CUBA 1962: KHRUSHCHEV'S MISCALCULATED RISK

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01385902
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 158
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-01699
• Publication Date: February 13, 1964

7/Vie: :
'Approved for Reiease: 2016/11/08 CO1385902 - ?
" l/ ./.0 (b)(3) 156 raq6.�:,_ rd
0-, Copy 93 ,
.. -, \ /
fj, e ,
,..., i ,\
.. 4. - -- ' \ /
1� /
/
,, /
/
/
z
7� I to
,
?
/
r I
rid I
/ I
0
\
--r : I
I I
14
I/
r scalcuiated Risk,
/
,
f
0
i
i
, -
o;�",
fr
tj
1 23:,,
1 � 'j
A I_ . #
ft,
71
tI
1 7"
TO
r itq 0 R R
DD,'I Staff Study
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS. COD
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive
No action is to be taken on any
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages
to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence.
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Nor
FOREWORD
This staff study of the Office of the Deputy Director (Intelligence)
(DD/I) was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports. Its purpose
is to review the evidence concerning the nature, scope, and timing of
the Soviet military buildup in Cuba in 1962 and to discuss the implications
of that evidence.
The study is divided into two parts. Part One contains a compre-
hensive review of the evidence, which is presented in considerable de-
tail in order to provide as complete and factual a reconstruction of the
buildup as possible. However, if the reader does not choose to read
the detailed assessment of the evidence and is willing to accept the facts
and judgments derived therefrom, he may proceed to Part Two, in
which the Soviet program as a whole is examined and in which conclu-
sions are drawn from the entire body of evidence as to the Soviet concept
of the buildup, the timing of the decision to embark on the venture, and
the probable Soviet policy considerations and objectives that shaped the
decision.
The conclusions drawn in the study regarding the implications of the
manner in which the Cuban missile base venture was carried out cannot
be proved absolutely. It was judged, however, that the major features
of the Cuban venture were the result of deliberate, rational Soviet deci-
sions that took into account the detailed knowledge of US reconnaissance
capabilities acquired by the USSR in May 1960. It is believed, there-
fore, that the conclusions represent the most likely interpretation in
view of the totality and interrelationship of the evidence available more
than a year after the crisis.
Because the quality of the evidence ranges from conclusive to am-
biguous, an effort has been made throughout the study to indicate clearly
the degree of certainty surrounding the information and the judgments
based on it. The time period covered begins in early 1960 and ends in
November 1962 with the withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons from
Cuba. The review of evidence in Part One discusses Soviet military
and economic relations with Castro's Cuba before 1962, recounts general
evidence of the activity related to the buildup as a whole, sets forth on a
-
-7013-SECREZ
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
a(b)(3)
mission basis the details of the deployment of Soviet military forces in
Cuba, and concludes with a summary of the withdrawal of offensive
weapons.
Valuable assistance was provided in the preparation of the study by
the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Current Intelligence,
and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, The reader is
directed to a complementary paper prepared by the DD/I Research Staff
entitled The Soviet Missile Base Venture in Cuba. Although that study
also discusses Soviet objectives, the timing of the decision, the Soviet
estimate of risk, the course of the buildup, and the reasons for retreat,
it is focused differently. Whereas this study collates and studies the
hard facts of the buildup, drawing its principal conclusions therefrom,
the Research Staff study examines the buildup within the broader con-
text of a survey of Soviet foreign policy, placing primary emphasis on
political factors, and considers the probable reasons why the USSR
estimated that the Cuban venture would involve only a low degree of risk.
In those areas where the studies overlap, they reach similar conclusions.
Where the studies do not overlap, one study provides additional back-
ground for the reader of the other.
- iv -
�7"019�SECREZ
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
����
Summary and Conclusions
Part One: The Evidence
I. Soviet Military and Economic Relations with
Castro's Cuba Before Mid-1962 . . . . . .
A. Military Aid
CONTENTS
� ...... �
B. Economic Aid and Terms of Trade
II. General Activity Relating to the Military
Buildup
A. Early Activity
Pate
8
9
11
12
12
C. Soviet Merchant Shipping 22
III. Air Defense Systems 23
A. Early Warning and Target Acquisition Radar
Capability 24
1. Before the Beginning of the Buildup .
2. During and After the Buildup �
24
25
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
P S EZ
3. Evidence on the Detection and Tracking
of US Reconnaissance Overflights
Page
During 1962
27
B. Surface-to-Air Missile System
28
60.
1. Capability of an Individual Site
to Take Action
30
00
2. Location and Timing of Offloading
of SAM Units and Associated
�
Equipment ........ . � .
31
3. Problem of Operational Status
32
4. Timing of Establishment of Individual
�
Sites and Support Facilities
33
5. Geographical Pattern of Deployment �
h. Development of an SA-2 System
�
35
Capability
37
C. Fighter Aircraft
38
IV.
Naval and Ground Systems
41
0.
A. Coastal Defense Missile Systems
41
ID
1. Offloading of Coastal Defense Units
and Equipment
41
2. Timing of Deployment of Individual Sites
42
3. Evidence of Intent to Deploy Additional
Units
44
B. Komar-Class Patrol Boat Missile System .
.
44
C. Submarines
46
D. Soviet Ground Units
47
V.
Offensive Systems
50
A. MRBM System
51
100
vi -
�
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
--TOP-SECIZEZ'
Page
1. Origin of the MRBM Units 51
2. Preparation of Sites and Delivery
of Missiles
2. Pattern of Withdrawal
52
3. Delivery of Oxidizer and Fuel to Sites 58
4. Problem of Combat Readiness 60
5. Target Coverage 64
B. IRBM System 64
1. Timing of Construction Activity
at Individual Sites 65
2. Intention to Construct Additional Sites . 66
C. Search for Nuclear Warheads 68
I. Equipment and Facilities . . . 69
2. Shipment to Cuba 71
3. Soviet Statements 73
D. 11-28 Light Bombers .......
E. Soviet Withdrawal of Offensive Systems
74
76
1. Week of Crisis, 22-28 October . . � . 77
78
Part Two: Implications of the Evidence 81
I. Concept and Timing of the Soviet Venture in Cuba . 81
A.
B.
C.
D.
Defensive Systems
Offensive Systems
Implications of the Timing of the Program
II. Soviet Policy Considerations and Objectives .
A. Soviet View of the Risks
B. The Decision
vii -
7-----VP'SzEGREZ
(b)(3)
81
83
83 (b)(1)
84
85
85
88
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Page
C. Probable Soviet Objectives . .
�
91
D. The Withdrawal 92
Tables
1. Arrivals of Soviet Ships in Cuba with Holds
Capable of Carrying Medium-Range Ballistic
Missiles, July-October 1962 . . . . . 55
2. Estimated Time Phasing of Construction
at IRBM Sites, August-December 1962 . 67
3. Soviet Withdrawal of MRBM's from Cuba.
November 1962 79
Illustrations
Following Page
Figure 1. Proximity of Cuban Military Com-
munications Facilities to Soviet
Missile Sites (Map) . . . ..... 20
Figure 2. SAM Site at Caibarien with a Full Load
of Missiles, 26 October 1962
(Photograph) 24
Figure 3. Types and Duration of Radar Illumina-
tions Recorded During the Reconnais-
sance Mission of 2 May 1962 (Map) .
Figure 4. Types and Duration of Radar Illumina-
tions Recorded During the Reconnais-
sance Mission of 5 September 1962
(Map)
28
28
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Following Page
Figure 5. Sketch of an SA-2 Surface-to-Air
Missile Site
30
Figure 6. SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles on Dis-
play in the Havana Parade of 2_January
1963 (Photograph) page 29
Figure 7. SAM Site at Los Angeles, Oriente
Province, 26 September 1962
(Photograph) 30
Figure 8. SAM Site at Mariel, 23 October 1962
(Photograph) 30
Figure 9. SAM Containers and Ground-Support
Equipment at the Santiago de las
Vegas Assembly Area, 7 November
1962 (Photograph) 32
Figure 10. Time Phasing of SAM Unit Emplacement
(Chart) 34
Figure 11. Time Phasing of SAM Support Facilities
(Chart) . . . . � ...... . . 36
Figure 12. SAM Units Deployed in a Peripheral
Defense Pattern During the Crisis
Period (Map) 36
Figure 13. SAM Deployment Pattern That Would
Have Provided Maximum Defense
of Principal Soviet Military Installa-
tions During the Crisis Period
(Map) 36
Figure 14. Initial Redeployment of SAM Units
in Early 1963 -- Emergence of a
Point Defense (Map)
-TOP-SEC
38
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Following Page
Figure 15. MIG-21 Aircraft of the Type Deployed
39
in Cuba (Photograph) page
Figure 16. MIG-21 Aircraft at Santa Clara Airfield
Armed with AA-2 Missiles,
10 November 1962 (Photograph) . 40
Figure 17. Cruise Missile Site at Siguanea � a
Typical Unit Emplacement Pattern,
9 November 1962 (Photograph) . .
Figure 18. Cruise Missiles on Display in the
Havana Parade of 2 January 1963
(Photograph)
Figure 19. Cruise Missile Crates at the Probable
Storage Area at Guerra, 9 February
1963 (Photograph) . . . .....
Figure 20. Komar-Class Patrol Boats Deployed
to Banes During the Crisis Period,
3 November 1962 (Photograph) . . .
Figure 21, Soviet F-Class Submarine Under Sur-
veillance by US Destroyers in the
Vicinity of the Cuban Quarantine
Zone, 11 November 1962 (Photo-
graph)
Figure 22, Four Soviet F-Class Submarines
Deployed Far Out of the Normal Area
of Operations in October 1962 (Map) .
Figure 23. Soviet Armored Combat Group En-
campment at Remedios, 1 February
1963 (Photograph) . . . . . . .
x
-707"-SECEZZ
42
42
44
46
46
46
48
IP
MP
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Following Page
Figure 24. Part of the Armored Equipment
Located at the Remedios Encamp-
ment During the Crisis Period,
25 October 1962 (Photograph) 48
Figure 25. FROG Missiles on Display in Moscow
(Photographs) 48
Figure 26. Soviet MRBM on Display in the Moscow
Parade of 7 November 1960 (Photo-
graph) page 50
Figure 27. Soviet Large-Hatch Ship Kirnovsk
Approaching Cuba on 21 September
1962 (Photograph) 54
Figure 28. Soviet Large-Hatch Ship Poltava Return-
ing to the USSR on 31 October 1962
After Imposition of the US Quarantine
(Photograph) 54
Figure 29. MRBM Launch Site 1 at San Cristobal,
15 October 1962 (Photograph) 58
Figure 30. MRBM Launch Site 1 at San Cristobal,
17 October 1962 (Photograph) 58
Figure 31. MRBM Launch Site 1 at San Cristobal,
23 October 1962 (Photograph) 58
Figure 32. Construction of the Nuclear Weapons
Facility in Progress at MRBM Launch
Site 1.at San Cr1stoba.1, 23 October
1962 (Photograph) 58
Figure 33. MRBM Launch Site 1 at Sagua la Grande,
17 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 58
Figure 34. MRBM Launch Site 2 at Sagua la Grande,
17 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 58
---"r07"-SECIREZ
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
-rap E cREz
Following Page
Figure 35. MRBM Launch Site 2 at Sagua la
Grande, 23 October 1962
(Photograph) 58
Figure 36. MRBM Launch Site 2 at Sagua la
Grande, 23 October 1962
(Photograph) 58
Figure 37. MRBM Launch Site 1 at Sagua la
Grande, 26 October 1962
(Photograph) 58
Figure 38. MRBM Launch Site 3 at San Cristobal,
27 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 58
Figure 39. MRBM Oxidizer Trailers Apparently
Being Loaded at the Punta Gerardo
Storage Facility, 27 October 1962
(Photograph) 60
Figure 40. MRBM Launch Site 1 at San Cristobal,
23 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 64
Figure 41. Target Coverage of the US That Would
Have Been Provided by MRBM's and
IRBM' s Deployed in Cuba (Map) . . 64
Figure 42, IRBM Launch Site 1 at Guanajay,
17 October 1962 (Photograph) . . . . 66
Figure 43. IRBM Launch Site 1 at Guanajay,
23 October 1962 (Photograph) . . 66
Figure 44. Probable Nosecone. Containers
Observed at a Special Unit Located
at Mariel Naval Air Station,
15 October - 10 November 1962
(Photograph) 70
TOP - SE. C Ell
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
7-"DP-SECREZ
Following_ Page
Figure 45. Completed Drive-Through Nuclear
Weapons Facility at IRBM Launch
Site 1 at Guanajay, 1 November
1962 (Photographs)
Figure 46. 11-28 Bombers Being Assembled at San
Julian Airfield, 27 October 1962
(Photograph)
Figure 47. MRBM Launch Site 1 at Sagua la
Grande, 26 October 1962
(Photograph)
72
76
78
Figure 48.- MRBM Launch Site 3 at San Cristobal,
1 November 1962 (Photograph) . . . 78
Figure 49. Missile Equipment at the Port of
Ma.riel, 2 November 1962 (Photo-
graph) 78
Figure 50. Missiles and Missile Equipment Await-
ing Shipment at the Port of Marie',
9 November 1962 (Photograph). . .� 80
Figure 51. The Soviet Freighter Kasimov Return-
it 11-28's to the USSR, 5 December
1962 (Photographs) 80
Figure 52. Identifiable Milestones of the Soviet
Military Buildup in Cuba (Chart) . . 82
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
""1"--refi-sEGREz
-T015.--SEC1347.1
110
111.
eft
PA
110
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
`ommv
CUBA 1962:
KHRUSHCHEV'S MISCALCULATED RISK
Summary and Conclusions
During the period from the end of July through October 1962 the
USSR delivered to Cuba and deployed large quantities of weapons,
equipment, and personnel representing a broad spectrum of Soviet
military strength. These forces, which comprised a complete air
defense system, naval and ground defense units, and two strategic
missile systems, were. equipped with some of the most advanced
weapons available to the USSR. Although some of these forces were
combat-ready during the critical week in October before Khrushchev
announced the Soviet decision to draw back from direct military
confrontation with the US, the original Soviet timetable apparently
did not call for the completion of many of the major elements of the
military establishment in Cuba, including the air defense system and
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) units, until some time during
the first half of November. The concept and execution of the venture
clearly indicate that the Soviet authorities made no appreciable effort
to prevent or delay US detection by aerial reconnaissance of the offen-
sive weapons during the deployment phase. It is believed that the
most likely explanation is that they judged the risk of a US military
reaction to be very slight.
The chain of events that culminated in the Cuban crisis of October
1962 can be traced back to the visit of Soviet First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan to Cuba in February 1960. This visit constituted the first
public endorsement of the Cuban revolution, after a. year of Soviet
reserve following Castro's seizure of power and Soviet diplomatic
recognition of the regime. It was followed by a series of economic
assistance agreements and, in the third quarter of 1960, the first
Soviet deliveries of land armaments. Soviet military aid to Cuba
thereafter proceeded cautiously and deliberately, particularly when
compared with assistance to other countries, as though the Soviet
leaders were carefully testing both US reactions and their relations
with the Castro regime. Deliveries of fighter aircraft to Cuba,
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
�616" -7-0P-SECBEE
probably planned before the Bay of Pigs invasion, were not made until
about June 1961. Following the Bay of Pigs episode, there was a period
of assimilation and assessment, after which arms shipments, including
the first naval vessels, were resumed. By late 1961 or early 1962 the
decision may have been made to provide obsolescent 11-28 (Beagle) jet
light bombers, but the Soviet authorities continued through mid-1962
to withhold from Cuba more advanced weapons that were already being
supplied to other countries and limited their deliveries to weapons
intended for defensive purposes, including the maintenance of internal
order.
Although there is now available some evidence of a limited influx
of Soviet personnel and increased activity in Cuba in the first half of
1962, probably foreshadowing subsequent manifestations of the drastic
change in Soviet policy toward Cuba, the actual deployment of Soviet
military forces to the Caribbean did not begin until the end of July.
As it was unfolded over the next 3 months, the Soviet program for
the establishment of a military base in Cuba was characterized by a
high degree of concurrency in deploying and bringing to operational
status both the major offensive and the major defensive systems.
The Soviet concept of the venture obviously did not envision the initial
establishment of an island defense in order to test US reaction and
screen the subsequent introduction of strategic missile forces.
Although increasingly advanced Soviet radars were added to those
existing in Cuba before the buildup, although more than 60 early model
MIG fighters and adequate communications facilities were already
available, and although SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) units were
emplaced in western Cuba during August and in eastern Cuba during
September, an integrated, centrally directed air defense system was
not brought into operation in Cuba until 27 October, the day before
the Soviet decision to withdraw offensive missiles was announced.
Moreover, the fact that this system expanded steadily for some time
thereafter indicates that its activation at that time probably was
earlier than planned. Command and control communications links
between the USSR and Cuba had been activated only a few days earlier,
also prematurely and in apparent response to US actions following
detection of the strategic missile sites. Meanwhile, however, con-
struction and preparation of the MRBM and intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) sites had been underway since early September, and the
missiles and unique system equipment were delivered to M.RBM sites
-Z -
-"TOP-SIXEIF,L'
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
-...7TYP-SECRELT_
from about mid-September through mid-October. Thus the SAM units
and other air defense elements were not planned to become operational
as a system for at least a month and a half after the presence of
MRBM's in Cuba rendered Soviet intentions subject to detection. In
addition, the geographical pattern of SAM deployment indicates that
maximum protection of the strategic missile sites was not the govern-
ing consideration. The SAM deployment pattern was planned to provide
an islandwide area defense, affording no greater protection to the stra-
tegic missile sites and other military installations than to all other
locations on the island.
The precise degree of combat readiness of the 24 MRBM launch
positions in Cuba at the time of the crisis cannot be determined from
available evidence, even in retrospect. The principal uncertainty con-
cerns the presence or absence of nuclear warheads; the evidence on
this aspect of the buildup is so ambiguous and inconclusive that it is
not possible to reach a judgment based on factual information. It is
clear, however, that the Soviet program for the MRBM units was not
complete by the time of the crisis. These units were originally de-
ployed in a field mode, following which work was begun on the prepa-
ration of more permanent facilities. This work was not completed at
any of the sites by the time dismantling began but probably would have
been completed by about mid-November. Similarly, some of the sites
may not have been fully equipped when the crisis occurred. If nuclear
warheads were available, these shortcomings probably would not have
prevented the launching of some missiles from all six sites during the
critical week in October but might have affected significantly the time
required to launch a salvo, as well as its effectiveness. On balance
it remains uncertain whether the Soviet leaders could have considered
the Cuban MRBM units sufficiently combat-ready to participate in a
coordinated nuclear attack on the US at any time during the crisis.
With respect to the IRBM sites, which required far more extensive
preparation, there is conclusive evidence that construction had not been
completed by the end of October, nor had the missiles and most system
equipment arrived at the sites. The missiles were almost certainly
en route to Cuba when the US quarantine was imposed. Although proceed-
ing at a rapid pace, construction of all three IRBM sites that were under-
way in October would not have been completed until about mid-December;
if a fourth IRBM site was planned, as seems possible, it could not have
been operational before some time in January 1963.
-7DP-SECREI
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
The 42 11-28 jet light bombers and trainers delivered to Cuba be-
ginning in late September were almost certainly not considered by the
Soviet planners as an integral part of their offensive capability in Cuba
but apparently were intended for the Cuban forces from the outset.
Moreover, at the rate at which they were being
assembled after their delivery, they would not have been fully oper-
ational until at least March 1963, thus being distinctly out of phase with
the timing of the offensive missile systems.
Although the Soviet authorities were fully aware of US photorecon-
naissance capabilities by May 1960 and may have been aware of US
overflights of Cuba by mid-1962, they made no effort in planning and
executing the Cuban venture to reduce the risks of detection by US
reconnaissance. This is evidenced not only by their concurrent deploy-
� ment of offensive and defensive systems but also by their failure to
camouflage or conceal unique mRpm system equipment, particularly
the missiles themselves, before the crisis. The measures taken after
the crisis began probably were a reaction to the initiation of low-
altitude reconnaissance. Furthermore, there was no apparent effort
to minimize the length of time during which some MRBM units were
detectable before all of the MRBM units were emplaced, equipped,
and combat-ready. Hence there would have been a period of about
2 months between the arrival in about mid-September of the first
MRBM's and the estimated completion in mid-November of the full
MRBM deployment program.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the Soviet leaders in their
planning did not regard the possibility of US detection as critical to
the success or failure of the Cuban venture. Unless the Soviet authori-
ties were convinced that no measures could be taken to delay or prevent
US detection, as seems unlikely, they must have chosen to disregard
US reconnaissance, capabilities. Thus they probably judged with con-
siderable assurance that the US would acquiesce in the deployment of
strategic missiles in Cuba or at least would not attempt to force their
removal by reacting militarily. In any event, at some point in the
process the Soviet leaders reached the conclusion that the advantages
to be gained from the installation of Soviet nuclear striking power with-
in 100 miles of US soil outweighed whatever risks they estimated were
4
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
---rop-sfertgz.
involved. Moreover, in spite of some signs of Soviet concern, the
deployment of strategic missiles proceeded unscreened by an activated
SAM system even after President Kennedy's statements of 4 and
13 September implied that the US possessed photographic evidence
of the buildup to that time and explicitly warned the USSR of the grave
consequences if the US detected offensive weapons in Cuba.
Although it is not possible to trace the evolution of the Cuban plan
or the specific decisions involved, the venture may have been con-
ceived late in 1961 or at the beginning of 1962, when Khrushchev
apparently was seeking some military means of rapidly and signifi-
cantly improving the USSR's bargaining position in the German negoti-
ations. There is some evidence that planning and initial preparations
occurred in the USSR and Cuba during the first quarter of 1962. It is
unlikely, however, that the final commitment was made until April or
May, probably after Moscow had assessed and acquiesced in Castro's
assertion of authority over the Cuban Communist movement in late
March and early April.
One element in the Soviet miscalculation of the risks may have
been the Soviet view of the role and significance of foreign military
bases. Having lived restively under the shadow of US strategic bases
for more than a decade, the Soviet leaders probably have come to
regard them, particularly in the age of the ICBM, as a disquieting
but not major phenomenon of great power relations. Castro's Cuba
presented Khrushchev with his first opportunity to establish an over-
seas military base. He may have felt confident that the US would
understand the rules as he did -- that military bases on the opponent's
periphery are facts of great power life which fall far short of a prov-
ocation to war. Although such a view may have been a factor in the
miscalculation of the Soviet leaders, their over-all judgment of the
risks in Cuba must have been based on a much broader assessment of
Soviet-US relations.
Khrushchev probably had a greater objective in sight than simply
the establishment of a military base in the Western Hemisphere. In
deciding to deploy offensive missiles in Cuba, the Soviet leaders prob-
ably were seeking primarily to reduce the strategic imbalance against
the USSR, calculating that the success of the venture would improve
sharply the Soviet bargaining position in world affairs and also be
advantageous in a host of other ways. While the Cuban missile bases
5
-Top-sEcR__g_Li
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
would have increased Soviet missile strike capabilities against the US
by more than 50 percent at the end of 1962, the Soviet leaders must
have realized that their relative power gain would have been highly
transitory in view of US ICBM and Polaris programs. /t is possible,
therefore, that had the Cuban venture been successful, it would have
been followed shortly by some further Soviet initiative to achieve a
dramatic victory elsewhere for a long-standing policy objective, such
as Berlin, which also could alter the long-term "world re.lation of
forces."
As it turned out, Khrushchev was faded with a direct military con-
frontation at a point where the US was able to concentrate overwhelming
conventional military force, backed up by a clear strategic nuclear
superiority. This unexpected and probably shocking turn of events left
him with only one feasible course of action: to insure that the Cuban
crisis did not escalate; to test the US resolve; and, if it were found
firm, to remove the strategic missiles as hastily as possible while
attempting to salvage as much of the remainder of the venture as pos-
sible. This appears to be precisely what occurred in the several weeks
leading up to Khrushchev's announcement on 20 November of his decision
to remove the I1r28's, which enabled both parties to allow the Cuban
crisis to recede slowly and uneasily into history.
- 6 -
-7015)--SECBSZ
b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
PART ONE: THE EVIDENCE
The evidence presented in this study was developed by examining
information compiled on an all-source basis that related to the deploy-
ment of Soviet forces in Cuba. The major part of the evidence consists
of aerial photography of Cuba obtained by overhead and peripheral recon-
naissance and by surface photography of Soviet shipping en route to Cuba.
Within the limits of coverage and the art of photographic interpretation,
such evidence is regarded as conclusive. It was particularly valuable
in establishing the validity of information from other sources.
Although information obtained from agents, refugees, and diplomats
appeared initially to constitute a major source of evidence,* it was fre-
quently proved to be unreliable. As a result, in almost all cases it could
not be evaluated with confidence unless information was available from
other types of sources against which it could be checked. For example,
more than 200 reports contain references to the presence in Cuba of
missiles before January 1962. Numerous reports also contain refer-
ences to construction activity and equipment observed during the spring
of 1962 in areas where SAM sites were located later. However, photog-
raphy of these areas obtained during or after the reported period of
observation failed to reveal any such activity or equipment. Reports
originating from diplomatic sources in cuba were relatively sparse be-
fore the crisis; thus they did not contribute significantly to the body of
evidence used in this study, the time span of which ends with the with-
drawal of offensive weapons. Nevertheless, in spite of these limitations,
the vast body of collateral reporting provided some unique and valuable
information that could not otherwise have been obtained.
* Referred to in this study as collateral information.
- 7 -
-Tor-sscizEz
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
I. Soviet Military and Economic Relations with Castro's Cuba
Before Mid-1962
Before the creation of their military establishment in Cuba in the
latter half of 1962, the Soviet leaders extended military aid to Castro
cautiously and gradually, remaining well within the limits set by the
precedent of their aid to other countries in the Near East, Asia, and
Africa. The USSR did not give Castro some of the more modern wea-
pons, such as the SA-2 system, which it contracted to supply to Indo-
nesia, Iraq, and Egypt during this period, nor was there anything ex-
ceptional about the quantity of material or the terms under which it was
supplied. Although the Bloc had come to account for about 80 percent of
Cuban foreign trade by mid-1962 and although there was a steady rise in
the amount of credit available to Cuba for economic development, there
was no comparable pattern of growth in military shipments. Even in
retrospect the military assistance provided by the USSR and other mem-
bers of the Bloc from mid-1960 to early 1962 does not contain indications
of any objective beyond improving the ability of the Castro regime to de-
fend itself from an invasion or internal uprising.
Soviet military assistance to Castro, when compared with that pro-
vided to other revolutionary governments (for example, the regime of
Qasim in Iraq), indicates that the Soviet leaders initially were somewhat
reluctant to extend similar aid to Cuba. The first Soviet-Cuban military
assistance agreement was reached some time between Mikoyan's visit to
Cuba in February 1960 and Raul Castro's return visit to the USSR in the
summer of 1960, or some 12 to 18 months after Castro had seized power.
By contrast the Soviet agreement on aid to Iraq was concluded 4 months
after the revolution that put Qasim in power. Whereas MIG aircraft and
frequently naval vessels had been among the first items delivered to other
recipients, Castro did not receive aircraft until the second quarter of
1961, and the first naval vessels did not arrive until January 1962. As
far as can be determined, the equipment delivered before mid-1962 was
limited to items useful primarily for defensive purposes. Furthermore,
the equipment was composed of the more obsolescent items in the Bloc
inventory. The total value of the arms supplied to Cuba before mid-
1962 is estimated at roughly $100 million, which probably ranked Cuba
below only Indonesia, Iraq, and Egypt as a major recipient of Soviet
military aid.
- 8 -
-77319-SECIZI:
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 001385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
A. Military Aid
As Cuba's efforts to purchase military goods in the West be-
. came increasingly difficult in 1959 and early 1960, the Cubans began to
make military contacts with Bloc countries, mainly Czechoslovakia.
Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960. when the USSR finally aban-
cloned its reserved attitude toward the Cuban revolution and publicly en-
dorsed the Castro regime, appears to have been an important milestone
in the developing relationship. Mikoyan was followed in June 1960 by
General M. A. Sergeychik, Deputy Chief of the Engineering Directorate
of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which has been
associated with other typical Soviet arms agreements with underdeveloped
countries. When Raul Castro visited the USSR in the summer of 1960,
the first shipments of Soviet arms probably were being readied. There is
no information available, however, on the details of the arms agreement
or even the approximate date on which it was signed.
10 �
Although photography of Cuban militia carrying Czechoslovak
rifles suggests that a shipment of small arms may have arrived in July
or August 1960, the first major shipment of Bloc arms to Cuba arrived
on 8 September 1960 aboard the Soviet freighter Ilya Mechnikov. The
cargo reportedly included T-34 tanks, antiaircraft artillery, machine-
guns, ammunition, electronic equipment, and other military materiel.
Some Mi-1 (Hare) and/or Mi-4 (Hound) helicopters were delivered later
in September 1960, and collateral sources reported the delivery of more
than 8, 000 metric tons of equipment by three Soviet ships in October
(b)(1)
1960.
:Sy mid-April 1961, at least 14 Soviet ships had de-
livered to Cuba equipment and supplies, almost exclusively land arma-
ments, estimated at 40, 000 metric tons.
What effect, if any, the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 had
��� on Soviet arms shipments is conjectural. The first of a total of more
than 60 MIG-15 (Fagot), MIG-17 (Fresco), and MIG-19 (Farmer) aircraft
apparently arrived at the end of May, and all the aircraft were delivered
we,
by mid-June. Although it is possible that delivery of these aircraft was
expedited in response to urgent Cuban appeals engendered by the inva-
sion, they probably had already been scheduled for delivery in 1961,
inasmuch as Cuban pilots apparently were training in Czechoslovakia in
the third quarter of 1960. No corresponding increase in shipments of
other kinds of equipment was observed; in fact, no additional shipments
WM.
1:6P-SEVREZ
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
"1.6-7013-SECRET_
of military equipment were detected until December 1961. Bloc military
assistance to Cuba. in the second half of 1961 seems to have been focused
on assimilation of new equipment, intensive training, and completion of
reorganization of Cuba's military establishment along Soviet lines.
Arms shipments were resumed at the very end of 1961, and the
first naval Vessels appeared early in 1962. Two shiploads arrived at
the end of 1961, and an average of two shiploads per month was noted
from January through June 1962. However, collateral reports indicate
that these shipments were confined to tanks, artillery, trucks, and other
land armaments, with the exception of 12 torpedo boats and 6 Kronshtadt-
class subchasers that were delivered between January and April 1962.
Throughout the period of arms delivery, Cuban personnel were
being trained in the Bloc and by a military training mission (principally
Soviet and Czechoslovak) sent to Cuba. Collateral sources reported
that Cubans were sent for military training in the Bloc as early as the
summer of 1960,
According to col-
lateral information, more than 500 Cubans were sent to the USSR for
naval training in 1961,
Collateral sources indicate that a hundred or more Bloc mili-
tary technicians probably arrived in Cuba during the second half of 1960
as the first arms shipments were being received, and there are continuing
reports of Bloc military personnel and technicians arriving during 1961.
By the time the Soviet authorities began to create their military establish-
ment in Cuba in mid-1962, it is estimated that at least 350 Bloc military
aid personnel were engaged in training Castro's forces on the island.
By mid-1962, Soviet Bloc military aid had turned the Cuban
military establishment into one of the strongest in Latin America. The
ground forces had acquired armored, artillery, antiaircraft, and
antitank capabilities on a scale unprecedented in the Caribbean area.
The Cuban air force was still a very limited organization, but even its
small number of older Soviet jet fighters represented a vast improve-
ment over previous capabilities. But the Soviet authorities had not pro-
vided, or apparently even offered, some of the more modern weapons
being supplied to other underdeveloped countries, and the aid was limited
- 10 -
-TOP-SEClikt
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
to improving the Castro regime's ability to maintain internal order and
defend itself against an invasion.
B. Economic Aid and Terms of Trade
Before mid-1962, lines of credit totaling at least $357 million,
with $100 million in addition likely, were opened by the Bloc for Cuban
basic economic development, although Cuba had actually used by that
time only about 10 percent of these credits. As in the case of Bloc aid
to other countries, the bulk of the credits were intended for basic indus-
trial facilities and overhead investments, such as transportation. The
terms given Cuba were identical or very similar to those for other re-
cipient nations: low interest rates, medium-term and long-term credits,
and provision to repay the debt with indigenous commodities.
By the time the Soviet military buildup began in mid-1962, the
Bloc had come to account for about 80 percent of Cuban foreign trade.
Some trade concessions advantageous to Cuba were made. Bloc coun-
tries generally paid a premium price for Cuban sugar, and Cuba was
permitted to run substantial trade deficits. The terms of trade as re-
flected by the balance between known prices set on Cuban exports to the
Bloc versus prices set on Cuban imports of fuel, food, and raw and
semifinished materials (which comprised more than 60 percent of im-
ports from the Bloc) indicate a slight advantage for Cuba compared with
world market prices for comparable items.
Information on the terms under which the military aid was sup-
plied is sketchy. The Chinese Communists provided an unknown number
of machineguns, including 12.7-mm antiaircraft machineguns, as a gift.
Soviet-supplied equipment probably did not involve payment in hard cur-
rencies. Based on known Soviet practice and some collateral informa-
tion, it is surmised that the initial agreements may have allowed a sub-
stantial discount on the equipment with a repayment time of 10 years or
more. The arms agreement, or agreements, with Czechoslovakia re-
quired payment partially in pounds sterling, and at least $30 million (in
sterling) has been paid by Cuba to the Czechoslovak State Bank. However,
most if not all of Cuba's outstanding obligations for Bloc military aid may
have been canceled subsequently, inasmuch as Castro stated publicly
early in November 1962 that the USSR had canceled all of Cuba's military
debts.
7407"-SECREZ
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
'-7rop-sEc42.Ez
IL General Activity Relating to the Military Buildup
During the period from the end of July through October 1962, the
Soviet authorities deployed a number of weapons systems and associated
personnel to Cuba that constituted a small but complete Soviet military
establishment with all the necessary organizational superstructure.
This section examines the evidence on general activities not related to
specific weapons systems and provides a framework for the subsequent
assessment of the detailed information on the deployment of specific
weapons systems. It covers evidence of preparatory activities before
the weapons and Soviet troops arrived in Cuba; the establishment of the
command, control, and communications structure; and the flow of Soviet
shipping to Cuba.
A. Early Activity
Collateral reporting contains many references to the sighting,
during the first half of 1962, of construction equipment, assorted vehicles,
and Soviet personnel in the general locations where various Soviet mili-
tary units were later identified. In several cases the reported locations
corresponded closely to the actual locations. Nevertheless, later photog-
raphy fails to contain evidence of visible activity in the areas mentioned
until at least August and invalidates these reports as a basis for assum-
ing that Soviet forces were present in significant quantities before the
end of July.
There is a strong possibility, however, that this reporting re-
flected an influx into Cuba, beginning in early 1962, of Soviet personnel
who were somehow ass nriated with thp niifltary built-Int: that beuar
physically in late July.
Soviet personnel first began to appear in un-
usual numbers during February-March 1962 and that by Marchnr groups of Soviet personnel were present all over the island.
a planl Manufactured prefab-
ricated concrete beams and columns (specitications approved by the
Soviet authorities) that were delivered to the Torrens reformatory, be-
lieved to be the Soviet military headquarters in Cuba, in late February
or early March.
- 12 -
7---4-07:1-5ECI1ZZ
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Other reporting generally supports thieL The Torrens
area may have become a sensitive zone in June, an numerous reports,
which substantiate one another, reflect a visit by Raul Castro to the re-
formatory and the evacuation of its inmates about the middle of July,
followed by an influx of Soviet personnel in late July. A similar pro-
gression of events is suggested also by reports concerning the port of
Banes. Twenty or 30 families allegedly were evacuated from the im-
mediate port area in January 1962. Other reports indicate that the entire
port area was evacuated sometime during the period between March and
early July 1962, that a small number of Soviet personnel arrived almost
immediately thereafter, and that large numbers of Soviet personnel moved
in during the last week in August.
The shadow of coming events also may have been cast by Cuban
officials in June, when a number of Cuban naval officers were (later)
reported to have made statements to the effect that in September Americans
would respect the Cuban flag and that by September Cuba would be the
"buckle" in the belt of NATO bases surrounding the USSR. Also in June
a briefing reportedly took place at which officials in the city of Matanzas
were advised that in the event of an attack by the US the USSR would
come to the assistance of Cuba within a 7-day period.
Based on the foregoing, it appears that the number of Soviet
personnel in Cuba probably did begin to increase early in 1962 and that
their very presence in any location could have generated the reports of
activity observed during the January-July period. The influx of Soviet
personnel at this time probably had some bearing on the later military
buildup and may well have involved activity related to the planning and
preparation required before the actual deployment of Soviet forces on
the island.
There is evidence regarding Soviet surveying activities in
Cuba, but it does not provide any indication of activity that can be
directly associated with the selection and preparation of the offensive
missile sites. It seems clear, however, that the Soviet problem of
locating the sites geodetically was simplified considerably by the avail-
ability of earlier geophysical materials on Cuba. As in the case of Soviet
economic aid programs to other underdeveloped countries, the Soviet aid
program in Cuba included an intensive resource exploration survey. Such
geological and geophysical survey activities necessarily include the utili-
zation of large-scale topographic maps and associated triangulation control
- 13 -
--77:719--SECREK
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
points, where available, or the undertaking of operations to establish
such control points when they are lacking. These basic materials would
have been directly applicable to the geodetic positioning of the Cuban
missile sites. Moreover, the island of Cuba previously had been geo-
detically tied to the US mainland by the Inter-American Geodetic Survey,
which is operated under the auspices of the US Army Corps of Engineers.
In addition, during 1956-57 a system of horizontal and vertical control
points for topographical mapping purposes had been established and a
complete aerial photographic study of the island accomplished by a highly
competent, private US contractor.
collateral sources have identified a Soviet
geophysical team in Cuba under the direction of one Bogatyryev. This
group, composed of about 150 people, was in Cuba at least as early as
October 1961 and was engaged overtly at a great many locations in activi-
ties connected with exploration for oil, mineral, and peat reserves. In
addition, some members of this team appear to have been geodesists
whose function probably was to extend triangulation control points as re-
quired for their intensified survey program. That the Soviet personnel
were doing their work well was attested to by a
described a geological map then re-
cently finished by the Soviet personnel as "magnificent and worth getting."
He further advised that "the Soviet geologists have taken all of the infor -
mation which all companies both mining and oil had in their files and put
it all together."
Although no reports are available of surveying in specific areas
that later became missile sites, members of this Soviet group may well
have been active in such areas. It would not be possible from the frag-
mentary type of evidence available, however, to distinguish between
activity related specifically to the establishment of the sites and activity
associated with the more general survey. In general, the appearance of
Soviet surveying groups at any given point or time in Cuba cannot be con-
sidered evidence of a Soviet intention subsequently to deploy missiles.
Because the Soviet geophysical team had been in Cuba at least
9 months before missile deployment and a wealth of data had been im-
mediately available to them, it must be assumed that virtually all of the
basic data required to locate the missile sites geodetically had been ac-
quired before the missiles were deployed. Therefore, the time neces-
sary to tie in an individual site to established geographic control points
- 14 -
ET
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
1E10
MI/
IMP
--f0P-SECRE_Z:
would have varied from only a few hours to a maximum of 1 week, and
this final preparation could have occurred after the site area was initially
occupied.
- I -
-77,715'-SECREZ
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Po�--
- 16 -
TO
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
.... -7171')-SE�UZ1'_
- 17 -
-701;"-SE
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
- 18 -
MP
�
-"TOP-SECZEL__7'
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
- 20 -
ET
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Figure 1
Th
6*.
AA PARRA
LOS
G'h'r 4. A wGgurs.,
'Lem- UNtlr,
�
MILITARY NO
R FORCE HO 01 con
A SANTLAGQ
/CCURA "
NAVY
140
ENTE
fr-
ANES
$110
/1
/5
8
4
���
nii
/ I
I
--- A
� MALGGN DO
TIAGO --". ' � i
4
41
4
e I
CERRO
IRAFLORE5
\ �
a 1)
k
1)
�IMP' � �
�
23
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
7I.S.KRET
- 21 -
PET
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
-raP-SECEIZZ:
C. Soviet Merchant Shipping
The pattern of Soviet merchant shipping to Cuba provides a
measure of the magnitude and intensity of the Soviet military buildup
and shows the abruptness with which it began. Whereas arms shipments
to Cuba had averaged about two shiploads a month during the first half
of 1962, about 125 voyages involving military cargoes were completed in
the 3 months between the last days of July and the establishment of the
US quarantine. The first ships carrying Soviet forces and their equip-
ment probably left the USSR during the first or second week of July
while Raul Castro was in the USSR. A key role in the subsequent flow
of Soviet arms to Cuba was played by a group of large-hatch ships,
which were the only Soviet-flag vessels capable of loading assembled
strategic missiles below decks.
Knowledge of both the volume and the nature of Soviet shipments
to Cuba is based on a variety of sources:
(3) photography of deck cargoes
obtained while Soviet ships were exiting the Black and Mediterranean
Seas, approaching Cuba, and being offloaded. From late July 1962 to
the time when the US established its quarantine on 24 October, Soviet
dry cargo ships completed about 150 voyages to Cuba (including 17
voyages by passenger ships). Sixteen other Soviet dry cargo ships
turned back to the USSR after the quarantine was announced. All but
about 25 of the 150 voyages are believed to have involved military cargoes.
An examination of the pattern of Soviet shipping to Cuba from
January through July 1962 indicates that dry cargo ship arrivals aver-
aged 15 per month. However, the number of Soviet dry cargo and
passenger ships arriving monthly approximately tripled from July
(15 arrivals) to August (43 arrivals) and increased still further in Sep-
tember (50 arrivals). The September level would have been maintained
in October had the additional 16 ships en route to Cuba completed their
voyages (see the chart, Figure 52*). In comparison, there was no sig-
nificant variation in the pattern of petroleum, oil, and lubricant ship-
ments. Although the Cuban buildup required a large relative increase in
Soviet shipping allocated to the Cuban trade, the diversion of this shipping
probably was not a serious problem in view of the size of the Soviet mer-
chant fleet and the availability of shipping in the world charter market.
* Following p. 82, below.
- 22 -
-7013--SECRF,11
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
By the time of the US quarantine the USSR had employed in the
Cuban trade all seven of its vessels that were capable of transporting
MRBM' s as hold cargo. Two of these vessels had made voyages to Cuba
before the military buildup began in July; the other five all made their
maiden voyages during the period of the buildup.*
With one exception, all of these large-hatch ships were built
outside the USSR, in Japan or Finland. As far as can be determined,
the contracts for these ships were awarded in a normal fashion, and
there was no evident haste in either the contractual negotiations or the
conditions set for their delivery. The Japanese contract, for example,
was negotiated from September to December 1960, and the lead-ship
was completed in December 1961. In addition to the three ships already
built, the Soviet authorities have placed orders with Japanese builders
for five additional ships of the same general type as the initial three.
The Finnish contract is part of a 5-year trade agreement with specific
deliveries negotiated annually. There is no information which indicates
that any of these large-hatch ships underwent extraordinary modification
of original designs while being built, and there was no sense of urgency
noted in the later stages of their construction.
The timing of the contracts and the fact that large hatches are
fairly common design features of large and modern ships currently
being built in shipyards throughout the world, as well as the absence of
any special circumstances involved in the construction of these ships for
the USSR, clearly indicate that they were not built for the purpose of
covertly carrying missiles to Cuba. However, the task of clandestinely
introducing those weapons onto the island probably could not have been
carried out before these vessels became available.
III. Air Defense Systems
One of the most striking features of the Soviet military buildup in
Cuba was the con.currency in bringing both defensive and offensive sys-
tems to an operational status, indicating a Soviet lack of concern for
acquiring the capability to protect the offensive weapons systems against
aerial detection or attack during their deployment phase. This section
reviews the evidence relating to the individual elements of the integrated
* For a detailed examination of the activities of these vessels, see V,
p. 50, below.
- 23 -
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
'4114'
Soviet air defense system that eventually emerged in Cuba. These ele-
ments are the early warning and target acquisition radar systems and
their supporting communications network, the SAM system, and the
force of fighter aircraft. Although all of these elements were present
in quantity in Cuba by the end of September, they were not integrated
into an operating air defense system until 27 October, the day before the
Soviet authorities announced their decision to withdraw the offensive
missiles from Cuba. The steady expansion of the air defense system
for some time thereafter indicates that its activation at that time prob-
ably was earlier than the Soviet authorities had planned.*
A. Early Warning and Target Acquisition Radar Capability
1. Before the Beginning of the Buildup
For more than a year preceding the crisis, the USSR had
been assisting Cuba in building an air defense capability, including the
provision of a variety of early warning and target acquisition radars.
Although some may have been delivered as early as September 1960,
when Soviet military shipments to Cuba began, the first firm evidence
of Soviet radars in operation in Cuba was acquired in June and July 1961,
It is probable that early
warning radars were included, along with the first jet fighters, in ship-
ments of military supplies which reached Cuba in late May and early
June 1961.
It is estimated that by late
July 1962, before the arrival of additional equipment during the buildup
period, there were between 20 and 30 early warning radars and about 20
antiaircraft artillery fire control radars deployed in Cuba.
a majority of the early warning equipment was
located in the western and central portions of the island. The fire con-
trol radars generally were sited with antiaircraft artillery units along
the northern coast of Cuba between Mariel and Caibarien, with the
heaviest concentration around Havana.
* For a photograph of a SAM site in Cuba with missiles in place on all
launchers, see Figure 2.
- 24 -
l'or-ssciaz
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
'MCP 1.C......
Figure Z. SAM Site at Caibarien with a Full Load of Missiles, 26 October 1962
SECRET
'
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
In site of this increase in radar capability, there was
no indicationL that a fully developed and integrated air defense
system was present in uba that could have assembled, collated, and
transmitted to appropriate control points the data necessary for passing
surveillance of an intruding aircraft from one responsible group to
another. However, there were isolated instances that suggested progress
toward such a system.
(b)(1)
ground-controlled intercept (GCI) exercises were occurring
routinely by July 1962, and on two occasions MIG fighters intercepted
unidentified foreign aircraft.
2. During and After the Buildup
As part of the Soviet military buildup beginning in late
July 1962, more modern and advanced radar equipment of greater range
and effectiveness was deployed in C.uba in sizable quantities. Much of
this equipment was associated with the SA-2 missile system. Photog-
raphy of late August and early September revealed the presence of SAM
system target tracking and control radars (FAN SONG) at the SA-2
sites emplaced in the western half of Cuba and the presence of possible
target acquisition radars (SPOONREST) at two of the sites. In mid-
11,5_:!0_()DEST radars in Cuba was confirmed
late October, photography permi e e en
other modern Soviet radars, me u mg a long-range warning radar and
a height-finding radar that, in combination, represent one of the most
advanced Soviet radar capabilities against aerodynamic vehicles.
It is estimated that by the time of the crisis period some
200 Soviet radars of all types were in Cuba. Much of this equipment,
particularly that associated with the SAM system, is known to have been
available to Soviet personnel when the US resumed reconnaissance over-
flights of Cuba on 14 October 1962. The remainder probably also was
available at that time or immediately thereafter, for little additional
equipment is believed to have arrived in Cuba at any time since the
announcement of the US quarantine on 22 October.
- 25 -
7---"M.7"SEGIZEJ_
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Although SAM sites and associated radars were deployed
in increasing numbers beginning in late August, this radar equipment
annarently was not generally activated by the Soviets until late October.
- 26 -
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
�181
10
�,�--7019-SECRZT_
3. Evidence on the Detection and Tracking of US Recon-
naissance Overflights During 1962
b)(1) It cannot be determine
\when the Cuban
government first became aware of these missions and their purpose.
However, there were numerous opportunities for identification of these
flights before mid-1962, and the Cubans may well have been aware that
their territory was being overflown by July 1962, if not considerably
earlier.
* Following p. 28, below.
- 27 -
--7ri19�SECREZ
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
---Tor-sgcazz
B. Surface-to-Air Missile System
The geographical placement of SA-2 sites and support facili-
ties in Cuba through the time when the strategie missiles were withdrawn
strongly suggests that the intention of Soviet planners was to establish an
area defense for the island as a whole and that maximum protection of
key military targets was not the governing objective. The Soviet authori-
ties evidently had no intention of employing the SAM system to prevent
detection of strategic missile sites under construction and had not
planned to activate this system until some time in November. There
was, nevertheless, no apparent reason why SAM sites could not have
been individually activated or the group on the western half of the island
activated by mid-September to screen the developing MRBM/IRBM sites
from aerial reconnaissance. Almost all the SA-2 sites were emplaced
and equipped and could have been integrated into a partial or fully de-
veloped SAM defense system by 14 October, when the first reconnaissance
aircraft photographed an MRBM site under development.
The SAM complex defending Cuba consisted of 24 SA-2 sites that
at the time of the crisis provided coverage of virtually the entire island.
Interspersed among the sites were seven support facilities that provided
the logistic support for the whole complex of sites. The individual SA-2
sites were integrated into an island-wide SAM defense system by a
network of communication facilities linking the sites, the early warning
radar network, and the Command and control centers. This integration
- 28 -
TVP-SEGIREZ
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
a R Sa e a � 4 $
Types and Duration of Radar Illuminations Recorded During
the Reconnaissance Mission of 2 May 1962
\--/Itus
f' f. F 0A' .11 X f C 0
MISSIOTI back
---- TOKEN
---- KNIFE REST A
KNIFE REST 8
SCAN ODD
34Saa
"
CARIBBEAN SEA
AS"--
-PASS \
�n
OQ
'111
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
a a 4 d Sa 1 S I 4
�SEGRET__
Types and Duration of Radar Illuminations Recorded During
the Reconnaissance Mission of 5 September 1962
.0�1�� MOM.]
- Mission Track
----- TOKEN
-KNIFE REST A
F/RE CAN
Woo 0.1 rpaxpm...,Nere�Nim
�
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
-TOP-SECIZ:L'
greatly increased the effectiveness of the system by providing additional
warning time, greater target tracking capability, and centralized control
of the entire system.
Although a few of the Cuban sites were deployed in a slightly
modified configuration, the accompanying sketch and photograph portray
the typical, fully developed SA-Z site constructed in Cuba. The
site con-
tains six revetted launch positions deployed in a star-shaped configura-
tion around a revetted, centrally located guidance area. In addition,
there are three revetted hold positions equally spaced about the periphery
of the circle formed by arcs connec:ting the launch positions (see Fig-
ure 5*).
Because the SA-2 system is entirely road-transportable and
SA-Z sites do not require extensive preparation, units can be deployed
and reach operational status relatively rapidly (see Figure 6). In Cuba,
er-rtv-
'
46471-eN,v4,1,k,V�.1:,w0;00
_�
Figure 6. SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles on Display in the Havana
Parade of 2 January 1963
equipment apparently was simply brought into the site area and placed
in the same respective and predetermined positions that it would occupy
at a fully developed site (see Figure 7*). The cables connecting the
necessary equipment were laid on top of the ground, and the site there-
after became operational as soon as missiles were present, the essen-
tial electronics checks and radar calibrations had been made, and the
equipment had been activated. Observations made in East Germany in-
dicate that an SA-2 unit can be moved out of a fully developed (revetted)
site location, transported a distance of 25 miles, and set up again in an
* Following p. 30, below.
- 29 -
-7073-SEGRZE_
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
+Oak
-Tor-sscazz
open field in a single day, presumably in an operational condition.
Soviet documents also attest to this capability.
As demonstrated in Cuba, the revetting of operational sites
is not an essential element of SA-2 deployment; as of 27 October 1962,
when an air defense system capability was first demonstrated, only
eight, or one-third, of the SA-2 sites had been revetted or were being
revetted. At all those sites, revetting was accomplished after the unit
apparently had been operationally deployed, but no pattern of revetting
among sites can be determined from the photographic coverage (see
Figure 8). More than half of the original SA-2 sites were never re-
vetted.
1. Capability of an Individual Site to Take Action
An individual site, whether minimally or fully deployed,
that is not tied into an over-all command and control system has a
limited capability for independent action. Although its radars can ac-
quire and track the target independently, and identify it as friend or
foe, the probability of a successful target intercept would depend heavily
on the skill and training of the troop unit, for the SA-2 system appears
to be designed to operate within the context of a fully developed air de-
fense system. Independent acqitisition of the target would be difficult
without additional azimuth and elevation data provided from both early
warning radar and from other SA-2 sites. In addition, the reaction
time of an individual site probably is too slow to enable it to launch its
missiles effectively against high-speed targets initially acquired by its
own radar.* As target speed decreases below 600 knots, however,
* An individual site, assuming acquisition of a target with a speed of
600 knots at a range of 100 nautical miles (am) and an altitude of 10 am,
would have approximately 10 minutes from the time of target acquisition
until the target was directly over the site itself. Thereafter, less than
2-1/2 Minutes would elapse before the target was out of missile range.
The criticality of the time factor in this case is pointed up by the fact that,
according to Soviet documents, an SA-2 site requires from B to 13 minutes
(depending on whether the power generators are on .or off) to move from a
standby condition (Readiness No. 2) to a launching or firing condition (Readi-
ness No. 1). Because an individual site is normally in an alert status no
greater than Readiness No. 2 and cannot be held in a firing condition,
according to Soviet writings, for longer [footnote continued on p. 31]
- 30 -
Approved for for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
Approved for Release: 2016/11/08 C01385902
PEZ
Num 5
Sketch of an SA-2 Surface4o-Air Missile file
/
gm AEST1 �,.�-�7
Ob ----. -.-- 7 f\ ' s--\---'. ' ---. 'I '
,,�-� v.,' / , , , ,
....: , ,
k
./.1:7.." 7,/ / \' , ,
/ / tOalltii�\"--1\\ / 1 ft ' '\\
t- � '" \ i '
, ,..
� .....,...46\
.4) i A
/ / \ \
1 I \ \
I e � v )
e f \ e
1 1 )I
1
\
\
}
1 1
ft
ki
/
\ \ � n 7
. \VI;
\
\ \ /
.` \ *'