VOL 1-Key Judgements USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01304058
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• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01432
• Publication Date: February 2, 1982

DireciApproved for Release: 2015/01/05 001304058 wA
Central
Intelligence
Vse:-ofjoo,.,
Chemicals in Sou
and Afghanistan
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I�Key Judgments
,1 FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN TO ODDI REGISTRY 1
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b)(3)
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arning Notice
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(WNINTEL)
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CURITY INFORMATION
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
3
DISCUSSION
5
Background
5
Methodology
5
Laos
6
Kampuchea
11
Afghanistan
13
What Chemical Agents Are Being Used?
16
Soviet Chemical Warfare Activities
19
The Yemen Experience
20
CONCLUSIONS
21
IMPLICATIONS
23
TCS--81944.4Z
III
Top Secret
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ktiS N .0"r
771LE
Seve 1 paragraphs of this estimate
are mar' -1 UNCLASSIFIED. However,
no part of s estimate is to be
released in any srm until specific
authorization is re ived from the
Department of State.
()/1.s d 77 9 1 � L F-6
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SNIE 11/50/37-82
USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL
CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND AFGHANISTAN
Volume I�Key Judgments
Information available as of 27 January 1982
was used in the preparation of this Estimate.
i75-18198-972-
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"lap�Sect-et
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
"IrS-849649-44-
�Tap-seerda.
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate presents the results of an intensive review by the US
Intelligence Community of all available evidence on chemical warfare
activities in Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. It also takes a
brief second look at intelligence holdings on the 1963-67 Yemeni civil
war and at the Soviet chemical-biological warfare program. The
Estimate does not consider the arms control and disarmament aspects of
the problem, nor does it examine in any depth the threat implications
flowing from the employment of chemical weapons in local conflicts.
While the Intelligence Community is confident of the key judg-
ments which follow, many uncertainties remain concerning the full
scope of Soviet activities in the chemical-biological warfare sphere,
particularly the USSR's research and development program
This volume presents the basic Estimate. Volume II, published
separately, contains a large amount of supporting data and analysis on
the subjects covered in volume I. Volume II also includes a series of
technical annexes that provide tabulations of reported attacks, details on
the sample analyses, a technical description of trichothecene toxins, a
bibliography of Soviet publications on these toxins, and other supporting
documents
44,LY.2_
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Laos
Lao and Vietnamese forces, assisted by Soviet logistics and supervi-
sion, have used lethal chemical agents against H'Mong resistance forces
and villages, causing thousands of deaths since at least 1976. Trichothe-
cene toxins have been positively identified as one of the classes of agents
used, but medical symptoms indicate that irritants, incapacitants, and
nerve agents also have been employed
Kampuchea
Vietnamese forces have used lethal trichothecene toxins on Demo-
cratic Kampuchean troops and Khmer villages since at least 1978.
Again, medical symptoms indicate that irritants, incapacitants, and
nerve agents also have been used.-1"ts)..�.
The Soviet Role in Southeast Asia
The one hypothesis that best fits all the evidence is that the
trichothecene toxins were developed in the Soviet Union, provided to
the Lao and Vietnamese either directly or through transfer of technical
know-how, and weaponized with Soviet assistance in Laos, Vietnam,
and Kampuchea. There is no intelligence at hand to support alternative
explanations, such as completely independent manufacture and use by
the Vietnamese. It is highly probable that the USSR also provided other
chemical warfare agents. While the evidence on the Soviet role does not
constitute proof in the scientific sense, the Intelligence Community
finds the case to be thoroughly convincing.
Afghanistan
Soviet forces in Afghanistan have used lethal and casualty-produc-
ing agents on Mujahedin resistance forces and Afghan villages since the
December 1979 invasion. There is some evidence that Afghan Govern-
ment forces may have used chemical weapons provided by the USSR
against the Mujahedin even before the invasion. No agents have been
identified through sample analysis, but we conclude from analysis of all
the evidence that attacks have been conducted with irritants, incapaci-
-7L-436-8,940.82.
3
�rirteo emit.
46.6
2- LAAW
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tants, nerve agents, phosgene oxime, and perhaps trichothecene toxins,
mustard, lewisite, and unidentified toxic smokes.
Yemen
Egyptian forces, with Soviet participation, conducted chemical
attacks in Yemen between 1963 and 1967. The striking similarities to
the subsequent chemical attacks in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan,
plus the substantial evidence collected at the time, lead us to suspect
that trichothecene toxins were used.
Implications
Our review of the chemical warfare evidence has yielded three
findings with serious implications that need to be reflected in future
threat estimates: (1) The Soviet Union has a well-developed program for
the employment of chemical and toxin weapons. (2) The Soviet military
consider the employment of chemical weapons by their forces and those
of their allies to be an acceptable and effective means of suppressing re-
sistance even in local wars. (3) There is a growing sense of alarm in
countries like Thailand, Pakistan, and China in contemplating conflict
with Soviet client states, and there is international concern that lethal
chemical weapons may become an accepted method of warfare in
limited conflicts throughout the Third World.
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DISCUSSION
Background
1. In September 1981 the US Government in a
public declaration raised the probability that the
trichothecene class of toxins '�poisonous chemical
substances extracted from biological material (specific
molds)�was the mysterious lethal agent that had been
used for many years in Laos and Kampuchea. This
significant statement was precipitated by the discov-
ery of high levels of trichothecene toxins in a vegeta-
tion sample collected shortly after a March 1981
Vietnamese chemical attack in Kampuchea. That pub-
lic declaration, however, rested on a much broader
base of evidence than the analysis of that sample.1`t"),
2. In April 1980 the Intelligence Community had
already concluded (see volume II, annex F) that lethal
agents had almost certainly been used against H'Mong
tribespeople in Laos. There was less reliable evidence
about the use of lethal agents in Kampuchea, mainly
because of suspicions about the propaganda campaign
of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean (DK) forces. The
DK claims were subsequently shown to be valid. It was
also concluded that chances were about even that
lethal agents had been used in Afghanistan. There was
little doubt by this time that riot control agents and
some form of incapacitants had been used in all three
countries, although not specifically mentioned in the
April 1980 assessment. Since mid-1980, sufficient ad-
ditional evidence has allowed a much firmer Intelli-
gence Community judgment than that stated in the
April assessment. There is now no doubt that deaths
and casualties have resulted from chemical attacks in
all three countries.
' Trichothecene toxins, like all other toxins, are chemical com-
pounds derived from biological material. For purposes of this
Estimate, toxins are characterized as chemical warfare agents. Their
manufacture, however, would most likely take place in biological
warfare facilities, even if the toxins were synthetically produced.s..
TM-306942
5
3. Analysis of additional samples from Laos and
Kampuchea has revealed at least four trichothecenes,
further supporting our conclusion that toxins were
used. A review of all the reports indicates the use of
many different chemical agents, means of deliver-
y,and types of chemical attacks. In some cases, the
symptoms are typical of those caused by trichothe-
cenes, but in many cases the symptoms suggest other
agents, which we have not been able to identify
through sample analysis. Significant differences as well
as similarities have surfaced in the reports from the
three countries. The evidence from each country,
therefore, is described separately, with attention
drawn to similarities where appropriate. A section on
the 1963-67 civil war in Yemen is included (see
volume II, chapter VI) because of the striking similari-
ties between the chemical warfare activities reported
during that conflict and what has been observed in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan>4.,
Methodology
4. The intelligence judgments of this study were
arrived at through the following analytic process:
� Every relevant piece of information on reported
chemical warfare incidents was reviewed, re-
corded, and tabulated (see volume II, annex A).
Numbers of attacks and deaths were screened for
potential duplication. The process included re-
ports not only on Southeast Asia and Afghanistan,
but on Yemen as well. An extensive data base on
the Soviet chemical and biological warfare pro-
gram was also searched.
� All the physical evidence available to the US
Government�including environmental samples
and background controls�was reviewed (see vol-
ume II, annex B).
� A scientific report on toxins was prepared, in-
cluding the analysis leading to the conclusion
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that trichothecenes were probably among the
agents used in Southeast Asia. The report also
documents the extensive toxin research conduct-
ed in the USSR (see volume II, annex D).
An analysis of the medical evidence was pre-
pared, drawing on all available information from
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan (see volume II,
annex E). This incorporated the findings of the
Department of Defense medical team (see vol-
ume II, annex C), which concluded that at least
three types of agents were used in Laos.
� Extensive consultations were held with govern-
ment and nongovernment scientists and medical
authorities, many of whom were asked to review
our evidence. Experts from other countries were
also consulted.
5. After the data base was organized to permit
comparative analysis, the study focused on three sepa-
rate questions:
� Have lethal and other casualty-producing agents
been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan?
� What are these agents and how and by whom are
they employed?
� Where do these agents originate and how do they
find their way to the field?
6. Although the evidential base differs for each
country, the analytic approach used was the same. The
testimony of eyewitnesses�date, place, and type of
attack�was matched against information from defec-
tors, journalists, and international organizations and
sensitive information that often pinpointed the time
and place of chemical attacks. In addition, the intelli-
gence files on military operations in the areas where
chemical attacks had been reported were searched to
establish whether air or artillery strikes took place or
whether there was fighting in the areas where chemi-
cal agents were reportedly used. In all three countries,
we identified a number of instances in which eyewit-
ness accounts could be correlated with information
from other sources.�),
7. There is no evidence of any systematic propa-
ganda campaign having been mounted by the H'Mong
or the Afghan resistance forces to promote the allega-
-Th43-2416.(442_
tion that chemical agents have been used on their
people. Rather it was the US Government, other
governments, and private individuals from many
countries that publicized the use of chemical agents
and that provided the evidence to international orga-
nizations. On the other hand, there were early indica-
tions that Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean resist-
ance did engage in an organized propaganda
campaign on chemical agent use. These indications
made us very cautious about accepting DK allegations,
which increased markedly after the chemical attacks
in Laos were publicized. For Kampuchea, therefore,
we were particularly insistent in our efforts to confirm
allegations made with sources of information that in
no way could be part of a propaganda or deception
campaign.
Laos
8. Reports of chemical attacks in Laos date from
the summer of 1975 to the present. These reports
describe 261 separate attacks in which at least 6,504
deaths were cited as having resulted directly from
exposure to chemical agents.
9. The actual number of deaths is almost certainly
much higher, because the figure above does not take
account of deaths in attacks for which no specific
casualty numbers were reported. The greatest concen-
tration of reported use of chemical agents occurred in
the area where the three provinces of Vientiane,
Xiangkhoang, and Louangphrabang adjoin (see map,
figure 1). This triborder region accounted for 77
percent of the reported attacks and 83 percent of the
chemical-associated deaths. Most of the reported at-
tacks took place in 1978 and 1979. In the past two
years, reporting has indicated a low level of chemical
activity but continuing high death rates among unpro-
tected and untreated victims�only seven chemical
attacks were reported in the fall of 1981, for example,
but 1,034 deaths were associated with those incidents.
10. With very few exceptions, these reports are
from HUMINT sources, particularly from H'Mong
refugees. \
6
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One exception is
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�1131,-.Seargi
Figure 1
Laos: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
China
Burma
Nam Yao:
Mae Charim
V
�\\J
' Xam Nua�
lac)s
, Ban Vinai
des
Jarres Xiangehoan
Phou Bia
mountain area
�
VIENTIANE
Nang Kai
Thailand
Area of concentrated chemical attacks
Province where chemical attacks have occurred
Military region headquarters containing chemical sections
Refugee camp
Sampling area�trichothecene toxins
Airfield
"Irrittersaite4.1
30976 1-82
200
Kilometers
HANOI*
Vietna
.Xend
Savannakhet
Kampuchea
7
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'Pakxd
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OF"..r.7fteERMI
an attack that took place at the village of Na Nhao, in
Vientiane Province, on 14 May 1981. According to a
Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA) report to pro-
vincial headquarters in Vientiane on 21 May 1981, the
local people had reported that a helicopter had flown
over the village and dropped poisons on 14 May. On
31 May an LPLA report to Vientiane confirmed that
an unidentified aircraft had dispersed toxic chemicals
in the village area, -poisoning large numbers of villag-
ers.- The villagers were still sick as of the time of that
report. It is also clear that certain Lao field units were
not aware that chemical attacks were being conduct-
ed. In June 1981 a group of ethnic Lao refugees from
Na Nhao reported that a helicopter from Vientiane
had dropped -poison- into the stream near their
village.
11. One possible explanation for the difficulty in
obtaining corroborative data for Laos may simply be
the nature of the fighting there. There have been few
major operations. Rather, the reports reflect numerous
minor engagements between the opposing forces, and
results of these encounters are rarely reported. This is
consistent with the observation that the resistance
forces are splintered, operating in small, discrete units
that emphasize sabotage and unconventional warfare.
Finally, in nearly all cases, the chemical use reported
has been directed against villages, in the absence of
obvious combat operations. This substantiates a Lao
pilot's claim that the Vietnamese and Laotian military
commands were engaged in a "H'Mong extermina-
tion- campaign.
12. Of particular interest are the circumstances
surrounding the collection of two physical samples that
were found to contain lethal toxins. The first sample
was collected after a 13 March 1981 attack on a village
between the villages of Muony Chai and Phakhao in
the Phou Bia region. In this case, a large two-engine
plane reportedly sprayed a mist of a moist, yellow,
sticky substance; two villagers and all village animals
died. The second sample is from Ban Thonghak,
another village in the Phou Bia region. That sample
was collected following a 2 April 1981 attack in which
a jet aircraft reportedly sprayed a yellow substance; 24
of the 450 villagers died. Seven separate chemical
attacks, resulting in 218 deaths, were reported to have
occurred in this region in the spring of 1981.
13. It is significant that these attacks took place
following a period of escalation in overall resistance
activities in the Phou Bia area in the winter of 1980-
81. During that period, joint suppression operations by
LPLA and Vietnamese Army (PAVN) forces had
achieved only limited success, perhaps spurring both
forces on to greater effort. The more intense use of
chemical weapons may have been part of this effort.
14. Every qualified interrogator who systematically
interviewed the H'Mong refugees concluded that the
latter had been subjected to chemical attacks. For
example, the US Government medical team returned
from Thailand in 1979 convinced that several uniden-
tified chemical warfare agents had produced the
symptoms described by the refugees. It was the testi-
mony of a Lao pilot who flew the chemical warfare
missions that helped dispel any lingering suspicions
that the refugees had fabricated or embellished the
stories. His detailed description of the Lao, Vietnam-
ese, and Soviet program to defeat the H'Mong resist-
ance with chemical agents appears in volume II,
chapter I.
15. The Lao pilot described the chemical rocket he
had fired as having a more loosely fitting warhead
than a conventional rocket. In 1977 a H'Mong resist-
ance leader found a US 2.75-inch rocket with a
modified Soviet warhead that fits this description. In
further corroboration, a reliable Thai source reported
that US 2.75-inch rockets were fitted with lethal
chemical warheads by Soviet and Vietnamese techni-
cians at facilities in Vientiane as well as in Xiang-
khouang and Savannakhet Provinces.
16. The locations of munitions storage facilities
referred to in Lao communications in connection with
chemical agents were confirmed by satellite photogra-
phy. In addition, photography of airfields in northern
Laos, dating back to 1975, shows L-19, T-41, T-28, and
AN-2 aircraft�the types most often reported by the
H'Mong refugees as being used to deliver chemical
agents4
pro
tacks.
8
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a
The Phongsavan airfield
y was a major staging area for chemical at-
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(D)(3)
(b)(3)
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"tois-Sacret
Kampuchea
17. For Kampuchea we have reports of 124 sepa-
rate attacks, from 1978 to the present, in which lethal
chemicals caused the deaths of 1,014 individuals. Here
again, the mortality figure represents a minimum
because some reports state only that there were deaths
and do not provide a number. The earliest reports cite
attacks in Ratanakiri Province, in the northeastern
corner of the country (sec map, figure 3). Reports from
1979 to the present show the use of lethal chemicals
primarily in the provinces bordering on Thailand. The
greatest use of chemical agents apparently has been in
Battambang Province (51 reported incidents); Pursat
Province has suffered the next highest frequency, with
25 reported incidents. These numbers are consistent
with the overall high level of military activity reported
in the border provinces.
1.8. Information regarding 35 of the reported 1.24
chemical attacks was provided by HU1VIINT sources.
A review of intelligence reports from all
sources provides direct and specific support for 28 of
these attacks. There is, in addition, some circumstan-
tial evidence that in all reported instances some form
of attack took place. This evidence includes reports of
troop movements, supply transfers, operational plans,
postoperation reporting, and air activity reports. It
indicates that military
activity took place at the time and place of every
incident reported to involve lethal chemical agents. In
some cases, it provides strong circumstantial indica-
tions that the action involved chemical substances -
for example, the movement of chemicals and personal
protection equipment in the area
19. In early 1.980, Thai intelligence concluded that
the Vietnamese were conducting Chemical attacks
with mortars, artillery, and grenade launchers as well
as with aircraft'
(b)(
(b)(
(b)(
(b)(3)
1)
3)
20. Of particular interest are those incidents from
which have come the samples�physical evidence. A
(b)(1)
collected vegetation and water samples from an aret(b)(3)
south of Phnom Mak Hoeun, a village in the Thailand-
Battambang Province border area after receiving re-
ports of lethal agents being used from 10 to 15 March
1981. Not only were the samples collected within
hours after the attack, but paramedics performed field
autopsies on the bodies of DK soldiers. A US doctor (b)(1
was briefed in Thailand on the results of the autopsies, ("3)
but the autopsy reports were not made officially k
available to the US Government. The autopsy descrip-
tions of the condition of the internal organs are
consistent with trichothecene poisoning. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
21. US analysis of contaminated vegetation samplet(b)(3)
from the March 1981 attack showed high levels of
three trichothecene toxins in a combination that we
would not expect to be found in a natural outbreak ir(b)(1)
this environment. These three trichothecenes at the(b)(3)
levels found on the vegetation would produce the
vomiting, skin irritation and itching, and bleeding
symptoms. Water samples taken from the area of the
same attack also contained trichothecene toxins. Con-
trol samples from nearby areas confirmed that these
toxins are not indigenous to the locale. (Details on the(b)(1)
sample analysis appear in volume II, annex D, and the(b)(3)
medical analysis is in volume II, annex E). (b)(3)
22. There is also ample evidence of military activity
at the place and time of the acquisition of the Thai(b)(1
sample. PAVN defectors described plans for multiregi-(b)(3)
mental sweep operations to be conducted along the
border in northwestern Battambang Province before
the end of the dry season in May. Actual fighting,
however, continued to be characterized by guerrilla
tactics on both sides, including, according to one
11
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I op
Figure 3
Kampuchea: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
Thailand
Siem Reap-
,COdclar Meanchey
Battambang
P u sat
-101i
Komporig
Kampuch,
Thorn
Kompong/
Chhnangf.,
cc/
PHNOM PENH
Kompong
Koh Kong Speu
Takeo
Kampot
1
h r,
Area of concentrated chemical attacks
Takeo Province where chemical attacks have occurred
Sampling area�trichothecene toxins
100
Kilometers
630971 1-82
WL\
�
a 0 S
a
Vietnam
.14:1,4miatcity
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(b)(3)
PAVN defector, staging ambushes, laying rninefields,
and use of deception.- indeed, UK forces were or-
dered to avoid large-scale operations, to limit combat
operations to scattered sapper attacks. Such informa-
tion is consistent with UK and Thai reports of PAVN
forces spreading toxic chemicals along streams and
roadsides and around villages, arid firing toxic gas
shells against enemy positions. In sum, the Phnom
Melai sector (in which Phnom Mak Hoeun is located)
was described as an "anthill of UK activity,- and
actions reported during March were "sporadic fire-
fights- around Phnom Mak Hoetm involving the
PAVN 2nd Battalion, 2nd Border Security Regiment.
23. In Kampuchea as in Laos, the period of late
1980 through spring 1981 was one of intensified
Vietnamese operations to suppress the resistance, and
the Vietnamese may have considered the use of toxins
an ef fective means of breaking the will of the opposing
forces.
24. Additional supporting evidence was derived
from blood samples drawn from victims of PAVN
chemical use that reportedly occurred on 19 Septem-
ber 1981 in the Takong area. (Blood analysis appears
in volume II, annex D.) Takong is in the same general
area as Phnom Mak Hoeun�that is, the central region
of the Battambang Province-Thailand border. Again,
there is no independent confirmation of the accounts
of the attacks, but US medical personnel visiting the
UK field hospital examined the victims and obtained
blood samples. Analysis of these samples suggested the
use of tricothecenes
25.
26. The chemicals used in the 19 September Ta-
kong attack were dispersed (according to the UK
soldiers affected) as a gas or powder, and as a poison to
water. The gas or powder was released from contain-
ers by tripwires in the area of the rear forces. This
description is consistent with the other reporting for
this area and time.
27.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
13
28. In sum, substantial evidence on the Vietnamese
use of chemical weapons existed before the discovery
of trichothecene toxins in vegetation and water sam-
ples. The Thai have developed a substantial data base
on the chemical attacks,
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
/The Thai's concerns about
chemical attacks against their own people have in-
creased, especially after one Thai died and others
became ill from Vietnamese poisoning. In May 1981
the Thai captured two Vietnamese in the act of
poisoning water with cyanide in a Thai relocation
camp
Afghanistan
29. Attacks with chemical weapons against the Mu- (b)(3)
jahedin in Afghanistan were reported as early as six
months before the Soviet invasion on 27 Decembe(b)(1)
1979. Five separate chemical attacks in this preinva(b)(3)
sion period were reported in eastern Afghanistan, but
the evidence for this period is inconclusive. The
reports specify only that Soviet-made aircraft were
used, with no clear identification of Soviet or Afghan
pilots, or of the specific agents used.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
/ A number of Afghan
military defectors stated, nevertheless, that the Soviets
l(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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provided the Afghan military with chemical warfare
training as well as supplies of lethal and incapacitating
agents. The Afghan reference to "microbe bombs" is
still unexplained./
30. For the period from the summer of 1979 to the
present, we have reports of 43 separate chemical
attacks with more than 3,000 chemical-associated
deaths (see map, figure 4). Ten separate chemical
attacks, killing considerable numbers of persons, were
reported in the first three months of 1980. All of the
reports came from northeastern Afghanistan and pro-
vide the highest percentage of reported deaths. By the
spring and summer of 1980, chemical attacks were
reported to have occurred in all areas of concentrated
resistance activity. Reports of chemical weapon use in
1981 essentially parallel 1980 reporting with respect to
frequency and location of attack. Of the 43 chemical
attack reports, 36 have come from human sources,
including Afghan Army deserters, Mujahedin resist-
ance fighters, journalists, and US physicians. For 24 of
the reported 43 attacks we have additional independ-
ent evidence supporting allegations of chemical at-
tacks. In seven instances we have additional human
reporting. For example, an Afghan insurgent provided
an eyewitness account of a 6 July 1980 attack on a
village 10 kilometers east of Darae Jelga in Vardak
Province. The insurgent reported that a Soviet MI-24
helicopter gunship dropped a bomb that, upon explo-
sion, released a lethal chemical. A separate report
from a reliable source confirmed that Soviet aerial
bombing attacks were taking place during this period
on villages in Vardak (as well as Lowgar and Parvan
Provinces).
31
In most cases the connections are
circumstantial, as when Soviet or Afghan Army com-
bat operations are described as being planned or are in
progress in areas at times approximating those of a
reported chemical attack. In a few cases, reporting is
more specfic. The following sequence, for example,
occurred in a small valley in Qandahar Province in
early June 1981: Soviet combat troops engaged rebel
forces in that valley (hiring a two-week period, accord-
ing to an Afghan exile
The Afghan exile reports that a Soviet
helicopter delivered a single rocket, which released a
chemical that killed 16 insurgents.
32. Nearly all reports state that chemicals were
delivered by aircraft or helicopters, with a few reports
describing chemical artillery rounds.
occurred at the
chemical attacks
1 These operations frequently
same time and place as reported
33. The evidence that Soviet forces are using lethal
chemical
agents
comes from HUMINT reporting.
34./ strongly support
the use of irritants to drive the insurgents into the open
to expose them to attack with conventional weapons
and incapacitants to render them tractable for disarm-
ing and capture.
14
35. Victims of Soviet attacks, conducted to flush
them from caves, describe symptoms that cannot be
associated with riot control agents like CN and CS or
even Adamsite. Medical examinations of some of the
victims include reports of paralysis, other neurological
effects, blisters, bleeding, and sometimes death. While
none of the agents being used in Afghanistan have
been positively identified through sample analysis, it
seems clear that the agents being used are far more
toxic than the irritants cited aboven-1
36. A reliable source has provided a list of the
Soviet agents stockpiled in Afghanistan and described
where and when some of them have been used. The
list included nerve agents, phosgene, phosgene oxime,
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Figure 4
Afghanistan: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
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Area of concentrated chemical attacks
Parvan Province where chemical attacks have occurred
� Soviet chemical defense battalion
+ Airfield
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390
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"Thri�Stioczajf.
sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and lewisite. The
agents used, plus the time and location of the attacks,
generally correspond to the refugee reports and re-
corded military operations. Afghan military defectors
have also described the agents being used by the
Soviets and pinpointed where they are stored.
37. Satellite photography showed operational per-
sminel decontamination stations at two locations in
Afghanistan and a chemical decontamination field
unit deployed during a sweep operation of the Konar
Valley in 1980. In addition, Soviet personnel have
been observed wearing chemical protective equip-
ment. At Shindand, TMS-65 decontamination units
were deployed in a classical operational mode
/ This
suggests that the chemical battalions have performed
an operational role in Afghanistan connected with
offensive chemical use. A Soviet chemical officer told
an American news correspondent that his mission was
to examine villages after a chemical attack to deter-
mine whether it was safe to enter or required decon-
tamination. An Afghan pathologist who defected de-
scribed how he accompanied Soviet chemical warfare
personnel into contaminated areas to collect soil, vege-
tation, and water samples after Soviet chemical at-
tacks. There are at least some firsthand reports from
former Soviet chemical personnel that it is not Soviet
practice to require decontamination equipment to be
stationed in an area where cheinieal bombs are stored
or loaded on aircraft. If this is correct, it suggests that
the operational deployment of this equipment in
Afghanistan is associated with the active employment
of casualty-producing chemical agents.
38. In stun, the eyewitness testimony of Afghan
refugees and journalists about chemical warfare activi-
ties is supported by defectors, as was the case in Laos
and Kampuchea evidence that
chemical agents have been used thoudt it does not
identify the type. evidence
on Afghan and Soviet military operations leaves no
doubt that fighting took place in almost every area
where we havt. 111.) MINT reports of chemical attacks.
7rs-77ottetig--
What Chemical Agents Are Being Used?
39. The specific chemical agents being used in
Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan cannot be deter-
mined without collection and analysis of at least one of
the following: environmental samples contaminated
with agent, the munitions used to deliver agents, or
biological specimens from victims of an attack. A
study by medical-toxicological experts of symptoms
exhibited by individuals exposed to toxic agents does
provide a good indication of the general class of
chemical agent used. Thus, the range of clinical
manifestations from chemical agents as reported by a
US Army investigative team resulted in the determina-
tion that nerve agents, irritants such as CS, and a
highly toxic hemorrhaging chemical or mixture of
chemicals were used in Laos. Other medical-toxicolog-
ical personnel arrived at the same determination and
further indicated that toxins such as the trichothecenes
were a probable cause of the lethal hemorrhaging
effect seen in Kampuchea as well as Laos. Symptoms
reported by the DK in Kampuchea and the Mujahedin
in Afghanistan were in many cases similar to those
reported by the H'Mong in Laos. In addition, symp-
toms reported from Afghanistan and Kampuchea indi-
cated that a highly potent, rapid-acting incapacitant
-knockout" chemical also was being used. Mujahedin
victims and witnesses to chemical attacks reported
other unusual symptoms, including a blackening of the
skin, severe skin irritation with multiple small blisters
and severe itching, severe eye irritation, and difficulty
in breathing�suggesting that phosgene oxime or a
similar substance was useciti.L
40. Collecting samples possibly contaminated with
a toxic agent during or after a chemical assault is
difficult under all circumstances but particularly when
the assault is against ill-prepared people without gas
masks and other protective equipment. Obtaining
contaminated samples that will yield positive traces of
specific chemical agents is dependent on a number of
factors. These include the persistency of the chemical,
the ambient temperature, rainfall, wind conditions,
the media on which the chemical was deposited, and
the time, care, and packaging of the sample from
collection to analysis in a laboratory. Many standard
chemical warfare agents are nonpersistent and disap-
pear from the environment within a few minutes to
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several hours after being dispersed. These include, for
example, the nerve agents sarin and tabun; the blood
agents hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride; the
choking agents phosgene and diphosgene; and the
urticant phosgene oxime. Other standard CW agents�
such as the nerve agents VX and thickened soman and
the blistering agents sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard,
and lewisite may persist for several days to weeks
depending on weather conditions. The trichothecene
toxins have good persistency but may be diluted to
below detectable concentrations by adverse weather
conditions. To maximize the chances of detection,
sample collections should be made as rapidly after a
chemical assault as possible, and with many agents this
means minutes to hours. Under the circumstances of
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan this has simply not
been possible. While numerous samples were collect-
ed, few of them held any realistic prospect of yielding
positive results. It is fortunate that trichothecenes are
sufficiently persistent to allow detection several
months after the attack.
41. Samples have been collected from Southeast
Asia since mid-1979 and from Afghanistan since May
1980. To date about 50 individual samples�of greatly
varying types and usefulness for analytical purposes�
have been collected and analyzed for the presence of
traditional CW agents, none of which have been
detected. On the basis of recommendations by medical
and toxicological experts and of findings by the CSL,
many of the samples have been analyzed for the
trichothecene group of mycotoxins. Four samples, two
I rom Kampuchea and two from Laos, were found to
contain high levels of trichothecene toxins. Prelimi-
nary results of several additional samples indicate the
presence of trichothecenes or their metabolites, but
quantification of their levels is pending. Details con-
cerning the samples, including the circumstances of
their collection, the analysis, and the results, are
provided in volume II, annex B.
42. The accompanying table lists the chemicals and
their probability of use in Afghanistan by Soviet and,
in Southeast Asia, by Vietnamese and Laotian forces.
The judgments shown in this table are based on sample
analysis, on collateral and special intelligence, and on
medical and toxicological evaluations
Degrees of Confidence in
Identification of Specific
Classes of Chemicals Used in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan a
Laos Kampuchea Afghanistan
Trichothecene toxins Confirmed Confirmed Suspected
Nerve agents Probable Probable Probable
Irritants Probable Probable Probable
Vesicants and urticants Suspected Suspected Probable
Incapacitants Suspected Probable Probable
a The confidence levels shown refer to the identification of specific
chemicals used, not to the probability that some form of lethal
chemical was used. We consider the latter a certainty.
Soviet Chemical Warfare Activities
43. Evidence accumulated since World War II
clearly shows that the Soviets have been extensively
involved in preparations for large-scale offensive and
defensive chemical warfare. We have identified the
chemical warfare agents and delivery systems they
have developed, probable production and storage
areas within the USSR, and continuing research, devel-
opment, and testing activities at the major Soviet
chemical proving grounds. None of the evidence
indicates any abatement in this program. The Soviets
have shown a strong interest in improving or enhanc-
ing their standard agents for greater reliability and
effect. Their large chemical and biological research
and development effort has led them to investigate
other kinds of CW agents, particularly the toxins. A
bibliography on Soviet research in the toxin field is
included in volume II, annex D.
44. The Soviets have supplied selected chemical
agents, delivery systems, and training in chemical/bio-
logical/radiological warfare to Syria, Vietnam, Laos,
Afghanistan, and Egypt. In all cases where chemical
warfare has been waged�Yemen, Laos, Kampuchea,
and Afghanistan�Soviet advisers and technicians
have been directly involved with the forces of their
client states, and in Afghanistan the Soviets conducted
the chemical attacks themselves.
45. To our knowledge, none of the four countries
most recently involved with CW activities�Vietnam,
Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan�has any large-
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Tor-riref4q1
scale facility or organization for the manufacture of
cliemical and biological materials. Nor are they known
to have produced even small quantities of chemical
warfare agents or munitions. 'Hie technical problems
of producing large quantities of weapons-grade toxin,
I owever, are not so great as to prevent any of the four
countries from learning to manufacture, purify, and
weaponize these materials. It is highly unlikely, how-
ever, that they could master these functions without
acquiring outside technical know-how. The only coun-
try known to be providing chemical warfare assistance
to these countries is the Soviet Union.
46. The Soviets have had advisers and technicians
working in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea for many
years, but not until early 1979 did evidence connect
the Soviet military directly with chemical warfare
activities. The evidence is quite conclusive. For exam-
ple, in mid-February 1980, Lao Supreme Headquar-
ters in Vientiane ordered the Southern Region Com-
mand in Pakxe to prepare its chemical storage
facilities for inspection by unidentified Soviet military
personnel.
clandestine reports, which provided
more detail on the mid-February visit and on another
Soviet inspection by chemical warfare experts in June
1980.
47. stated that the chemical section
in Xiangkhoang prepared Soviet-manufactured chemi-
cal items for inspection by a Soviet military team on 7
February 1979. A seven-man team of Soviet chemical
artillery experts, accompanied by Laotian chemical
officers, inspected chemical supplies and artillery
rounds at the Xeno storage facility on 1 June 1979.
One report stated that the Soviet team would be
inspecting the same chemical explosives used to sup-
in the
1)retiti
the IlaMong resistance
Phou Bia area. In
20
The Yemen Experience
48. Additional evidence that the Soviets are pre-
pared to supply toxins and other lethal agents to client
states is provided by the Yemen case, which is reas-
sessed in volume II, chapter VI, and summarized here.
49. During the Yemeni civil war (1963-67), Egyp-
tian forces were reported to have used chemical
bombs from March to August 1963 against the royalist
forces. Both deaths and injuries were reported, but the
agent was not identified. During the period October to
December 1966, the Egyptians employed a chemical
agent that was more persistent and considerably more
lethal than any of those previously used. It was never
identified conclusively, but was tentatively held to be
one of the mustard compounds. Chemical experts
conducting postattack on-site observations disputed
this view, arguing that if mustard had been used, it
was
to disguise another agent that caused the deaths.
50. In January 1967 a new agent or combination of
agents was dispersed by Soviet-made IL-28 light
bombers. The agent was remarkable for its extremely
rapid and devastating effect on humans, animals, and
vegetation. This material was not identified conclu-
sively either. claims that he clearly
identified as a Soviet the dead pilot of a plane shot
down after dropping chemical bombs..��.
51. There are striking similarities between the
symptoms described as resulting from the attacks in
1967 and those that have been reported from South-
east Asia and Afghanistan. We cannot positively state
that trichothecene toxins were used by the Soviets in
Yemen, but that explanation fits the evidence better
than any other. Samples that were collected by reputa-
ble sources did not reveal any known chemical war-
fare agents. At that time toxins were not suspected and
the special analytic techniques that revealed trichothe-
cene toxins in 1981 were not developed in 1967.
52. There is also a striking similarity between the
tactics used in Afghanistan in 1979 and Yemen in 1967
against resistance forces operating from sanctuaries in
rugged terrain. The use of the IL-28 bombers in both
places is particularly striking and also fits with the
descriptions of chemical bomb tests using IL-28s in the
USSR in the early 1970s.
lop
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CONCLUSIONS
Laos. We conclude from all the evidence that
selected Lao and Vietnamese forces, under direct
Soviet supervision, have employed lethal trichothecene
toxins and other combinations of chemical agents
against the 1I'Mong resistance forces, including their
villages, since at least 1976. Thousands have died, have
been severely injured, or were driven from their
homeland by the use of these agents-7'lb.),
Kampuchea. The evidence strongly supports the
conclusion that the Vietnamese have similarly been
using lethal trichothecene toxins and other combina-
tions of chemical warfare agents on Democratic Kam-
puchean forces and other resistance groups since at
least 1978.
Afghanistan. We conclude that Soviet forces in
Afghanistan have used a wide variety of lethal and
nonlethal chemical agents on Mujahedin resistance
forces and Afghan villages since the Soviet invasion in
December 1979. Afghan Government forces probably
used chemical weapons before the Soviet invasion, but
we cannot identify the types of agents used. It has not
been possible to identify the agents used by the Soviets
through sample analysis, but a number of reliable
sources have named the agents brought into the
country and have described where and when they
were used. That information has been correlated with
all other evidence, including the reported symptoms.
We conclude that nerve agents, phosgene oxime, and
various ineapacitants, and irritants probably have been
used. Other agents and toxic smokes are also available
in country, but we cannot state confidently that they
have been used. Some of the reported symptoms are
consistent with those produced by lethal or sublethal
doses of trichothecene toxins, but our evidence is not
conclusive
The Soviet Role. We conclude that the Soviets
either provided the toxin weapons directly or provided
the toxins for weaponization in Vietnam and Laos. A
common practice in the Soviets' own military forces is
to store agents in bulk and move them to the field for
munitions fill as needed. Our assumption that this
practice is also followed in Indochina and Afghanistan
is supported by HUMINT and COMINT reports, some
of which specify that Soviet technicians supervise the
shipment, storage, filling, and loading on aircraft of
the chemical munitions. The dissemination techniques
reported and observed are evidently drawn from years
of Soviet chemical warfare testing and experimenta-
tion. No intelligence is at hand to support any alterna-
tive explanation, but we cannot completely rule out
the possibility that Soviet technical assistance has
enabled at least the Vietnamese to conduct an .ndig-
enous toxin production program.
Motivation for Chemical Weapon Use. In volume
II, chapter III, we consider the question of motivation.
Is there a military-strategic or tactical rationale for the
systematic use of chemical weapons in Laos, Kampu-
chea, Afghanistan, and Yemen? We conclude that the
military problems faced in all four countries�as
viewed from the perspective of the Soviets and their
allies�make the use of chemical weapons a militarily
effective way of breaking the will and resistance of
stubborn guerrilla forces operating from relatively
inaccessible protected sanctuaries. These weapons of-
fer substantial advantages over conventional weapons.
In all four countries the resistance was able through
conventional means to frustrate Soviet and client-state
objectives of extending and consolidating control over
the countries attacked. The Soviets probably reasoned
that attainment of these objectives�as quickly and
cheaply as possible justified use of chemical weapons
and outweighed a small risk of exposure and interna-
tional condemnation. They may well have calculated
that they and their allies could successfully counter or
deny charges that chemical weapons had been used,
recognizing that it would be as difficult to compile
incontrovertible evidence from Southeast Asia arid
Afghanistan as it was from Yemen in the 1960s. In
addition, the Soviet military very likely consider these
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remote areas as providing unique opportunities for the
operational testing and evaluation of chemical weap-
ons under various tiActical conditions.
We finind support for tliis conclusion from
officers who had attended the Soviet Military Acade-
my of Chemical Defense in Moscow. According to
their Soviet instructor, three types of chemical agents
may be used during the "initial stages- of local wars:
"harassing agents (CS, CN, DM), ineapacitants such as
psychochemicals (liZ) or intertoxins [sic (possibly
-"Tr`5-9444-42-
enterotoxins)1, and herbicides." During the "decisive
phase, lethal agents can be employed under certain
circumstances.- In a "local war, chemical weapons can
be used to spoil enemy efforts to initiate operations,
even if the enemy has not used them first."
account, including detailed descriptions of
the Soviet chemical warfare .-.rogram by
supports the conclusion that the Soviets con-
sider chemical weapons an effective and acceptable
means of warfare even in local conflicts
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IMPLICATIONS
In volume I chapter III, we consider and reject a
number of alternative explanations for the phenomena
observed. One hypothesis best fits all the evidence: the
Soviets had began to weaponize toxins by at least the
early .1960s and have used these weapons in Laos and
Kampuchea, and possibly in Yemen and Afghanistan.
If this hypothesis is sustained, it means that the
Soviets have gained considerable experience through
operational use of biotoxins. If we are correct, the
United States and its allies face a new threat not
previously considered in intelligence estimates and
defense planning.
Furthermore, far more potent toxins than the tri-
chotheeene class have been extensively investigated by
institutes in the USSR that are linked to chemical and
biological weapons development. Indeed, the Soviet
military consider the employment of chemical weap-
ons by their forces and those of their allies to be an
acceptable and effective means of suppressing resist-
ance even in local wars.
As a result, countries like Thailand, Pakistan, and
China may develop an even greater sense of alarm in
contemplating conflict with the Soviet Union or its
allies. Chinese experts are actively reanalyzing their
evidence on Vietnamese use of chemical agents against
their forces in 1979. Beyond these considerations,
there is growing international concern that lethal
chemical weapons may become an accepted method
of limited warfare in conflicts throughout the Third
World.
23
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