POLITICAL ACTION RELATED TO 1970 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01304669
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2022
• Case Number: F-2019-02353
• Publication Date: March 5, 1970

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4.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The 40 Committee
SUBJECT
� Political Action Related to 1970
Chilean Presidential Election
I
1. Purpose of the Memorandum
A. This memorandum, will bring the members of the
Committee up to date on the pOlitical developments which have
taken place since the March 1969 congressional election and
recommend that the Committee endorse certain covert activities
designed to reduce the possibility of a victory by a Popular
Unity (UP) candidate in the September 1970 presidential elec-
tion. The UP is a coalition of Communists, Socialists and
other leftists, and is similar to the Popular Action Front
(FRAP). which supported leftist coalition candidates in past
elections. This memorandum also discusses the leading
presidential candidates, the major campaign issues and the
political climate. The recommended covert activities involve
support to individuals in the Democratic Radical Party (PDR)
and the use of a propaganda mechanism.
B. The most reliable political surveys indicate
that the presidential contest will 'be a close race with an
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estimated 10-15% of the vote still undecided or floating,
and, therefore, crucial. The Embassy in Santiago, the
Department of State
of the UP candidate
spoiling operations
and the CIA have agreed that the election
would be detrimental to the U.S. and that
should be undertaken to influence a por:-
tion of the uncommitted vote away from the UP. It has also
been agreed that the U.S. Government should not support
either of the other two presidential candidates in the
sensitive political environment currently found in Chile,
since there is little to choose between them.
2. Political Developments and Candidates
A. The months following the March 1969 election
have been marked by intense political activity. The six
parties which currently make up the UP agreed to nominate
the Socialist Senator Salvador Allende in January 1970 after
a bitter and prolonged struggle involving intense ideological
and personality differences. ,The other two announced candi-
dates are Jorge Alessandri, an independent, and Radomiro
Tomic, the former Ambassador to the U.S. who bears the Chris-
tian Democratic Party (PDC) standard.
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(1) Tomicts attempts to form a coalition of
leftists in support of his candidacy not only were
rebuffed by the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) but
also succeeded in alienating the political right.
He is running on a progressive platform basing his
campaign appeal on the continuation and intensification
of the "revolution in liberty" theme begun by President
Frei in 1964. Although-the PDC won 30% of the popular
vote in March 1969, Tomic cannot count on this per-
centage and recent polls indicate that he is presently
running third. The PDC also has been weakened since
March 1969 by the defection of some of its best-known
revolutionary figures who left the party to form the
opposition United Popular Action Movement (MAPU) in
mid-1969. The MAPU since has allied with the PCCh
and the Socialist Party of Chile (PS) in a series of
university elections and is now counted upon in the
UP camp.
(2) The Radical Party (PR), whose leadership
led it into the UP, at first fought to have its own
candidate, Senator Alberto Baltra, chosen as the leftist
unity candidate. The PCCh (and later the UP) rejection
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of Baltra was a blow to the PR, which in March 1969
held 13% of the vote. In addition, the PR was weakened
by the expulsion of its more moderate members who formed
the Democratic Radical Party (PDR) after the July 1969
PR party convention.
(3) The National Party, which attracted 20% of
the March vote, is supporting former President Jorge
Alessandri. Current voting surveys indicate that
Alessandri, whose support crosses party lines, is the
early leader in the presidential race. (Ambassador
-Th
Edward M. Korry believes, however, that/Alessandri's
strength may be at its peak and will weaken before
election day.
(4) The Communists and Socialists had diffi-
culty in forming an electoral alliance similar to the
FRAP. They disagreed on,which political parties should
be included in the front and on the election issues.
The PCCh, for example, wanted a broad alliance (including
elements which the Socialists viewed as bourgeois) and
it objected to Socialist encouragement of violence and
support to ultra-revolutionary groups. The selection of
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Senator Allende came after five months of political
bargaining, and the intense bitterness which became
increasingly evident during the writing of the UP
platform will linger on. At the same time, the PCCh,
which is one of the best-organized and most pro-Soviet
Communist parties in the hemisphere, was successful in.
forging a-broad-based electoral machine which it will
support with its experienced campaign. organization. If
the UP partners retain the votes they polled in March
1969, their September 1970 aggregate will amount to
approximately 40% of the total popular vote. The split
� within the PR will, however, reduce its contribution
� to the Allende campaign.
B. On 21.0ctober 1969 a recently,-retired Chilean
general led a limited military protest designed to exploit
.the:Army s discontent over the failure of its high command
to respond to requests for higher pay and more modern
miii-
tary Although the protest was short-lived and
confined to two Santiago regiments, the fact that it occurred
at all is significant because of the military's traditionally
apolitical behavior and its support of the constitution. The
Frei Government acceded to many demands by the disgruntled
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officers, including the granting of a wage increase which it
was ill-equipped to finance. Military pay raises have sparked
similar demands by other public sector employees thereby adding
to the already serious inflation.
Another serious consequence of the military unrest, and
the handling of it by the Frei administration, was a public
charge that the U.S. Government was involved in the protest's
origins. Although the Chilean Government eventually stopped
its participation in the anti-U.S. campaign, other voices in
the Chilean Congress and the press continued for a time, in
their attacks. The end result was that Chile was made unusually
sensitive to the presence of the U.S. Government and CIA.
3. Campaign Issues
The issues at stake during this presidential campaign
center around Chile's economic problems -- chronic inflation,
':.housing shortages and unemployment. The need for agrarian
reform is treated as a vital problem as is the general concern
over the rising tide of violence. Now aware that the traditional
apolitical stance of the military can no longer be taken for
granted, the candidates are under mounting pressure to be more
responsive to the increasing social, economic and political
demands of the electorate.
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4. Covert Activities
On 19 January 1970 representatives of State and CIA',
including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State john H. Crimmins,
Ambassador Wymberley Coerr and Ambassador Korry, met to discuss
the current political situation in Chile and the covert adtion
operations which were being coridudted or proposed to reduce
the chance of a UP victory. i
A. One covert activity involves the continued
and expanded use of the propaganda mechanism established
during the March congressional election period. The
mechanism's effectiveness and security were tested
during the Marcli election operation when it performed
the dual role of providing propaganda support
and
disseminating anti-Marxist propaganda via press, poster
and radio outlets.
(1)
The propaganda mechanismcas created
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radio and press outlets in the countr
The
security of the mechanism, plus its proven
talents in the propaganda field, permit the
mounting of an anti-UP campaign on a country-
wide basis in which the U.S. hand will not show.
In addition to producing posters, radio and
newspaper ads, and leaflets directed against
the UP, aGi-weeklynewsletter will be mailed
to 2,200 journalists, ac emicians, po ticians,
labor leaders and ot r influentia opinion
makers. The new etter will di cuss and reveal
the tactics
strategy of ommunism and popular
fronts, a will suggest ourses of action for
those interested in
(2)
co ntering UP election efforts.
the propa-
ganda mechanism may attempt to use it to fur-
ther the candidacy of Alessandri. With this
possibility in mind it has been made clear
that our interest in the mechanism is solely
to draw votes away from the UP and to divide the
coalition. Although a conflict of interest is
not expected to arise, the propaganda will be
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monitored closely and should the tone or content
become pro-Alessandri rather than anti-UP, our
support will cease.
B. The second covert activity supports the PER in
its efforts to reduce the number of votes which the
Radical Party can deliver to the UP.
(1) Historically the Radical Party has been an
important party in Chilean politics. From 1938-
1952 it ruled essentially alone by outmaneuvering
its Marxist allies. From 1952-1964 it remained
the largest single political party but suffered
defeats in the congressional elections of 1965
and 1969, and in the latter case fell to fourth'
place in voter popularity. Its opportunistic
leaders now view, alliance with the UP as the only
avenue to regain a measure of power. Although the
PR currently represents only about 13% of the voter
it could play a decisive part in a close presidential
race and it is therefore necessary to work against
the present leaders thereby reducing the number of
votes they can deliver to Allende.
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(2) The Special Group first authorized
covert contacts with
the PR in 1962
when approval was given to assist moderate
Radicals in their efforts to gain influence
within the party.
December 1963, the Special
Group approved financial
Julio-Duran w
kept Radic
iiort to.PR Senator
cratic Front candidacy
from going to the FRAP
967, the
sub-
sidy to assist moder Radi s in their con-
candida el lende. On 28 Apri
303 Committee approved
ecia.1
test with pro-F' leade for control of the
June 1967 p ty cony tioFai1ing that, the
moderates were encouraged to gain sufficient
strength to restrict the policy control then
being exercised by Marxist-oriented PR leaders.
The PR moderates failed to gain sufficient con-
trol and the party moved closer to an alliance
with the Communists and Socialists. This trend
was confirmed during the July 1969 convention
when dissident moderates were purged from the
PR hierarchy. The dissidents then organized
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the PDR in opposition to the parent party and
its proposed alliance with the PCCh and the
Socialists.
(3) With the approval of Ambassador Korry,
we continued to work with dissident PR leaders
to establish the PDR as a political base. Assist-.
ance during the July-December 1969 period amounted
to a roximately
The PDR acquired 14,000
signatures and was registered as a legal party
in December 1969.
(4) Ambassador Korry has agreed to two recent
proposals to assist the PDR in its efforts to
undercut PR and UP strength. The first involves
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(5) Our interest in the PDR is in its
ability to reduce the electoral support which
the PR can deliver to Allende. This spoiling
operation will be monitored closely by the
Ambassador and the CIA Station in Chile and
will be discontinued should it become more
of a vehicle for promoting Alessandri's
candidacy than an anti-UP weapon.
C. There are other existing political action
capabilities available to the CIA Station which are
hi a�tak and we aken the tIP
5. Recommendations
A. There is a State/CIA consensus that the 1970
presidential election will be a close race in which no candi-
date is likely to win an absolute majority. No U.S. Government
support is planned for Tomic or Alessandri. Tonic is now
running a distant third and it is unlikely that external support
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could swing a sufficiently large number of votes to make him
a serious contender. Even if this were a possibility, Tomic's
views on economic and political matters would indicate that
a government led by him would be apt to take some actions
not consonant with U.S. interests. Alessandri's advanced
age (he is now 73 years old) and the undistinguished record
of his 1958-1964 administration, are factors which argue
against support of his candidacy. In 'addition, the present
political climate in Chile is very Sensitive to the presence of
the U.S. and the CIA, and it is not conducive to the mounting
of a large-scale election operation.
B. The UP candidate, Allende, running as the
standard-bearer of a broad leftist coalition and benefiting
from. the extensive organization. talents of the strong PCChl
is a formidable contender; he is presently running second.,
according to an October 1969 public opinion survey; Intelligence
indicates that the Chilean military would probably not prevent
him from assuming office. Based on Allende's own views plus
.the public platform.of the UP, we must assume that-an Allende
victory would mean the emergence of a.Castro-type government
in Chile.
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C. Since the race is expected to be close, in which
10-15% of the vote is floating and crucial, there is a reasonable
chance that the spoiling operations, involving the PDR and the
propaganda mechanism, could influence a small but critical
number of votes away from the UP. It is therefore considered
advisable to attack and attempt to divide the UP by means of
these two spoiling operations. There is also the justified-
expectation that these operatdons will be conducted without
the U.S. hand showing.
D. The estimated costs of these two activities through
September 1970 are: (1) for assistance to the PDR and
(2)
for the propaganda mechanism. It is recommended
that the 40 Committee endorse these activities at the funding
level mentioned above. Funds are available within the Agency.
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