
in the mountains. Toward the autumn, however, a more ambi-
tious and riskier project came under tentative consideration.
Castro waS organizing large formations of militia and was ob-
viously bent on crushing the counterrevolutionary movement
before the Cuban populace caught fire. With a view to saving
the movement, it was proposed to build up an invasion force
big enough to seize and to hold on the Cuban shore a beachhead
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sufficiently deep for the expedition to proclaim a provisional
government, and so provide a rallying base for the discon-
tented. By. this time; too, the rudiments of an anti-Castro
air force Were in training nearby. The planes, however, were
all obsolete--mostly' propeller-driven, B-26's, ,twin-engine
bombers of World War II vintage that had been redeemed from
the Air. Force's graveyard. Associated with them, was a troop-
carrying squadron with which a small detachment of paratroopers
was training.
During the summer and fall of 1960, Eisenhower from time
to time personally reviewed the scheme. In late November, the
last time it came up for his comprehensive review, an opera-
tional plan had not yet crystallized; no timetable for action
had been set. Across the Potomac at the Pentagon, Under Secre-
tary of Defense Douglas, who was charged with quasi-military
operations under the noncommittal category of collateral cold-
war activities, was keeping a watchful eye on the project, and
releasing such military talent and gear as the CIA requisi-
tioned. Neither benor the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Whose cOn-
nection with the project remained informal at this stage)
believed that much good would flow from an attack made by Cubans
alone. For one thing,-the resources then available'permitted
the training of only 300 men or so, and the air unit had but a
dozen planes. This was hardly enough to bring down a tough,
well-armed regime, and Douglas repeatedly counseled more
realism in the planning. Indeed, it was taken for granted by
Douglas and. the others directly concerned that a landing in
force could not possibly be brought off unless the expedition
was shepherded to the beach by the U.S. Navy (either openly or
in disguise), and covered by air power in whatever amoung might
be necessary:. Eisenhower,. the commander of Normandy, under-
stood this well enough.
"You may have to send troops in"
It beoame obvious toward the end of 1960' that Ike would
be out of office well before an effective force would be ready.
So the decision as to how big the show should be, and how con.-
spicuous should. be the U.S.. share, and in what role, was no �
longer his to make. ,Given. the relaxed attitude at the White' .
House, the military chiefs also relaxed; military concern for
the enterprise'sank to the "Indians"--from the four-star level
to the colonels on, the Joint Staff who had been.advising the
CIA in. such matters as training and tactics. Bissell Was en-
couraged, on the one.hand, to go 'forward with preparations for
an invasion, but he was cautioned to be ready to fallback to
the more modest objective of simply generating a supply of re-
inforcements for the anti-Castro forces in the mountains.
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Before Eisenhower was fully rid of his responsibility,
however, a number of disquieting developments combined to im-
part to the enterprise an air of emergency. It was established
that Castro was to start receiving, early �in 1961, substantial
deliveries of Soviet jet fighters, and that pilots to man them
were already being trained in Czechoslovakia. From all indica-
tions, these would provide him, by �early summer, with an air
force that would be more than enough to extinguish the last
chance of a successful invasion by Cuban exiles; it would be by
all odds the most powerful air force in Latin America. Two
other developments were scarcely less worrisome. Castro was
making progress in his systematic destruction of his enemies in
the mountains, upon whose cooperation the invasion counted, and
there was no way, save by an overt air supply to get guns and
ammunition to them. The stability of the exile movement itself
was, moreover, coming into question. Warring political factions
threatened to split their ranks, and men who had trained long
and painstakingly were impatient over the failure of their
American advisers to set a sailing date. The feeling took hold
of them and their American sponsors that it was to be in the
spring or never.
After his election, Kennedy had been briefed fairly
frequently on the Cuba situation, along with that in Laos. As
his hour of authority approached, the question of what to do
about Cuba was increasingly on his mind. The problem had a
personal angle. In his fourth television debate with Richard
Nixon, he had sharply blamed the Eisenhower Administration for
permitting Communism to seize a base there, "only ninety miles
off the coast of the U.S." He discussed Cuba, along with
Laos, at length in both of his pre-inaugural talks with
Eisenhower, and by his stipulation. Ike was inclined to rank
Cuba below Laos in terms of urgency, but Cuba clearly worried
him. In their second conversation Ike said: "It's already a
bad situation. You may have to send troops in."
The first necessity; control of the air
On taking office, Kennedy at once called for a detailed
briefing on the condition and prospects of the U.S.-fostered
operation. This information was supplied by Allen W. Dulles,
the director of the CIA, and by Bissell. After Kennedy had
heard them out he decided that he had to have from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff a technical opinion of the feasibility of the
project. It is at this point that the locus of responsibility
begins to be uncertain.
The operation was not a Department of Defense responsibility.
Only once before, in early January, had the chiefs formally
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reviewed the plan, at Eisenhower's invitation. Now they were
asked only for an "appreciation" of its validity. The enter-
prise, moreover, had expanded considerably in scope and aim
in the past few months. With more than 100,000 Cuban refugees
in the U.S.', recruiting had stepped up, and the organizers
were at this point aiming at a landing force of about 1,000
men. An operational plan for a. landing on the south coast of
Cuba, near the town of Trinidad, �was finally beginning to jell.
There the country Was open, with good roads leading into the
Escambray Mountains and the needed link-up with the indigenous
guerrillas. Also cranked into the plan were ingenious schemes--
a barrage of radiobroadcasts from nearby islands and showers
of pamphlets from airplanes--intended to galvanize the anti-
Castro Cubans in the cities and villages into demonstrations
as the invaders struck. It was never explicitly claimed by
the CIA that a general uprising was immediately in the cards;
the intention was to sow enough Chaos during the first hours
to prevent Castro from smashing the invasion on the beach.
Once the beachhead was consolidated, however, and if fighting
gear went forward steadily to the guerrillas elsewhere in Cuba,
the planners were confident that a mass revolt could be
stimulated.
Finally, the plan still assumed that U.S. military help
would be on call during the landing. Castro's air force con-
sisted of not quite two-score planes--a dozen or so obsolete
B-26's, plus about the same number of obsolete British Sea
Furies, also slow, propeller-driven airplanes. But in addi-
tion there were seven or eight T-33 jet trainers, the remnants
of an earlier U.S. transaction with the Batista government, so
the force was not the pushover it appeared at first glance.
Armed with rockets, these jets would be more than a match in a
battle for the exiles' B-26's. The scheme was to destroy them
on the ground in advance of the landing, by a series of attacks
on.Castro's airfields; should the T-33's escape the first sur-
prise blow, there would be ample opportunity to catch them
lai-er on the ground while they were being refueled after an
action. In any event, a U.S. carrier would be close by., below
the horizon, and one or two of its tactical jets could presum-
ably supply whatever quick and trifling help might be required
in an emergency.
It stood to reason that, considering how small the landing
party was, the success of the operation would hinge on the B-26's
controlling the air over the beachhead. And the margins that
the planners accepted were narrow to begin with. The B-26's
were to operate from a staging base in a Central American
country more than five hundred miles from Cuba. The round trip
would take better than six hours, and that would leave the
planes with fuel for only forty-five minutes of action, for
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bombing and air Cover over Cuba. In contrast, Castro's air
force could be over the beachhead and the invaders' ships in
a matter of minutes, which would increase his relative air
advantage manifold. Hence the absolute necessity of knocking
out Castro's air power, or at least reducing it to impotence,
by the time the ground battle was joined.
,This, in general terms, was the plan the chiefs reviewed
for Kennedy. The assumptions concerning the possibilities of
an anti-Castro uprising not being in their jurisdiction, they
took these at face value. They judged the tactical elements
sound and, indeed, they accorded the operation a high proba-
bility of success. They were allowed to appraise the train-
ing and the equipment of the forces. A team of officers was
sent to Guatemala. On the basis of its report, the chiefs
made several recommendations, but again their assessment was
favorable.
Late in January, Kennedy authorized. the CIA to lay on
the invasion plan, but he warned that he might call the whole
operation off if he had a change of mind as to its wisdom.'
day was tentatively fixed for March 1 but this proved impos-
sible to meet. For one thing, it took some time to organize
the quarrelsome exiles in New York and Miami into a workable
coalition that would sponsor the expedition. For another, it
was decided that .a battalion of about 1,400 men was needed to
secure a beachhead, and that the force, which called itself
the Cuban Brigade, should be beefed up generally. In'conse-
quence of these developments, the target date kept slipping
until it finally came firm as April 17.
It has since been reported that the President was
'inwardly, skeptical of the operation from the start but just
why has never been clear--whether he judged the force too
small to take on Castro, or because he was reluctant to take
on so soon a nasty job that was bound to stir up an interna-
tional ruckus, however it came out. Some of his closest,ad-
visers, in any case, were assailed by sinking second thoughts.
What bothered them was the ,"immorality" of masked aggression.
They recoiled from having the U.S. employ subterfuge in strik-
ing down even so dangerous an adversary as Castro, and they
were almost unanimously opposed to having the U.S. do the job
in the open. Even with the best of luck, there would certainly
be a flutter among the six leading Latin-American states, which,
with the exception of Venezuela, had refused to lend themselves
to any form of united action against Castro. And the repercus-
sion would scarcely be less embarrassing among the neutralists
of Asia and Africa, whose good opinion Kennedy's advisers were
most eager to cultivate. And so the emphasis at the White
House and State began to move away from a concern with the
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military considerations--the things needed to make the
enterprise work--and to become preoccupied with tinkerings
they hoped would soften its political impact on. the neutral
nations.
The dismembering begins
A
The "immorality" of the intervention found its. most -
eloquent voice before. the President during a meeting in the
State Department on -April 4, only thirteen days before the
date set for the invasion. (Stewart Alsop told part of the
story in a recent issue of the Saturday Evening Post.) The
occasion was Bissell's final review of the operation, and
practically everybody connected with .high strategy was on
hand--Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara,
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, General Lemnitzer,
CIA chief Allen Dulles, as well as Bundy, Paul Nitze, Kennedy's
specialist on strategic planning at the Pentagon,- Thomas Mann,
then Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs,
and three of 'Kennedy's specialists in Latin-American matters,-
Adolf Berle, Arthur M. Schlesinger, -Jr., and Richard Goodwin.
There was also one outsider, �Senator William Fulbright, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had been
Kennedy's favorite choice. for Secretary of State, and whose
support he wanted. . After Bissell had completed his.briefing
and Dulles had summed up the risks and prospects, Fulbright
spoke and denounced the proposition out of hand: it was the
wrong thing for the U.S. to get involved in. �
Kennedy chose not to meet this issue. Instead, he
quickly noted certain practical considerations and then, going
around the table, he asked various of his advisers whether
they thought the operation should go forward. Without excep-
tion, the answer was, yes. Berle was particularly outspoken.
He declared that "a power Confrontation" with Communism in
the Western Hemisphere was inevitable amyhow. As for this
enterpriSe. "Let 'eryip".was his counsel. Mann, whd previ-
ously had been on the fence, now spoke up for the operation.
Rusk,, too, said he Was for'it, in answer to the president's
direct' question, but as would presently be manifest, he pri-
vately had no heart for it. Two other men among the Presi-
dent's senior foreign-policy advisers, not present. at the meet-
ing, shared'Fulbright's feelings:. Under Secretary of State
Chester Bowles, and Adlai_Stevenson, with the. United Nations
in New York, who, soon came to know in a general way that some-
thing distasteful was afoot. In deference to these views,
Kennedy--either at the meeting or soon afterward�made two
separate ruling's� that were to contribute to the. fatal
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dismemberment of the whole plan. First, U.S. airpower would
not be on call at any time: the obsolescent B-26's flown by
"our" Cubans would be on their own. Second, the B-26's
could be used in only two strikes before the invasion--first
on D-minus-two-days (April 15) and again on the morning of
the landing. Although these limitations clearly lengthened
the risks, Lemnitzer did not dispute them, nor did Bissell's
own military advisers; they were confident that if the B-26's
missed the T-33's on the first go, they would surely catch
them on the second.
During the few remaining days, Kennedy drew his circle
of advisers more tightly around him. Apart from Bundy and
Rostow, the only White House advisers who remained privy to ,
the development of the operation were the Latin-American ex-
perts--Adolf Berle and Schlesinger. Lemnitzer and, of course,
Allen Dulles were in and out of Kennedy's office. But the
doubts of Rusk and Fulbright and of others were all the while
imperceptibly converging on the President and, bit by bit, an
operation that was marginal to begin with was so truncated as
to guarantee its failure.
The embarkation of the expedition was scheduled to start
on April 10. This was, in itself, quite a job. Some half-
dozen small steamers were collected for the first movement,
together with a number of tactical landing craft. The take-
off point was a port on the Caribbean, several hundred miles
from the training area in Guatemala, and the transfer of the
Cuban,Brigade was done by air and at night, through four
nights, in the interest of secrecy. The gear aboard the ships
was enough to supply the landing force through ten days of bat-
tle, and also to equip the thousands of guerrillas expected to
be recruited after the beachhead was gained.
Only a week before the embarkation, and indeed only a
day or so before the last go-around at the State Department,
another serious change was made in the invasion plan. At the
insistence of the State Department, Trinidad was eliminated
as the target landing area. State's reasons were complex.
Rusk decided that the entire operation had to be kept "unspec-
tacular" and minimize the overtness of the U.S. role as much
as possible. That required shifting the attack to a less
populated and less accessible area, where Castro's reaction
might be slower and less effective. Rusk and his own advisers
were also anxious to be rid at all. possible speed of the in-
cubus of responsibility for mounting the operation in Central
America, anxious that the B-26's should be based as rapidly as.
possible on Cuba. The only vulnerable airfield capable of
taking the planes was one in poor condition near the Bay of
Pigs, on the Zapata Peninsula, about 100 miles to the west of
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Trinidad. Here the countryside was quite deserted and, to
succeed at all, the invaders had to seize and hold two nar-
row causeways leading. across a swamp that was impassable on.
either side. These actions did not end the last-minute cur-
tailments directed by the White House. Even the arrangements
for arousing the Cuban populace and trying to stampede Cas-
tro's militia with leaflet raids and radiobroadcasts were
struck from the plan, and again because State was afraid that
they would be too obvious a showing of the U.S. hand. On *
April 12, while the convoy was heading north,, Kennedy was im-
pelled to announce at a .press conference that the U.S. would
not intervene with force in Cuba. Rusk made sure the idea
got home by repeating the same guarantee on the morning of
the invasion. The effect of this was to serve notice on the
Cubans in Cuba, who were known to be waiting for an encourag-
ing signal from the U.S., that whatever they might be tempted
to try would be at their own risk.
The politicians take command
Clear to the end, Kennedy retained tight control of the
enterprise. As each new sequence of action came up for his
final approval--the Go signal for the embarkation, then for
the pre-invasion air strike on the morning of April 15, he
came to his decisions quickly and firmly. All the way, how-
ever, he reserved the option to stop the landing short of the
beach. He kept asking how late the enterprise might be re-
versed without making it look as if Castro had called an Amer-
ican bluff. He was told: noon on Sunday, April 16, when the
invasion force would be eleven hours of steaming from the Bay
of Pigs. The Sunday deadline found Kennedy in the Virginia
countryside, at Glen Ora; only then did he raise his finger
from the hold button. As he did so, he noted with relief
that no other unfavorable factors had materialized. He was
mistaken. At dawn of the day before, by the timetable, the
B-26's, having flown undetected through 4 the night from their
Central American staging base, appeared over Cuba and bombed
the three fields on which Castro's ready air was deployed.
(The attack was, on the whole, highly successful. Half of
Castro's B-26's and Sea Furies, and four of his T-33 jets were--
blown up or damaged and so removed from the imminent battle.)
The story was put out that Castro's own pilots, in the act of
defecting, had attacked their own airfields. This was a gloss,
to say the least; the attackers were indeed defectors from
Castro, but they had defected long before. Later that after-
noon, at the United Nations, alter the Cuban Foreign Minister,
Raul Roa, had charged that the attack was. a "prologue" to a
U.S. invasion, Adlai Stevenson arose and swore that the
planes were Castro's.
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From this hapless moment on, Stevenson's role becomes
unclear.. There was a subsequent published report that he in-
tervened to block the second strike. Stevenson has flatly
.denied, and continues to deny, that he even knew about the
second strike, let alone that he demanded. that it be called
off. But there was little doubt about his unhappiness over
the course of events in the Caribbean and he conveyed these
feelings to Washington. Before Sunday was over Bundy was to
fly to New York, to see Stevenson (Bundy said) and still
wearing, in his haste to be off, sneakers and sports clothes.
This sudden errand followed a shattering order that went out
to Bissell.
It was Sunday evening, only some eight hours after Kennedy
had given "the go-ahead." In the first dark, the expedition
was even then creeping toward the Cuban shore. In Bissell's
office there was a call on the White House line. It was
Bundy, being even crisper than usual: the B-26's were to
stand down, there was to be no air strike in, the morning,
this was a presidential order. Secretary of State Rusk was
now acting for the President in the situation. If Bissell
wished to make a "reclama" (federalese for appeal), it could
be done through Rusk.
Bissell was stunned. In Allen Dulles' absence ,(he was in'
Puerto Rico), he put his problem up to CIA Deputy Director
Charles Cabell, an experienced airman. Together they went to
the State Department to urge Rusk to reconsider a decision that,
in their judgment, would put the enterprise in irretrievable
peril. Cabell was greatly worried about the vulnerability to
air attack first of the ships and then of the troops on the
beach. Rusk was not impressed. The ships, he Suggested,
could unload and retire to the open sea before daylight; as
for the troops ashore being unduly inconvenienced by Castro's
air, it had been his experience, as a colonel in the Burma
.theatre, he told his visitors, that air attack could, be more
of a nuisance than a danger. One fact he made absolutely
clear: military considerations had.ovezruled the political
when the D-minus-two strike had been laid on; now political
considerations were taking over. While they were talking, Rusk
telephoned the President at Glen Ora to say that Cabell and
Bissell were at his side, and that they were worried about the
cancellation of the strike. Rusk, at one point, put his hand
over the mouthpiece, and asked Cabell whether he wished to
speak to the President. Cabell shook his head. Perhaps that
was his mistake; it was certainly his last chance to appeal a
lamentable decision. But Bundy had made it clear that Rusk
was acting for the President, and Cabell is a professional
military man, trained to take orders after the facts had been
argued with the man in command.
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On their return to the office, Bissell flashed orders to
the B!-.26 commander at the staging field, more than 500 miles
from the Bay of Pigs. The force got the changed orders short-
ly before midnight, only half an hour or so before they were
scheduled to depart; the bomb bays were already loaded and
the crews were aboard. Meanwhile the planes carrying the
paratroopers had taken off, and the first assault barges, still .
unobserved, were even then approaching the beaches.
Tuesday, the turning point
Past .midnight, in the early watches, Bissell and Cabell
restudied the battle plan, while signals of consternation
welled up from their'men far to the south. At four o'clock,
less than an hour before first light on the Cuban shore,
Cabell went back to Rusk with another proposal. it was man-
ifestly impossible for the Brigade's small force of B-26's
(only sixteen were operational) to provide effective air
cover for the ships from their distant base against jets that
could reach the ships in minutes. Cabell now asked whether,
if the ships were to pull back of the three or twelve-mile
limit, whichever distance U.S. legal doctrine held to be the
beginnings of international water, the U.S.S. Boxer, a car-
rier on station about fifty miles from the Bay of Pigs, could
be instructed to provide cover for them. Rusk said no and
this time Cabell finally took advantage of the reclama that
Bundy had extended to Bissell. .The President was awakened.
Cabell registered his concern. The answer was still no.
Shortly after that, on Monday morning, April 17.,
Brigadier General Chester Clifton, the President's military
aide, received word that the Cuban Brigade had landed. They
had little chance. They were without the ranging fire power
that the B-26's with their bombs and machine guns had been
expected to apply against Castro's tanks and artillery as
they wheeled up Castro's forces camp wfast. He still had
four jets left, and they were indeed armed with powerful rock-
ets. He used them well against the ships in the bay. Before
the morning.was done, he had sunk two transports, aboard which
was the larger part of the .reserve stocks of ammunition, and
driven off two other, with the rest of the stock.
Now Kennedy and his strategists became alarMed. About
noon on. Monday, Bissell was told that the B-26'S could attack
Castro's airfields at will. Orders went to the.staging base
for a major attack next morning. But the orders 'came too late,
Most of the pilots had been in the air for upwards of eighteen
hours An an unaVailing effort to keep Castro's planes off the
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troops and the remaining ships... That night a small force was
scratched together. It was over Cuba at dawn, only to find
the fields hidden by low, impenetrable fog. Nothing came of
the try.
Tuesday, the second day, was the turning point. The men
ashore had fought bravely and gained their planned objectives.
They had even seized and bulldozed the airfield.' But they
were desperately short of ammunition and food, and under the
pressure .of Castro's superior fire power and numbers they
were being forced back across the beach; three B-26'.s trying
to help them were shot down.
Two small landing craft had made rendezvous with two
remaining supply ships and taken on ammunition and rations;
but, from where they were, they could not reach the beach until
after daybreak, at which time Castro's jets were certain to
get them. There remained still one last clear chance to make
the thing go. Boxer was still on station. The release of a
few of its jets simply for air cover should see the two craft
safely to the shore.
"Defeat is an orphan"
That night Kennedy was caught up in a White House recep-
tion, a white-tie affair, for Congress and the members of
his Cabinet. He was informed by an aide that Bissell wished
to see him. The President asked Bissell to come to the White
House. Calls went out to the other principals--to Rusk, who
had been entertaining the Greek Premier at a formal dinner at
the State Department, to McNamara, General Lemnitzer, Admiral
Burke.
They gathered in the President's office shortly after
midnight. One of the participants recalls: "Two men domina-
ted that singular oceasion�the Presidgfit and Bissell. Bissell
was in the unhappy posture of having to present the views of
an establishment that had been overtaken by disaster. He did
so with control, with dignity, and with clarity." Bissell
made it plain that the expedition was at the point of no re-
turn; unless U.S. airpower was brought forward, the men on
the beach were doomed. In substance, he asked that the
Boxer's planes be brought into the battle to save the opera-
tion. Rusk still would not have this. Several others were
also opposed, including the President's personal staffers.
Burke vouched for the worth of Bissell's proposition. The dis!..
cussion with the President lasted until 2:00 A.M. Its outcome
was a singular compromise. Jets from the Boxer would provide
cover next morning for exactly one hour--from 6:30 to 7:30 A.M.,
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just long enough for the ships to run into the shore and
start unloading, and for the remaining B-26's to get in a hard
blow.
Next morning, through an incredible mischance, the B-26's
were over Cuba half an hour ahead of schedule. Boxer's jets
were still on the flight deck. But Castro's jets were ready.
Two of the B-26's were shot down; others were hit and forced
to abort. That was the melancholy end. At two-thirty that
afternoon, Bissell received word from one of his men aboard a�
ship An the Bay of Pigs,: remnants of the landing force were
in the water and under fire. There was a final message from
the gallant Brigade'commander ashore to this effect, "I have
nothing left to fight with and so cannot wait. Am headed for
the swamp." Bissell went'to the White House to report the end.
Kennedy gaveorders for a destroyer to move into the bay and
pick up as many men as it could. It was no Dunkirk. Only a
few of the 1,400 were saved.
"Victory," Kennedy noted some days later, "has a hundred
fathers, and defeat is an orphan." Yet, for all Kennedy's
outward calmness at this moment of defeat, he was never,
after it, quite the same. Speaking before the American Society
of Newspaper Editors, a grave President said, "There are from
this sobering episode useful lessons for all to learn."
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