RED CELL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01327057
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02409
• Publication Date: November 2, 2002

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FROM: ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE ,
SUBJECT: RED CELL
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AGENCY
INDIVIDUAL (NAME)
OFFICE
Room NBR
PHONE NBR
DOD
DOD
DOD
PAUL WOLPOWITZ
DoUGLAs FErrn
PETER-RODMAN
Dep Sec of
Defense
Dep Sec of
Defense fbr Policy
AS/Intl Security.
Affaits.
Room 3E944
Pentagon
Room 4E808
Room 4E838
Pentaton
703/692-7150
703/697-7200
703/695-4351
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Director of Central Intelligence
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DCI Red Cell
A Red Cell Special Memorandum
2 November 2002
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Turning Saddam's Core Personality Traits Against Him
Saddam Hussein 'c strong conviction about the absolute correctness of his own
opinions makes him vulnerable to deception operations. Similarly, Saddens
overconfidence in his singular ability to manage crises might lead to
misjudgments and exploitable rashness, partkularly lf Saddam perceives his
Control of people and events to be slippfng. The dictator's ruthless readiness to
suppress internal challenges colds! be pricked to induce repressive steps that e
roil his inner circle and build international support for US Intervention. And the
Iraqi strongmaleS preSVHIptiOn that 'leveryone is willing to cat deaP might (b)(3)
lull him into a false sense of longevity and into dela countermeasures
against IS military moves until it Is too late.
asked to consider how to turn thosi characteristics to US advantage.
Exploiting Sadclam's Self-Image
Saddam is a resourceful thug who has nearly perfected the art of dictatorial rule.
Successful application of calculated ruthlessness and a wanton disregard for anything ,
other than himself effectively shields him from potential foes.
� Opportunities nevertheless abound to turn his supposed strengths against him.
Saddam-watchers have identified key attributes that sery
insatiable appetite for power but that may work against him in wartime.
Conviction about the correctness of his own opinions, intimidation of subordinates
who disagree, and unwillingness to listen to bad news or contrary views leaves Saddam
vulnerable to deception operations. If facts on the ground conflict with his strongly held
notions, he could be led to reject the facts, to his own detriment.
� The dogmatic convictions of Hitler about where D-Day would come and of Stalin in
rejecting warnings of a German invasion are cases in point Few Iraqi subordinates
are willing to say, "No, Saddam, you are wrong,' especially if they believe his mind is
jet. And Saddam may reject the Views of those few who dare suggest alternatives.
� saddam's propensity to operate inside the box�of hb own infallibility might be
enhanced by disinformation or disruption operations directed at communications
between Saddam and his key commands. With little, or confusing, information
coming in, Saddam is even more likely to act on "what I alone know Is true."
Arrogance about his ability to manage crises and "come out on top" could lead to
misjudgments if Saddam sees his control of people and events slipping. Belated realization
that things are not going his way, either diplomatically as war looms or on the battlefield
once the shooting starts, could set off an escalatory cycle of anger, impublveriess, and
poorly hatched decisions undermining Iraq's warfighting capabilities.
Ittewi
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. US-led or orchestrated actions that undermined Saddam's control would exploit this
vulnerability. Saddam might be especially inclined to overreact if he thought his own
clans or broader elements of the Sunni elite Were abaridoning hirn, or if hated foes�
Kurds, Shra, or Iranians�were lead a ous charge or otherwise dilutlrpg his
ability to manage a wartime crisis.
A ruthless willingness to suppress internal challenges to his rule is an integral part
of Saddam's confidence that he can master any crisis; pricking this sensitivity might induce
new repressive actions that further divide Iraqis and justify US interveritkin. Selected
operations "proving" that Saddam's hold is weakening might enrage the dictator and push
him into exploitable blunders, including diversion of elite troops to supposedly troubled
locales and away from more critical US wartime targets.
.1f Saddam thought major Shra or Kurdish moves against him were in the offing
despite his increased efforts to deter them, he might move him to suppress them
preemptively, which would strengthen the case for prompt US intervention on
humanitarian grounds. Saddam might reject the lure �and contairi his instincts, allowing
opposition groups to gain important ground. Saddam,' in his infallible wisdom, might
also be convinced of "a dear between Iran, the US, nd the Shra and fall into
mistakes.
. Credible indications of plots against the Iraqi dictator from within the regime might
Incite purges and push a worried crony to get Saddam before Saddam gets tarn. For
example, the rivalry between Saddam's sons, Qusay and Uday, opens the door to
stories designed to sow distrust between the sons and between father and sons. Or
noticeably dropping Tariq Aziz or other prominent leaders from the published list of
potential war criminals�perhapsfollowing a foreign trip�might lead Saddam to infer
collaboration with the US. .
� Saddam is mindful of the fate of Romania's Ceaucescu and Serbia's Miksevic�one
murdered by the mob, the other turned over to a war crimes tribunal. Information
warfare daiming that fissures Inside Iraq will lead Saddam to such an end might
induce paranoid mistakes and miscalculation.
The Iraqi strongman's belief that, at the end of the day, everyone is willing to cut a
deal might lull him into a false sense that, even as fighting begins, he can put something
together with Washington. This sense might lead to delays in critical dedsions or "too
too late" responses to US military moves. Thinking he is Supremely able to navigate a world
of options�even war leaves some options open�might Induce him to delay military or
terrorist strikes until US countermeasures are ready.
� For example, Saddam might believe whispered messages from Russia or Syria
indicating a US willingness to cut a deal on inspections rather than risk a war without
sufficient UNSC support or to let Saddam survive a war as 10012 as he does not use
WMO against the US.
� Saddam might even see the prospect of US troops at the gates of Baghdad as
providing scope for a deal if the US or the right foreign government hints that a
prolonged but "humane siege is likely, in lieu of a destructive assault.
Even if Turkey cannot be restrained from implementing its Contingency plans to occupy
parts of the north, the US might be able to make use of this as part Of a mind game.
Saddam probably assumes invading Tulle would have their hands full with the Kurds, and
that both Turks and Kurds would bargain with Baghdad to avoid dashing with Iraqi forces.
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� If it appeared, however, that the Kurds and Turks had made their own deal to keep
their knives away from each other's throats, Saddam's sense of controlling the
battlef,ield might be shaken in ways that cause hirn to disperse reliable troops or take
provocative actions that solidify international support for US military action.
Saddam is a classic victimizer, turning his subordinates and the Iraqi people into '
perversely loyal drones filled with repressed anger and resentment While it is difficult to
liberate victims from obedient paralysis, Saddam might one day push a dose associate too
far, cathartically releasing a lethal response. Although suspicious of everyone and, like a
mob boss, quick to kin at the merest whiff of betrayal, Saddam might miss a plot concocted
by a toady he has browbeaten for years.
� An information war offensive that plays to the theme of Saddam's inner circle pushed
over the edge by his idiosyncratic tyranny�In effect playing back on Saddam the
Sadat scenario of assassination by his own seCurity people�might exploit the
dictator's paranoia and provoke a purge, to US advantage.
� As the pressures of war increase and associates se4 Saddam wining to sacrifice
everyone else on a heretofore-unimagined scale, stories that subordinates will ditch
Saddam to save themselves become more credible.
If Saddam has a *values compass," its magnetic needle points only at Saddam
himself. Playing off of his goals and values�all nicety rational and coherent in his own
mind�is another tack for influencing behavior. Power, prestige, and idolatry are Saddam's
food, air, and water. Depriving him of this sustenance could throw him off stride.
� Destroying his symbols of ornnipotence�palaces,istatues, monuments, and Images�
and Inducing Arabs states, France, and Russia�in whose respect Saddam rinds
aspects of hlsiself-image�to show instead scorn, contempt, and slight regard might
frustrate and distract him.
� Anti-Saddam agitations from the vaunted "Arab Street" sprawling across Arab media
outlets�especially popular satellite channels on whith Saddam counts to get his
propaganda out to the world�would undercut his pretensions as exemplary "hero of
all Arabs.'
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