TRACK II
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
01307266
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date:
December 13, 2018
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2016-00792
Publication Date:
October 3, 1970
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
track ii[15520566].pdf | 57.92 KB |
Body:
Approved for Release: 2018/10/17 001307266
A. Actions:
SECRET/Sr .S1T;VE
ONLY
3 October 1970
TRACK II
���
I.
1. The 40 'Committee approved Ambassador Korry's recom-
mendation that U.S. military aid to Chile be suspended until
after 25 October.
2% President Frei said accurate version of his conversa-
tion with General Schneider on 23 September was that he never
considered resigning or naming a military.tabinet, and that
the military should wait until after 24 October before acting.
� ... , .
3.LhAmbassador Korry informed Minister of Defense Ossa
(throug an Agency channel) that if Allende wins, the USG
will not provide financial support to the PDC for post election
activities.
4.F-Three "false flag" staffers will arrive in Santiago
next week to establish an outside base. 7
5. General Camilo Valenzuela believes that the military
will not take over the government, and should General Viaux
decide to move on his own, he would fail.
6.
That
in Chile.
Ex-Foreign Minister told
B. /Accomplishments:-1
By the beginning of next week Santiago Station will have
"fal"Se flag" staffers actively engaged in contacting Chilean
military leaders. 40 Committee approval to suspend U.S. mili-
tary aid to Chile until after the election might make our key
targets more receptive to coup proposals.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
could assist in provoking economic crisis
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
C. Situation:
� The situation remains relatively unchanged. President
Frei is still unwilling or unable to pave the way for a mili-
tary cabinet. Apparently he harbors the hope that he can work
out a political solution to the present dilemma. The PDC junta
today, however, may force Frei to reconsider the feasibility of
a political solution.
At the same time the military remains reluctant to move
against Allende despite their knowledge that the USG is con-
sidering cutting military aid to Chile and that no guarantees
exist ensuring the positions of top military leaders.
SECRET/ 1TIVE
-S ON, Y
(b)(3)
FULL TEXT COPY-DO NOT PiELEIZE
Approved for Release: 2018/10/17 001307266