CIA'S ROLE IN THE PAN AM 103 INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01407030
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2021
• Case Number: F-2021-00716
• Publication Date: February 8, 2007

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(b)(3)
SECRETIINOFORMX1
Breaking New Ground
CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 Investigation
and Trial (U)
1))ral History Program Interviewer
(b)(3)
On 21 December 1988, Pan American flight 103, a Boeing 747, took offfrom London, bound for
New York City. As it was climbing on its northerly flight path, it exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland. All 259 passengers and crewmembers and 11 people on the ground were killed. One CIA
employee, Matt Gannon, (b)(3)
was on board. After more than 11 years of determined investigation by many officials in many (b)(6)
countries, two Libyans were tried for the crime before a Scottish court convened in the
Netherlands. One was convicted. This article focuses on the CIA's contribution to the investigation
and trial, as it is remembered by Agency officers involved. The officers recount the CIA's
engagement in the hunt for those responsible, the discovery and assessment of key pieces of
evidence, and the successful prosecution. This is the story of a jigsaw puzzle's assembly by
cooperating law enforcement, intelligence, and legal personnel. The officers conclude by offering
the lessons they believe the CIA learned from the experience. (U)
Below are excers ts rom interviews of seven Agency officers. Working for the CIA's Oral History
Program onducted the interviews in 2002, shortly after the trial. The interview (b)(3)
transcripts are held in the CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence. (U)
(b)(3)
The Crime (U)
the senior Directorate of Operations (DO) officer res s onsible or the
case during its prosecution phase describes the attack and the apparent motive. Chief (b)(3)
of the [CIA] Counterterrorist Center (CTC), always speculated that Pan Am 103 was brought
down as payback for the US air raids against Tripoli in which Qadhafi's stepdaughter was killed;
and that might well be the truth.] (S)
What emerged during the trial, in the testimony, and what was previously indicated in the
indictment was that apparently a deliberate effort had been made to search for a way to bring down
an American plane. Somewhere along the line, it's not clear just when the light went on,. . . the
Libyans got the bright idea that they could insinuate a piece of luggage into the system at Malta
Airport--unaccompanied baggage--send it as checked luggage through the connector flight from
Malta to Frankfurt, have it automatically transferred to a Pan Am feeder flight from Frankfurt to
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London, and finally have it automatically transferred to Pan Am 103, which originated in London.
(U)
The bomb was probably supposed to explode when the plane was over the ocean. It did not
because of the weather that night. On that night, the jet stream was particularly strong from west to
east, at about 150 miles an hour. The plane could not take off over Land's End, as it normally
would, and fly straight out, from Heathrow straight out over the Atlantic. Instead, it headed
overland, due north, and it reached cruising altitude [30,000 feet] just over Lockerbie, Scotland,
and was just beginning to turn left. Lockerbie is within sight of the Irish Sea. (U)
They probably had just taken off the seatbelt sign and were just bringing out the drink carts. In
another 90 seconds, that plane would have been over water. Had it followed the original flight
path, it would have been miles out over water. We would never have found any evidence. (U)
There wasn't a lot of explosive in that bomb. There was only a couple of pounds, because it was
put in a fairly small Toshiba Boombeat, I think it's called, portable radio. And it's probably just
pure serendipity that that plane was brought down as it was, because a 747 is a very robust aircraft.
It normally would take a lot to bring down that aircraft with all of its backup systems. (U)
From computer models and forensic evidence,
the British and the FBI reconstructed just what
happened when that bomb went off. They
know precisely where the bomb was. They
were able to pinpoint the exact luggage
container, which they found. Obviously there
had been an explosion in it, as it was shattered
outward. They knew where in that luggage
container the bag with the bomb was placed,
because they had records, actually, of which
bags went into what container, and they could
tell, again, from the forensic evidence where it
was. It was about two up from the bottom, and
they knew where in the aircraft that luggage
container was placed. And then they actually
blew up some planes on the ground here to �Reuters 1998
prove that theory. (U)
They demonstrated that, because the luggage container was next to the wall of the aircraft, just
under the business class section, about row 14, the force of the explosion and the explosive
plasma, which came out from the bomb, had nowhere to go. It did not break the skin, the outer
skin. It broke the inner skin, and then it spread up through the fuselage in a circular pattern
between the outer skin and the inner skin. And essentially it went all the way around the aircraft.
And then burst out. And it just cut the aircraft. It was like taking a huge cleaver and chopping off
the nose of the aircraft. Which is why you had the cockpit section lying in the field, the famous
picture where the Pan Am logo was visible. (U)
Initial Approach (U)
An engineer from the Air Crash Investigation Unit peers
out from the reconstructed remains of the Pan am
Boeing 747 that crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland. (U)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
Where to Look? (U)
recalls: The immediate place, I think, everybody looked was toward the Palestinians,
because there had been indications that the Palestinians had definitely been planning to bomb
airliners. That was the initial link to Pan Am 103.
(b)(3)
(b)(1 )
(b)(3)
elaborates on the initial direction of the search for suspects: In fairly short order,
within a month or so, it became clear that there were a number of potential leads . . . particularly
the PFLP-GC, Ahmed Jebril's outfit.
there was a lot of additional anecdotal and fragmentary information that began coming in pointing
to the Palestinians. To make a long story short, that focus continued for the next year to
year-and-a-half. (S) (b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Break (U)
recalls: The sequence of events that really changed the focus to the Libyans [occurred] in
the fall of 1989. Months after the plane went down, the Scots discovered a piece of [circuit board
from] the timer that came from the bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103. A shredded shirt [containing
the fragment] was found by a Scotsman walking his dog after the formal recovery effort had
ended. (S)
Chief of the Litigation Division of the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and the
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supervising Agency attorney on the case during the prosecution, describes the moment in 1989
that the key piece of evidence turned up in afield near Lockerbie: The shredded shirt. . . was some
distance off from the main crash site. This [fanner] saw this fabric, looked at it, knew, of course,
the plane had crashed. . . and brought it to the attention of the Scottish police. The shirt had been
destroyed. However,. . . the label in the back of the collar had a tag that linked it to Mary's House,
a clothing store in Malta. That's how [the Scottish investigators] were able to tie it to that store.
The shirt was made of polyester fabric so the heat of the explosion had actually fused the timing
device chip into the shirt so it didn't fall off when the man picked up the shirt. If he hadn't thought
it was a piece of debris, or thought it was only a piece of litter and just left it there, we still might
be searching to figure out what happened. (U)
(b)(1)
The Lockerbie police sent the shirt fragment to the Royal Armaments Research and Development (b)(3)
Establishment military laboratories, where, as they were pulling the scorched fabric apart, they
found the piece of circuit board from the timer. (U)
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CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 Investigato)(3)
(b)(3)
The Libyans who ultimately went on trial for the Pan
Am 103 bombing: Abdie Basset. Ali Al-Megrahi (left)
and Al-Amin Khalifa Fahitna. (U)
MeanWhile, xplains, the Scots had linked the shirt fragment to Malta and the Libyans:
. . . [By Septernbr I 9891 the Scots had begun their own investigations in Malta. They had come -
across Tony Gau(.�,i, the shop owner who ran the Mary's House clothing store [in Valletta]. And he's
the one who recalled ri:Jat he had sold such-and-such articles of clothing, similar to what was found
at the crash site, to sol:tebod-y that he said he could identify as Libyan. He didn't know the name.
(b)(3)
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He did not know whether they were connected to the Libyan Airlines office, or the Embassy, or
what. But he said that just by appearance, by language, he recognized them as Libyan. He
identified them when he was a witness at the trial. (U)
Tom McCullough, the Detective Chief Superintendent from Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary,
has been with this case since the night the plane went down. He was recovering bodies and was in
charge of the temporary mortuary. Later, he emerged as the Chief Investigator and, in the last few
years, has traveled to Libya., Jordan, Turkey, and all over Europe. McCullough has nominated
Gauci for the [US] Department of Justice (DOJ) reward money in this case. McCullough says that
the Scottish prosecutors viewed Gauci as probably the single most crucial witness in that whole
process. He was able to make the connection to the Libyans. While the forensic evidence might
have pointed to a Libyan connection, Gauci was the one who was able to put a face on the plot. n
(b)(1 )
CIA's Libyan Asset (U) (b)(3)
Abdul Majid Gaika, a Libyan intelligence officer,
officers cultivated Majid, who, �
provided information on the Libyan intelligence service and the activities of
Libyan officers passing through Malta. Majid had no connection with the Pan Am bombing, but (b)(1)
he held another of the keys to the solution of the puzzle. No one realized what he could offer, (b)(3)
however, until the investigation of the Libyan connection had deepened as a result of the discovery
of the circuit board piece and the account of the Maltese shopkeeper. (S)
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Even after the bombing, we did not suspect that the Libyans were behind it, and we certainly h(b)(3)
no clue whatsoever that Al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Kalifa Fahima [who also went on trial] were
involved or had anything to do with that bombing. In fact, when I first learned about their
involvement in 1991, I was quite surprised, because there was a lot of speculation in Malta at thc(b)(1)
time that this was an Iranian sponsored attack in response to the incident that happened in the (b)(3)
summer of 1988 where the US Navy ship VINCENNES shot down that Iranian Airbus. (S)
Majid Connects the Puzzle Pieces (U)
Understanding of Majid's utility to the Pan Am case and Al-Murales role in the bombing
unfolded over two years.
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b)(1)
Finally, in June 1991, we briefed the Justice Department on the possibility that the Libyans we4b)(3)
the perpetrators of this tragedy. What Justice said they needed to prove the indictment was an
expert witness from inside the Libyan Intelligence Service, the ESO, who could talk about how the
ESO works. So we determined that Majid could certainly satisfy (b)(1)
that need. We didn't think about it in terms of an absolute solution to Pan Am 103, we were just (b)(3)
looking for an expert witness who would be available. (S)
lescribes Ma jid's role: We had at that time no indication [Majid] knew
anything about Pan Am 103, but we knew he had been a Libyan intelligence officer and he could
give us information about that intelligence service.
In the debriefings, he revealed for the first time that he had seen, the day before the bombing, a
shiny brown Samsonite luggage taken off the carousel at Malta airport by Al-Megrahi, who was
one of the suspects at that time, and therefore Majid became very important. (S)
adds: The more they [FBI] started investigating there in Malta, the more the leads
were tugging them away from the Palestinians and towards the Libyans. And Phil [Reid, of the
FBIl said that it wasn't really until Majid came out--and he was the first one to interview him (b)(1')
-that it became pretty apparent to him that this N(b)(3)
a Libyan job and wasn't a Palestinian job. (S)
Basically Majid's part in this was that he was connecting a lot of the pieces they had discovered,
and that's why they called him "Puzzle Piece;" that was what the FBI's codeword for him was.
They had first used a lot of our previous cables about him to come to that conclusion. Then, wh(b)(1)
the FBI started interviewing him, and he started providing specific data and filling in some gapscb)(3)
he put a number of things into perspective for them. This is when it become apparent that, yes, this
was a Libyan operation. (S)
(b)
(1)
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(b)(3)
The key thing that came out during the trial was the fact that the Libyans had given him a false
passport in that [alias] name and he was in Malta at the right time to arrange for the insertion of the
bomb suitcase into the luggage system that eventually carried it to Pan Am 103. The alias was
what put him in Malta on the day of the bombing.
Supporting the Prosecution (U)
describes the evolution of the Agency's' role in the prosecution and trial of the
Libyans Al-Megraln and Fahima at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands : We [the Office of
General Counsel] gave our first briefing to the DCI in early 1999, and, at that point, he looked
directly at all of us and said: "This is very important to me. I want you to be forward-leaning, do
all that you can to help." And it was understood that there were things in this case [we were going
to have to do] that were counterintuitive to us in the intelligence business. We're used to protecting
our secrets. And it was going to be a push, but he instructed us to go forth and cooperate as much
as we could. (S)
Artist's rendition of Libyan defendants Al-Megrahi and
Fahima as a witness testifie; :-,aririg the Pan Am 103 trial
in the Netherlands. (U)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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When we were first told that Qadhafi had produced the defendants and we were actually going1(b)(1)
have a trial, the two Department of Justice attorneys, Dana Biehl and Brian Murtagh, sent a reqi(b)(3)
to us saying that, "We're going to need to see all of your files relating to Pan Am 103. The
prosecution is going forward. The United States government is going to be directly prosecuting the
defendants." (S)
We weren't happy about that. Then Justice became unhappy when they learned that they weren't
actually undertaking the prosecution, but there was an agreement made by the State Department
and Justice to assist the Scots, who were conducting the prosecution, and we were to help in any
way we could. So the Justice attorneys came to [CIA] Headquarters. We accumulated all the files.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Department of Justice, these two attorneys [Murtagh and Biehl] from the Terrorism and
Violent Crime Section, came out and reviewed as many of the documents as they could.
But they got to the pertinent and most important material. One obvious thing that
they wanted to see was the 201 file on Majid.4 So they spent a lot of time going through that with
a fine-tooth comb. They found the documents that they determined to be relevant to the case and
helpful to the Scottish prosecutors. At that point, we began the redaction process to declassify the
documents that they asked for, which took awhile. DOJ came over, and we went back and forth
with the DO Information Review Officer to discuss the scope of the redactions. (S)
The Trial (U)
from OGC's Litigation Division, recalls: We had two issues that had to be dealt
with. One was our dealings with Majid, and how that was going to come before the trial. The
second involved the timers, and how we were going to prove that this little chip had something to
do with or was connected to Libya. We couldn't obviously connect the chip to these defendants.
But we could connect it to Libya and that was going to suggest it came from somewhere in the
Libyan intelligence organization. (S)
The Scottish legal system is much different from the US legal system. It requires much more
supported background information for [something] td get in [as evidence]. So, for example, the
CIA's cables about its meetings with Majid . . . were going to be needed in this trial, because
Majid's memory was sketchy, and he was not the world's best witness, by any stretch of the
imagination. He was high-strung, and not overly bright, and there were some other issues, as well.
And his testimony would not have been credible if the Court actually came to these conclusions.
(S)
Majid's testimony and evidence were supported by these cables that would indicate that he said
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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what he said at a time when he had no reason to say anything else, unless you really believe in a
huge conspiracy theory. The cables would support what he said in 1988. There was a question of
whether the Court was going to let those cables be used [especially if they were redacted to protect
security information]. We don't let our cables be seen by just anybody, and certainly don't want
them being seen by foreigners, especially Libyans, who might learn about our sources and methods
and tradecraft. (S)
At the time, we weren't going to acknowledge our presence [in Malta] and it wasn't [widely]
known that Majid existed. I mean, we knew. DOJ knew. The Scots knew. But the rest of the world
didn't know that Majid was a CIA agent, or that we had this particular specific information. So
there was first the question of how was the CIA going to get involved in this at all. Next we were
not sure what it would take to get these cables introduced into evidence. (S)
elaborates: The [Scots] are even more particular about authentication than we are. Under
Scottish law, we would have to acknowledge that they were CIA documents. We would have to
have the cables revealed, and we'd have to have someone testify that they, in fact, had received the
information from Majid, that they had then gone ahead and written down the information in these
cables. (S)
It took a seemingly unusual act offaith by the court to accept that potentially exculpatory
information had not been redacted from the CIA cables that were introduced . escribes
how it happened: In this case, the Lord Advocate had never seen the minimally redacted cables,
and he said [to the Court], "Well, these are the cables. This is all I've seen." The Court says, "We
think there's more out there. . . can you go find out?" The Lord Advocate then came back to the
Court after reading the minimally redacted cables and said, "This is what we can have. I've now
gone through it. I sat down with the CIA and we went through them one-by-one. I am satisfied that
the only thing that is left out is something that's actually national security." And the Court said,
"Okay. We believe you." The defense whined about it, and the Court said, "Well, I'm sorry. This is
the way it is." (S)
Weighing Majid's Testimony (U)
recalls the testimony of the CIA asset, who took a pretty severe beating during
cross-examination : Because of the fact that [Majid] had never told us about the luggage [until
long after the bombing], he was crucified during cross-examination. But the FBI took him, put him
in the witness protection program. (S)
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CIA Officers as Witnesses (U)
Arranging the appearance of undercover CIA officers required extraordinary measures
recounts what was needed: Our witnesses were in disguise, in aliases, their voices were
altered, and, although the Court was open to the public, there was a closed-circuit TV that was
broadcast to other parts of the Court, back to New York, DC, and London, where there were
offices set up solely for the family members of the crash victims. You had to have a special pass to
get in. There was also a media center, where the media could watch, but they couldn't videotape it.
The media were only allowed to sketch and take notes. (S)
The judges, the defendants, the defense counsel, and the prosecution could see the witnesses.
There was a screen put up when our witnesses testified to block them from the gallery and the
public. And the closed-circuit TV cameras were degraded so you couldn't see the person. You
could barely tell it was a person, and their voices were degraded. . . they sounded like Darth
Vader. It was very unusual. (S)
Agency officers helped establish that the timer used in the bombing was of Libyan origin. This
involved testimony not only from therofficer who had made the ,connection, but
also from an officer involved in the irrest in Senegal of the Lib-yans who had brought explosives
and a MEBO timer into the country. recalls : The first [witness] was in
Senegal when the Libyans were arrested
which didn't come out during the trial, so I think it's probably still classified,
(b)(3)
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When the Libyans got off the plane, the police were there and arrested them as they were ente(b)(1 )
Senegal. The Agency was involved in that saw them being arrested and taken i(b)(3)
the VIP Lounge at the Senegal Airport. Subsequentl
Then he was involved in making arrangements fo
he saw them in prison a couple of days later.
officers to examine the device and the
(b)(1) (b)(3)
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explosives and to take pictures of them. That was the substance of his testimony during the trial.
(S)
The second Agency witness was the Agency officer who took pictures of the Senegal timer. He
testified about and showed pictures of all the things that were taken out of the Libyan's briefcase--a
pistol, Semtex explosive, and the timer. Fortunately, he had gotten some pretty good pictures. At
one point, he had tried to take the timer casing apart, but the Senegalese wouldn't let him. He
testified to all of that, which went pretty well. The pictures were very important to show that these
were the same type of chip, same type of timer used to destroy Pan Am 103, and how it related to
the way the Libyans operate. So the Agency testimony was a big part of establishing that. (S)
It didn't take a lot of work for the prosecution to
link the timer in Senegal to be exclusive with thc
Libyans once Messier and Bollier, the timer's
manufacturers, testified. They admitted to the
fact that these were [MEBO] timers, which were
sold to the Libyans, but not exclusively. The
owners said they had sold a small number to the
Stasi, the East Germans. It's hard to prove a
negative, that nobody else had them, but Bollier
testified that he had sold 25 of these timers to th(
Libyans. He had taken them there, and the
Libyans had taken him out to the desert, and he
had done tests for them, and helped them
configure the timers, and showed them how to
use them. There's always the possibility the Libyans could have sold them to somebody
themselves, or something crazy like that could have happened, but there was no evidence
supporting that theory throughout the trial. (S)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
describes his testimony at the trial: 1\ileister. . . . testified before I did. They showed (b)(3)
him the fragment again, and he said, "Oh, well, this a green circuit hoard. We only use green
circuit boards for the Libyans. We use brown circuit boards for the PFLP-GC." Sc when I went in
October and met me there, I saicl,_"What do you need me for? He's already testified that (b)(3)
it's theirs and that Libya was the customer." Said, "Well, I think they want you to talk about
how the ice cube timer [used by the Palestinians] works." So I sat down 'with the prosecuting
attorneys the night before I testified and went through that. I came away from that session and I
said, "I still don't know why I'm here. They don't know what to do with my testimony." So I felt
very uncomfortable. (S)
The trial got delayed or adjourned for three weeks, while they went chasing leads and trying to (b)(3)
resolve some issues. I went back in late October, and, again, the night before, I sat down with the
prosecuting attorneys. And this time, God bless them, they had a nice script all put together. One
of the prosecutors said, "I'm going to talk about your background. What your technical
qualifications are, then I want you to describe for me the ice cube timer." He was using me as just
a technical witness. "Forget about �ming to see you. We don't need that." What (b)(3)
they were trying to do was to essentially rethte the defense's case before the defense had a chance
to present it. And so he says "I want you to talk about the technology here, the technology there,
then compare the two." So I testified for about 40 minutes on the stand. (S)
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(b)(3)
There were two defense attorneys, of course, one for Fahima, one for Megrahi. I had been warned
that they were like a good cop, bad cop routine. Fahimah's was the nice guy, and he would ask
these very nice questions, and then the other attorney would jump up and call you a liar and
question your parentage and everything else, trying to get you upset, saying something like, "We
obviously can't accept any of that testimony." And he was very successful doing that with a few of
the witnesses. (S)
So the prosecution went through their routine, following the script, which was great, as I knew
where they were going. [A prosecutor] had told me, "Don't give me more than what I ask you. Just
answer the question but don't elaborate. And if I want more, I know what you know, I'll ask you
and I'll draw it out of you. Let me pull it out." So I knew where he was going and this was good, so
we went through the 40 minutes of testimony and Fahimah's attorney got up and said, "No
questions, my Lord." (S)
And then Megrahi's attorney gets up and asks, "Is it true today, and in fact in the 1980s, that any
electronic equipment would contain electronic components?" My first question was what did they
mean by that? And then I thought, that's not what he's trying to ask me. What is it he's trying to ask
me? But then I thought, no don't figure it out for him. I'm not here to help the defense, so my
answer was--and I thought I can't give him a smart ass answer either--so I said, "By definition, sir."
That was my answer, "By definition." Electronic components, that's what makes it a piece of
electronic equipment. And he says, "And therefore it would also contain circuit boards?" And I
said, "Not always." And he says, "But in the majority of the cases," or "by far and away," or
something like that. And I said, "Yes, normally it would." "No more questions." (S)
comments on this testimony: What brought to the trial was to differentiate (b)(3)
between the PFLP-GC's altimeter timers and the MST-13. And that was very important, because
their whole defe7Af as basically premised on the fact that the PFLP-GC bombed Pan Am 103 and
not the Libyans got rave reviews from the Scottish prosecutors and the Department of Justice (b)(3)
attorneys for his testimony. The Department of Justice attorneys stayed there the whole time,
throughout the trial. They actually were allowed to sit in the benches with the Scottish prosecution,
which is very unusual. Afte testified, they came over, and one of the DOJ prosecutors said (b)(3)
that he thought that was the best witness that he had seen. And I don't think he was just making us
feel good. Butrwas very convincing, and very authoritative. He was our expert witness. And (b)(3)
he, unequivocally, demonstrated that the timers the F'FLP-GC used, which are called ice cube
timers, were outdated, and totally, 100 percent, different in their construction from the MST-13
that the Libyans used. And nowhere nearly as sophisticated. That was extraordinarily important to
(b)(3)
achieving the conviction. (S)
Logistics (U)
recalls the situation at the scene :
We didn't know what to expect, we didn't know if
there'd be a lot of media coverage. By the time our witnesses had to testify, everyone was bored
( b)( 1 )
(b)(3)
with the trial and there wasn't much media coverage at all. There was one reporter around, and no
one was taking pictures. We ended up using all those support people, but I think there was a
thought that maybe we don't need to do this as extremely as it started. (S)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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offers another take:
We went to Scotland and we got a tour of the crash site. We spoke to the
officers who were there that night, who told us what they had seen. They took us to the eviderS11)(3)
room and showed us all the suitcases and pictures. We met with the Chief Constable of Dumfries
and Galloway, who was responsible for the whole case.
reflects on the preparations made to bring the agent's handlers to the trial and the
prosecution's decision not to use them: . . the decision was made by the Crown Office not to put
[Majid's] handlers on [the stand] . . Those officers each traveled to the trial two or three
times. So each of them really went out of his way a number of times to come and stand by, go
through the whole security rigmarole, in disguise waiting, ready to go. And . . . the
lead solicitor decided. . . that the prosecution had made their case adequately, they'd established
the facts they wanted to establish, and if they put these fellows on the stand, the defense would
keep questioning them until they got into areas that these officers could not talk about. (S)
We all felt that it was unfortunate that they did not testify. They felt frustrated that they did not
appear, because, had they appeared, they probably would have been able to bolster Majid's (b)(1)
credibility. They would have been able to corroborate and expand on a number of things that M(b)(3)
had testified about but on which he had been badgered and belabored and picked apart by the
defense. (S)
ffers another observation about the unique circumstances in a foreign court: The other
complicated thing about this case was the foreign soil facet. . . Actually the Scottish Court was a
country within another country.
Protecting Intelligence Secrets (U)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
mentions several of the accommodations that the Agency had to make at the trial:
One was [acknowledgment] that the Agency had a station in Senegal, at least during "X" period of
time, and a particular Agency officer was re nonsible there. One of the really bi2 ones was that we
were running unilateral operations in Malta.
We had to admit everything involving our asset, Majid, and that, in Malta, we
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
recruited somebody out of the Libyan External Intelligence Service. (S)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
adds: Two things [of special note]: One, the provision of highly sensitive and critical
documents, that is DO operational cables, although redacted, but, in the end, redacted
minimally--very minimally--in an international criminal trial--not a US trial--for the first time.
And, second, passing them, essentially, to the Libyans, because they were given to the defense. It
was the same as telling the Libyans what we were doing, how we were "reading their mail"
through Majid. There were no questions about what the extent and nature was of our relationship
with Majid. They knew previously that Majid had defected to this country, that Majid was going to
be a witness. But they certainly didn't know the details of his relationship with CIA that came out
subsequently. That was a real departure. (S)
Another unique thing is, similarly, providing the witnesses. We were prepared to put on the stand
half a dozen serving officers-
-which had never been done before. Then the whole facilitative
piece had to be pulled together, which was probably the bulk of my effort
and my contribution in this project. Beyond that, it was clear to everybody, it was clear to the
judges, it was certainly clear to the defense, clear to the public, that CIA was heavily invested in
this trial. That meant something. That meant CIA had something. We weren't just concocting this
stuff. I think the judges, realizing as they did that we had taken extraordinary steps in providing (b)(1 )
witnesses and documents, probably tended to give a little more weight to some of the witnesses (b)(3)
and some of the argumentation by the prosecution. (S)
Lessons (U)
The Scottish Court presiding over the trial of the two Libyans announced its verdict on 31 January
2001. Megrahi was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to no less than 27-years'
imprisonment under Scottish law. His co-defendant, Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima, was acquited; the
Court concluded that the evidence in his case was insufficient to satisft the high standard of
"proof beyond reasonable doubt." An appeal by Megrahi was rejected, and he remains in a
Scottish prison. The verdict also led the Libyans to openly acknowledge their culpability and to
offer compensation to the fitmilies of the victims. (U)
(b)(3)
Reflecting back on the long process, said he was proud of everyone who pitched (b)(3)
in to support the Pan Am 103 trial. Asked to reflect on lessons learned from the experience, he
suggested that CIA should remember its proper role: I think we have to recognize that we are an
intelligence organization, not a law enforcement organization. We shouldn't be collecting
evidence, except in those very narrow situations, counterintelligence situations, where we have a
charter to do that. I think we have to be very careful about how we provide our intelligence and our
operational information in support of law enforcement, if for no other reason than to protect it and
our clandestine sources from the scrutiny that it's going to come under in a judicial setting, where it
should come under scrutiny. I think that intelligence is a marvelous mechanism to enable law
enforcement people to go after evidence and get evidence that can stand up in a court of law. But I
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(b)(3)
don't think intelligence is a substitute for that. (S)
This was one of those extraordinary cases where, after sitting down and looking at it, and talking
to our lawyers, and talking to the Scottish investi ators, talking to the prosecution, and getting a
good perspective on this from people like who saw the strategic dynamic, that we had to
give that information up, and it had to go out as evidence, because there was no other way that it
was going to be. . . that there was no substitute available. And without that, the verdict would not
have come out the way it did. (S)
(b)(3
Asked if he would do anything differently responds: No, I don't think so. We got a guilty (b)(3)
verdict [for Al-Megrahi] and were able to provide a definitive answer to the family members of the
victims of Pan Am Flight 103 that the Libyans definitely were behind this. That was the lingering
question that we wanted answered by a court of law. And that's what we got. We accomplished it
within the framework of Scottish Law. Indeed, it was a rather significant feat." (S)
concluded:
We were determined to find
solutions and to take that extra risk so that this trial could take place. From the operations officers,
to the security protective personnel, to the lawyers, all of us worked long hours and weekends to
solve problems. "We can't do it" was never muttered. I can say that from the professionalism of the
officers I got to work with during this entire episode, I have no doubts that CIA is the best.
intelligence serv:ce in the world. (S//NF)
Footnotes:
1 An exchange of tactical missiles between Libya and the United States during US naval (b)(1 )
maneuvers in the Mediterannean in March 1986, and the subsequent bombing by Libyan (b)(3)
operatives of a discotheque frequented by US soldiers in Germany, led Washington to launch air
raids against Libyan targets linked to terrorism on the night of 15 April 1986. (U)
2 Trial testimony underlined the time it took Scottish authorities to process and evaluate the huge
volume of debris. The shirt fragment--a piece of collar--bearing the timer fragment was loggei(b)(1)
as evidence in January 1989. The finger-nail sized piece of the circuit board was discovered ir(b)(3)
May, among other pieces of plastic, metal, wire, and paper imbedded in the shirt fragment. In
September, the Scottish investigators asked for help from London in identifying it. (U)
3
4 A CIA 201 file is the official file containing all biographic reporting on and references to an
individual of specific interest to the Directorate of Operations, including personal history and
operational assessments
5 According tc the Court didn't believe Majid on a lot of his points because the justices
never saw a second, more extensive, batch of redacted cables, which would have confirmed much
of what he said in court. (U)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3
(b)(3)
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erved in the CIA's Office of General Counsel. (U)
SECRETIINOIORNIIX1
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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