CIA CHILEAN TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES, 15 SEPTEMBER-3 NOVEMBER 1970 (PROJECTS <SANITIZED> AND FUBELT)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01325319
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-00792
• Publication Date: March 9, 1974

Approved for Release: 2018/10/17 001325319
9 March 1974
SUBJECT: CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September-3 November 1970
(Projects and FUBELT) (b)(1)
(b)(3)
1. On 16 September 1970 the DCI informed a group of senior Agency
officers �that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in
Chile was not acceptable to the United States. The President asked
the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him and
authorized up to ten million dollars for this purpose.. Further,:the
Agency was directed to carry out this mission without coordination with
the Departmentof State or Defense. The DDP was assigned overall
responsibility for this project with the assistance of a special WH
Division Chilean Task Force.
2. Although Allende had received a plurality of the'popular vote
in the 4 September Presidential elections, he required confirmation in
a Congressional run-off scheduled to be held on 24 October, prior to
being invested as President on 3 November. The Task Force attempted a
dual approach to blocking Allende consisting of Track One (the "consti-
tutional" route) and Track Two (the military coup route - which was also
known as Project FUBELT). Track One involved a series of efforts to
coerce a reluctant and indecisive President Frei to use legally availa-
tle means in an admittedly difficult political maneuver to stop Allende.
The Department of State and the Ambassador were aware of the general
nature and objectives of the Track One program which was conducted with
40 Committee approval.
3. By early October it was clear that President Frei was unlikely
to move decisively in this situation and the Task Force therefore placed
primary emphasis on the far more sensitive Track Two activities designed
to provoke a military coup. For this purpose the U.S. Army Attache in
Chile was placed under the operational control of the COS through a
special arrangement with the Department of Defense. In addition, four
non.-American appearing "illegal" case officers, under alias, were
assigned to the Santiago Station to handle those military contacts with
the highest risk potential. Between 5 and 20 October the Station and
the Army Attache (mostly the latter) �made 21 contacts with key military
and Carabinero (national police) officials. Seven of these officials
were advised by the Army Attache of the U.S. Government's decision to
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deny Allende the pre$idency and its willingness to support a coup
attempt. The "illegals" separately met with two well-known Chilean
military coup plotters who requested arms, ammunition and funds but
contact was suspended with these two individuals when it was deter-
mined that they lacked.. the organization to conduct a successful coup.
4. Eventually, the best prospects for a.successful coup were
-de'veloped among the high-level military contacts of the Army Attache.
On 18 October the Commander of the Santiago Garrison, General Valenzuela,
advised that he and a group of other high military officers were pre-
pared to kidnap Army Commander in Chief General Schneider who was opposed
to any intervention by the armed forces to block Allende. The only
assistance requested by Valenzuela to set his plan in motion was three
'submachine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all
of which were provided by the Station through the Army Attache) plus
$50,000 for expenses (which was ready to be passed upon demand).
5. On 22 October General Schneider was mortally wounded in an
apparently bungled kidnapping attempt. It still is not certain who or
what group was ultimately responsible for Schneider's assassination. The
.Valenzuela group claimed th-at it was not and subsequently returned all of
the CIA provided weapons and materiel to the Army Attache. In any event
the assassination of Schneider provoked a strong reaction in Chile and
Allende was elected easily by Congress on 24 October.
(Project was established on 18 September 1970 with DCI
approval for to cover expenditures on these activities -
� Project FUBELT, et al.)
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