PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01335318
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01898
• Publication Date: March 11, 1964

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NATIONAL
Prospects For the
of the Republic
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
11 MARCH 1964
-sE-EREL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation 0
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, and NSA.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Di-
rector, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their
jurisdiction.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 43-64
Prospects for the Government
of the Republic of China
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM 1
CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 3
I. INTRODUCTION 3
II. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 4
A. The GRC vs. Communist China 4
B. Economic Problems 7
C. Internal Security Problems 10
D. The Problem of Succession 11
E. Foreign Relations 12
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY 14
MILITARY ANNEX 15
I. MILITARY POLICY 15
II. CAPABILITIES 16
III. COMPOSITION 17
TABLE: Inventory of Aircraft and Missiles by Configuration and
Assignment Chinese Air Force, GRC, as of 2 March 1964 21
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'seemz_
PROSPECTS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the problems facing the Government of the Re-
public of China (GRC) and to estimate its prospects, with par-
ticular consideration of implications for the US.
CONCLUSIONS
A. French recognition of Communist China, together with
fears about the strength of the US position in the Far East and
the firmness of US Far Eastern policy have further damaged the
morale and confidence of the Government of the Republic of
China (GRC). However, we believe that, unless the GRC leader-
ship becomes convinced that the US is abandoning Taiwan and the
anti-Communist cause in the Far East, the GRC will live through
this setback relatively intact and that it is also likely to survive
subsequent blows arising from recognition of Peiping by other
important powers and from a bitter struggle over the UN China
seat. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that a crisis
might precipitate a radical change in the makeup or policies of
the GRC. (Paras. 1-6)
B. Such setbacks, however, will reduce the �n and stability
of the regime. Mistrust and misunderstanding between the GRC
and the US are likely to increase, and it will be increasingly diffi-
cult for the US to influence the GRC toward building up the
economy of Taiwan. The GRC will continue to maintain a large
military establishment and to proclaim its status as sole legiti-
mate government of all China. (Paras. 38-49)
--tEGRET, 1
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"1"6�RE.,
C. The GRC's internal security is generally good and is likely
to continue effective. There has been rapid economic growth
and continued progress is likely, although it will fall considerably
short of its potential, and unemployment is likely to be an in-
creasingly serious problem. There will almost certainly be strong
pressure from the GRC for sustained or even increased US eco-
nomic and military aid. (Paras. 16-28)
D. There is likely to be a continuing decline in the GRC's
international status with more states establishing economic and
diplomatic relations with the mainland regime. As this process
goes on, there will be an increasing tendency for the US to be
isolated in its support for the GRC as the government of all China.
Much of the world will condemn the GRC's efforts to press its
claim to the mainland as endangering peace and order in the Far
East. (Para. 44)
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DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
1. For many months the leaders of the Government of the Republic
of China (GRC) have been depressed by the prolonged frustration of
their hopes for a return to the mainland and by a feeling that a favor-
able opportunity may have been missed in 1961. More recently their
gloom has been increased by a conviction that the US anti-Communist
position is deteriorating dangerously in Southeast Asia and a concern
that US policy is shifting toward a reduced US commitment in Asia and
to the acceptance of two Chinas, i.e., a Communist Chinese mainland
and a Free Chinese Taiwan.
2. French recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, which was
announced rather abruptly on 27 January 1964, was a serious blow to
the GRC. The line against recognition of Peiping, which had generally
been held effectively since 1950, was for the first time ruptured by a ma-
jor Western power�a NATO ally of the US�in the face of what the
world knew as strenuous US opposition. The GRC's international
status was undermined and the specter of a critical shift of world sup-
port to Peiping was raised. Leadership confidence was further shaken
by a 21 January incident in which a prominent major general exhorted,
albeit unsuccessfully, the First Armored Division to move on Taipei and
seize the government.
3. Over the past several years the situation on Taiwan has been rela-
tively stable; changes have come only slowly. There appeared to be
time for the GRC gradually to adjust, if necessary, to an indefinite post-
ponement of its hopes of returning to the mainland and to a general
rejection of its claims to be the legal government of all China. Recent
events, particularly the French recognition of Peiping, have accelerated
the pace of events and reduced drastically the time for adaptation to
changed circumstances.
4. The last few weeks have depressed the morale and confidence of
the leadership and for the first time in several years have raised the
possibility of a dramatic change in the makeup of the regime or in its
basic policies. We believe, however, that, unless the GRC leadership
becomes convinced that the US is abandoning Taiwan and the anti-
Communist cause in the Far East, the GRC will weather this setback
without radical changes. Over the years the GRC has demonstrated a
capacity to adjust to serious blows to its hopes and its prestige, and we
believe it will continue to do so as long as it has the firm backing and
support of the US. Discouraging as the leaders may find their current
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situation on on Taiwan, they probably cannot realistically perceive any
alternatives more attractive than their present course of hanging on
and making the best of it.
5. Even though we believe that the GRC will successfully weather the
current situation, more nations will recognize Peiping and there are
likely to be bitter and possibly humiliating battles over the UN seat.
The possibility cannot be ruled out that a crisis might precipitate some
drastic action that would basically alter the situation on Taiwan. It
is unlikely that Chiang would withdraw, either retiring on Taiwan or
moving to some foreign haven. If, however, for any reason Chiang were
removed from the scene he would almost certainly be succeeded by an-
other mainlander regime, since the Taiwanese lack the organization or
leadership to make an effective bid for power. If a coup should occur,
it would almost certainly come from within the mainlander military
leadership. Other possibilities are a move to accommodate with Pei-
ping or a desperation attack upon the mainland. We believe both
these last alternatives highly unlikely, although support for such moves
could develop among mainlander groups should they come to believe
that all hope for a return to the mainland seemed otherwise lost.
6. Thus, while drastic action of some sort must be considered a pos-
sibility in some future crisis, we believe it more likely that the regime
will continue basically intact and carry on essentially along established
lines. Successive crises will take their toll, however, from the �n and
confidence of the regime. Its problems will be increased and its stability
will be less certain than it has appeared over the past decade or so.
H. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
A. The GRC vs. Communist China
7. The Continuing Civil War. The unfinished Chinese civil war has
dominated the thinking of the GRC leadership for two decades and
it will continue to do so. The GRC tends to evaluate international
and domestic events according to their effect on the relative positions
of the GRC and the Communist regime. The GRC's claim to be the
legitimate government of all China sustains its morale, gives it a sense
of purpose, and provides a justification for superimposing a national
government over the provincial government of Taiwan and for main-
taining maximum military forces. We do not believe that Chiang Kai-
shek or any of those in line to succeed him will openly accept for the
GRC the status of a government of Taiwan without claims to the main-
land, but they may in practice adjust to an indefinitely prolonged
existence in Taiwan.
8. Offshore Islands. The Kinrnen and Matsu island groups are valu-
able as early warning outpost in the defense of Taiwan, but their greatest
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importance for the GRC is as a link with the mainland and a symbol
of successful defiance of Communist power, since they are historically
part of mainland Fukien Province. Nearly a third of the army's com-
bat strength is stationed on these islands, the forces are well dug in,
and morale appears high. The GRC uses Kinmen as a showplace for
visiting American officials and overseas Chinese and for youth leaders
from Taiwan. The GRC by itself could not prevent a determined Com-
munist effort from taking the offshore islands, but it could make the
action very costly to the attackers. Under present circumstances, it
is not certain that the US could induce the GRC to abandon these
islands even by the use of measures so drastic as to risk wrecking
US-GRC cooperation and destroying the morale of the GRC.
9. Relations with Communist China. The GRC maintains no official
contacts with the Communist regime, which it considers an illegal and
temporary usurper of power. Taipei is as nationalistically Chinese as
is Peiping, and it finds itself in basic agreement with some of Peiping's
internationally unpopular policies such as the assertion of Chinese
authority in Tibet and the defense of Chinese border claims on the
Indian frontier.
10. The Peiping regime has attempted a sort of informal communica-
tion with the GRC leaders through radio broadcasts and open and
secret letters. Hong Kong intermediaries claiming to represent Peiping
have also been in touch with Taipei authorities. Up to the present
time, we have no evidence that Chinese Communist offers have elicited
any positive response from GRC leaders. In spite of the increased sense
of frustration and discouragement that has developed in recent months,
there is no evidence that any significant number of mainlanders in
Taiwan have been led to consider joining the Communists as an ac-
ceptable alternative. While the Communists have tried to exploit fric-
tions between the Taiwanese and the Kuomintang (KMT), they have had
little or no success in converting the Taiwanese to their cause. Taiwan-
ese feeling against the GRC is not pro-Communist but pro-Taiwanese, a
sentiment Peiping has no wish to encourage.
11. Barring a major change in US policy, we do not believe that
mainlander susceptibility to Chinese Communist blandishments will
increase significantly. Even the detonation of a nuclear device by the
Chinese Communists would probably not change things greatly. The
chief effect on the GRC would likely be demands for renewed assurances
of US protection and an insistence that the imminence of a Communist
nuclear capability makes inescapably clear the need for prompt action
against the Communist regime. Although the GRC would continue to
rely primarily on the US for protection, it might make a request for
nuclear weapons.
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12. Small Operations Against the Mainland. For some time to come
the chief form of contact between the two regimes, aside from the propa-
ganda war, is likely to remain small-unit raids and penetration attempts
by the GRC. The latter have failed totally to date; a few minor suc-
cesses have been scored by small raids. In the near future, at least,
raids upon Chinese Communist shipping and isolated coastal outposts
are likely to receive increased emphasis.
13. Invasion Attempt. In the past two or three years, Chiang has
stepped up preparations for a large-scale attack on the mainland and
talked publicly of launching an invasion very soon. In 1962 even the
Chinese Communists took his threats seriously enough to deploy large
reinforcements into the area near the Strait. (The magnitude and
vigor of their reaction indicates they believe the US was backing Chiang's
plans.) Chiang's past record of military conservatism and his com-
mitments to the US, however, argue against the likelihood of his launch-
ing an invasion attempt without US support. On the whole we con-
sider it highly unlikely that he will do so. Nevertheless, we cannot rule
out the possibility of an invasion if Chiang should come to feel that
conditions on the mainland had reached such a point that he could
make enough headway either to enlist US support or carry the day
without it.
14. Military Capability. The GRC has available armed forces of
approximately 600,000 men. GRC ambitions notwithstanding, US mili-
tary aid has been designed to shape this force along defensive lines for the
protection of Taiwan and the Penghus. The GRC's capability to lift
forces across the Strait by sea and air is limited and it lacks bombers
and other important offensive weapons. The GRC has sought to com-
pensate for these limitations by domestic production of such items as
landing craft and by trying to buy abroad parachutes, landing-craft
components, and possibly helicopters. It has further given training
to special forces beyond those supported by the US. Although some
progress has been made in increasing lift capacity, we believe the sum
total of these efforts has not made any significant increase in its
invasion capability.
15. Implications for Economic Development. Preparation for an in-
vasion of the mainland and the economic development of Taiwan com-
pete for the regime's limited resources. Chiang Kai-shek is reluctant
to divert his interest from military preparations to economic problems.
Primary responsibility for the economy devolved until recently upon
Premier Chen Cheng and his Cabinet and technicians. Many of the
policies which have helped economic growth are the result of patient
and persistent urging by American advisers, working with such officials
'This figure includes a large number of noncombatant personnel. See Annex
for further information on the armed forces.
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as C. K. Yen, formerly the Finance Minister and now the new Premier.
Yen's appointment as Premier would appear on the surface to bode
well for future economic policy, but the net effect of his appointment
may be the opposite. Yen is a technician with no independent political
strength, and he is probably less able than Chen Cheng to push crucial
economic programs.
B. Economic Problems
16. Economic Growth to Date. The economy's performance over the
past decade has been generally impressive. Industrial production more
than trebled from 1953 to 1963 and agricultural production was up
about 60 percent. Real national income doubled and per capita in-
come rose at an average annual rate of 3.7 percent, reaching US$118,
high by Asian standards. Exports doubled while imports rose by less
than 60 percent. A recently favorable world sugar market helped build
up gold and foreign exchange reserves, which reached about $212 million
by the end of 1963. Taiwan's 12 million people provide a supply of
hard working, low cost labor, and considerable managerial skills and
enterprise are available.
17. Trouble Spots. Continued economic progress is threatened by a
population increase of about three percent a year. With about 870
people per square mile, Taiwan is already one of the most densely popu-
lated areas of the world, a situation rendered worse by the fact that
only about a third of the island is arable. The regime has made only
a tentative approach to population control and such programs as may
be undertaken are unlikely to have much impact in the next several
years.
18. Directly related to the population problem is that of unemploy-
ment, which is already a serious problem. Even if the hoped-for six
percent annual growth in Gross National Product (GNP) continues,
unemployment will probably get worse. In 1964 about 175,000 will enter
the labor force with jobs expected for less than half this number. Pro-
jections indicate that by 1966 only one-third of the new employables
will find regular work. Large increases in the labor force over the next
five years reflect the fact that 46 percent of the population is now under
15 years of age. In addition to unemployment, underemployment is
widespread, with resultant low labor productivity and raised production
costs. Any effort to alleviate unemployment by spreading the work
among more employees would raise production costs and thus make
Taiwanese products less competitive on the world markets.
19. There has also recently been a slowdown in the investment growth
rate. Total gross investment in 1963 was about 19 percent of GNP,
compared with 21 percent in 1962. A number of factors tend to dis-
courage domestic investment, and a sizable amount of domestic capital
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is lying idle. The antiquated financial system is adapted to the old
family system of enterprise and lacks the suppleness to cope with
modern corporate business. It is difficult to obtain loans for private
industrial expansion: gaining bank and government approval is time
consuming and entails considerable petty graft, unreasonably high col-
lateral is demanded, and interest rates are very high. The administration
of taxation, allocation of raw materials and import permits, and various
bureaucratic regulations, tend to favor government enterprises and
handicap private initiative. Although the tax system has been im-
proved, inefficiencies remain which tend to discourage expansion and
long-range development.
20. In 1959 and 1960 the GRC tried to raise the previous low level
of foreign private investment by passing very liberal laws on foreign
investment. Such investment had begun to rise markedly in response
to the liberalization, until 1962, when the GRC temporarily adopted
the Special Defense Assessment (increased taxes and utility rates).
These, along with signs of stepped-up military preparedness and the
development of a war psychology, contributed to a 50 percent drop in
foreign investment for 1962-1963 compared with 1960-1961. There
was an increase in investment in the last half of 1963.
21. Since 1950 the US has extended about US$4.6 billion in aid, some
of which is still in the pipeline. Of this amount, military aid has
accounted for about $2.5 billion (53 percent). The GRC has made
effective use of US aid, which has been an essential ingredient in
Taiwan's economic growth. In 1961, the US began to shift to long-term
loans at interest and away from grants and "soft" loans. A US decision
to phase out the latter completely over the next few years was an-
nounced in 1963. This decision was based on the belief that by then
Taiwan could sustain its economic growth by relying on international
lending organizations and private foreign investment. Military aid and
PL 480 shipments were to be continued, altliough at unspecified levels.
22. Over the past several years military expenditures have accounted
for over 50 percent of the total national, provincial, and local budgets
and over 80 percent of the national budget. The current defense budget
of about $195 million is approximately $25 million less than last year's.
It remains, however, at about the same percentage of government ex-
penditures since� the overall budget was smaller as a result of reduced
domestic revenues (chiefly the ending of the special defense assess-
ments) and reductions in US aid. It is unlikely that the share of GNP
devoted to the military over the next few years can be decreased, even
if GNP should increase rapidly. Military expenditures are likely to
increase at least as rapidly as national income, primarily because of
a strongly felt need for maximum military forces, but also for other
reasons, chiefly the widely held view that force cuts would add to the
already serious unemployment problem.
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23. Hypersensitivity on the subject of Communist China has involved
the GRC in damaging disputes with its trading partners. This problem
has been greatest in the case of Japan, whose increasing contacts with
Communist China greatly agitate the GRC. Exchange of trade delega-
tions and increased Japanese sales to Peiping, especially that of a
complete vinylon plant, led in September 1963 to the stoning of the
Japanese Ambassador's home in Taipei, recall of the GRC Ambassador,
and a GRC threat to break relations if a permanent Chinese Communist
trade mission were accepted by Japan. In a rupture of Japanese-GRC
trade relations, the GRC would be the chief loser. In 1963, trade with
Japan accounted for 33 percent of the GRC's imports and 24 percent
of its exports. (The US is the GRC's only other trading partner of
comparable size.) Trade with the GRC, however, only accounts for
about two and one-half percent of Japan's exports. Already Japanese
investment in Taiwan�one of the largest sources of private foreign
investment�has been practically stopped by anti-Japanese pressures
there. In recent weeks, since France's recognition of Peiping, the GRC
has begun to value Japanese friendship more highly, and Japan's
protestations against the recognition action were greatly appreciated
in Taipei. Nevertheless, it is almost certain that trade and other con-
tacts between Tokyo and Peiping will grow in the near future and will
be a source of troubles.
24. Economic Prospects. In spite of the economic problems facing
the GRC, its economy has sufficient momentum and basic strength to
continue growth for some time even in the absence of economic reform.
If certain economic reforms were made, notably those which would mod-
ernize the financial system and improve government administration
and the tax structure, thus encouraging foreign and domestic invest-
ment, Taiwan's prospects for rapid economic growth would be good.
However, even under the best circumstances there will be serious prob-
lems arising out of the high rate of population growth and increasing
unemployment.
25. Taiwan's resources are proportionally comparable to those on
which the Japanese economy is based. To achieve a self-sustaining
growth along Japanese lines, however, it would be necessary to give
economic growth a more important place in the nation's planning and
to take vigorous action to remove some of the inhibiting factors dis-
cussed above. The danger is that the GRC leadership, for essentially
political reasons, may not only fail to do this but may actually take steps
that will further slow down growth, such as the devotion of an even
greater share of resources to the military, imposition of new taxes dis-
couraging to investment, or actions in the international sphere destruc-
tive to its foreign trade and the flow of foreign investment.
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26. Thus, the future of the economy is to a considerable extent a
political question. The allocation of sufficient resources to economic
investment and the achievement of the needed reforms would require
changes in some long-held views of the top leaders, as well as the over-
coming of considerable bureaucratic inertia. Given these factors, we
believe that the GRC will not make the most effective use of its re-
sources in meeting the demands placed upon its economy by rapid popu-
lation growth, the rising expectations of its people, and reduced US aid.
C. Internal Security Problems
27. Internal Security. Chiang Kai-shek has shown extraordinary
virtuosity in manipulating internal security controls. Despite the fact
that his is, in a sense, an alien rule imposed upon a native majority, he
has kept the situation on Taiwan completely under control without
resorting to mass arrests or open terror. Although he has been ruthless
in a number of individual cases, indirect means have generally been
adequate to correct any worrisome deviations from authorized behavior.
For example, editors who stray from the line suddenly find newsprint
impossible to acquire, or they become entangled in a series of paralyzing
lawsuits. Only the most flagrant violators are liable to be jailed, and
even then it is for some other charge than the actual crime of censor-
ship violation. The various security forces are ubiquitous and effec-
tive; any sort of organization that threatens even remotely to form a
real opposition to the regime is found out and neutralized before it can
gather momentum. Neither Communist subversion nor Taiwanese
separatism has made any significant headway.
28. This lack of organized opposition testifies more to the regime's
skillful controls than to its popularity. The Taiwanese who form
nearly 85 percent of the population, continue dissatisfied under main-
lander domination. At present their political role is pretty well con-
fined to local offices and the lower branches of the bureaucracy. As
time passes, the political aspirations of the Taiwanese are likely to in-
crease. Whether to try to control these aspirations by increased repres-
sion or by providing for greater Taiwanese participation in the govern-
ment is a growing problem for the GRC leadership. Chiang resists any
suggestions that the Taiwanese should be given a greater role, probably
feeling that such action might whet rather than satisfy the Taiwanese
appetite, and, more especially, that it would undermine the back-to-the-
mainland rationale. For these reasons, further concessions to the Tai-
wanese will be very limited and carefully hedged. There is some danger
that growing protest will bring forth more severe, less veiled suppression
which in turn might breed more bitter opposition.
29. The drop in leadership morale and self-confidence which has re-
cently developed may give rise to security problems. Increased sus-
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picion and sensitivity to possible opposition is likely to result in tighter,
less subtle repression, which in turn may increase antipathy toward the
regime. If the sense of frustration and hopelessness among the main-
landers, especially in the military, continues to grow, a coup attempt
will remain a possibility even after the immediate crisis has passed.
D. The Problem of Succession
30. The effect on the GRC of the demise of Chiang Kai-shek is diffi-
cult to estimate. To a considerable degree Chiang Kai-shek is the GRC,
both to his own people and to the world at large. No one else has had
final responsibility in the KMT, the government, or the armed forces
for the past 38 years. During this time Chiang has learned much and
has perfected his skills as a subtle and generally benign dictator. His
regime has been an extremely personal one built upon personal loyalties
rather than upon forms and institutions. Even if the succession takes
place in a regular and orderly manner, the task of his successor, who-
ever he is, will be extremely difficult.
31. President Chiang is in exceptional health for a man of 76, and he
has not revealed any plans for his eventual replacement. Nevertheless,
the question of succession has already become a factor in current politics.
Until the latter part of 1963 it was generally considered that Chen Cheng,
who was both Vice President and Premier, would succeed Chiang Kai-shek
with the latter's powerful son, Chiang Ching-kuo, biding his time while
nominally supporting the more elderly and ailing Chen. During the
past few months, however, Chen's status has undergone conspicuous
decline, spotlighted in early December by the President's acceptance of
his resignation as Premier and, more recently by his being ignored in
formulating a response to French recognition of Peiping. At the same
time, Chiang Ching-kuo, has come more into the foreground. In the
late summer of 1963 Chiang Ching-kuo made an official trip to Wash-
ington which was followed by considerable and unaccustomed publicity
upon his return. During the ninth KMT party congress in November,
the younger Chiang played an important role and arranged the election
or appointment of many of his followers to the KMT Central Committee.
32. The Generalissimo appears now to be grooming his son more
openly as his eventual successor. However, with Chen Cheng still serv-
ing as Vice President and Deputy Director of the KMT, he is still likely to
be at least titular successor should Chiang Kai-shek die before his cur-
rent term expires in 1966. In any case, the passing of the Generalissimo
will sharply increase the danger of instability in the GRC. The extent of
this danger and the direction from which it might come will depend upon
how the regime survives and how morale and unity are affected by
external events in the months ahead.
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E. Foreign Relations
33. General. The dominant theme of GRC foreign relations has
been the struggle to preserve as far as possible the regime's status as the
legitimate government of all China. Essentially, this has entailed block-
ing international recognition of the Communist Chinese regime and
protecting the GRC's title to the China seat in the UN General Assembly
and on the Security Council. Despite a widely held feeling that Com-
munist China should be recognized "as a fact" and a desire to try to
bring it into the society of nations, the majority of nations has withheld
recognition. This has been largely a result of US pressure, aided at criti-
cal times by blatant aggressiveness on the part of Peiping. Voting on
the China issue, posed in various forms in the UN, has roughly followed
the pattern of recognition.
34. Peiping's recent breakthrough in winning recognition from France
has seriously threatened the GRC's prospects for holding on to its
position. There has not been a rush to follow the French precedent,
but it has caused a number of countries to consider recognition of Peiping,
and erosion of the GRC position has been almost certainly accelerated.
35. Africa. Taipei's chief successes in the past few years have oc-
curred in Africa. Until recently 19 African nations have had diplomatic
relations with the GRC as against 15 with the Chinese Communists.
This record results from an energetic diplomatic offensive, which has
been supported by a small, but effective, agricultural assistance program.
Success has been most notable among the former French colonies in
contrast with the former British areas, which have generally followed
London's example in recognizing Peiping. Only one of the former
French colonies (Congo (Brazzaville) ) has as yet followed the French
example. However, a number of others are considering recognition and
Dahomey appears headed in that direction.
36. The United Nations. In the past three years, the UN has voted
on resolutions which have combined the demands that the Chinese
Communists be seated and that the GRC be expelled. Over the three
years Peiping has won only four new votes in the General Assembly
compared with a gain of nine for the GRC. This strengthening of the
GRC position represents very largely the votes of new African nations.
French recognition has improved Peiping's prospects for the 1964 session
of the General Assembly, but it is not certain that Communist China
can win majority support even then if, as is likely, the question is put
in terms of denying representation to Taiwan. The growing sentiment
for "two Chinas" is such, however, that a resolution which invited Peiping
without expelling Taiwan would probably have a good chance of getting
majority support. Although Peiping would almost certainly not accept
an invitation on such terms, serious complications would ensue, includ-
ing the possibility that the GRC might quit the UN in protest. In any
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case, future action in the UN on the China question will be greatly in-
fluenced by what happens between now and the next General Assembly
session, including the behavior of Communist China and the GRC.
37. Southeast Asia. The GRC has had little impact, either economic
or political, on Southeast Asia, although it has been active in Thailand,
South Vietnam, and among the rightists in Laos. Continued contact
with the remaining Chinese irregulars in the Thai-Burma-Laos-Yunnan
border areas holds little prospect for gain and considerable danger to
US relations with Burma. The overthrow and assassination of Diem
and Nhu in South Vietnam, like the earlier overthrow of Rhee in South
Korea, caused discomfort and worry in the GRC and increased its sus-
picions of the US. Southeast Asia is now less important to the GRC
as an area of operation for GRC foreign policy than as a barometer
of anti-Communist effectiveness and US determination.
38. Relations with the US. Because the GRC is heavily dependent
upon the US, it maintains an intensive watch on US politics and policy.
GRC leaders display an extreme touchiness whenever a US official men-
tions policy toward either the Chinese Communists or the GRC. Taipei
fears that the US may be embarking on a "two Chinas" policy and even
that the US may be planning to cut its commitments sharply in Asia.
Continued US presence in South Vietnam has done as much as anything
to assure the GRC leaders that the US is willing to commit its troops
and assume risks to stop the spread of communism in the area.
39. Taipei is disturbed by any apparent improvement of US-Soviet
relations, and only reluctantly joined in signing the Test Ban Treaty.
The GRC leaders felt that they should not be associated with the Soviet
Communists in any treaty, and that US initiative in drawing up the
treaty reflected naivet�n trusting the Communists. They may have
feared that the treaty would lead to a lessening of tensions, which would
adversely affect the GRC hope of regaining control over the mainland.
40. The US and the GRC differed over the proper response to French
recognition of Communist China. Chiang took the position that na-
tional pride demanded a prompt severance of relations with France
and had decided to do so. Strong US urging led to a temporary reversal
of policy with the aim of forcing Peiping to expose its unwillingness to
establish relations on a "two Chinas" basis and forcing France publicly
to sever relations with Taiwan in response to Peiping's demand. The
first aim was achieved, but two weeks later the GRC's pride led it to
respond to an oral representation by the French charg�t Taipei, which
amounted to severance of relations, by publicly announcing the GRC's
break with France, thus relieving the French of the need to make the
open break. This divergence of view as to proper policy has abraded
GRC-US relations, an effect which was increased by Taipei's public
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announcement of its break with France before notifying the US and with-
out consulting on the form of the announcement.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
41. The US is likely to find the GRC increasingly difficult to work with.
US motives will be suspect and GRC responsiveness will be decreased.
In the present atmosphere, reductions in US economic and military aid
will probably take on a new significance. It will be increasingly diffi-
cult to convince GRC leaders that such cuts are not steps toward reducing
the US stake in the area in line with a decreasing US presence in the
Far East.
42. Uncertainty as to the future and lack of confidence in the direction
of US policy in the Far East are likely to reinforce the GRC's desire to
maintain a maximum military capability of its own. Thus long-range
economic needs on Taiwan are likely to run a poor second to an increase
in military capabilities. The GRC leaders are confident that the US
cannot afford to let the GRC collapse and that the US will therefore act
to save Taiwan's economy even from troubles caused in large part by
the further allocation of resources to the military against US advice.
Thus the GRC may expand its offshore procurement and domestic pro-
duction of material needed for the military at the cost of more rapid
economic growth. What the US is most likely to face, therefore, is an
economy which is growing, but not as fast as it should, and which is
saddled with increasing unemployment and popular discontent. The
GRC will seek further US aid and point to economic difficulties as jus-
tification. US efforts to limit military expenditures will be resented, and
substantial further cuts in US military aid or intensified efforts to bring
about a significant reduction in the GRC military establishment would be
looked upon as defeatism and a de facto support of the "two Chinas"
policy.
43. The loss of confidence and �n in the GRC leadership and the
decreased certainty of the regime's stability present the US with a much
less steady situation than has prevailed on Taiwan for the past 15 years.
The US now has to be prepared to respond to any one of a number of
different forms of internal crises which were not considered serious
possibilities before.
44. On the international scene, France's new initiative will multiply
US difficulties in holding the line against recognition of Communist China
and in protecting the GRC's position in the UN. If present trends con-
tinue, more nations will sooner or later recognize Peiping as the only
legitimate government of China. As this process goes on, there will be
an increasing tendency for the US to be isolated in its support of the
GRC as the government of all China. Much of the world will condemn
the GRC's efforts to press its claim to the mainland as endangering
peace and order in the Far East.
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MILITARY ANNEX
I. MILITARY POLICY
1. Although the US military aid program is aimed at modernizing
and developing the GRC armed forces for the defense of Taiwan and
the Penghus 2 the GRC's own philosophy of preparation for attacking
the mainland places a premium on developing offensive capabilities.
Limitation of US support to defensive requirements has created a sense
of frustration in the GRC leadership, which has led to various efforts
to get around the US restriction. For example, the utilization of MAP-
supported training facilities for the training of non-MAP-supported
units is a common occurrence. The purpose for which the GRC hopes
to use its forces also dictates that they be kept at maximum strength.
The GRC has therefore resisted US pressures for any significant reduc-
tions and maintains the largest per capita armed force in the world.
It will probably continue to strive to keep MAP-supported forces as large
as it can while maintaining and perhaps increasing its non-MAP-sup-
ported unconventional warfare forces.
2. The fact that such large numbers of military personnel cannot be
replenished from the mainlander sector of the population alone has
necessitated an ever-increasing ratio of Taiwanese in the forces. At
present Taiwanese comprise about 38 percent of the personnel and the
ratio is increasing about three percent a year. A more significant fact
is the extent to which Taiwanese have been kept from positions of au-
thority: they form about 88 percent of the lower enlisted ranks but only
about 11 percent of the non-commissioned officers and about four per-
cent of the commissioned officers. While there would be doubt about
the reliability of the Taiwanese troops for an invasion of the mainland,
we believe that they would perform effectively in the defense of National-
ist-held territory.
3. In recent years the GRC has sought to increase its military strength,
especially its offensive capabilities, through efforts uncoordinated with
the MAP. To this end it levied temporary defense surtaxes from 1 May
1962 through 30 June 1963 in support of a $59.3 million special Prepared-
ness Budget. In that period the GRC's self-financed defense expendi-
tures rose from 8.7 percent of GNP in FY 61 to 9.8 percent and 10.5 per-
cent in FY 62 and FY 63, respectively. The figure is estimated at 8.7
percent in FY 64. An essential reason for the Special Budget was to
Under the US�GRC Mutual Defense Treaty signed 2 December 1954, the US,
is committed to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus (Pescadores) . A Con-
gressional resolution of 1955 gives the President discretionary power to extend
the defense to the offshore islands "as he judges to be required or appropriate
in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."
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accelerate its covert activities on the mainland and acquire psychologi-
cal warfare equipment additional to that supplied under MAP.
H CAPABILITIES
4. In general the capability of the GRC armed forces appears to be
at or approaching a peak. Morale is fair to good and has been at its
best on the offshore islands. However, morale, particularly among the
mainlander leaders of the military, is closely tied to the objective of
recovering the mainland, and recent events may have had a discourag-
ing effect among the leaders. Although only about one-fifth the size
of the Communist Chinese forces in terms of manpower, the GRC forces
probably compare well qualitatively, but grounds for comparison are
extremely scarce. In the last major meeting of the two forces during
the offshore island crisis of 1958, the GRC exhibited a striking qualita-
tive superiority in the air. In the two minor air skirmishes since that
time, the Communists demonstrated somewhat improved tactics, but
their aircraft are now becoming increasingly aged and obsolescent.
Additionally, their insufficiencies in pilot flight time and training in all-
weather operations, and the lack of air-to-air missiles all contribute to
a relatively low degree of combat effectiveness.
5. On defense, the armed forces of the GRC could not withstand a
sustained military effort by the Chinese Communist against either the
offshore islands or Taiwan and the Penghus without US naval and air
support. Offensively the GRC's capabilities are limited. It can drop
approximately 3,400 troops on the mainland and follow up with limited
resupply if all assigned C-46, C-47, and C-119 aircraft are employed.
In a supported amphibious assault upon a hostile beach against limited
to moderate enemy �resistance the GRC Navy could provide sufficient
amphibious ships and craft to land a 10,000-man tactically balanced
force with full allowance of tanks, guns, LVT's, wheeled vehicles and
supplies. If the number of troops to be transported were the primary
consideration without regard to unit and tactical integrity, or accompany-
ing heavy equipment, the same vessels could lift approximately 36,000
troops. Additional forces could be transported in 73 combat loaded
merchant ships with a lift capability of 500,000 tons (Cargo DWT) or
approximately seven infantry divisions totalling 75,000 troops with com-
bat equipment. These figures are all based upon 100 percent avail-
ability and a single operation with no turn around.
6. The GRC has been exercising its capability of landing small groups
of 7 to 20 men on the long mainland coast with the stated objective of
moving inland to establish contact with "resistance groups." A number
of teams have succeeded in getting ashore in the past year or so but all
or nearly all participants were killed or captured within a few hours of
landing. Publicly, however, the GRC has claimed success for its opera-
tions, saying the great majority of their infiltrators are at large on the
mainland.
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�St-64U-
7. A few of the raids, in contrast to the infiltration attempts, have
had minor success, but they have so far produced little intelligence or
much else of value. Nevertheless, the leadership believes that the fact
of the raids and infiltration efforts and even the Communist publicity of
captures and executions serves as a reminder that the GRC is still an
active enemy of Communist domination. The GRC plans to continue
these small landings, perhaps increasing the size of the forces involved,
but it plans to place more emphasis on raids on Communist shipping
and isolated outposts with small teams in plastic boats launched from
mother craft. Sabotage attempts out of Hong Kong and Macao have
succeeded in winning publicity out of all proportion to the small dam-
age done, and they have brought forth the wrath of the colonial au-
thorities and precipitated local police action against GRC agents, espe-
cially in Hong Kong.
III. COMPOSITION
8. The GRC maintains a total military force of about 600,000 men,
distributed as follows:
Ministry of National Defense (MND) 30,000
Army 415,000
Navy 61,000
(Includes 26,000 Marines)
Air Force 87,000
Combined Service Force (CSF) 7,000
600,000
Of this total 35,500 consisting of 8,000 in the MND and 27,500 in the
Army do not receive MAP support. The 8,000 MND personnel in general
serve in an overhead capacity. The 27,500 in the Army however, form
an integral part of that force and include such units as two Special
Forces groups totaling 7,000 and the Anti-Communist National Salvation
Corps (ACNSC) of 5,500. These two Special Forces groups, along with
the two MAP-supported Special Forces groups, are subordinate to the
Special Warfare Center, The ACNSC is a veteran force of ex-main-
lander guerrillas under direct control of the Army GHQ which garrisons
the minor offshore islands of Tung-yin and Wu-chiu. Not included in
the 600,000 figure are 7,500 physically disabled or over age troops com-
prising three Garrison Regiments of the Taiwan Garrison General Head-
quarters (TGGH). The TGGH, an internal security organization, also
has one regular MAP-supported Army division assigned on a rotational
basis.
9. The Army. The GRC ground forces consist of a general headquar-
ters, 2 field armies, 6 corps, 21 infantry divisions (including 6 light re-
serve divisions), 1 armor center with 2 armored divisions, 1 special war-
fare center with 4 special forces groups, 1 air defense artillery (ADA)
missile group, and 1 airborne infantry regiment. These forces are corn-
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bat ready, increasingly well trained and equipped, and have a substan-
tial reserve and replacement manpower pool. The Army must have
foreign support to maintain its armed forces at present levels of readiness
or to conduct sustained military operations. Steps are being taken to
remedy equipment shortages and personnel management deficiencies
and improvement is continuing.
10. In the Taiwan Strait area, GRC forces are now more formidable
than in 1958. The Army has about 19,000 troops on the Matsu Islands
group facing an estimated 42,600 Chinese Communist ground troops on
the nearby mainland (the vicinity of Foochow). On the Kinmen Island
group, there are approximately 67,000 GRC troops. The Chinese Com-
munists have an estimated 92,600 ground troops nearby in the Amoy
area and within 12 days, could reinforce their troop strength in the
Amoy�Foochow area with the additional forces already in East China
(approximately 212,000 troops, including three airborne divisions which
total about 21,000 men). These forces are conveniently astride main
lines of communication and would most probably enter the coastal area
by way of the Nanping�Foochow rail line in the north and/or the
Ying;tan�Hsiamen (Amoy) rail line in the south. Such redeployment
possibly could be accomplished without detection, but it is believed that
any sizable concentration of forces or amphibious craft would be detected
if current US�GRC surveillance is continued.
11. Chinese Communist artillery strength in the Matsu-Kinmen areas
totals about 850 pieces, as compared to 400 GRC pieces. Improvements
in fortifications and covered artillery emplacements have increased
the defensive capability of both the Kinmen and Matsu garrisons. Food,
ammunition, and other supplies in abundance are stockpiled in tunnels
on the major offshore islands.
12. The Navy. The GRC Navy has a small fleet composed of former
US ships, the largest combat type being destroyers. The total ship
strength is as follows:
Destroyer (DD) 4
Escort Ship (DE) 5
Patrol Escort (PF) 1 (2)
Escort (POE) 7 (1)
Submarine Chaser (PC) 16
Motor Gunboat (PGM) 1
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT) 6
Coastal Minelayer (MMC) 2
Fleet Minesweeper (MSF) 2
Coastal Minesweeper (MSC) 4
Amphibious Warfare Ships 43 (4)
Amphibious Craft 335
LCU 21
LCM 154
LCVP 160
Figures in parentheses are additional ships in reserve.
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-SECRET-
GRC Naval forces afloat, except small patrol and harbor craft assigned
to naval districts, are organized into the Fleet Command (comprising
five squadrons) , an Amphibious Force Command, and a Fleet Training
Command.
13. The GRC Navy is primarily a defensive force with the principal
mission of maintaining sea control of the Taiwan Strait and of providing
for the naval defense of Taiwan. It is only moderately effective, but
through MAAG assistance its state of readiness and its combat potential
are being steadily improved. Proficiency in surface gunnery is con-
sidered to be good, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) , air defense,
minelaying and minesweeping capabilities are improving.
14. The 26,000-man elite Marine Corps is organized into a headquar-
ters, a supporting establishment, and the Fleet Marine Force. The
operating forces consist of 1 division, 1 brigade, 1 LVT, and 1 LVTA bat-
talion, organized and equipped under modified US Marine Corps TO&E.
The Marine Corps has the training and combat readiness which would
enable it to execute an amphibious assault engaging the division and
the brigade against light to moderate resistance if adequate air and
naval support, including amphibious shipping, were available.
15. The Air Force. The Chinese Air Force (CAF) has 25 squadrons
organized into 6 wings: 4 tactical fighter wings, 1 composite wing, and
1 transport wing. The 4 tactical fighter wings and 1 composite wing
comprise a total of 13 tactical fighter squadrons, 1 fighter-interceptor
squadron, 1 all-weather squadron, 2 tactical reconnaissance squadrons,
and 1 search and rescue squadron. The transport wing consists of 7
transport squadrons. All squadrons are considered to be operationally
ready except those preparing for conversion to higher performance air-
craft. The majority of tactical fighters have been modified to accom-
modate the SIDEWINDER (GAR-8) missile. Personnel strength of
87,000 includes about 2,130 trained pilots.
16. The capabilities of the CAF have been improved by the addition
of Century-series supersonic fighters, and it could provide reasonably
good air defense of Taiwan under daylight or clear air mass conditions.
Air defense of the Taipei area is bolstered by a Nike-Hercules missile bat-
talion and a Hawk missile battalion scheduled to become operational
this year. The early warning radar coverage from ground installations
on Taiwan and in the Penghus is fairly good and is being improved by
the modernization of present equipment. Radars on Kinmen and
Matsu provide valuable early warning information. The main weak-
ness in air defense is the limited number of all-weather aircraft which
are available. At present, only one squadron is equipped for all-weather
defense. With the addition of two F-104G squadrons programmed to be-
come operational in the near future, this weakness will be somewhat
reduced. There are also important limitations in air control capa-
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bilities as air-defense communications still have inadequate capacity
and quality to link air-defense weapons and control centers effectively.
Although only a small number of photo-reconnaissance aircraft are
available, CAF reconnaissance operations in regular missions against
the mainland have proved to be outstanding. This capability will be
further improved as RF-104G aircraft replace the RF-84F's which are
scheduled for early phaseout.
17. In the event that US-GRC strategy should call for air defense of
Taiwan and the Penghus by US air units, a number of Chinese Na-
tionalist F-86F and F-100 day fighter aircraft could perform important
tactical missions against mainland targets along with the F-104G's.
The F-86F, equipped with two 200-gallon drop tanks and two 500-pound
bombs, would have a combat radius of 300 n.m. on a hi-lo-hi mission
profile. The F-100A aircraft, equipped with two 275-gallon drop tanks
and two 500-pound bombs, flying the same profile, would have a combat
radius of 310 n.m. The combat radius of the F-104G in the same pro-
file, carrying 2,510 pounds of bombs and ammunition, is approximately
540 n.m. Mainland targets within these radii would be primarily air-
fields, control centers, radars, lines of communication, military installa-
tions, and targets of opportunity.
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INVENTORY OF AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES BY CONFIGURATION AND
ASSIGNMENT CHINESE AIR FORCE, CRC, AS OF 2 MARCH 1964
BASIC CONFIGURATION
MODEL
IN TACTICAL UNITS
INVENTORY TOTAL
JET
PROP
JET
PROP
Fighter
All Weather
Day
F-860
10-104G '
F-86F
F-100A
--
12
212
63
�
16
10
228
69
1'-10010
7
8
F-104 A
15
18
F-104B
3
3
--
--
Subtotal
312
352
Reconnaissance
RE-84F
15
15
RE-101A
4
4
RF-1040 b
8
Subtotal
19
27
Trainer
T-28A
21
T-33A
16
45
TF-1040
6
Subtotal
16
51
21
Transport
C-46A
1
C-460
72
79
C-47A/B
16
21
1:C-470
l
C-119G
12
15
C-118
1
1
HU-16A
7
9
Subtotal
108
127
Helicopter
UH-19B
4
Ii
Subtotal
4
6
TOTALS
347
112
430
154
TOTAL ASSIGNED TO TAC-
TICAL UNITS
459
TOTAL INVENTORY
584
Surface-to-Air Missiles e
48
86
Nike Hercules
a Tell of 32 aircraft already delivered. Remaining 22 programmed for delivery by 31 May
1964.
b Eight aircraft delivered fit December 1963.
e Missile group is manned and operated by the Chinese Army but is under the operatialial
control of the CAE.
d Twelve missiles in launching section of each of four batteries. Six missiles in storage
and one under reprocessing at each battery. Ten missiles in storage at ordnance direct
Support Unit (DSU).
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EAST CHINA AND TAIWAN
ARMY STRENGTHS
I March 1964
- Road Railroad
Military region boundary
COMMUNIST
AMOY
UNIT STRENGTH
31st Army 48,000
83rd Div, 28th Army 15,000
28th Army Arty Regt 1,000
63rd AAA Div 4,000
64th AAA Div 2,600
3rd Arty DIv 5,500
9th Arty Div 5,500
u/i Arty Div 5,500
u/i Arty Regt 1,500
80 BD Regt 2,000
84 BD Regt 2000,
TOTAL 92,600
FOOC HOW
UNIT STRENGTH
28th Army 0 33,000
65th AAA Div 2,600
13th BD Div 7,000
TOTAL 42,600
REINFORCEMENTS*
UNIT STRENGTH
15th Army 48,000
20th Army 48,000
47th Army 47,000
60th Army 48,000
1st Abn Div 7,000
2n4 Abs Div 7,000
u/i Abs Div 7,OCO
TOTAL 212,000
within 12 days
1"
GRC
UNIT STRENGTH
First Field Army 86,000
Second Field Army 69,000
Penghu Del Comd (PDC) 20,000
Chinmen Del Comd (KDC)67,000
Matsu Del Comd (M DC) 19,000
Other 154,000
TOTAL 415,000
Kan -c
Shao-kuan
Nan-ch'an
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u
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NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
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50
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120
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122
Figure 1
38975 3-64
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Figure 2
EAST CHINA AND TAIWAN
NAVAL FACTORS
I March 1964
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I 34
CHiN-MEN
QUEMOY
(CHIN-MEN TAO)
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
ARS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
r �
I
PENGHI1 -
(PESCADORES
P'ENG-HU
IMAKUNG)
Kao-hsittn
TSO-YING3
120
IMA-YOU SHAD
IjPAI-CHIOAN LIEH-TAO
WHITE DOGS)
TING-HA)
CHI-LUNG
TAI Ocj' Hung
,XSu�ao
HUA-LIEN
Hua:nen
P H 1 LI P P,51 N E S
126
\Nts'0
tck
38976 3-64
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C01335318
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C01335318
EAST CHINA AND TAIWAN
AIR FACILITIES
I March 1964
Road -4 Railroad
Air defense district boundary
AIRFIELDS
GRC
lt) 10000 ft.+ *7800 to 8500 ft.
COMMUNIST
0 Suitable f fi htersilight bombers
eng-yang
SOUTH
Shao-kuan
CLOUD
CANTON
PMACA
(Port.)
ON
IA
G KONG
U.K.)
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
ARE NOT NE9ESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
114
38977 3-64
Ch'ao-,arr
116
-SteREZ.
NON KIN
A-CH'IAO-C
Yu-ch'i-k'ou�
-ch'ing
(Huai-ning) EAST HANGCHOW
o yang
Hu �4
hang-ja
Cl/JUNG- N
kYung-an
-04'ENGT
Cfian-cho
L. C 'ING-YANG
LUNG CH'
Chang-tho'
(Lung-0'i)
sin TOW NE
watow
hin-hua
CH'O-HSIEN
Chien-ou
F000piyiv.,
LUNG-T'IE
LU-CH'IA
'ANG
IANG-WAN
GHAI
HUA
EAST
CHINA
SEA
5th Tac Ftr Gp
17th126th127th inc Ftr Sqs
5T-33A 72 F-86F
6th Tor Recon Gp
4th Toc Reran Sq
4 RF-101A
17th Tar Recon Sq
N i5 RF-84F
KUNG�KGAN
3d Tor Ftr Gp
78th Ftr Sq
2 T-33A 26 F.86F
8th Ftr Intcp Sq
15 F-104A 3 F-1048
7th Ftr Sq.
To receive F17 F-104
SOUTH CHIN
9
TAIWAN STRAIT
CHIA-I
4th Tar Ftr Gp",
2ist122c1123e4oc Ft
63 F-100/4.7 F-R2
4th Air Seo Rescta;
UH-199 7 HU-
Kao-hsiu
P'ING-TUNG NOR
El
VIP
/ C-s
1-1S1N-CHLI
th lac Ftr GP
4151/48th Tac
5T-33A 47
44th -We
12 5A60
86
)er
Figure 3
i-lung
G-SHAN
s So/
i6 C-47 A/9
u-ao
- TAIWAN"
F r Gp
' I-NAN
Toc
T e
Tai-nani,3d1 th
q T- 3A 67 F-
T' ai-tung
A SEA
510 190
50 190
50 190
118
170 Nautical Miles
170 Statute Miles
50 Kilometers
-StieRET,
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 CO1335318
120
�
P' TUNG SOUP
ioth roe port Gp
lots II,2d1103d /Vans
44 6D
20th Transport Gp
6th/tith Trans Sas
28 C-46D
2�I Trans Sq
C-1/9G
32-
30-
28-
26-
24-
22-
-lien
r SeTS
oF
SS
122
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C01335318
CP
PORING
PAN.1710
�
01
05
CHINA OFFSHORE ISLANDS
KWANOTUNG
AT= r?
�4
mower) C//N,) SHA
11000 1101410 0 90 um I5e 44444.4s4.414,
(U.K.)
Y90 00 j011lll aim
sp icoo taos..44414,4
1161 1101 1201
12001
C14010
0-2
1,1w18
el�chureg
NUDINn
TAIWAN
MA-TSU SHAN
AND
ADJACENT ISLANDS
(Same sushi es Inset 4)
Cf t
�A'fir,i0.TENCI 110
� Halso.ehle
(fr. Td.chfle
CH'ANONS0 SH
(FF10114.01.3
'eD
* 51 � - ' � 0 N0.1100.01410
.4044r ' '. 4. . . MA�TSLI SHAN
Pelatioan.chlse
" 1.144.011an Chill
LE'
Pau Shan
Gillet Red
sql�CH:OAN
47)4)4eue 811? 04,0
HM CIMOAN TAO
IUNO.CIMOAN TAO
�Ulm.
12511
38978 3-64
P111/.1 PPI
0,
I
120530
N
120015.1
LANG TAO
110.0/9
101.TIN TAQ(1),�:� lO
t'-'1711NG YIN SHIN
a6020,
1400261
TU NG-YI N SHA N
csorno se�le as Meat
119010,1
3
acali
NM 448G
W U-C MU, HSU
(Seim 41.111 as Inset 44
1111.0000 HIS
00
LlEHltsu
C)1,1., (LITTLE QUEMOY),
DIVNE
3)0-MEN TAO
(qK,NG.s.
1100081
n440IS')
Figure. 4
1180501
uyehin
0,
wwrou AO
449
IFEI. VOL, CNA
QUEMOY .
.(CHIN-MEN TAO)
PeTtIne Tao
QUEMOY
AND
ADJACENT ISLANDS
Seale 1:330,000
10 St�lute
4�60301
11801241
LEGEND
R Woad
Road
Spot height
(in feet)
Roth, awash, sinken
Reef; limit of navIgstion
Foreshore Ilal
GLOSSARY
7iano O. hart, In'171
it.o point, oape
reel, ree, N1en0
Wall
MU Island
lie,No
0,504a5 04171
MN
shan "1:Z71
,D,'Ne onsOnne,l,
100�
1111.TZU HSI)
Shih.chlu
HUM
TAN ISLANDS
Seale 1:70,000 Dlek�
2 Nemo noes
0 500 lope Repo
1180101
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C01335318
2408z
L4*10,
118114'1
6
TUNG.TING HSO _
TUNG-T1 NG HS()
(Same see.. Inset 51
sified: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C01335318
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
I. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a
need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the
following officials within their respective departments:
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the
Department of the Army
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Navy
e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for
Force
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
i. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other
Agency
the Department of the Air
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with
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arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC�D--69/2, 22 June
1953.
4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text should be clas-
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C01335318
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 C01335318
-
Approved for Release: 2019/07/09 CO1335318