ESAU XXXVII THE ATTITUDES OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS TOWARD FIGHTING AND NEGOTIATNG (REFERENCE TITLE: ESAU XXXVII)

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01369580
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 25, 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RSS No. 0025/68
25 March 1968
THE ATTITUDES OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS
TOWARD FIGHTING AND NEGOTIATING
(Reference Title: ESAU XXXVII)
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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THE ATTITUDES OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS
TOWARD FIGHTING AND NEGOTIATING
This is a staff study produced by the Special Research
Staff of the Directorate of Intelligence. It traces the
attitudes of North Vietnamese leaders on the conduct of
the war--that is, fighting, negotiating, and fighting-
while-negotiating. The paper attempts to show how these
attitudes have developed, to set forth the general scheme
the leaders have appeared to agree on, and to suggest the
circumstances in which latent differences among *them could
perhaps become important.
The study is based upon an extensive review of
Hanoi's public statements and of relevant classified
materials, emphasizing the past three years. It does
not include some materials given very limited dissemina-
tion.
John Kerry King
Chief, Special Research Staff
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THE ATTITUDES OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS
TOWARD THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
Page
Summary and Conclusions..
A Priori Groupings 1
From Geneva to War in the South, 1954-1960 2
Domination by the Militants, 1961-1963 4
Hostility to Negotiations, 1964 6
Attraction to Negotiations, Late 1964 and
Early 1965 7
Ambiguity About Negotiations, Late 1965 11
An Agreed Position on the Conduct of the War,
Early 1966 13
Renewed Probing on Negotiations, Late 1966
and Early 1967 20
Pressure for Cessation of the Bombing, Early 1967. 25
Marking Time, Summer 1967 28
Toward Negotiations Again (Maybe), September 1967.. 31
New Hopes for Pressures on Washington, Autumn 1967. 34
Renewed Pressure for Talks, December 1967 and
January 1968 38
The Tet Offensive As a Prelude to Negotiations,
Early 1968 41
Some Conclusions and Some Speculation 49
.3.5(c)
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THE ATTITUDES OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS
TOWARD FIGHTING AND NEGOTIATING
Summary and Conclusions
There have been differences among North Vietnamese
leaders with respect to the conduct of the war since 1954,
b4t by early 1966 the primary figures had apparently been
able to. subordinate their differences to an agreed general
scheme--to accept a military stand-off if necessary, and
to await indications that the U.S. will to persist had been
broken. The breaking of the U.S. will--regarded as the
stage of "decisive" but not "final" victory--could be
brought about in the "relatively short period" of a
"femo'years. This need not involve negotiations, but
it probably would. It might be signalled by American
acceptance of Communist terms for entering into negotia-
tions, or might come in the course of negotiations. The
Communists would continue to fight while negotiating, and,
with the eventual U.S. withdrawal and the establishment
of a Communist-dominated "coalition" in the South; the
"protracted war" would end in "final" victory.
This approach to the conduct of the war has appar-
ently underlain Hanoi's professions of willingness since
early 1967 to enter into "talks" which would set-up nego-
tiations--after an "unconditional" cessation of the bomb-
ing and of unspecified other "acts of war" against the
North. In refusing to give anything at all for a cessa-
tion--not even a promise not to take military advantage
of it--the Communists have apparently meant this refusal
to serve as a test of whether the U.S. will has been
broken or at least bent. The Communists have kept open,
however, the option of getting into negotiations without
insisting on this test and of trying then to break the
U.S. wilI.during a possibly prolonged period of fighting-
while-negotiating.
The recent Tet offensive was consistent with this
attitude toward negotiations, including the Communist
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preference for breaking the U.S. will before beginning
negotiations. Hanoi apparently calculated that the at-
tacks, if they achieved maximum success, would lead to
American acceptance of Communist terms for negotiations
and to the early establishment of a Communist-dominated
"coalition" government. In the apparent Communist scenario,
the U.S, would be forced to accept this "coalition" as
part of the settlement and to negotiate with it a with-
drawal of U.S. forces. In reaffirming--soon after the
offensive began--Hanoi's own interest in bilateral talks
and negotiations with the United States, and in saying
in effect that the talks could be negotiations, Hanoi's
Foreign Minister may have been trying to simplify the
process of getting negotiations started (by cutting
through the immediate problem of defining the roles in
negotiations of the Saigon government and the Liberation
Front). The Communist failure to hold any of the cities
--as a basis for proclaiming a "coalition" which could
join ongoing negotiations between Hanoi and Washington,
but excluding Saigon--may have postponed that possible
short-cut to a settlement but did not eliminate it.
It is probably still the Communist estimate that
the U.S. can be brought to accept a settlement essentially
on Communist terms. Since autumn 1967 the Communists have
shown an increased confidence that this would be the out-
come, primarily as a result of continued military pressure
in Vietnam and the erosion of the Saigon government (and
thus of the basis for the U.S. presence in Vietnam), and
secondarily as a result of domestic problems in the United
States and intensified activities by militant Communists
elsewhere. In their view, they cannot be compelled by
continued bombing to agree to end the war, while (as
they continue to see it) the U.S. is unable to prevent
reinforcements and supplies from reaching the South, un-
able to secure the countryside when the cities are brought
under attack, and unable to create a viable political
structure in the South. The Tet offensive presumably
increased Hanoi's confidence on the last two points.
On the assumption that Hanoi will not soon take
the remaining step to get into "talks" or will take that
*step but will be intransigent in talks and/or negotiations
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and cause them to fail, the question remains 'as to whether
North Vietnamese leaders will see things any differently
a year or two from now. This is the question of the state.
of their own will if and when they find that their basic
estimate--of the loss of U.S. will to persist--has been
mistaken.
Even before that time, the death or disability of
Ho Chi Minh might conceivably precipitate a power struggle
among the other primary leaders and force Hanoi to take
a less militant attitude toward the conduct of the war.
But it seems much more likely that these leaders would
work together until the course of the war itself forced
them into conflict. There have been apparent differences
in inclination among Ho's three principal lieutenants--party,
leader Le Duan seeming the hardest, Premier Pham Van Dong
the least hard, General Giap somewhere between--which in
the proper circumstances could perhaps produce such a
conflict.
If the North Vietnamese leaders were under continued
pressure and had no prospect either of a settlement on
their terms or of a military victory, there might then
be either a general shift to the right (a less militant
attitude) or a split in the politburo. Even with Ho still
dominant, either might happen; with Ho out of the picture,
such possibilities would be enhanced. Premier Dong would
be expected to lead any general shift to the right or to
lead right wing forces in a split. Le Duan (with Truong
Chinh) would be-expected to lead resistance toa shift
or to lead the left in a split. Dong and Duan would each
have several followers in the politburo. General Giap
might be the key figure in the middle; while he would
probably have fewer followers at the politburo level, they
might include those decisive in the control of the prin-
cipal instruments of force, the army and the police.
It must be emphasized that such a shift or split
appears to be more than a marginal possibility Only if
and when the Communist leaders--or some of them--come
to believe that the.basic factors are no longer working
in their favor. �At present, they are confident that this
situation has not arisen and that it will not arise.
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THE ATTITUDES OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS
TOWARD THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
A Priori Groupings
Some preliminary groupings of North Vietnamese
leaders can be made a priori. One would expect, on the
Chinese example, to find a single dominant leader and at
least three loose associations of his lieutenants, dis-
posed by temperament and profession to think and behave
in fairly distinctive ways: party-machine figures, in-
clined to be doctrinaire, militant, and pro-Chinese;
government leaders, less doctrinaire, more nearly moder-
ate, and pro-Soviet; and military leaders, likely to be
clOser in their sympathies to the second group than to
the first. Thus, at any time after perhaps 1960, the
members of the North Vietnamese party politburo--the
,group that counts--could be broken down something like
this:
(a) Ho Chi Minh, clearly the dominant figure;
(b) Le Duan, first secretary, primary figure
of the party-machine group; Le Due Tho, a secretary,
director of the party's organization department; Nguyen
Chi Thanh (now dead), a secretary, director of political
work in the armed forces; and possibly Truong Chinh, one-
time first secretary displaced by Duan.
(c) Pham Van Dong, premier, primary figure of
the government group; Pham Hung, ranking deputy premier;
Le Thanh Nghi, the principal economic planner; Nguyen Duy
Trinh, a planner, now foreign minister; and possibly Hoang
Van Hoan, foreign affairs specialist, sometime ambassador
to Peking.
(d) General Vo Nguyen Giap, Minister of Defense,
primary figure of the military group; and Van Tien Dung,
his chief-of-staff.
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(e) Finally, as a free floater or as head of a
possible, police group, Tran Quoc Hoan, Minister of Public
Security, probable head of the party police. (Dung and
Hoan are only alternate members.)
The following exercise examines the positions
taken by and attributed to these leaders in recent years,
in order to judge whether differences among them have any
practical consequences for Hanoi's conduct of the war,
including the question of a possible negotiated settle-
ment.
From Geneva to War in the South, 1954-1960
By spring 1954, the Vietnamese Communists, carry-
ing out a "protracted war" in three stages as originally
formulated by Mao and as updated for Vietnam in 1950 by
General Giap, had destroyed the enemy's will to persist
(without defeating the French militarily)--the same ob-
jective they are working toward now. In summer 1954, how-
ever, Ho Chi Minh, working primarily through Pham. Van
Dong, accepted an unfavorable settlement in the Geneva
negotiations. This was mainly owing to Russian and Chi-
nese pressure, and it was reportedly opposed and criti-
cized by Le Duan and other "militants." The North Viet-
namese Communists then lay back, waiting for the Diem.
government, in the South to break down, while themselves
concentrating on a harsh land-reform on the Chinese model.
But Diem did pretty well, while the land-reform failed;
Truong Chinh, then secretary-general, had to assume the
responsibility for this failure.
Against Russian advice, the party began in 1956
to make preparations for "armed struggle" in the South,
and the militants began to group more closely around Le
Duan, who was already associated mainly with the program
(then emphasizing subversion) in the South; Duan was soon
to displace Truong Chinh as the de facto secretary-general.
At the same time, Diem refused to hold elections for the
unification of Vietnam'(while Hanoi refused to allow
supervision of elections �in the North), and those like,
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Pham Van Dong identified with the Geneva agreements report-
edly suffered some loss of prestige in consequence.
In late 1957, Peking shifted from "peaceful coexist-
ence" to a militant pursuit of anti-American policies
everywhere, and in early 1958 the Vietnamese Communists
responded in a series of pronouncements by the militant
Le Duan criticizing Khrushchev's policies. In the same
period, another hard-line figure, Nguyen Chi Thanh, played
the leading role for the party in forcing military profes-
sionals to accept party positions on a range of questions.
General Giap, both a party leader and military leader,
apparently tried to stay out of the dispute, but some
observers believe that he declined in stature in 1958
and 1959.
.In May 1959 the North Vietnamese party decided
upon a new phase of violent revolution in the South, and
publicly exhorted its compatriots there to launch it.
While Khrushchev was advising the North Vietnamese to avoid
a direct confrontation with the U.S., Mao was telling them
to press on. Le Duan, leader of the militants and Ho's
most influential lieutenant, advocated taking �the risk,
and reportedly had the support of other militants like
Thanh and Le Duc Tho; Hoang Van Roan, though not a party-
machine type, had joined this militant group by this time.
By spring 1960 Hanoi's line in the Sino-Soviet
dispute was virtually identical with Peking's, but in the
latter part of 1960 Ho saw the wisdom of adopting a neutral
position. Illustrating the practice of North Vietnamese
leaders of expressing a common position on a critical
matter, the relatively moderate Dong was chosen to state
this line, and the relatively hard Tho gave it his public
support.
At this time (September 1960) Hanoi openly declared
its intention to promote and support "revolutionary strug-
gle" in the South. Le Duan was the spokesman for this
intention, and General Giap played a supporting role. Dong,
while not opposed, was more cautious. Duan also called
for the formation of a new front in the South, and the
Liberation Front duly appeared in October 1960. It soon
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issued A call for the overthrow of Diem's government and
its replacement by a "coalition."
Following the U.S. elections of November 1960,
there were several North Vietnamese probes--encouraged
by Moscow--of American intentions, and one North Viet-
namese leader at that time described the leadership as
divided between a moderate group around Premier Dong
--which wanted to ease tensions--and a group of uniden-
tified "extremists" (presumably Le Duan, Truong Chinh.
Thanh, Tho, and loan, and perhaps at that time Nguyen
Duy Trinh, the present foreign minister).
Domination by the Militants, 1961-1963
Peking was vociferous in 1960 and 1961 in publicly
encouraging the violence in South Vietnam, and Premier
Dong visited both Peking and Moscow to get declarations
of support. Vietnamese Communist leaders seemed confident
�that American aid would not extend to the large-scale
commitment of troops or to airstrikes against the North,
and seemed well satisfied with the progress of the guer-
rilla war in the South.
By the end of 1961, Hanoi was on record with its
terms for a settlement--essentially, a U.S. withdrawal
and acceptance of the Front's program for the South.
In January 1962 Hanoi surfaced the People's Revolution-
ary [Communist] party as the guiding force of the Front.
Soon thereafter, Hanoi appealed for international negotia-
tions. Throughout 1962, however, the Communists indicated
that they did not intend to make concessions either to
set up negotiations or in the course of them; in their
scenario, only the U.S. was to do so.
By early 1963, lack of Communist progress in the
South had apparently precipitated a dispute in the North
Vietnamese leadership--one serious enough to impel General
Giap to appeal publicly for party unity. The divisive
question was whether (a) to maintain or increase the tempo
of military action in the South, or (b) to put greater
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emphaSiS on political forms of action. The advocates of
the hard-line course--reaffirmed publicly by the militants
Duan and Thanh--prevailed, although a minority remained
unconvinced. Thanh,became Hanoi's leading spokesman on
military affairs, a shift toward Chinese positions in the
Sino-Soviet dispute began, and a pro-Chinese secondary
leader (Xuan Thuy) was named Foreign Minister.
Peking sent Liu Shao-chi (then second only to Mao)
to Hanoi in May 1963 to stiffen the determination of the
militants. Liu publicly praised their leader, Le Duan,
and the militant Truong Chinh thanked Liu for his endorse-
ment of Hanoi's policy; but he and Ho both made clear to
Liu that Hanoi would not fully accept Chinese positions
in the Sino-Soviet dispute. (Hanoi soon did support Peking
on the test-ban treaty, however, because any Communist
cooperation with the U.S. on a "peace" issue undercut the
militant program in the South.)
In July 1963 the Liberation Front in the South
stated explicitly what had been suggested earlier--a
distinction between (a) negotiations with the U.S. on
the 'external' matter of U.S. withdrawal, and (b) negotia-
tions with elements in the South on the 'internal' mat-
ter of "unification." The full scenario now was: U.S.
agreement to withdraw, the working out of arrangements
for withdrawal in negotiations, the formation of a "coali-
tion" government in the South, and the arrangement of
"reunification" by the two regimes. This is still the
basic scenario.
The militants of Le Duan's conjectured group pur-
sued their advantage in the summer and fall of 1963. Gen-
eral Thanh denounced those who were unwilling to provoke
the United States; Truong Chinh took a hard line on the
need to provoke internal war and risk external war; and
Thanh returned to denounce the cautious again and to call
for a struggle against "revisionism." The demand for an
American withdrawal continued to be made in terms which
suggested little or no flexibility, and North Vietnamese
spokesmen held out little prospect of successful negotia-
tions. The relatively moderate Dong associated himself
with that position, and was the first to emphasize the
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importance of making the U.S. lose the will to persist
so that it would take the initiative to withdraw. Le
Duan continued to speak in extremely militant terms.
By the end of 1963, a fairly clear picture of the
North Vietnamese leadership had emerged: Ho Chi Minh as
the dominant figure, balancing and mediating between
militant and relatively moderate groups; Le Duan as the
leader of the militantS, including Truong Chinh, Thanh,
Tho, Hoan, and possibly Trinh; Pham Van Dong as the leader
of the moderates (but, like Chou En-lai in China, one who
would loyally carry out militant policies which his leader
favored), a group probably including Pham Hung and pos-
sibly including Le Thanh Nghi; and General Giap as likely
to be closer in general to the moderates, although not
necessarily in his attitude toward the war.
Hostility to Negotiations, 1964
In early 1964, the position of the dominant figures
in Hanoi--Ho Chi Minh and the militants around Le Duan--
was about as hard as possible. One element of this was
a rejection of negotiations (except with anti-Saigon ele-
ments in the South). Duan, Thanh, and Tho all publicly
criticized the opponents of the dominant (militant) line.
General Giap in the same period seemed either to be fend-
ing off criticism or making a counter-criticism of the
militants.
Also in early 1964, Duan, Tho and Hoan (three mili-
tants) went together to Moscow to get greater Soviet sup-
port, perhaps including a statement deterring the U.S.
from airstrikes. The mission failed, and by late spring
Khrushchev's caution was drawing criticism even from some
of the relatively moderate like Dong and Giap.
During that spring, North Vietnamese journals re-
jected any international negotiations before attaining a
series of military successes in the South which would
leave the U.S. no choice but to withdraw. General Giap
himself said this, and agreed that the prerequisite for
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a settlement was an American withdrawal. Such statements
were evasive on the relationship between withdrawal and
possible negotiation--for example, whether withdrawal was
to precede "negotiations' or was to be worked out in them.
In June 1964, the Chinese decided to increase their
logistic support Of North Vietnam. Neither Peking nor
Hanoi appeared to fear nuclear strikes against either China
or North Vietnam, and one North Vietnamese military leader
publicly reassured his comrades that use of nuclear weapons
was politically unacceptable to the U.S, Both were prob-
ably concerned, however, with the possibility of conventional
bombing; and in fact the first strike, provoked by Hanoi
in a bad reading of the U.S, humor, came in August.
Tension between the party leaders and the profes-
sional military re-emerged at this time, apparently on
the first principle of party domination of the army,
rather than on any particular issue related to the con-
duct of the war. Truong Chinh, Tho and lesser militants
took the lead again in insisting on the principle. Gen-
eral Giap and other military leaders agreed on the prin-
ciple, but again showed some sympathy for the military
professionals being harassed by political types.
Attraction to Negotiations, Late 1964 and Early 1965
Ho Chi Minh was reportedly very receptive in the
late months of 1964 to third-party proposals for' negotia-
tions between North Vietnam and the United States, at a
time when the war was going very badly for South Vietnam
and Ho may have believed that he could negotiate a surrender.
It was reported that Ho agreed to meet with an American
representative in Rangoon, and that Premier Dong also
expressed a "great desire" for negotiations. In the same
period, North Vietnamese spokesmen privately encouraged
the belief that an American withdrawal could follow the
establishment of a "coalition" government in the South,
and that reunification could come much later. Also in
this period, spokesmen privately expressed the desire of
the Liberation Front to negotiate with Saigon, intglying
readiness to deal With the legal goVeinment.
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While Hanoi was waiting for the U.S. response,
and immediately following Khrushchev's fall, Dong led a
delegation to Moscow. There he got an agreement on poli-
tical and military support, but apparently also a private
statement of Moscow's preference for a negotiated settle-
ment. The Chinese opposed the latter, and saw a trace
of flexibility in Hanoi's attitude; there were in fact
some hints of this in the North Vietnamese party press
in December, which stated a willingness to "talk peace"
if and when the American attitude changed. In the same
month, Peking began to upgrade the Liberation Front, as
a hedge against Hanoi's possible willingness to settle
for less than Mao was asking (which was, if possible, a
complete military victory, and if not that then a U.S.
withdrawal prior to negotiations). Both General Giap
and C/S Dung published articles on the war at that time
--both tough and confident, and unconcerned with negotia-
tions, articles which understandably were to serve as
the model for statements by military leaders.
In December and January (with Hanoi still waiting
for an American response), French officials probed North
Vietnamese willingness to conclude a settlement on the
basis of "neutralization" of Vietnam_ The North Viet-
namese fielded this by observing that the Liberation
Front program already envisaged a "neutral" government
for the South. Application of this concept to the North
was to come only in the form of a provision--in Hanoi's
four "points"--for the North and South both to abstain
from military alliances.
Washington reportedly rejected the proposed Rangoon
meeting in a message of late January 1965, although the
third-party proponent's version of the event has left un-
clear the form of the reply and the stated grounds. Some
sources were apparently told that the grounds were "that
negotiations would serve to depress South Vietnamese
morale--a result Ho may indeed have been counting on (a
captured document later admitted this to be one of the
principal purposes of negotiations).
There were signs of continued North Vietnamese
interest in negotiations even after this, coinciding with
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Kosygin's advocacy of this course in his talks in Hanoi
in February. In late February and early March the Chi-
nese urged Hanoi to reject negotiations categotically and
seemed to be inciting the North Vietnamese to make a
large-scale attack across the l 17th Parallel (which would
help to deter a political settlement in the South by
destroying the concept of the South).
The Liberation Front in March--which had criticized
Soviet efforts toward negotiations--appeared to follow
Chinese counsel in making the accomplished fact of an
American withdrawal a precondition for negotiations, and
in early April Hanoi Radio associated Ho Chi Minh himself
with this apparent position. Pham Van Dong, however,
speaking privately at the same time, repeated General
Giap's call of March for -a cessation of the increasing
U.S. airstrikep and implied that "talks" might follow upon
such a cessation.
Speaking publicly a few days later, Dong put for-
ward the four "points"--all off them made at one or another
time previously; and stated by-Ho Chi Minh hIrself in the
form. of "three points". during 1964--which have since been
invariably held to be the "basis" for a settlement. The
"points," briefly, called for U.S. withdrawal, abstehtion
of North and South from military alliances, settlement of
affairs in the South in accordance with the Liberation
Front's program, and accomplishment of reunification at
an unspecified time. (These "points" as stated would not
bar Northern support of the war in the South, and would
simplify the task of imposing a Communist-dominated govern-
ment on the South.)
Dong in this speech called for "recognition" of
the four "points" as a precondition for any negotiations.
As "recognition" apparently meant 'acceptance in principle,'
Dong was apparently not calling for an American withdrawal
prior to negotiation-S-7-but rather for an American promise
(in advance of negotiations) to withdraw in the course
of negotiations or thereafter. Peking, however, chose
to take the harder position apparently stated by Ho and
the Front as official (withdrawal first, negotiations
later), and this interpretation was not publicly disputed
by Hanoi.
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In the same period (mid-April), Hanoi turned down a 17-
nation appeal for a cease-fire and talks.
There was evidence in April 1965 that elements of
the North Vietnamese leadership--although perhaps not at
the top levels--were attracted to negotiations on too
easy terms. The new chief of political work in the armed
forces warned in strong terms of the need to combat an
"exaggerated desire for peace" and to resist the lure of
negotiations. However, the pro-Chinese Foreign Minister
was replaced by one less so (Nguyen Duy Trinh, a polit-
buro member) which may have been owing either to prepara-
tions for eventual negotiations or to Hanoi's anger with
the Chinese--indicated by Le Duan at the time--over Peking's
obstruction of Soviet materiel passing to North Vietnam.
Faced with the hard position stated by Ho and the
Front and endorsed by Peking, Moscow began to call for
a cessation of the bombing as a precondition for negotia-
tions. Hanoi did not discourage this, but would not at-
firm Dong's reported private statement that this might
be the only precondition for "talks" (as distinct from,
preliminary to, full-scale negotiations, although Dong
may not have made the distinction at the time). Hanoi
in early May again rejected a third-nation proposal for
a cease-fire, and the week-long pause in the bombing in
mid-May did not make Hanoi any more forthcoming. North
Vietnamese spokesmen rejected the idea of a reciprocal
concession, and Foreign Minister Trinh refused to provide
any clarification of the-four "points." However, a spokes-
man outside Hanoi confirmed that Dong's proposal was in-
deed for acceptance of the "points" in principle, prior
to negotiations.
In July 1965, while primary leaders like Dong and
Giap were being evasive in their statements about negotia-
tions and Giap was stating Hanoi's uncertainty as to whether
the U.S. was going to turn its "special war" into a full-
scale "local" war, some sources stated what was-Itot was
to become--Hanoi's true position. Soviet and other bloc
sources said that "talks" could follow a permanent cessa-
tion of the bombing, while one North Vietnamese leader
stated that negotiations would follow the cessation of
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the bombing and of the U.S. troop build-up, plus acceptance
in principle of the four "points," (This is still essenti-
ally Hanoi's position.) The Chinese Communist foreign
minister contributed to the picture by .stating privately
thet the dominant leaders in Hanoi regarded the time as
not yet "ripe" for negotiations, The question of when
the time would be "ripe" was not then--but was to be later--
in dispute between Peking and Hanoi,
AMibiguity About Negotiations, Late 1965
At about the same time (mid-1965), when the U.S.
build-up and airstrikes had clearly indicated the American
determination to play a major role in the fighting, a
debate apparently began among North Vietnamese leaders on
military strategy, This followed in time one on similar
lines between Peking and Hanoi, in which Peking (envisag-
ing a Communist Victory in a much shorter period than
Hanoi did) had been pushing the Vietnamese Communists to
pass from a predominantly guerrilla tO'a predominantly
conventional phase, urging North Vietnam to increase the
number of its regular forces in the South, and pressing
Hanoi as well not to consider negotiations. In the internal
debate developing from mid-1965, the militant, pro-Chinese
Thanh, sent at that time to.direct military operations
in the South, argued that the Viet Cong were capable of
large-scale, prolonged attacks on U.S. forces, while the
opposition--possibly including Giap--apparently doubted
this and seemed to favor a shift to a defensive strategy
emphasizing guerrilla warfare; as General Thanh was later
to put it, as late as autumn 1965 "we were not firmly
resolved to fight" (meaning, apparently, "big battles"),
This dispute later seemed to subside, and may have ended
by the time of the death of Thanh in mid-1967,
In the latter half of 1965, North Vietnamese lead-
ers presented a mixed picture with respect to a negotiated
settlement of the' war. Ho Chi Minh (who in August asked
for "proof" that the U.S. had accepted in principle the
four "points") and Pham Van Dong (who of course had stated
Ho's position in formulating the points) suggested readi-
ness to negotiate when the U.S. called off the bombing,
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stopped the troop build-up, and "recognized" the points.
Moreover, Le Duan seemed to move further away from his one-
time extremely pro-Chinese position, making himself appear
at least as not opposed to negotiations on these terms;
and two of his conjectured followers, Tho and Hoan, fol-
lowed his lead. However, C/S Dung and Truong Chinh ap-
peared to be opposed to negotiations on any terms, and
the Chinese again threw their weight behind those who
took this position (and who favored large-scale battles
and greater use of North Vietnamese regulars in the South).
Statements by the Foreign Ministry and by lesser leaders
were ambiguous: for example, a Foreign Ministry statement
of 23 September was interpreted by some observers as a
harsh rejection of U.S. overtures and by others as bid-
ding for a dialogue with the U.S. (it seemed somewhat
forthcoming on the matter of a U.S. withdrawal and the
role of the Liberation Front), while several sources
explicitly rejected the idea of a reciprocal concession
for cessation of the bombing but encouraged the view that
Hanoi would be forthcoming in unspecified ways.
Perhaps Hanoi's position was best stated by Dong
and Giap. Giap in October argued publicly to the effect
that the American military position was not yet bad enough
to prepare Washington to negotiate a surrender, and called
for "equal emphasis" on operations by guerrillas and
regular forces in a war of attrition. And Dong was re-
ported at the same time to be stating privately--as he
had in 1963--his confidence that protracted war would
create political conditions in the United States (as in
France in 1954) which would eventually force acceptance
of the four "points." (Le Duan was soon to state a similar
view.) In the winter of 1965-66, this position was to
be given a theoretical rationale, and was to become the
reported position of all of the primary leaders by mid-
1966.
In November and December, bloc sources continued
to encourage the view, that Hanoi would be forthcoming
after a cessation of the bombing, and there were some
reports (not well sourced) that Hanoi would or might
effect a de-facto scaling-down or even a cease-fire after
such a cessation. After the U.S. on 24 December began
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a pause in the bombing which was to last more than five
weeks, Ho Chi Minh on 28 December introduced the explicit
demand for a "complete and unconditional" cessation. While
Ho did not state that this action would suffice for
"talks," one spokesman for Hanoi implied that talks would
indeed follow a cessation of the bombing and acceptance
in principle of the four "points," and that Hanoi would
de-escalate the war in the course of those talks, effect-
ing a complete cease-fire in the course of subsequent
"negotiations." At the same time, the Lao Dong central
committee passed a new resolution--to' be discussed pres-
ently--which was to serve as the theoretical rationale
for Hanoi's conduct of the war.
The record as of the end of 1965 suggested a pic-
ture of the North Vietnamese leadership essentially:the
same as it had seemed two years earlier but with a few
possibly significant changes: Ho Chi Minh as still clearly
dominant; Le Duan still second, with himself, Truong,
Chinh, Thanh, Tho and Hoan as all still more-or-less
militant, but with Duan, Tho and Hoan having shifted from
extreme pro-Chinese positions, leaving only Chinh and
Thanh in that apparent position; Dong as still the leader
of the relatively moderate, favoring negotiations but not
soft on conditions for a settlement, along with Hung,
Nghi and possibly Trinh; and General Giap as still closer
to the moderatesin general, but apparently opposed',to
early negotiations. All of the primary figures apparently
were moving toward a rough agreement to undertake "talks"
if the U.S. was willing to make an important concession
(at least the cessation of the bombing) to get them, and
toward another agreement that American will to persist
in the war could be eroded to the point that they would
be able to negotiate a phased surrender.
An Agreed Position on the Conduct of the War, Early 1966
The United States in early January 1966--during
a bombing pause which was to last to the end of January--
offered a 14-point statement which Hanoi came to recognize
(in its surly way) as a most forthcoming position. Although
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the statement was quickly denounced by Hanoi, it was later
treated by North Vietnamese spokesmen as having expressed
acceptance in principle of three of the four points which
Hanoi had presented as the "basis" for a settlement,
and thus as having gone far toward meeting Hanoi's condi-
tions for negotiations--if, as had been frequently implied,
acceptance in principle of these "points" was required
in advance of any full-scale negotiations. (The three
accepted, entirely or essentially, related to U.S. with-
drawal and the dismantling of bases, abstention of North
and South from military alliances, and reunification to
be effected by the Vietnamese themselves.)
As this U.S. statement was being put on the record,
another Soviet delegation�led by Shelepin--came to Hanoi
and reportedly again encouraged Hanoi to enter into negotia-
tions. According to a raptured document, Hanoi promptly
rejected this advice, According to the 3.3(h)(2)
North Vietnamese did this in the form. of insisting to
Shelepin that they would enter into "talks" (not negotia-
tions) only in exchange for a cessation of the bombing
and a halt in the build-up of U.S. forces, leaving the
question open as to whether they would demand acceptance
in principle of all four "points" as stated as a precon-
dition for full-scale negotiations. In any case, Ho Chi
Minh---who had apparently been asked directly by the. U.S.
what his response would be if the bombing pause were ex-
tended�was no more forthcoming in his 24 January letter
(to heads of state) than he had been On 28 December.
Evading the fact that the U.S. had accepted in principle
three of the four "points," Ho's etphasis was on the
point that the U.S. had not accepted. He insisted that
the U.S. must recognize the Liberation Front as the "sole
genuine representative" of the South and must negotiate
with it (about withdrawal of U.S. troops), a demand which
as stated was manifestly unacceptable. He reiterated
that the U.S. must accept the whole four-point package
and declared that the U.S. must "prove this by actual
deeds; and must.unconditionally" end the bombing. The
latter demand--in this formulation--could be read as mean-
ing the "proof" that the whole package was being bought,
and North Vietnamese spokesmen said privately that this
was the right reading; one said further that the cessation
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would have to be proclkimed,"permanent and unconditional"
(another manifestly unacceptable demand).
In early February, after the U.S. had resumed the
bombing (31 January), various sources reported that North
Vietnamese leaders were now in agreement in spurning negotia-
tions and pressing on to a successful military conclusion.
Articles at the time by General Giap and c/S Dung contended
--as might be expected--that this could be done, However,
Giap informed his audience that the U.S. had indeed "gone
beyond" the earlier "special war" and that the new war--to
be fought by "guerrilla warfare" and "limited regular war-
fare"--would be "long and hard.." 3.3(h)(2)
in the same period said that Hanoi realized
that it could not win a military victory; Hanoi's plan,
they said (as Pham Van Dong had been indicating for more
than two years), was to make the war so costly that the
U.S. would withdraw. In the same period, an article by
the hard-line Le Duc Tho indicated that elements in the
party--not the hard-liners like himself, and not neces-
sarily any members of the politburo--were discouraged by
the war and wanted a negotiated settlement on terms accept-
able to the U.S.; the article also suggested tension on
other matters between party-machine leaders like himself
and government leaders like Premier Dong and Foreign Minister
Trinh. Hanoi at the same time admitted a morale problem
among the Viet Cong in the South.
At about this time, North Vietnamese leaders began
to transmit to Communist forces in the South an agreed
position on the conduct of the war which had been reached
by the central committee at the end of 1965--that is, a
new resolution embodying decisions reached after U.S.
intervention had blocked the military victory the Com-
munists had expected to achieve in 1965 and after the
party leaders had had time to assess their new situation.
The resolution itself has not come to light, but several
captured documents written in early 1966 are believed to
reflect it faithfully. The best of these were a resolution
by the Communists' "central office for South Vietnam"
(COSVN), a letter by Le Duan, and speeches attributed
to General Thanh and Deputy C/S Nguyen Van Vinh.
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The COSVN document argued that "decisive victory"
would come when the Vietnamese Communists had destroyed
a large part of U.S. forces and most of the South Viet-
namese forces. (It remained for other documents to make
clear that--as Hanoi saw it--this would have the effect
of destroying the U.S. will to persist.) The Communist
objective was stated as that of coordinating military
operations with a "popular uprising to liberate cities
and towns," preparing for a "general offensive and up-
rising" when the time was ripe. (These terms havelnot
been used in the same way at all times.)
The hard Le Duan began his mid-March letter to
the Viet Cong by saying that the politburo was (now) in
complete agreement on the war. Conceding that U.S. inter-
vention had greatly slowed the "revolution," he neverthe-
less asserted that the Viet Cong was now on the offensive
(contrary to the Chinese view). The politburo continued
to hold, he wrote, both to the strategy of "protracted
war" and to the objective of gaining "decisive victory
in a relatively short period of time." As now defined,
however, "decisive" victory would come when the United
States was frustrated in Vietnam and knew it--so that it
could be brought to accept Hanoi's terms for a settlement
and would withdraw. The politburo, he wrote, was agreed
on a military and political struggle, a fight-and-negotiate
policy that had worked well for the Chinese. The time
was not ripe (he continued) to negotiate; and it would
not be ripe (he went on to imply) so long as the U.S.
tried to impose conditions ("concessions") for negotiations.
In any case, the politburo.would decide when negotiations
were to Vietnamese Communist interests. (The Russians
in this period again turned out to be right about Hanoi's
position: Soviet leaders said that Hanoi was not ready
to negotiate, but that, when it was, then a.cceptarfce in
principle of the four "points" would have to be the basis
for negotiations.)
In late March Le Duan led a delegation to Moscow,
where he warmly praised the Russians without accepting
their advice to be more forthcoming about negotiations.
And in early April, on the anniversary of the original
statement of the four "points," Hanoi reaffirmed that its
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terms for ending the war had not changed and that it had
no immediate interest in negotiations. (In other words,
the U.S. still had not been softened up enough.)
In April 1966, General Thanh and Deputy C/S Vinh
gave illuminating expositions (notes on which were later
captured) of the party's decisions of late 1965 on the
conduct of the war, clarifying some of the points made
by COSVN and Le Duan. Agreeing with Duan that the party
for some time had envisaged "decisive victory" in a "rela-
tively short period of time," they made it more clear
that large-scale American intervention had made it neces-
sary to define "decisive" victory in terms of breaking the
U.S. will to persist. In this connection, they.were con-
fident that the U.S. greatly underestimated the number of
troops which would prove necessary to prevent the North
from reinforcing the South and to conduct the war in the
South effectively (including the defense of the cities)
at the same time. "Decisive" victory, which would create
the "conditions" for "final" victory, would come in the
course of an indecisive war (they foresaw a "deadlock"),
after a part of the U.S. forces and most of the South
Vietnamese forces had been destroyed (as the COSVN docu-
ment had said); at some point, the U.S. would decide :that
it did not .care to go on with the war and would be ready
for negotiations. (The thought apparently was: if the
U.S. were ready to negotiate on Hanoi's terms, that would
prove that its will hadbeen broken; while if negotiations
were undertaken for whatever reason on other terms, Hanoi
would use negotiations to find out whether the U.S. will
was broken, and, if not, to go on to break it.) When negotia-
tions did come (Vinh said), the Communists would use them as
"another front;" with which to "disintegrate" South Viet-
namese armed forces and exacerbate "contradictions" (con-
flicts of interest) in the enemy camp. Fighting would
continue (according to Vinh' s' exposition) during and
perhaps even beyond negotiations (thus "protracted" war),
in order to impose Hanoi's terms and ensure that agree-
ments were kept; in other words, whether the U.S. will
was broken before or during negotiations, the settlement
would be on Hanoi's terms. Whereas the Chinese (Vinh
said), thought that the time would not be ripe for negotia-
tions for several years or "even worse, seven years"
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(contrary to their earlier exhortations to press for a
quick victory), the North Vietnamese were confident they
could bring the war to a fight-and-negotiate stage in two
or three or at most four years.
Peking soon made clear that it was concerned over
the possibility that Hanoi would enter into negotiations
prematurely in order to get the U.S. to stop the bombing.
It presumably made this point to Ho when he made an un-
publicized trip to Peking in May.
Hanoi's public pronouncements in April and May
of 1966 continued to convey the impression--as would be
expected from the party documents--that North Vietnam
had no immediate interest in negotiations, but was con-
tinuing to prepare for negotiations when the time was
ripe. For example, Premier Dong in mid-April indirectly
conceded that the U.S, had accepted in principle three
of the four "points" and went on to present Ho Chi Minh's
demands in such a way as to seem to be saying more clearly
that cessation of the bombing would be taken as "proof"
that the U.S. had accepted in principle the four "points,"
after which negotiations could begin. In other words,
the time would be ripe when the U.S. gave a good indica-
tion--by halting the bombing without any reciprocal con-
cession--that its will was or could be broken.
In June and July, North Vietnamese officials con-
tinued to imply that Hanoi would enter into some kind
of discussions in exchange for the "unconditional" and
permanent cessation of the bombing demanded earlier.
While some of these sources explicitly rejected any reci-
procal concession for the cessation, some were reportedly
more forthcoming; one visitor construed remarks by Pham
Van Dong himself as meaning that Hanoi would or might
make a concession, possibly in the form of halting the
movement of Northerners into the South. Other North
Vietnamese sources said that Hanoi would be forthcoming
in the actual negotiations, e.g. would be satisfied for
a time with a "step" toward withdrawal, would not demand
Communist domination of a government in the South and
would accept international supervision of elections, and
would postpone unification indefinitely.
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The Chinese publicly attacked ,the possibility of
negotiations or even "talks." And a visitor to Peking
confirmed that the Chinese had a genuine fear that Ho
at some stage might agree to a settlement on easier terms
than an American surrender.
Some bloc sources have asserted that NOrth Vietnamese
leaders were ready to enter into negotiations in the
early summer of 1966 and that the U.S. airstrikes near
Hanoi changed their minds about the feasibility of nego-
tiations, but the bulk of the evidence indicates that the
dominant figures in Hanoi were not in fact in any hurry,
North Vietnamese leaders at that time were reported by
many sources to believe--consistently with the private
remarks of Pham van Dong in 1963 and 1965, with the
central committee decisions of late 1965, and with the
exposition of those decisions by party leaders in early
1966--that the war had reached an indecisive stage in
which neither side could win a military victory, and that
Hanoi could exploit such a situation better than the U.S.
could, but that the time was still not ripe for negotia-
tions, and that Vietnamese Communist forces might have
to go on fighting for two or three years yet before U.S.
public opinion would force the U.S. to accept Communist
terms. Ho Chi Minh himself gave a visitor much this
assessment, and General Thanh wrote an article exhorting
the people to hold out and make the U.S. realize it could
not win--about as close as Hanoi could come to saying
publicly that it could not win either, but that it could
better exploit a stand-off. General Giap was rumored to
be among those who favored negotiations immediately, but
Giap both before and after that time associated himself
publicly with the dominant view (as above) and probably
really shared it.
In July Ho reaffirmed publicly that the Vietnamese
Communists would fight for 20 years or more if necessary
(they did not think it would be necessary), a line Peking
liked to hear. But the North Vietnamese leaders were
soon to make clear that they would not let Peking formulate
Hanoi's foreign policy, and that they would enter into
negotiations if and when they decided it was �to their
interest
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Renewed Probing on Negotiations, Late 1966 and Early 1967
In August 1966 Hanoi may have concluded--possibly
on the basis of conversations with other bloc officials--
that the U.S. had come nearer to readiness to talk on some-
thing like Hanoi's terms. There were unconfirmed reports
that Premier Dong and General Giap went to Moscow'at this
time to tell the 'Russians that Hanoi would act on this
if conditions were favorable (i.e., if the U.S. made a
large concession).
In September the picture was, as usual, mixed.
Dong himself on 1 September dismissed negotiations in a
"fight and win" speech. Further, after President Johnson
on 5 September proposed to make public a schedule for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces if infiltration- from the North
were halted and DRV forces then in the South withdrawn,
Hanoi quickly denounced this proposal as an attempt to
"trick" Hanoi into admitting that Northern forces were
in fact in the South (General Thanh in his March 1966
speech had admitted to--indeed, boasted of--five divi-
sions), and went on to say that the U.S. could not impose
conditions either for the U.S. withdrawal or for a cessa-
tion of the bombing. At the.same time, bloc sources
claimed reason to believe that Hanoi was "tired" of the .
war and was willing':to effect a de factO cessation of the
infiltration into the South in exchange for 'a cessation
of the bombing, and on 24 September Dong-said still-More
clearly what he had seemed to be saying in April--that
the sign of American "good will" required by Hanoi, as
the first step 'toward a "peaceful solution," was the
permanent cessation of the bombing. This was the clear-
est public implication to that time (although this had
been said privately) that talks of SOMR kind could follow
a cessation (of some kind) of the bombing, There was
still the question--before negotiations could follow--of
Hanoi's third "point" on the Liberation Front's program,
but the U.S. had come some distance here too in Ambassador
Goldberg's statement at the UN that some form of recogni-
tion of the Front could be worked out. (Some weeks later,
a North Vietnamese spokesman in a private talk appeared
to reciprocate by failing to demand that the Front be
recognized as the "sole" spokesman of the South.) _
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At about the same time (October or November), the
North Vietnamese party politburo adopted a resolution
defining a neutral position for Hanoi in the Sino-Soviet
dispute and emphasizing the need for Hanoi to manage the
war independently of Russian and Chinese positions. This
specifically included the preservation of Hanoi's freedom
to enter into and to conduct negotiations.
At the same time (October and November), bloc
sources passed the word that Hanoi would "no longer" be
deterred by Peking from acting on its desire for a negotiated
settlement, and stated flatly (though privately) that ces-
sation of the bombing was the only precondition for "nego-
tiations." (In fact, it was not, although it was the prin-
cipal one for "talks"; a North Vietnamese spokesman in
November confirmed that the conditions for negotiations
were cessation of the bombing, recognition of the Libera-
tion Front as a spokesman for the South, and acceptance
in principle of the four "points.") While bloc sources
did not claim that Hanoi would promise to de-escalate in
exchange for a cessation of the bombing, some non-Communist
spokesmen claimed to have indications that the Vietnamese
Communists were prepared to "cease hostilities" on a de
facto basis.
By November, Hanoi was ready to send public signals
to the outside world that it would act independently of
Peking, which was known to be opposed to negotiations.
Hanoi broadcast at that time a speech by Truong Chinh,
the most pro-Chinese of any of the top leaders, which re-
jected Mao's "thought" for Vietnam. Moreover, Le Duan,
long regarded as generally pro-Chinese, made a speech in
December which was clearly an attack on the premises and
content of Mao's "cultural revolution." The two speeches
could be taken as removing Le Duan and his followers (most
of the "militants") as obstacles to negotiations. The
Chinese immediately expressed doubt that Hanoi's leaders
--Ho in particular--would stand firm against negotiations.
At the same time (December), East European diplo-
mats were talking to the North Vietnamese about a 10-point
statement (drafted by themselves) which in their view
held promise as a basis for talks and negotiations. Ac-
cording to various sources, these talks broke down when
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the U.S. asked that one of these points--which provided
that North Vietnam would not be forced to acknowledge
publicly the presence of its forces in the South--be
amended to provide that, in exchange for this lace-saving
concession, those Northern forces actually be withdrawn
from the South. Bloc sources.subsequently asserted that
whatever hope there may have been--not very much--for
resolving this matter was quickly destroyed by airstrikes
of mid-December in the outskirts of Hanoi, an �assertion
similar to the assertion made by similar sources in early
summer 1966, when in their view the picture had likewise
been promising. Although Hanoi was reportedly assured
that targets in or near Hanoi would not be bombed again,
the North Vietnamese reportedly declined to discuss further
the 10-point draft.
In January 1967 Dong went to Moscow and Duan went
to Peking to explain the autumn resolution of the polit-
buro on the management of the war (including talks and
negotiations). Moscow was reportedly very agreeable,
saying that it would support either continued fighting
or efforts to negotiate. The Chinese, however, expressed.
opposition to negotiations even if combined with fight-
ing, and they again proposed that the Vietnamese Commun-
ists fight on for five to seven more years until Peking
was ready to help. Liberation Front representatives were
reported to be taking privately much the same line as the
Chinese.
Also in January, when observers in Hanoi were re-
porting that U.S. bombing was hurting the regime badly,
there were several statements by the North Vietnamese and
their friends designed to encourage the view that Hanoi
was now serious about negotiations. Later in the month,
one of these sources gave Senator Robert Kennedy a pro-
posal for negotiations which went beyond anything pre-
viously on the r9cord, in that--as reported--it opened
with an apparently clear offer to enter negotiations (or
talks) in exchange for an unconditional cessation of the
bombing and went on to propose three stages of negotia-
tions; bilateral negotiations between Hanoi and Washing-
ton on problems relating to those governments; "continua-
tion of negotiations" on the matters, in sequence, of a
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cease-fire between the U.S, and the Liberation Front, the
formation of a "coalition" government in the South, and
the status of U.S. forces in the South after negotiations;
and "local" negotiations by representatives of the U.S.,
North Vietnam, the Front and the "coalition" in order to
"completely solve" the Vietnam problem. (In other words,
negotiations were to include the Front at an early stage,
either as a third party to ongoing negotiations or in the
form of bilateral U.S.-Front negotiations undertaken Se-
parately and concurrently; either seemed more likely the
true scenario than the reading�e.g., from Ho's letter of
January 1966--that Hanoi was encouraging the U.S. to nego-
tiate with the Front independently of Hanoi.) The proposal
as reported was not really a retreat from the four "points."
Indeed, while it was forthcoming to a degree in making
more clear that U.S. troops need not be withdrawn prior
to negotiations, it failed to provide any role in negotia-
tions for the Saigon government or any role in a "coali-
tion" for Saigon's leaders.
At the end of January 1967, Foreign Minister Trinh
stated publicly and explicitly (for the first time) .that
"talks" (not negotiations) could follow cessation of the
bombing (and other "acts of war," e.g. reconnaissance
flights, naval operations off the North Korean coast,
Shelling across the DMZ). In the context of possible
talks, Trinh asked only for an "unconditional" cessation
of the bombing (i.e., not "permanent" as well), a formula-
tion thereafter employed (in this context) in all elite
statements. (Trinh did not promisethat talks would neces-
sarily follow.) In the same period, Truong Chinh made
another tough speech which did not mention negotiations,
and a Liberation Front spokesman ignored Trinh's remarks
on the matter. Nevertheless, Hanoi and its friends ob-
viously felt that Hanoi had made a move and that the next
move was up to the United States.
As of January 1967, when Hanoi seemed more forth-
coming about negotiations than it had been at any time
since autumn 1964, the picture of the North Vietnamese
leadership looked much the same, but the positions of in-
dividuals had developed. Ho Chi Minh seemed still dominant,
putting forth various spokesmen as he chose: he himself
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had been receptive to negotiations in 1964, hard (while
his spokesmen were evasive) to mid-1966, and as of mid-
1966 among those who thought Hanoi could hold out until
the U.S. softened, while in autumn 1966 he had made pre-
parations for negotiations and in January 1967 had cer-
tainly authorized the release of a somewhat more forth-
coming statement, including the offer of "talks" in ex-
change for the large concession of a cessation of the
bombing.
As for the other leaders, Duan still seemed second,
still the leader of at least a loose group, but since mid-
1965 not extremely pro-Chinese and not inflexibly militant;
Tho and Hoan still seemed his likely followers, although
perhaps midway between Duan and the most militant. The
most militant had continued to be Truong Chinh and Thanh,
but the former too had withdrawn from an extremely pro-
Chinese position, and the latter had associated himself
with the central committee resolution which envisaged
eventual negotiations. Dong still seemed third, still
the leader of the relatively moderate, foremost in offer-
ing negotiations (or talks) and in such a way as to sug-
gest that this course was his personal preference, but
also foremost in stating Ho's hard terms for a settlement,
and foremost Also'in arguing (since 1963) that a protracted
war would force the U.S. to accept those terms; Hung,
Nghi and Trinh all seemed pretty well fixed as his fol-
lowers. General Uiap still seemed the fourth primary
figure, somewhere between Duan and Dong, and apparently
associated with the central committee's official position
on negotiations.
While there had been abundant evidence of tension
among individuals and groups since 1954, the weight of
evidence indicated that by early 1966 their remaining
differences had been submerged for the time being, to
the point where all of the politburo members could .accom-
modate themselves to a broad 'central' position on the
war, one which they continued to hold in January 1967:
to try to force negotiations on Hanoi's terms within two
or three years (recognizing that differences among them-
selves might emerge in defining the terms of a settlement
in negotiations), meanwhile offering to talk .With the
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United �States on conditions (cessation of the bombing)
which would much reduce the pressure on North Vietnam.
While they agreed that it was important to try to get
the bombing stopped, they also appeared to agree that they
could hold out for some time, so sharply divisive pres-
sures did not seem to be operating on themselves as
leaders.
Pressure for Cessation of the Bombing, Early 1967
In the first week of February, beginning an inten-
sive campaign to induce the United States to cease the
bombing, Hanoi publicly and privately assured the U.S.
that Trinh's 28 January offer of "talks" was genuine;
Moscow encouraged Washington to accept the offer, while
Peking did not. Some spokesmen for Hanoi--including Ho
Chi Minh in a talk with two American newsmen--encouraged
the view that a de facto cessation would do and that de-
escalation would or might follow, and other spokesmen en-
couraged the view that full-scale negotiations would fol-
low the talks and that Hanoi was prepared to make conces,-
sions in them.
On 8 February, culminating a series of probes of
Hanoi's intentions, President Johnson sent Ho Chi Minh
a letter (received on 10 February) which suggested to
Hanoi that it act privately rather than publicly if it
were seriously interested in negotiations and which stated
the President's willingness to order a cessation of the
bombing and a halt in the U.S, troop build-up (the same
actions Ho reportedly specified to Shelepin as conditions
for talks a year earlier) as soon as assured that infil-
tration into the South had stopped. In other words, the
request was for de-escalation, a request later in 1967
modified to a request for non-escalation. (North Viet-
namese sources have asserted that an "ultimatum" accompanied
this 8 February letter, namely that the U.S. would wait
only until 14 February for a reply,) In the second week
of February, while this letter was being considered,
Hanoi sent a delegation to Peking which found the Chinese
hostile to the President's proposal.
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On 14 February the bombing was resumed, and on
15 February Ho Chi Minh replied. It is not clear whether
he deliberately waited for the asserted "ultimatum"--said
by North Vietnamese sources to be "unacceptable"--to
expire, or was waiting for word from Peking, or simply
needed five days to prepare an answer, In any case, Ho's
reply ignored the President's call for a halt in infil-
tration, and reiterated that Hanoi would enter into talks
only if there were an "unconditional" cessation of the
bombing, He also reiterated that the four "points" were
the basis for a settlement ("correct political solution"),
and called again for the U.S. to "recognize" the Libera-
tion Front (he did not in this letter demand, however,
that the Front be recognized as the "sole" spokesman for
the South), Soon thereafter, on 20 February, Peking de-
nounced the prospect of talks even in exchange for a
"permanent" cessation of the bombing,
On I March, Dong said that he saw no "present pos-
sibility" of talks with the U.S. but reaffirmed the offer.
Other sources offered Supporting statements in the form
of confirming Peking's suspicions of the North Vietnamese
leadership while asserting that Peking's influence was
now minimal in Hanoi--in other words, that Peking was
opposed to negotiations but that this was not the control-
ling factor, In publishing on 21 March the texts of the
Johnson-Ho exchange, Hanoi seemed not to be telling the
U.S. that it was not interested in talks but rather to
be notifying Peking that North Vietnam would enter into
talks when its own conditions--"unconditional" cessation
of the bombing and so on--were met.
A North Vietnamese delegation headed by Dong went
to Moscow in April to seek increased military aid, and
was reportedly told again that Moscow would support the
military effort but hoped for a negotiated settlement,
as the Russians did not believe that a military victory
was possible. General Giap soon reaffirmed publicly that
a military victory was indeed possible (although he like
others had increasingly implied that Hanoi's true assess-
ment was that of a deadlock), Peking at the same time,
in commentaries commending Viet Cong progress, appeared
to regard the Viet Cong as still a "weak army strategically
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on the defensive," a view obnoxious to Hanoi both in terms
of its military conduct of the war and its contingent
interest in negotiations (because it could not negotiate
from a "defensive" position).
In mid-April Dong was reported to be still confident
that Hanoi could hold out, reiterating that there would
be no "concessions." At the same time, Foreign Minister
Trinh, in an article stating explicitly (as Dong had con-
ceded indirectly a year earlier) that the U.S. had "recog-
nized" three of Hanoi's four "points," followed Ho Chi
Minh's 1.1Eid in suggesting a possible willingness to com-
promise on the point still in dispute; that is, while
describing the Front as the "sole genuine representative"
of the South, he did not insist that the U.S. recognize
it as that in order to begin negotiations. Trinh, like
Le Duan a year earlier, justified negotiations whenever
they seemed desirable, and, like Ho in February, declared
flatly that Hanoi would not talk "under the threat of
bombs." (This much--no talks under bombing--has seemed
from the first a matter of principle, while the question
of whether to give anything to get the bombing stopped
may or may not be a matter of principle.) At the same
time, a Front leader reportedly again encouraged a belief
in a de facto arrangement, stating flatly that the Viet
Cong would scale down the war in the South for a cessation
of the bombing.
At the end of April, Peking denounced Moscow for
advocating "unc-nditional" discussions, and showed strong
concern that Hanoi might reduce its effort in the South
in order to get negotiations or close it out in the course
of negotiations. At the same time, Hanoi released the
December 1966 speech of Le Duan which had been clearly
anti-Chinese (i.e., anti-Mao) in intent. Two weeks later
(mid-May), the North Vietnamese party journal hit Mao even
harder, in an article praising Ho's style of leadership
while by implication denoUncing Mao's. One factor was
surely the persistent Chinese intervention in Hanoi's
management of the war, especially the effort to close
out the option of negotiations when the time was ripe.
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�6-14+14�4"---
In the rest of May; North Vietnamese sources Con-
tinued to assert that. Hanoi regarded talks with the LS,
as desirable now, but only if the bombing ceased. Premier
Dong was rep6iTe-ci at the time to be "fed up" with the
war, whereas Hp Chi Minh was said not to share this view
Chinese officials gave support .(presumably unwitting) ,to
the view that Hanoi really did want to talk, saying that
they believed Ho to be willing and that he was .a "captive
of the revisionists" in Hanoi (earlier identified as-in
Peking's view--Duan, Dong, and Glap, the other primary
leaders). In the last week of May, articles by North
Vietnamese military leaders again rejected the Chinese
view that the Viet Cong was on the "defensive"--partly
to defend its conduct of the war and perhaps partly to
reaffirm that Hanoi was in a strong enough position to
negotiate if it chose to do so. This closed out the period,
however, of intensive North Vietnamese pressure for a Ces-
sation of bombing in exchange for talks.
Marking Time, Summer 1967
In early June, Foreign Minister Trinh set the tone
of Hanoi's public pronouncements for the summer of 1967
in an interview pointing to the "good. will". expressed in
his 28 January offer of talks and evading' the question - -
of whether Hanoi was prepared to offer a reciprocal de-
escalation in exchange for a cessation of the bombing.
(At the least, it seemed, Hanoi was not going to agree
publicly to do so, and probably not even privately in
those explicit terms,) Trinh denounced the ILS. for hav-
ing imposed a "time-limit" for Ho's reply to president.
Johnson's 8- February letter, and went on to state that
Hanoi was not counting on the 1968 Presidential election
in the U.S0 to bring a settlement but rather on Vietnam's
"own efforts," C/S Dung soon contributed a very hard
article dismissing negotiations whereas Trinh in April
had defended Hanoi's course against both those who..wanted
negotiations at once and those who opposed negotiations
altogether, Dong seemed to be attacking only the proponents
of negotiations. Other spokesmen, perhaps taking their
cue from these public statements, said privately that�
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Hanoi's view of the importance of U.S. public opinion had
indeed changed and that Hanoi Was determined to fight on
to military victory--meaning, apparently, that Hanoi was
no longer counting on U.S. public opinion to reinforce
Communist successes on the battlefield and thus compel
Washington to undertake negotiations on Hanoi's conditions
and to accept a settlement on Hanoi's terms. However,
other spokesmen for Hanoi continued to state privately
that North Vietnamese leaders recognized that they could
not win the war in a conventional military sense, that
Hanoi was still willing to enter into talks as soon as
the U.S. "unconditionally" ceased the bombing (one said
again that it would not be necessary to declare the ces-
sation unconditional), ,and that all questions were negoti-
able except the bombing.
While the primary leaders probably shared the view
that the Vietnamese Communists could not win the war in
a conventional sense, the view �of those leaders--even the
moderates--reportedly remained sanguine, because their
assessment did not depend on a military victory in that
sense. Two of these, Premier Dong and General Giap, re-
portedly reaffirmed privately the view that most of the
leaders had reportedly held since early 1966: that. Hanoi
could hold out, and that the U.S. would eventually be
obliged to withdraw. At about the same time, a North
Vietnamese official summed up Hanoi's position: that
Hanoi was prepared to negotiate but did not "need" to do
so at that time. Ahother said, contrary to reports of
a changing view of the factor of the 1968 elections, that
Hanoi needed to "hold out" only until those elections.
At the same time, the death (in early July) of
General Thanh, director of operations in the South, re-
moved from the politburo the man who had seemed the hard-
est of all the "militants," and put the militants in a
minority. Thus, if the primary leaders--contrary to
their stated views--had not been in agreement on a course
of action (holding out until the U.S. had softened up),
and if Ho were now obliged to be responsive to a new
balance of power--with the "moderates" dominant--in the
politburo, one would expect to see--as in the Korean war
after Stalin's death--some signs of a more forthcoming
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attitude. (The earlier dispute between Thanh and others
on the relative emphasis �to be given large-unit versus
guerrilla operations had apparently been resolved by the
time of his death, with a decision to increase both.)
In the weeks following Thanh's death, Hanoi seemed
to go out of its way in its public pronouncements to dis-
courage any belief that its overall position on the war
would soften, while Peking continued to show its fear
that Hanoi would indeed soften. Party leader Le Duan,
another military leader backing up C/S Dung, and General
Giap himself all added their voices to those dismissing
negotiations. Moreover, Hanoi privately reassured the
troops that any period of negotiations would be used to
.prepare for a "general counter-offensive." (Hanoi's true
view of negotiations was surely more sophisticated than
this--thinking of them, at a minimum, as a means of dis-
covering whether the_will of the enemy had indeed been
broken, and not simply as a respite; moreover, in the
event, the operation described by the Communists as begin-
ning the "general offensive"--the attacks on cities in
late January l968--came before any negotiations had got
underway.) However, the Vietnamese Communists continued
to prepare for possible negotiations, a policy which did
not derive from General Thanh's death. ,In this period
they continued to work privately to make their position
on the third of their four "points" (the role Of the Front
and the terms of its program) look more attractive; and
North Vietnamese spokesmen reportedly said privately
that Hanoi would settle for a de facto cessation of the
bombing (or perhaps even a*scaling-down of it, similar
to the staged de-escalation proposed by several Republican
congressmen), and Pham Van Dong himself made a private
statement construed by a visitor to mean that a de facto
cessation would do.
[According to Washington official sources (quoted
some months later), it was at this time--on or about 25
August--that the United States transmitted to Hanoi the
position which was to be stated publicly by President
Johnson five weeks later: namely, that the U.S. would
stop the bombing if assured that this would lead to prompt
and productive discussions, and that North Vietnam would
not take military advantage of the cessation. Because
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the precise terms of this message have not been made public
and may have differed significantlyfrom the terms employed
by the President--for example, as stated publicly in late
September the position was that the U.S. would "assume"
that no advantage would be taken--the Communist response
to this overture is discussed in a subsequent section
of this paper.]
� At the end of August, Ho Chi Minh made what was
to be his last public appearance until late December.
At the same time, Premier Dong, speaking publicly, ac-
cused the U.S. of hypocrisy in its talk about negotiations
and again implied--as had Trinh in January--that Hanoi
was no longer demanding a permanent cessation of the bomb-
ing as a precondition for talks, But Hanoi did not, at
the time draw attention to this possible shift.
Toward Negotiations Again (Maybe), September 1967
Throughout September, Hanoi seemed to be preparing
again for talks and negotiations. On 1 September, Hanoi
broadcast the Liberation Front's new "political program,"
emphasizing the broad character of the "coalition". govern-
ment it envisaged for the South and the accession of the
regime through "free general elections." (The Vietnamese
Communists privately reassured their troops, however, that
this "coalition" would be dominated by the Front, and their
spokesmen said privately that the leaders of the Saigon
government were not acceptable.) A Front spokesman con-
firmed that the Front wished to negotiate vi5th the U.S,
on the matter of an American withdrawal, and with other
-(unspecified) Vietnamese on the composition of the en-
visaged coalition; and Dong reaffirmed that the U.S. must
talk with the Front if it wanted peace in the South.
The Chinese quickly expressed their continued preference
for a prolonged military struggle, while the Russians
endorsed the Front's new program.
On 10 September, Premier Dong reaffirmed that
Hanoi would enter into talks after an "unconditional"
cessation of the bombing, while reaffirming also that
Hanoi would make no reciprocal concession (or, at least,
would not agree to make one). He also reiterated the
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call for U.S. "recognition" of the Front, but, again, did
not demand its recognition as the "sole" spokesman for
the South. After Secretary Rusk (on the same day) stated
publicly that the Department regarded "unconditionally"
as meaning "permanently," from mid-September Hanoi repeat-
edly called attention to the fact that it was no longer
demanding an explicit U.S. commitment to a "permanent"
cessation of the bombing--thus leaving open the question
of whether it would demand an explicit statement that the
cessation was "unconditional" or private assurances that
it was, or would simply settle for a de facto cessation
(as often stated or implied). At the same time, Foreign
Minister Trinh told a visitor that talks would (not "could")
follow cessation of the bombing, beginning with a meet-
ing to work out an agenda. Another spokesman privately
confirmed this, saying again that "everything" could be
discussed.
At the same time, a North Vietnamese official con-
firmed that Secretary McNamara's testimony had been in-
terpreted in Hanoi as indicating a "realistic" American
assessment of the bombing--namely, that the bombing could
not shake the determination of the dominant figures in
Hanoi to hold out until the U.S. wearied of the war and
accepted Hanoi's terms. This source seemed to clarify
Hanoi's view of the relationship between public opinion
and the U.S. elections--that is, public opinion would
eventually work to end the war, but not necessarily or
even probably as soon as 1968. (It will be recalled that
North Vietnamese estimates in the winter of 1965-1966
had allowed for this, envisaging "decisive" victory at
any time in the next several years.)
Also at this time, General Giap published another
analysis of the war, one emphasizing--as increasingly
recognized since eafly 1966--the present "deadlock" or
"stalemate." He argued on one hand that the U.S. recognf-
zed that it could not "defeat" the Vietnamese Communists;
American forces in Vietnam were not large enough to do
the job, and the U.S. could not afford--politically,
economically, or militarily--to commit sufficient forces.
But on the other hand, while pointing to such encouraging
factors as the Communists' increasing ability to "attack
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cities," he did not encourage his audience to believe that
the Viet Cong could triumph militarily in the foreseeable
future--unless assisted by a "revolution" in the U.S. or
by the opening of a second front against the U.S. else-
where, the latter being an addition to the scenario long
urged by Castro. (In public statements by Dong and Giap
and others, and in private remarks to visitors, North
Vietnamese leaders gave an impression of high hopes that
the "struggle" of Negro Americans would supply this "revo-
lution," forcing the U.S. to withdraw from Vietnam. More-
over, Giap was reported to be visiting Cuba at about this
time, perhaps exploring the prospects for a second--or
third--front in Latin America.) Giap confirmed that Hanoi
was not counting on the 1968 elections, and seemed to give
more importance to the possibility that U.S. troops would
be needed outside Vietnam (in the U.S. and/or elsewhere).
He concluded that Hanoi must hold out, because what was
at stake was nothing less than the doctrine of the efficacy
of "liberation wars.
At the same time, visitors to Hanoi got the impres-
sion that Ho Chi Minh had become a "figurehead" and that
Pham Van Dong was now dominant. The evidence for those
conclusions was not impressive, but it was confirmed that
Ho was ill and Dong had indeed seemed to be growing in
importance among the primary figures.
'At the end of September, in speeches surrounding
Communist China's National Day, Peking reaffirmed its
opposition to negotiations, while North Vietnamese spokes-
men--both the relatively moderate Premier Dong and the
hard Truong Chinh--left the door open for negotiations,
without expressing any favor for them. North Vietnamese
officials in conversations, and the line taken in a cap-
tured document, agreed at that time--confirming many in-
dications of Hanoi's thinking--that victory for the Viet-
namese Communists would come not from a conventional
military triumph but from increasing the human and material
cost of the war to the U.S. until Washington was ready
to accept Communist terms for and in negotiations. Part
of this scheme was to erode the basis for the U.S presence
by weakening the Saigon government.
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New Hopes for Pressures on Washington Autumn 1967
President Johnson on 29 September delivered a
speech in San Antonio in which he offered to stop the
bombing if this would lead promptly to productive dis-
cussions, and stated that the U.S. would "assume" that
Hanoi would not take military advantage of this. This
was a position which had reportedly been transmitted pri-
vately five weeks earlier; while the terms of the pri-
vate message are not known, the position as stated pub-
licly by the President must have been recognized by Hanoi
as thesmost conciliatory possible way of asking for a
reciprocal' concession, as it did not demand de-escalation
in exchange for a cessation. Nevertheless, Hanoi publicly
attacked this position in early October, on the ground
that the proffered cessation was still conditional--con-
ditional on the results of the talks. Moreover, Hanoi
thereafter failed to probe privately--as it had failed
since late August to probe--any of the President's key
formulations. This bAcking-away again at a time when
the U.S. was unusually forthcoming�as in early 1966--
admitted of several possible explanations, including those
(a) that Hanoi had never been serious about negotiations,
or (b) that Hanoi did not want to prejudice the chance
of an "unconditional" cessation by showing interest in
a lesser offer or (c) that Ho Chi Minh was incapacitated,
and party leadership had fallen to militants opposed to
negotiations (but Ho soon reappeared). The right explana-
tion was probably the reason stated (in other words, the
U.S., rather than showing that its will to persist was
broken by offering an "unconditional" cessation, was look-
ing for a sign that Hanoi's will was broken), together
with Vietnamese Communist expectations from military
operations planned for the winter, and Hanoi's apparent
new appreciation of the contribution that might be made
by the opening of a second front elsewhere.
This last point was taken up in an article broad-
cast immediately after Hanoi's rejection of the President's
overture. Agreeing with General Giap's estimate of a
"stalemate" in Vietnam, the writer argued explicitly that
the U.S, would be "unable to cope" if another "Vietnam-
type" (guerrilla) war wbre to,get started. This article,
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and a captured document pointing to the importance of
diversion of U.S. military forces to deal with the "de-
veloping Negro movement," strengthened the impression
that Hanoi had high hopes for (without necessarily count-
ing on) contributions by the most militant of the Commun-
ist states and parties (e.g. the Cuban) and from large-
scale disorders in the United States.
Both in early and mid-October, Hanoi reaffirmed
through diplomats and other spokesmen the official posi-
tion that "unconditional" cessation of the bombing must
precede talks, and that there would be no reciprocal
concession. Some warned of Communist preparations for
major military actions (e.g., forecasting "another Dien
Bien Phu"), implying' that these would be undertaken if
the present Communist terms for talks and negotiations
were not accepted. �(Various spokesmen confirmed that
Hanoi envisaged first "talks," then "negotiations.") At
the same time, spokesmen for Hanoi stated publicly and
privately that Hanoi had no confidence in the word of
President Johnson and Secretary Rusk (described privately
as "crooks").-thus preparing the ground for possible sub-
sequent assertions, if Hanoi could not get talks and
negotiations on its own terms, that Hanoi had known all
along that it could not deal with the President and the
Secretary.
In late October, Ho Chi Minh and Premier Dong
reportedly said (as had some North Vietnamese leaders
in June) that they were under no pressure to negotiate
at all, as their side was "winning." They reportedly
reaffirmed their view of the importance of U.S. public
opinion, which they saw as swinging against the war.
Other spokesmen for Hanoi said the same.
At the same time, there was additional evidence
from a variety of sources that Hanoi and the Front were
trying to design a concept for a "coalition" which would
be acceptable to all but the hardest anti-Communists in
Saigon--as a part of the process of eroding the position
of the Saigon government and thus the basis for the U.S.
presence in Vietnam (and thus the willingness of the U.S.
to persist in the war). Contrary to what had been told
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or.,VIIN.E.
the Viet Cong troops, various Communist sources encouraged
the view that the Communists need not have and would not
seek Communist domination of the coalition from the start.
At the same time, captured documents called for a new of-
fensive in the winter of 1967-68--a "General Offensive
and General Uprising," which in retrospect appear to have
forecast the attacks on cities in late January 1968--which
would prepare the population psychologically to accept
a Communist-dominated "coalition" in the South.
In early November, Ho Chi Minh was reported now
to be so sick he had to stay in bed. Evidence was lack-
ing that he was too sick to make his will known and to
impose it, but this introduced a new factor: if lib's
illness were to lead to his incapacity or death, policies
would have �to be reformulated, and subordinated differences
might emerge again.
Also in early November, on the 50th anniversary
of the October Revolution; Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and
Truong Chinh all contributed important statements. Duan
by implication, and Chinh explicitly, were militant about
the war, but both left the door open for negotiations,*
Dong was less sanguine about a military victory, but--stat-
ing what had been and was probably still the position of
Ho and the majority�envisaged the U.S. as eventually
losing its will to persist and withdrawtng (perhaps as-
sisted by negotiations). ,Dong at the same time reiterated
that:the U.S. aimed by -its bombing to force Hanoi into -
negotiations and to accept American terms in negotiations,
�and that Hanoi would never negotiate "Under bombing or
the threat of bombing." A
There were continued reports in November that
the Communists would conduct a winter offensive to soften
up the South for a "coalition," and some suggested that
the primarily political phase could begin as early as
February or March (presumably as the happy result of the
*One observer--Victor Zorza�contended after the late
January attacks that Le Duan in this November speech had
advocated an "urban uprising" in contrast to Giap's advo-
cacy of "political action" in the cities. In fact both
advocated "political struggle" in the cities without
.specifying the form.
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"general offensive and general uprising.") In other words,
while the Communists sti1.1 seemed to be presenting a "coali-
tion" in terms designed tc5 be acceptable to the United
States as well as to all elements of the Saigon government
except the very top leaders, these reports were suggest-
ing the possibility that the Communists--if successful
in their military operations during the winter--would pro-
claim a "coalition" government in and for the South without
waiting for negotiations with the U.S. In any case,
Peking soon showed its concern again over the possible
composition of a coalition in the South, warning the Front
of the dangers, of not having tight Communist control from
the start.
In mid-November, Premier Dong gave a curious inter-
view in which he reaffirmed the demand for an "uncondi-
tional" cessation but then refused to define "unconditional,"
and in which he reaffirmed the demand for a U.S. with-
drawal but theh refused to say when and how this was to
be accomplished. In broadcasting this interview, Hanoi
might have been implying that it could not state its true
position publicly, and thus have been inviting the U.S.
to explore privately both of these points (although Hanoi
itself had not explored privately the Administration's
formulations of late August and late September).
In late November, the North Vietnamese military
journal x.eaffirmed the official estimate that U.S. policy
would not change as a result of the 1968 elections. The
article made clear, however, that this was a doctrinal
argument which need not have reflected the true estimate,
and in fact the same article, discussing U.S. domestic
opposition to the war, suggested a private conclusion
that Hanoi would indeed be able to exploit U.S. domestic
opposition--in conjunction with domestic disorder--either
before or after the elections. A Front spokesman at the
time said that the Front did indeed count on the "anti-
war movement" in the United States to help "very much"
in bringing the war to an end, although he made no esti-
mate of the time.
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Renewed Pressure for Talks, December 1967 and January 1968
In the first week of December, a variety of Com-
munist Sources (largely non-Vietnamese) asserted that
Hanoi would "respond positively" to a de facto cessation
of the bombing. Such sources seemed to be encouraging
the U.S. to believe that Hanoi could not promise to make
progress in the talks (as this depended on both parties)
and could not promise not to exploit a prolonged bombing
pause (because aiding the South--like .not negotiating
under bombing--was a matter of "principle"), but would
agree privately to try to make progress and to refrain
from, exploiting the pause. However,
said that, while talks would
follow within "three wee s of cessation of the bombing,
Hanoi's current position called for de-escalation (or
non-escalation) to be taken up in the talks; in other
words, Hanoi would not give anything in this respect prior
to the talks, if at all.
Shortly thereafter, a North Vietnamese ambassador
reportedly stated--as spokesmen for Hanoi had periodically
stated since June--that Hanoi was in no hurry to negotiate.
Describing American leaders as "fighting among themselves,"
he again indicated that differences of opinion in the
U.S. were an important factor in Hanoi's calculations.
In mid-December, Vietnamese Communist sources pub-
licly and privately provided unusually good indications
that North Vietnam was being badly hurt by the airstrikes.
However, HanOi failed to comment on President Johnson's
suggestion of 19 December that the Saigon government hold
informal talks with the Liberation Front, and during the
Christmas cease-fire it continued (in fact, increased)
the movement of trucks into the South. In late December,
Ho Chi Minh (described as "strong and healthy") reappeared
and made another "fight and win" speech. But on 29 Decem-
ber, Foreign Minister Trinh reaffirmed the offer of "talks"
following an "unconditional" cessation of the bombing (the
DRV "will" hold talks).
In mid-January, a North Vietnamese spokesman abroad
said
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publicly that talks "will" follow a cessation of the bomb-
ing, and that this cessation could be announced "through
a declaration or any other procedure capable of proving
the reality" of it (meaning, perhaps, private assurances),
but that Hanoi would make no reciprocal concession. [This
latter formulation may have meant that Hanoi would make
no concession which could be publicly taken as reciprocal,
but would make such a concession--if at all--in a second
stage coinciding with the talks, an interpretation con-
sistent with the Russian official's account of Hanoi's
position as of early December. At the same time, uniden-
tified sources were reported to be asserting that Hanoi
did indeed intend to make a reciprocal concession--in the
form (they said) of de-escalation-in the course-of the
talks.] The North Vietnamese spokesman abroad said that
the questions to be taken up in the talks could be decided
on in a meeting .(an early meeting) of the two parties.
Hanoi' Radio presented this interview as authoritative:
atter cessation of the bombing and other acts of war
against the North, the DRV "will hold talks with the U.S.
on relevant questions," the level of the talks and their
agenda would be worked out in a meeting, and the talks
would begin "after an appropriate time."*
There was another interview from the same place
(Paris) on the following day, probably with the same spokes-
man. The spokesman was even more forthcoming in this
interview, asserting that talks might begin within "a
few days," and that they might take up any subject, in-
cluding questions relating to South Vietnam. -Consistently
with the Russian account of Hanoi's position and perhaps
in accordance with reports that Hanoi was prepared to de-
escalate during the talks, this spokesman reiterated that
Hanoi would make no reciprocal concession for cessation
*Some sources have reported Hanoi's formulation on
"other acts of war" to mean a demand for cessation of
military operations in the South as well as against the
North; but Hanoi itself has always stated this point as
a demand for cessation of acts of war against the DRV.
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of the.bombing but was willing to discuss the President's
"no advantage" proposal (presumably in the talks). This
interview was mist officially endorsed, but probably stated
the true position; on the same day (17 January), an authori-
tative spokesman for Hanoi reportedly told an inquiring
diplomat that the publicly-stated position of Hanoi meant
that, after the bombing was stopped, talks would begin
and could take up any subject (including de-escalation
or non-escalation), and that Hanoi did not require any
further secret contacts to clarify positions. Soon there-
after, various sources (who may or may not have known
the true positions of North Vietnamese leaders) again en-
couraged the view that Hanoi would settle for a de facto
cessation and would respond with a de facto de-escalation,
but /the remarks attributed to the
above-cited spokesman seemed to state the position more
clearly: no agreement on de-escalation or non-escalation
prior to talks.
President Johnson's remarks on Vietnam in his State
of the Union message on 17 January--reiterating essenti-
ally the San AntOniO-formulations but with a harder phras-
ing on the matter of "no advantage" (this time, that .North
Vietnam "must not take advantage" rather than the earlier,
more conciliatory formulation that the U.S. would "assume"
that no advantage would be taken)--was predictably re-
jected by Nhan Dan within a few days. As previously,
Hanoi treated these formulations as an attempt to impose
"conditions", and the abusive terms of the commentary
may have been meant (on one reading) to convey Hanoi's
displeasure that the President was drawing public atten-
tion to U.S. demands (rather than working for a de facto
arrangement).
In remarks attributed to leading officials of the
Administration in the last week of January, however, Hanoi
must have recognized that the U.S. was stating the most
forthcoming position on talks and negotiations that it
had ever taken, at least publicly, These officials were
quoted.to the effect that the "no advantage" formulation
should be interpreted to mean American willingness to
allow a "normal" flow of men and materiel from North to
South during the talks, although not a willingness to
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accept a dramatic change in the military balance. In
other words, this U.S. condition was stated clearly as
agreement to non-escalation, rather than as the de-escala-
tion which most observers had previously interpretedit
to be. Moreover, this clarification was provided in a
context of de facto limitation of the airstrikes--exclud-
ing Hanoi and Haiphong and their environs from the strikes--
which had persisted since mid-January.*
Thus, as of late January, the Vietnamese Communists
could evidently conclude that they could get into "talks"
--the talks they had been professing to desire--simply
by refraining from insisting that a cessation of the
bombing be proclaimed as "unconditional" and by letting
it be known privately that they were willing to have
talks promptly, to try to make them productive, and to
refrain from trying to effect a major change in the mili-
tary balance while the talks were going on.
The Tet Offensive as a Prelude to Negotiations, Early 1968
The widespread attacks on cities and military in-
stallations in South Vietnam which began on 30 January
served, in Secretary Rusk's phrase, as a "political
answer" to the U.S. overtures of January. The attacks
were open to interpretation as a conclusive answer to
any overtures--namely, that the Communists were not
interested in talks and negotiations on any terms at any
time. This view, however, seemed excessive. While the
increased professions of interest in talks and negotia-
tions in the months of December and January may have
*At the same time, President Thieu of South Vietnam
in his State of the Union message dismissed Communist
proposals for talks and rejected any "coalition" with the
Front. This line to some extent suited Hanoi's purposes,
because the Communists had already made clear that they
envisaged no role in either negotiations or a "coali-
tion" for the leaders of the Saigon government.
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been intended in part to put the U.S. off guard prior to
the Tet offensive, the Communists soon made clear that
they were still interested in talks and negotiations on
their terms, and various materials soon made clear that
the attacks were undertaken as part of a scenario in
which the Communists envisaged successful attacks as
leading to American acceptance of Communist terms for
and in negotiations, as well as American acceptance of
any kind of "coalition" the Communists might proclaim.
The Tet offensive, which came during a lunar New
Year cease-fire proclaimed by the Communists themselves,
was presented as the long-heralded "general offensive"
which was to set off a "general uprising" in the South.
The operation was pretty clearly a failure in at least
three major respects: apart from the fact that the Com-
munists suffered very heavy casualities (perhaps anticipated),
they pretty clearly hoped to hold at least some of the
points they attacked, hoped for "uprisings" in at least
some of the cities, and hoped for mass defections on the
part of South Vietnamese armed forces.* If they had
*Some observers think that the Communists could not
even have hoped for these things. At the other extreme,
Douglas Pike--in an interesting article in the Washington
Post of 25 February--has argued that the Communists were
counting on mass defections by South Vietnamese troops
and a "great deal of public support." On the present
writer's reading, the right word is hope. Pike also
argues that the Communist scenario envisaged a decisive
military victory by mid-1968, and some other observers
agree; on the present writer's reading, however, the
"decisive" victory envisaged was as set forth in early
1966--that is, the breaking of the U.S. will to persist,
in part by eroding the basis for the U.S. presence in
Vietnam, which would be expressed by U.S. acceptance of
Communist terms for and/or in negotiations. Pike also
argues that the Tet offensive was undertaken by General
Giap because he (and Ho and Dong) were on the "defensive"
against younger members of the politburo who wanted a
greater emphasis on negotiations. There had been no
(footnote continued on page 43)
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achieved these things, they would have been in an excel-
lent position
to proclaim "alliances" or local governments,
which in turn could act with the Front to proclaim a
"coalition" government for all of the South, which in
turn could take in those elements of the Saigon government
(or what was left of it) acceptable to the Communists,
which in turn could "negotiate" an American withdrawal.
.(Two "alliances" to this end were proclaimed in Saigon
and Hue in the early days of the fighting.) Disappointed
in this, the Communists had to take comfort--which at
that was considerable--in �the great damage they did to
the pacification program in the countryside, and in their
demonstration to the people of the South that they could
strike damaging blows anywhere.
The best account of the envisaged relationship
between the Tet offensive and negotiations was obtained
from a Vietnamese Communist official--con-
cerned with one of the cities attacked--who was briefed
by a delegation from Hanoi soon after the attacks began.
The general offensive ("general raid attack") was predicated
on the intransigence of the Saigon government (about ne-
gotiating with the Communists) and on the insufficient
readiness of the United States to negotiate (although the
U.S. was seen as much more nearly willing than Saigon).
Under heavier pressure (the Tet offensive), it was argued,
both the U.S. and the remains of the Saigon government
would be forced to accept Communist terms for and in
negotiations--and, indeed, the operation could be judged
successful only if it achieved this end. As the argument
apparently ran, the Saigon government would be seriously
weakened, perhaps in effect destroyed as a government, and
(footnote continued from page 42)
evidence, however, of a split between older and younger
members of the politburo on these lines, and, as previously
noted, the leaders seemed to be agreed from early 1966
on a scenario which envisaged negotiations when the U.S.
had been sufficiently softened up.
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it might might even be possible to establish a rival and gen-
erally credible "central" government. While successful
action on any scale against the Saigon government would
be a "victory" in a limited sense, this would Still not
be a "decisive" victory--because a decisive victory could
come only by breaking the U.S. will to resist (precisely
the way this concept of "decisive" victory was defined
in early 1966), unless a new "central" government had such
manifest authority (apparently viewed as a marginal pos-
sibility) as to be able simply to order the U.S. to with-
draw. (A captured COSVN document confirmed that even a
successful operation would bring only a partial victory.)
The U.S. had the option (the argument continued) of bring-
ing in additional fortes to make up even for the "collapse"
of the Saigon government (and, moreover, other forces in
Saigon might "unite" against the Communists); thus it would
be necessary to continue military operations until U.S.
bases had been destroyed or until the U.S. was ready to
agree (presumably in negotiations) to withdraw its forces.
A captured document confirmed that it was the Com-
munist hope that the offensive would be so successful as
to lead to the early.establishment of a "coalition" govern-
ment. In this connection (meaning, apparently, whether
the "coalition" was established prior to negotiations or '
as the result of them), the Liberation Front was prepared
to negotiate with the United States but not with the "pup-
pet" government (i.e., not with the Saigon government as
a government, not with its leaders). This document also
confirmed surmises as to which posts the Communists would'
demand in a "coalition" of any kind--the ministries of
Defense, Public Security, and Foreign Affairs, and the
key'ministry or ministries concerned with the economy.
A captured Communist official (fairly high-level)
confirmed that it was the Communist plan to keep the
military pressure on--in a series of attacks--until the
Communists got the kind of "coalition" they wanted. As
he understood it, the first step would be a provisional
"united" government for the South, worked out by the
Front and elements of the Saigon government and dominated
by the Front. After agreement had been reached on "political
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problems" implicit in such a "united" government---e. g.,
after the Communists had got the key ministries--the
various parties would apparently go on to set up the kind
of "coalition" envisaged all along in the Front's program;
he did not, however, make clear the role of the U.S. in this.
Immediately after the Tet offensive began a spokes-
man reaffirmed Hanoi's interest in talks with the U.S.
(but not with the leaders in Saigon), and added his voice
to those asserting or implying that the Communists would
effect a de facto de-escalation in exchange for a cessa-
tion of the bombing. Foreign Minister Trinh made the first
part of this official on 8 February. Citing his state-
ments of January 1967 and December 1967 as having "clearly
indicated the way to bring about talks," Trinh reiterated
that the San Antonio formula (even, presumably, as most
recently defined by Administration spokesmen) was unaccept-
able because it was a proposal for a conditional cessation.
However, Trinh went on to confirm the position stated by
the spokesman in Paris in mid-January--namely, that "rele-
vant problems" (Trinh's 29 December formulation) could
be discussed, meaning questions related to a settlement
on the basis of the Geneva agreements (of which Hanoi's
four "points" had long been presented as the concentrated
expression), that "other questions" could be taken up in
the talks (either formulation would permit the war in the
South to be discussed), and that the talks could start
as soon as the U.S. chose to "demonstrate the reality of
the unconditional cessation" of the bombing and other
acts of war against the North (in other words, he was ap-
parently not asking the U.S. to proclaim this).* In the
same period, the Communists privately assured representa-
tives of several non-Communist governments that they were
indeed still prepared to talk with the U.S. if the bomb/ipg
were halted.
*Another observer has suggested that Trinh may have
deliberately obscured the distinction between "talks" and
negotiations, saying in effect that talks could be negotia-
tions, thus deftly removing what had been the main obstacle
in getting from talks to negotiations (agreement on the
roles of the Saigon government and the Liberation Front).
This is important if true, but Trinh's intention is not clear.
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The Communists also reaffirmed their interest in
negotiations with elements in Saigon, but not with the
Saigon government as a government. A Liberation Front
spokesman on 8 and 9 February said that the establishment
of a "provisional" government (see above) was now a Front
objective, at an unspecified time and following "consul-
tation with other revolutionary forces." Soon thereafter,
according to Havana Radio, the chief of the Front mission
in Hanoi said that the Front had not advocated and did
not advocate a coalition with the "Saigon regime; that
Is out." For the Front, he said, any future coalition
would be made up of those elements of the population
which had contributed to the "liberation" of the South.
At the same time, the Vietnamese Communists in
effect reaffirmed the concept of a protracted war. An
authoritative commentary appearing in the military news-
paper on 11 February argued that, while the two weeks of
the Tet offensive had achieved a "marvelous victory,"
the American will to persist was not yet broken: The
Americans, "basically stubborn," would "pour in more
troops and money," and "decisive trials"were "still in
prospect." In other words, the Communists still had
some distance to go to a "decisive" 'victory, and some
distance beyond that to a "final" victory.
In mid-February North Vietnamese sources said
again--as reported periodically, since early December--
that Hanoi was willing to make "de-escalation" an item
on the agenda of "talks" with the U.S. These reports-of
willingness to discuss the U.S. demand--seemed more likely
to be a true account of Hanoi's position than the oc-
casional reports in the same period from friends of the
North Vietnamese that Hanoi had already assured them of
its willingness to de-escalate.
Nevertheless, in the last week of February sources
in contact directly or indirectly with the North Vietnamese
continued to profess confidence that Hanoi would make a
reciprocal concession for a cessation of the bombing.
A well-known correspondent said this on 23 February, ap-
parently on the basis of conversations with non-Vietnamese
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11 alon
said
that he had been given "assurances" that Hanoi
would reciprocate (give something "tangible") for a ces-
sation.
In the same period, the North Vietnamese military
newspaper summed up the situation. Communist forces were
now in a position to "launch simultaneous, continuous,
large-scale and highly effective attacks," and "every-
where" in South Vietnam Communist military and political
forces were being expanded and developed. The enemy, in
contrast, had fallen into a "complete defensive position"
and had lost the initiative. "Regardless of how many
more troops" and how much more materiel the U.S. might
pour in, the U.S. could not stabilize the situation. In
sum, the Vietnamese Communists now had a solid basis for
moving on to an eventual "complete victory" (although
still not a military victory in a conventional sense).
Thus, at the beginning of March 1968, the Vietnam-
ese Communists seemed genuinely to see their position as
strong. They could continue to fight indefinitely, and
they could begin to talk, while continuing to fight, at
whatever time the United States was willing to accept
Communist terms (unconditional cessation of the bombing)
for the talks. As the Communists saw it, there was no
good reason for them to abandon their basic estimate
--abiding for more than two years--that "decisive" vic-
tory, the loss of the U.S. will to persist, could come
in a "relatively short time" (perhaps by 1969 or 1970),
and that "final" victory, the negotiated withdrawal of
American forces and the formation of a Communist-dominated
"coalition" in the South, lay not too far beyond that.
As of March 1968, the picture of the North Viet-
namese leadership had developed a bit further in some
respects, although with fresh opacities in others. While
Ho Chi Minh had apparently been sick for a whjle in the
late months of 1967, his lieutenants had continued to act
on his positions, essentially those of prosecuting the
war vigorously while leaving the door open for negotiations,
making only small concessions to that end while encouraging
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unofficially a belief that larger concessions lay ahead;
and Ho himself was back in action. Le Duan did not seem
as clearly the second-ranking leader (he may have been
overtaken by Pham Van Dong), but he may still have been,
and was still associated with Ho's positions, and still
the leader of a relatively militant group, probably in-
cluding Le Duc Tho and possibly including Hoang Van Hoan.
The most militant had been reduced by the death of General
Thanh, but Truong Chinh was still'a leader of this group,
possibly with one or two followers at the politburo level.
(In all, four of the nine remaining full members apart
from Ho--Duan, Tho, Hoan, and Chinh--seemed on the 'left'
of the spectrum.) Pham Van Dong still seemed at least
third, possibly second, in the hierarchy (although some
now saw him as first); he had continued to have the larg-
est role in stating Hanoi's positions on the war, had con-
tinued to suggest his personal favor for negotiations,
and had had the largest role in stating Hanoi's small con-
cessions and implying larger future concessions, but had
also associated himself with Ho's position that Hanoi
did not "need" to negotiate and had continued to believe
that the U.S. would lose the will to persist and would
withdraw (probably through negotiations); his followers
still seemed to be Pham Hung, Le Thanh Nghi, and Nguyen
Duy Trinh. General Giap still seemed fOurth, and, while
reaffirming the Vietnamese Communists' ability to win,
had seemed increasingly to think of the war as a stand-off
and to associate himself with the willingness of other
primary leaders to negotiate from that position; C/S Dung
still seemed his likely follower, although the latter's
very hard line on negotiations may have indicated an im-
portant difference of view on this. (Thus five of the
nine full members apart from Ho--Dong, Hung, Nghi, Trinh,
and Giap--seemed to be on the 'right' of the spectrum.)
As suggested above, it still seemed likely, as of
March 1968, that the primary leaders were in agreement
on a position for the conduct of the war which--as they
saw it--would pose no sharply divisive issues for some
time yet. In other words, all seemed willing to accept
for a time the cost of holding out--a continuation of the
bombing--while attempting to get a cessation of the bomb-
ing at no real cost to Hanoi, and all seemed willing to
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accept a settlement--in negotiations in which they would
be relieved of the pressure of the bombing--which would
result sooner or later in an American withdrawal and a
Communist-dominated "coalition." The critical time for
their cohesion would come--if at all--only when the costs
had mounted and when there was no hope of either a settle-
ment on those terms or a military victory in lieu of it.
Some Conclusions and Some Speculation
There has been evidence of tension among groups
(not always the same ones) in the leadership on various
questions related directly or indirectly to the war at
least since 1954: in the Geneva settlement of 1954: dur-
ing the land-reform of 1954-56; in working out the rela-
tionship between the party apparatus and the military
establishment in 1956-1957; in deciding to undertake
violent revolution in the South in 1959; in deciding to
state this course openly in 1960; in working out a rela-
tionship with the Soviet and Chinese parties when the
Sino-Soviet dispute hardened in 1959-60; in probing the
Kennedy Administration's intentions in 1960-61; in decid-
ing the relative emphasis to put on military versus poli-
tical forms of action in the South in 1962-63; in again
defining the party-military relationship in 1964; possibly
but not demonstrably, later in 1964, surrounding the offer
to undertake talks with the IT.S.; again in early 1965,
in deciding what attitude to take toward negotiations .
after the U.S. had not taken up the first offer; possibly
in early 1965, in formulating the terms for a "peaceful
settlement" (that is, on questions related to the U.S.
withdrawal, the form of government in the South, and "un-
ification" of Vietnam, tension which if latent might
emerge again if negotiations were to take place); and
clearly, in 1965, �continuing perhaps to 1967, on the ques-
tion of the relative emphasis to give to large-scale
military operations versus guerrilla warfare.
By early 1966, however, the primary figures had
apparently been able to subordinate their remaining dif-
ferences to an agreed position on--an overall scheme for--
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the conduct of the war, even if not always in agreement
on military methods. While in any Communist party domi-
nated by a single leader the stated views of lesser
figures must be in a range permitted by that leader, so
that private views may differ widely, the public and
private statements of the primary figures (reinforced
by documents)--Ho, Duan, Dong, and Giap--after late 1965
seemed to indicate genuine agreement on a course of action.
This was to settle if necessary for a military stand-off
and to wait for indications, at some time in the next "few"
years (from early 1966) that the U.S. will to persist had
been broken. This "decisive victory" might come when the
U.S. entered into negotiations on Communist terms, includ-
ing a cessation of the bombing (desirable in itself), or
might be brought about only in the course of negotiations
(relieved of the pressure of the bombing), but it should
come in a "relatively short period." The Communists would
continue to fight while negotiating, in order to impose
Hanoi's will and to make it stick; and with the eventual
U.S. withdrawal (perhaps after "unification"), the "pro-
tracted war" would end in "final victory."
This plan for the conduct of the war apparently
underlay Hanoi's professions of willingness, from early
1967, to enter into "talks" in exchange for an "uncondi-
tional" cessation of the bombing and of unspecified other
"acts of war" against the North. This seemed true regard-
less of whether the Communists (a) were to stand on their
refusal to give anything at all-'-not even a promise not to
take military advantage of a cessation--for a cessation,
or (b) were instead to offer privately the signs of will-
ingness to compromise (i.e., genuinely negotiate) which
the U.S. had been demanding. If they remained intransigent,
they would be choosing to wait for indications as they saw
it that the U.S. will had been broken (or at least cracked)
before negotiations began. If instead they were passably
forthcoming, they would be choosing to find out in the
course of talks and negotiations whether the U.S. will
had been broken--and, if not, to try to break it. They
apparently believed that they could get a settlement on
essentially their terms if they held out (before negotia-
tions and/or in them). From autimn 1967 they showed an
increased confidence that, if they kept the military pressure
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on, the demands made on U.S. resources by the war in Viet-
nam, together with the erosion of the basis for the U.S.
presence in Vietnam, plus (secondarily) domestic problems
in the U.S. and increased activity by militant Communists
elsewhere, would sooner or later force the United States
to accept this outcome.
The recent Tet offensive was consistent both with
this general scheme and with the Communist effort to break
the U.S. will if possible before beginning negotiations.
Hanoi apparently calculated that the attacks, if they
achieved maximum success, would lead to American accept-
ance of Communist terms for negotiations and to the early
establishment of a Communist-dominated "coalition" govprn-
ment. In the Communist scenario, the U.S. would eventu-
ally be forced to accept this "coalition" as part of the
settlement and to negotiate with it a withdrawal of U.S.
forces. In reaffirming Hanoi's interest (in his 8 Febru-
ary statement) in bilateral talks and negotiations with
the U.S., and in blurring the distinction between talks
and negotiations (saying in effect that talks could be
negotiations), Foreign Minister Trinh may have been try-
ing to simplify the process of getting negotiations started
(by cutting through the immediate problem of reaching
agreement on the roles in negotiations of the Saigon
government and the Liberation Front). This is turn would
simplify the. process of negotiating an American withdrawal,
as this could be effected between the U.S. and a "coali-
tion"--less obviously a creature of Hanoi than is the
Front--which would join the ongoing negotiations, exclud-
ing the Saigon government. The Communist failure to hold
any of the cities--as a basis for proclaiming a "coali-
tion"--postponed but did not eliminate that possible short-
cut to a settlement.
In regard to "talks," it is still the Communists'
official position that they will give nothing in exchange
for a cessation of the bombing. While some of their
spokesmen and other sources continue to encourage the
view that Hanoi will be forthcoming once the "talks" are
underway, and while Hanoi has so shaped its position that
it is not possible to be sure of Hanoi's attitude on the
matter of a reciprocal concession until there has in fact
been a cessation of the bombing for some weeks, Peking
apparently means its intransigence to serve as a test
of the U.S. will.
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u..1213.01...12,
In regard to negotiations, there might seem little
difficulty about progressing to negotiations once the
"talks" had got underway, in view of U.S. acceptance of
three of Hanoi's four "points" and Hanoi's various indi-
cations of willingness to accommodate on the remaining
point. However, the failure of the Tet offensive to
create conditions for an early "coalition" may return
the Communists to A demand for recognition of the Front
as an autonomous entity and as a full participant in
negotiations or even to a demand that the Front be
recognized as the "sole" representative of the South.
Moreover, the Communists may go ahead and proclaim a
"coalition" anyway, and demand that its program be ac-
cepted in principle--before negotiations begin--as the
basis for a settlement in the South.
With regard to a settlement, the Communist posi-
tion is still known only in the most general terms,
hardly better than their own formulation of them in the
four "points." As for a cease-fire, unless Trinh was
changing the position in his 8 February interview, the
North Vietnamese are not willing to handle the matter of
a cease-fire in the South; the U.S. would have to negotiate
this with the Front or a "coalition." In either case
(i.e. no matter who is handling it), the.Communists would
presumably not agree to an immediate cease-fire and re-
groupment, as their concept envisages a period of fight-
ing-and-negotiating, and it is not clear at what point
they would regard a cease-fire as an acceptable risk;
neither could there be a guarantee against a resumption
of hostilities, as their concept envisages such a resump-
tion if negotiations are unsuccessful or if agreements
are not kept. They would obviously insist on the cessa-
tion of all military operations against the North (as-
suming that this had not already taken place prior to
"talks"), although the cessation of some operations (e.g.
reconnaissance) perhaps could not be verified. They
wouI4 also of course insist on the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces and bases from the South (already agreed to in
principle), but it is doubtful that they would agree to
withdraw North Vietnamese forces (which do not officially
exist) from the South in exchange, or that they would go
ahead and do this without any agreement, or that there
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