(EST PUB DATE) CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY: THE ORIGINS OF CIA'S CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION IN THE FAR EAST 1945 - 1952

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01233345
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-01650
• Publication Date: January 1, 1952

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CS Historical Paper
No 195
CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HISTORY
OITLEOFNVOU
\ THE ORIGINS OF
,
CIA 'S CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION
IN THE FAR EAST
maim
- 1945 � 1952
DO NOT DESTROY
Date published: June 1969
Copy No. 2 of 2 copies
Controlled by �
Date prepared �
Written by
FE Division
Spring 1969
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Inchon.
of
SEC-2.ET
area. Between them,
staffers and sources
they established the nresence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(0)(] )
(h)cl)
orders to make
reconnais-
with
sance of the Inchon area. From
Korean sources
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
who had first-hand knowledge of the Inchon harbor and
coastal, region, together with
maps
and charts which these
sources helped to compile,
was able to supply excel-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
lent reconnaissance information which contributed heavily
51/
toward the success of the Inchon landing on 16 September.
There were a number of accomplishments of CIA oper-
ations personnel in the Korean War, not the least of which
was to continue to function as a relatively independent
organization in a theater of war (even if it was not so
declared) in the face of repeated efforts by the armed
52/
forces to take over or to exercise strong control. �
Two of the more dramatic incidents were the accomplish-
ments of
in preparation for. the Inchon landing already
refead to, and the placing of Surgeon General Sams
of the U.S. Army behind the North Korean lines to investi-
gate the truth of the enemy charges that United Nations
Forces were using bacteriological agents in warfare.
The suspicion was that North Korea had some kind of
epidemic running rife in its area and was laying it to
germ warfare by the United Nations forces. General Sams
107
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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was put ashore
and there
verified the American suspicio . He was exfiltrated
and made his report so convincingly that
the germ warfare charge died out in a hurry.*
The difficulties in trying to work with the military
command while avoiding being taken over by it are touched
on by
by
CIA 'forces in Korea, in two reports, one referred to in
but are covered' more estensively
the next commander of the combined
Reference No. 52, and the other his review of the. CIA
effort in Korea in his report to Admiral- Overesch, whom
CIA Director Bedell Smith appointed in the summer of 1952
as Senior Representative heading the CIA North Asia
Command,** which covered
activities
munist China and the Soviet Union.
Korea, as well as
directed toward Corn-
* These events, as well as the trials and tribulations of
the early period of the Korean War when the OSO and OPC -
'activities were combined under one commander, are related
in CS Historical Paper No 52 The Secret War in Korea,
June 1950-June 1952, by
**For an account of this experiment in funneling the
re-
lations of several field components to their respective
Headquarters elements through a single command point in
the field, see CS Historical Paper No. 211, The North
Asia Command, 1952-1956, by
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