CSHP-150 - THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION 1952-1956

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01225490
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 101
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01255
• Publication Date: August 25, 1967

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CS Historical Paper
No. 150
CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY
THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION
1952 - 1956
Other copy held by:
DDP
Controlled by: Fl/Division D
Date prepared: 25 August 1967
Copy No. 2 of
2
Date published:
24 June 1968
Written by:
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
IGROUP 1
Excluded from automati.
, downgrading and
declassification
.................0.....
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS iii
I. INTRODUCTION. . 0 e 000 Oa.
II. PLANNING
IMPLEMENTATION
IV. TERMINATION . �ou o e � o
V. PRODUCTION. � ......� �
VI. AFTERMATH .
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
e 0 OOOOOOO 00
- Analysis of the Reasons for the
Discovery of the Tunnel
- Recapitulation of the Intelli-
gence Derived
- Typical American Press Comment
- East German Press Comment
1
6
17
23
25
27
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PREFACE
PBJOINTLY (the Berlin Tunnel project) came into being
sometime in 1952 (the exact date cannot be established) and
ceased as an active operation in the summer of 1956. The
writer served as Headquarters case officer on the project from
the winter of 1952-1953 until the summer of 1954 and then as
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
the field case officer until February 1955.
a senior Office of Communications
officer in the project; Mr. William
K. Harvey, Chief,
Berlin
Operating Base,
1952-1958;
and
Chief, (b)(3)
(b)(6)
Fl/Division D,
1952-1958,
were intimately associated with the
planning and implementation of the project at the policy level
and very kindly offered suggestions for the preparation of
this manuscript. Their comments have been incorporated and
are greatly appreciated. Several other individuals, including
who were in a position to offer valuable (b)(3)
(b)(6)
advice were absent from Headquarters during the period the
paper was being prepared and thus unavailable to assist.
When this project was first discussed with the then
Director of CIA, Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in
the interests of security, as little as possible concerning
the project would be reduced to writing. It is probable that
few orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet there
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G
are a great many cubic feet of files connected with this pro-
ject. These files mainly concern technical and administrative
matters. Only those details which, in the opinion of the
writer, are necessary to a broad understanding of the manner
in which the project's objectives were accomplished have been
included in this paper. Those interested in additional data
may wish to consult the files.
In addition to setting forth significant developments,
the writer has attempted to provide insight into the reasons
for certain courses of action. At times this required a
speculative approach. The judgments derived from such specu-
lation were shared by all those actively concerned in the
management of the project, and it is the writer's hope that
they are accurately expressed in the following paper. Any
error in this respect, however, is the sole responsibility of
the writer.
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1 - Map of Berlin
2 - Detail Map of Rudow Section, Berlin
3 - Aerial View' of Rudow Section, Berlin
4 - Dirt in the Basement
5 - Vopos Studying the Installation
6 - East German View of the Compound
7 - Blinds on the Shield
8 - Excavating Using the Blinds
- View of the Completed Tunnel
10 - Construction of the Vertical Shaft
11 - Completed Vertical Shaft
12 - View of Cables and Taps
13 - Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement
14 - Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box
15 - Target Cables Exposed
16 - Schematic View of Tunnel
17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-AmpChamber
18 - Pre-Amp Chamber
19 - Tapping Bridle
20 - Lead-Away Lines
21 - Soviet Press Briefing
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I. INTRODUCTION
The exact moment when the idea emerged of digging a
tunnel to intercept Soviet and East German communications is
somewhat obscure; A number of factors must be considered,
among them the following:
a. As early as 1948 U.S. Intelligence Officers
became interested in the benefits to be derived from
tapping Soviet and Satellite landlines on a scale not
previously considered necessary. The loss of certain
sources during this period created gaps in our intelli-
gence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during
this period of Cold War escalation. It became evident
that the tapping of certain'selected landlines might pro-
duce the information needed to fill a number of the gaps
in our overall intelligence picture.
b. In the late 1940's and early 1950's the U.S.,
through the briefings of "returnee" German scientists
(those who were taken by the Soviets after World War II
to work in Russia) and other sources, became aware of a
new Soviet voice secrecy device which the Soviets referred
1/
to usually as "VHE CHE." � It soon became evident that
1/
In normal usage "VHE CUE" means "high frequency". The
Soviets, however, in context, used this term for a special
speech scrambling device developed to provide security to their
high level communications.
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the Soviets planned
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
C. In the late 1940's the Office of Communications,
in the course of its continuing efforts to provide secure
communications for the Agency, became aware of a principle
which, when applied to target communications, offered
certain possibilities. Plans to exploit this technique
were immediately formulated.
These factors then served as additional incentives (above
and beyond our normal collection requirements) to focus atten-
tion on Soviet landline targets. In mid-1951 exploratory
discussions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an
attack on Soviet landlines in East Germany with special empha-
sis to be placed on the Berlin area. As a result of this
conference
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
an agent network was set up which was
successful in penetrating the East Berlin office of the East
German Post and Telecommunications network.
Vital information on the
first became available
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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during the latter part of 1951, and by March 1952 all of the
pertinent technical material �had been assembled and sufficient-
ly analyzed to permit the pinpointing of the most important
Soviet circuits.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Subsequent events proved
this information to be completely correct.
Various methods. of tapping these circuits were explored
and one sampling operation was run in the East Zone, unfortu-
nately with negative results. By January 1953, however,
effectiveness of the penetration network
the(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
had become such that a 15-minute sample
was obtained of the prime target circuit. This was accomplished
by
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
cable pair to the West Berlin Post Office where it was recorded.
This operation continued for some six months
for a total of
almost two hours. The longest continuous sample obtained was
29 minutes and most samples were of two to three minutes'
duration. Special mention should be made of the fact that
it was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over a six-
month period on "our" end of the cable to record these
3
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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samples
r
(b)(1)
Meantime collateral collection effort continued on the (b)(3)
communications systems involved and the Office of Communica-
tions developed techniques for recovering the text from the
magnetic tape recordings of the target signal. Somewhat
ironically, the first actual material recovered proved to be
a recording of a student teletypist practicing on the "home
keys". While perhaps disappointing from the standpoint of
intelligence content, this material served to prove the tech-
nical possibility
At this point (mid-1953) we knew it could be done - the next
step was the problem of installing a.permanent tap on the
target lines.
Precisely at what point the idea of a tunnel for the
purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus
cannot be pinpointed: In 1951, the British advised CIA that
they had for some years been tapping Soviet cables through a
system of tunnels in the Vienna area and offered to share the
take with the U.S. The suggestion was made by the British at
4
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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the time that similar opportunities might be present in the
Berlin area. While it should perhaps be possible to credit
one individual with the initial concept, it appears to be a
bit difficult to do so. At any rate., the British and CIA
(W( 1)
continued to pool collateral information, and by May 1953030)
the idea of a tunnel to
tap the target cables began to take definite shape.
5
ET
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II. PLANNING
Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible
to tuhnel from the U.K. or the U.S. Zones to the target cables
served to narrow the choices to two spots: one in the British
and one in the U.S. Zone. The site actually used (see figs.
1, 2, and 3) was selected after careful deliberation which
included, but was not limited to, the following factors:
a. The location of the permanent water table
(which is normally relatively high in Berlin) was ascer-
tained to be 32 feet below ground surface. It was con-
sidered that this fact would obviate the necessity for
the use of compressed air, watertight locks, and water-
tight construction with a corresponding reduction in the
attendant engineering problems.
b The length of the tunnel was considered to be
not impractical although it far exceeded anything which
had been done by the British in Vienna.
c. Land was available on which to construct an
installation from which to begin the tunnel.
d. Complete collateral information on the area
was available, including the target cable plans, aerial
photographs, and the plans for all utilities serving the
area.
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At this point the following major questions remained
unanswered:
a. Was it indeed possible to dig a tunnel of this
magnitude (approximately 1500 feet) clandestinely, con-
sidering the fact that the border at this point was
heavily and constantly patrolled by the East Germans,
and hit the targets?
b. If the answer to the above was favorable,
what was to be done with the spoil (reckoned at approxi-
mately 3,000 tons of sand)?
c. What type of cover installation could be built
in such a remote area (this portion of Berlin was at that
time a "squattersville" of shacks and hovels constructed
from rubble by refugees from the East German Zone)?
In retrospect the first question, "Could the tunnel be
dug?", was never really a debatable one---those concerned more
or less decided that given sufficient money and personnel the
job could be done. (This judgment fortunately proved sound.)
The second question, "Where do we put the dirt?", haunted the
minds of project personnel for many weeks and a great many
ingenious ideas were brought forth and discarded for one rea-
son or another until the suggestion was made facetiously that
we "dig a hole and put the dirt in it." This in effect was
the solution. At this time no convincing cover story had
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suggested itself and the current consensus favored making the
cover compound an element of the Quartermaster Corps with a
rather vague mission of housing items that should be dispersed
for one reason or another in a remote area of Berlin. Space
requirements for the recording and associated equipment were
such that a building of warehouse proportions was needed; so
it was decided to build a two-story warehouse. Local engineers
were told that it had been decided to experiment with a new
type of warehouse, one which would be half above the ground
and half below with a ramp suitable for running fork lift
trucks from the basement to the first floor. Berlin had been
selected as the site for this warehouse because (a) construc-
tion would be cheap due to low labor rates and (b) the work
would benefit the Berlin economy. So the basement was dug
under the eyes of the local border guards and we had "our hole
2/
to put the dirt in." � (See fig. 4.)
While the "warehouse cover" was adjudged sufficient to
solve the temporary problems of construction, it was not deemed
solid enough to carry the project for an extended period. At
this particular time the intelligence community was becoming
increasingly interested in the potential of
2/As an interesting sidelight,'we heard later that the
Quartermaster Corps became seriously interested in this type
construction because the ratio of cost to storage space
available was amazingly low. We do not know if any follow-
up ever occurred.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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- Dirt in the Basement
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SE
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
For example:
a. Excuse was provided for maintaining extra- (b)(1)
ordinary physical security and tight compartmentation.(b)(3)
in the Top Secret
category at this period in its evolution.)
b.
c. Legitimate targets
existed in the area.
d. The existence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
the site provided the opposition with an explanation for
the site's existence. In spite of the fact that any form
of
presents a priority target,
it was argued that presenting the opposition with a reason
(W(1)
for the site's existence would make it a less prominent(m3)
target than leaving it a "mysterious something." The
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site did in fact
In
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
addition, the sight
of the Soviets and East Germans standing
on top of the tunnel
with binoculars focused
on the roof of the installation provided
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
considerable amusement to personnel at the site. (See fig. 5.)
Joint U.S.-U.K. planning for .the project continued
throughout 1953 and in December of that year the Director of
Central Intelligence approved the terms of reference which
covered formal negotiations with the British for the implemen-
tation of the project. A series of conferences in late 1953
and early 1954 led to the following decisions:
a. The U.S. would:
(1) procure a site, erect the necessary
structures, and drive a tunnel to a point beneath
the target cables;
(2) be responsible for the recording of all
signals produced
and
(3) process in Washington all of the tele-
graphic material received from the project.
b. The British would:
(1) drive a vertical shaft from the tunnel's,
end to the targets;
10
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Figure 5 - Vopos Studying the Installation
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(2) effect the cable taps and deliver a
usable signal to the head of the tunnel for
recording; and
(3) provide for a jointly manned U.S.-U.K,
center in London to process the voice recordings
from the site.
It was jointly agreed that each side would keep the
other advised in detail on all aspects of the project. It
should perhaps be said here that the bilateral aspects of this
operation (with one notable exception, which will be discussed
later (see BLAKE, page 23)) caused few, if any, problems. The
skills developed by the British during the Vienna operations
stood us in good stead and the distribution of effort and ex-
pense proved in the end to be reasonably equitable.
Activity thus proceeded on three fronts - in Berlin steps
were taken to lease the necessary land and right-of-way ease-
ments for the site and a contract was let with a German con-
tractor. The compound, which was roughly the size of an aver-
age city block, was fenced with chain-type high security
fencing and contained the main operations building (the one
story with basement type warehouse previously described),
combined kitchen-dini4g facilities and barracks, and another
building which housed three diesel driven generators to
provide power for all facilities. (See fig. 6.) Sanitary
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JO MOT A UEUIJO9
CD
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provisions consisted of a cesspool. (The logical placement
of the cesspool was such that it was situated only a few feet
from the tunnel site. It later developed when the tunnel was
dug that this was quite unfortunate because working conditions
in the sector adjacent to the cesspool were, to say ,the least,
highly unpleasant.) Planning called for the completion of
this workron 27 August 1954.
For assistance in actually digging the tunnel it was
decided to request help from the Army Corps of Engineers,
and to this end the Chief of Staff and the G-2, U.S. Army,
were briefed on the project. The initial contact with the
Army was made personally by Mr. Allen Dulles to General
Matthew B. Ridgway. Fortunately General Arthur Trudeau, a
trained engineer, had just been appointed A.C. of S., G-2.
From the first moment he learned of the operation, General
Trudeau was an enthusiastic supporter of the concept. The
Army selected Lt. Colonel Leslie M. Gross (the only available
member of the Engineering Corps with any experience in
tunneling) to head the project. This proved to be an excellent
choice for Lt. Colonel Gross turned in an outstanding job. By
mid-summer of 1954 he had firmed up the engineering plans,
selected a crew of engineering personnel, and actually con-
structed a mock-up tunnel some 150 yards long working under
operational conditions at a high security base
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Some mention should be made of the actual method of construct-
ing the tunnel. Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin
area showed a high percentage of sand. For this reason it was
decided that the tunnel should be lined with steel. The same
sand content contributed greatly to the danger of cave-ins at
the face of the tunnel, and to eliminate this risk a shield
was devised (see figs. 7 and 8) with horizontal "blinds"
so arranged across its face that should even dry sand be
encountered the danger of cave-ins was virtually eliminated.
The tunnel liner was formed of sections of heavy steel plate
so constructed that, when bolted together, five sections formed
a steel ring approximately six feet in diameter and 15 inches
long. Provision was made for, bolting these rings together to
form a continuous tube of solid steel. The men worked under
cover of the shield described above (which was slightly larger
in diameter than the steel liner) and when sufficient material
had been excavated, the shield was forced forward with hydrau-
lic jacks and a new section of liner was bolted in place.
Since this method left a void of approximately one and one-
half inches around the liner (remembering that the diameter
of the shield was greater than that of the liner), screw-type
removable plugs were built into every third section of tunnel
liner. This permitted removal of the plugs and the forcing
of grouting material under high pressure to fill the void
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PIaTqS 0141 uo SpUil - L
Figure 7 - Blinds on the Shield
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Figure 8 - Excavating Using the Blinds
Figure 8 - Excavating Using the Blinds
�
�
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after the liner was in place. It was calculated (and subse-
quently proven to be true) that this method of construction
would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the
tunnel from the surface. (See fig. 9.)
Meantime in the U.K. British engineers constructed a mock-
up of the tunnel's terminal end and fabricated an ingenious
device which worked in principle like the tunnel "shield"
described above, with the difference, of course, that the
blinds (which closely resembled a conventional venetian blind)
were horizontal but so hinged as to 'permit vertical excavation.
This permitted excavating cautiously across the upper face of
the vertical shaft in small areas and then jacking the entire
structure up at the optimum rate. (See fig. 10.) Available
plans indicated that the cables were buried some 27 inches
deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway. The top
of the vertical shaft (see fig. 11) then needed to be
approximately 12 to 14 inches below the surface of the high-
way in order to give the tapping crew room to work below the
ceiling of the shaft, and the whole structure had to be
capable of supporting the weight of heavy trucks since the
tunnel and tap chamber lay directly beneath the highway. (See
fig. 12.) Considerable care was devoted to insulating the
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Figure 9 - View of the Completed Tunnel
- View of the Completed Tunnel
�
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OI ean2Ta
Construction of the Vertical Shaft
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--revg4L
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Figure 12
View of Cables and Taps
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3/
tap chamber to prevent its acting like a huge drum.
Considerable thought was given to the quantity and
content of the material available from the target and the
manner in which it was to be processed. It was in this
field, perhaps, that we experienced some of our greatest
problems. It had been decided very early in the project's
planning stages to maintain the strictest possible security
measures. As a minimum precaution security checks were made
on each individual who in any way became knowledgeable of the
project's mission, and the same standards in force for clear-
ances for Special Intelligence were utilized. A list of
briefed personnel was maintained, special secrecy agreements
were executed, and special briefings were given to all knowl-
edgeable personnel. It was in the assemblage of a processing
team that we experienced our greatest problem in maintaining
security standards. Since the material to be processed was
largely Russian voice, it was thought that we would need
linguists with near native fluency in Russian. It is axiomatic
that native fluency is usually available only in natives, and
1/In spite of the insulation, it was a weird sensation
to be in the chamber when an iron-shod horse trotted across
it. We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning
when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forth with a
continuous series of dull thuds. After the sun burned away
the fog, visual observation showed that the East German
police had set up a temporary automobile checkpoint directly
over the chamber. The "thuds" the microphone picked up were
caused by the police officer in charge stomping his feet on
the road surface to keep warm.
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S E C
natives were not clearable for the project. Although we were
never successful in obtaining as many linguists as we needed,
we were successful, through careful screening and intensive
language training, in assembling a minimum crew for the job.
This necessitated screening each personnel file in the Agency
of those individuals who claimed any knowledge of German or
Russian, arranging interviews and language tests, and negoti-
ating transfers to the project. The Agency's language capa-
bilities then were considerably less than now and some of the
negotiations proved, to say the least, difficult.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION
By 17 August 1954 things were beginning to take shape
and the situation was as follows:
a. The German contractors had completed the
compound and we were in possession.
b. All of the basic supplies, equipment, and
personnel were in Berlin ready to start construction
on the tunnel. This in itself involved transporting 125
tons of steel tunnel liner from the ZI to Berlin. The
initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted
of one and one-half freight trains, the loss of any pack-
age of which could have blown the project. For security
purposes all sensitive items, such as the tunnel liner,
were double crated and banded and subjected to severe
drop tests before they left the ZI. Similar items were
differently packaged for deception purposes.
co Space at Headquarters was secured and the
Office of Communications had assembled a crew and was
well under way in fabricating the unique equipment
necessary to process the anticipated telegraphic traffic.
do Initial personnel had been selected and were
� being processed for both the Main Processing Unit (MPU)
in London and the Technical Processing Unit (TPU) in
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Washington. It should be noted that personnel and equip-
ment were programmed initially to exploit approximately
ten percent of the anticipated take. In retrospect, per-
haps this could be considered overly cautious. In
justification of this decision it should be said that no
one had ever tunneled 1,476 feet under clandestine condi-
tions with the expectation of hitting a target two inches
in diameter and 27 inches below a main German/Soviet
highway. There were those who manifested certain reser-
vations on the feasibility of so doing, and it is greatly
to the credit of those senior officials, both civilian
and military, that, in spite of these reservations, the
project was permitted to proceed.
In late August a vertical shaft some 16 feet in diameter
was started in the warehouse basement floor (see fig. 13) and
ground water was encountered at 16 feet instead of at the pre-
dicted 32 feet. Such examination as could be safely undertaken
under the steady observation of East German border guards and
Soviet officials indicated that a clay lens existed in this
particular spot, creating a "perched water table" the magnitude
of which was unknown. Available information indicated that the
clay lens possibly sloped down in the direction of the target
and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the
top cover was to be less than half what had been anticipated.
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Figure 13 - Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement
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Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement
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Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling
operations stopped each time the German guards walked over
the tunnel on their regular patrols. Pumps were installed
to take care of the excess water. Observation logs were
maintained, and since the highway under observation was the
main road from East Berlin to the Schoenfeld Airport, consid-
erable Order of Battle information was obtained. It was also
possible to estimate quite accurately the relative importance'
of individuals visiting East Berlin by observing the security
precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets.
Both sides of the tunnel were lined with sand in bags
as the tunnel proceeded and the excess spoil was hauled back
to the basement of the warehouse. To facilitate movement, a
wooden track was laid on the floor of the tunnel and a con-
verted electric fork lift was used to pull a string of rubber-
tired trailers back and forth in the tunnel. (See fig. 14.)
Cool air was supplied to the face of the tunnel through duct-
work from an air conditioning unit located in the warehouse.
The tunnel was completed on 28 February 1955. Construction
of the tap chamber commenced 10 March 1955 and was completed,
with the three target cables exposed, on 28 March 1955. (See
fig. 15.)
To appreciate this accomplishment it is necessary to
remember that the tunnel was 1,476 feet long (roughly the
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Figure 14 - Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box
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Figure 15 - Target Cable Exposed
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length of the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool) and that the
first half sloped down and the second half sloped up. (See
fig. 16.) The lack of an adequate base line made the survey-
ing problem especially difficult. The engineers decided at
one point that an object of known size in the East Zone would
be useful as a reference point, so a baseball game was organ-
ized with the objective of knocking a baseball as far into the
East Zone as possible. This scheme was frustrated by the
friendliness of the East German guards who kept returning the
baseball. Nonetheless, the engineers expressed confidence
that they knew their position when the tunnel was completed
to a point which could be contained in a six-inch cube. They
were correct.
Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies
of electronic equipment. To guard against this problem the
section of the tunnel immediately adjacent to the tap chamber
was insulated and sealed with marine-type plywood to form, in
effect, a closed room. (See figs. 17 and 18.) Vapor barriers
were erected and, in addition, a heavy "anti-personnel� door
of steel and concrete was constructed to seal off the tunnel
some 15 yards. from its terminal end. From the beginning it
was realized that the duration of this operation was finite.
Considerable thought was given to the posture the U.S. Govern-
ment would adopt upon the tunnel's discovery and to those
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Figure 16 - Schematic View of Tunnel
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(NOT TO SCALE VERTICAL EXAGGERATED - DIMENSIONS APPROXIMATE)
SCHEMATIC VIEW
NOT TO SCAI,-g
VERTKAL ExAG6ERlirE0
DMEN5ION.5 APPROIIMATE
Figure 16
Schematic View of Tunnel
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Figure 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber
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Figure 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber
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measures which would be taken at the site. The following
position was finally approved:
a. The posture of the U.S. would be one of flat
denial of any knowledge of the tunnel.
b. The tunnel was mined at the point it crossed
the East-West Zone border with demolition charges capable
of caving in the tunnel liner should the Soviets attempt
forcible entry into the cover installation.
c. The "anti-Personnel" door described above was
4/
installed. �
d. It was agreed that the installation would be
defended against forcible entry with all means at hand.
The three cables were tapped on 11 May 1955, 21 May 1955,
and 2 August 1955. All equipment for isolating and preampli-
fying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for record-
ing was in place before each tap was made so that monitoring
of each pair could begin as soon as it was tapped. (See figs.
19 and 20.) Careful check was kept of the temperature and
./This door bore the following inscription neatly lettered
in German and Cyrillic: "Entry is forbidden by order of the
Commanding General." It was reasoned that this sign might give
pause to Soviet and/or German officials and gain time. As a
matter of fact, there were those Communist individuals who
considered the posting of this sign as one of the most auda-
cious aspects of the entire undertaking.
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is1L,
Figure 18 - Pre-Amp Chamber
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J.
0
CD
0IPT-Ta 2uTddeJ, - 61
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Lead�Away Lines
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humidity in the tap chamber to prevent the possibility of the
introduction of moisture into the target cables thus causing
faults. The moisture in the air caused by the breathing and
perspiration of the technicians doing the tapping operation
forced the suspension of the operation several times to
permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidify the
chamber. All the components in the electrical isolation net-
works were individually selected and subjected to rigorous
tests to insure maximum reliability, and the lead-away cables
were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed in
lead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone
company standards. The strictest possible visual watch was
maintained with the tap crew. In short, in this, as in all
aspects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee
success even though in many instances it meant delay in
achieving the objective.
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IV. TERMINATION
The tunnel was discovered (see fig. 21) 21 April 1956,
after 11 months and 11 days of operation. A memorandum pre-
pared on 15 August 1956 (reproduced in its entirety as
Appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of
that date on the reasons for the discovery. The conclusion
reached was that the loss of this source was purely the result
of unfortunate circumstances beyond our control - a combina-
tion of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor
physical condition (this was known from the beginning) and a
long period of unusually heavy rainfall. It appeared that water
entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make it inopera-
tive, thus necessitating digging up sections of the cable and
causing discovery of the tap.
Subsequent developments offer an alternative reason
for the demise of the operation. In April 1956, MI-6 discov-
ered that George BLAKE, case officer in their service, had
been recruited by the Soviets while a prisoner in North Korea
in 1952 and had continued under Soviet control. BLAKE was
privy to all aspects of the tunnel from the earliest planning
stages. BLAKE stated that he had informed his Soviet contact
of the planned tunnel at the time the final decision was
made on its location in the latter part of 1953. The
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Figure 21
Soviet Press Briefing
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'
question then arises as to why the Soviets permitted the
tunnel to be dug and to operate for nearly one year. Many
theories have been advanced, but it is most probable that
we will never know the exact rationale behind the Soviet
moves.
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V. PRODUCTION
The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating
the project:
a. Three cables were tapped. They contained 273
metallic pairs capable of transmitting a total of approx-
imately 1200 communications channels. The maximum number
of channels in use at any one time approximated 500. On
the average 28 telegraphic circuits and 121 voice circuits
were recorded continuously. Approximately 50,000 reels
of magnetic tape were used - some 25 tons.
b. The London:processing center employed a peak
number of 317 persons. Twenty thousand Soviet two-hour
voice reels containing 368,000 conversations were fully
transcribed. In addition, 13,500 German two-hour voice
reels were received and 5,500 reels containing 75,000
conversations were processed. Seventeen thousand of
these conversations were fully transcribed.
c. The Washington center employed 350 people at
its peak. Eighteen thousand six-hour Soviet teletype
reels and 11,000 six-hour German teletype reels were
completely transcribed. It should be borne in mind
that many of these reels contained as many as 18
separate circuits, some of which utilized time-division
multiplex to create additional circuits. The potential
of any given six-hour teletype reel was approximately
216 hours of teletype messages. Both plain text and
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SE
encrypted traffic was received. The daily output was
about 4,000 feet of teletype messages. Printed in book
form, these messages would have filled a space ten feet
wide, 15 feet long, and eight feet high.
d. A small processing unit (two to four persons)
was maintained at the Berlin, site to permit on-the-spot
monitoring of engineering circuits fory the protection of
the project and scanning of the more productive circuits
for the "hot" intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient
value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington
and London were produced.
e. Processing of the backlogged material con-
tinued until 30 September 1958 and resulted in a total
of 1,750 reports plus 90,000 translated messages or
conversations.
f. The total cost of the project was $6,700,000.
The information from this material was disseminated in
a closely controlled system called "REGAL." Appendix B
consists of a summary of the value of the material received
together with typical customer comments. Despite our knowl-
edge of the fact that certain elements of the Soviet Govern-
ment were aware of our plans to tap these cables, we have no
evidence that the Soviets attempted to feed us deception
material through this source.
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VI. AFTERMATH
As previously noted, considerable thought was given
during the entire life of the project on the result its
discovery would bring. In retrospect it is probably correct
to say that, among those most actively concerned with the
project's management, a consensus developed that the Soviets
would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel's existence
rather than admit to the world that Free World intelligence
organs had the capability of successfully mounting an opera-
tion of this magnitude. In other words, it was felt that for
the Soviets to admit that the U.S. had been reading their high
level communications circuits would cause the Soviets to lose
face. Perhaps fortunately, fate intervened, and as a possible
consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly contrary
to expectation.
The Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would
normally have controlled the handling of the situation when
the tunnel was discovered, was absent from Berlin and the
Acting Commandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, was in charge.
There is some reason to believe that he (for whatever reason)
was forced to make a personal decision on a course of action
without benefit of advice from Moscow. At any rate his
reaction was unexpected in that he invited the entire Berlin
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press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel and its
facilities. As a result the tunnel was undoubtedly the most
highly publicized peacetime espionage enterprise in modern
times prior to the "U-2 incident." Worldwide reaction was out-
standingly favorable in terms of enhancement of U.S. prestige.
Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as follows:
a. There was universal admiration (and this
included informed Soviets) on the technical excellence
of the installation and the imaginative nature of the
undertaking.
b. The non-Communist world reacted with surprise
and unconcealed delight to this indication that the
U.S., almost universally regarded as a stumbling neophyte
in espionage matters, was capable of a coup against the
Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master
in such matters.
c. Coupled with regret that the Cold War necessi-
tated such measures, thoughtful editorial comment
applauded this indication that the U.S. was capable of
fulfilling its role of Free World leadership in the
struggle.
Appendix C contains a sampling of typical U.S. press
accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel. Predictably
the Communist press treated the tunnel as an outrage and an
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intolerable indecency. Appendix D consists of a study of
East German press reaction to the incident.
For their contributions to Project PBJOINTLY awards
5/
were made to the following individuals: �
Mr. William K. Harvey
After the project went
Distinguished Intelligence Medal
Intelligence Medal of Merit (b)(3)
(b)(6)
Intelligence Medal of Merit
Intelligence Medal of Merit
Distinguished Intelligence Medal
Intelligence Medal of Merit
Intelligence Medal of Merit
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
Distinguished Intelligence Medal
Intelligence Medal of Merit
into the production phase it was
necessary to brief a great many people to properly utilize
the product. In all almost 1500 U.S. personnel were cleared
for the project, in addition to a very large number of British
.p../Unfortunately the writer has been unable to locate an
exact record of those persons who received other recognition
from the Agency for their participation in this project and
any omissions are regretted. It should also be noted that
approximately 1000 people participated wittingly or unwittingly
in this undertaking. In fact thereare very few, if any, of the
elements of CIA that were not called upon for assistance, either
directly or indirectly (such as providing manpower), during
the life of the project.
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subjects. With the exception of BLAKE (as noted above), we
have no indication that there was a single security leak
during the life of the project. It is also interesting to
note that compartmentation was good enough, even at the
Berlin site, that a number of individuals actively engaged
in working with the REGAL material were unaware of the exact
source until they read about it in the press.
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APPENDIX A
NOTE: This assessment was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff
immediately after the discovery of the tunnel and is based
on pertinent information available. At the time the report
was prepared BLAKE's activities had not been surfaced.
15 August 1956
DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF PBJOINTLY
Analysis of all available evidence - traffic passing on
the target cables, conversations recorded from a microphone
installed in the tap chamber, and vital observations from the
site - indicates that the Soviet discovery of PBJOINTLY was
purely fortuitous and was not the result of a penetration of
the U.S. or U.K. agencies concerned, a security violation, or
testing of the lines by the Soviets or East Germans. A descrip-
tion of the events leading to these conclusions is contained
in this paper.
Following heavy rains in the Berlin area a number of tele-
phone and telegraph cables were flooded and began to fault
between Karlshorst and Mahlow on the night of 16 April 1956.
The first major fault was discovered on cable FK 151 at
Wassmannsdorf on 17 April. The fault was repaired by cutting
the defective stretch of cable and replacing a 3000 meter
length with a temporary replacement cable. Between 17 and 22
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April, when the tap was discovered, cables 150, 151, 153, and
157 were inoperative at various times. During this period
Soviet signal troops and East German Post and Telegraph tech-
nicians worked frantically to re-establish and maintain com-
munications. Telephone lines serving Marshal Grechko, the
Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), and
General Kosyakin, Malyi, Tsarenko, and Dudakov failed, tempo-
rarily depriving these officers of communications. Faults on
cable FK 150 put the Main Soviet Signal Center in Germany out
of communications with Moscow, and the Soviet Air Warning
Control Center in East Germany similarly lost its communications.
German technicians began a testing program based at
Karlshorst and Mahlow and working north from Mahlow. A major
fault on FK 150 was discovered and repaired at Wassmannsdorf
on 18-19 April, and on 19 April a second major fault on the
same cable was discovered at Schoenfeld only two kilometers
south of the tap site. It appears that the faulty section.rof
cable was replaced with a new stretch during the early hours
of 20 April, but communications remained unsatisfactory, par-
1/
ticularly on FK 156� 9 and the testing and repair program
1/
FK 150 caused project personnel considerable concern
from the day that the cables were reached. It was physically
in very poor shape, with brittle and cracking insulation. The
actual tap of FK 150 was delaye0 almost three months in
deference to its poor physical condition.
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continued. This general situation was noted by personnel at
the site who checked the tap on the morning of 19 April and
found it to be in good condition with no faults present.
Berlin notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening of
20 April, noting, "available precautions taken including
primary one of crossing fingers."
Throughout 20 April Soviet operators at Karlshorst, the
Mahlow cable chamber, and Zossen/Wuensdorf checked FK 150 pairs
carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made
switches where necessary or possible. Nothing was said con-
cerning the testing being conducted to discover the faults or
work being done by a Soviet labor force lent to the Germans
to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable. On 21 April
a Karlshorst technician told a colleague in Zossen/Wuensdorf
the FK 150 had not yet been repaired and that another two days'
work would probably be necessary to clear up the trouble.
Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped up during the
evening of 21 April, and the Soviets showed considerable con-
cern over the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning telegraph
channel which had been transferred to FK 150 on 17 April� Lt.
Colonel Vyunik, Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Wuensdorf,
telephoned Major Alpatov, Chief of the Karlshorst Signal Center,
at his apartment to inform him of the failure of the Air
Warning circuit. They agreed that communications had to be
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established before morning and Alpatov left for his duty
station.
There is no significant information available on the
actual progress of the testing and repair program proper from
0300 hours on 20 April to 0050 hours on 22 April. On the basis
of available information, however, it seems probable that (a)
the testing program continued north until a fault was located
near the site and a decision was made to replace an entire
section of cable which embraced the tap site; or (b) the re-
peated faulting coupled with the age and physical condition of
FK 150 led the opposition to the conclusion that the only
effective remedy was to replace the cable, section by section,
and that this program was inaugurated somewhere south of our
site and continued northward until the tap was discovered.
At approximately 0050 hours on 22 April, 40 or 50 men
were seen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee, deployed
along the entire area observable from our installation,
digging at three to five foot intervals over the location of
the cable and, incidentally, the tap chamber. At approximately
0200 hours the top of the tap chamber was discovered, and at
0210 Russian speech was heard from the microphone in the tap
chamber. The first fragments of speech indicated that the dis-
covery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion among those
present. A small hole was broken in the tap chamber roof
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permitting limited visual observation of the chamber, and a
2/
Soviet captain was brought to the spot. After some discus-
sion all agreed that the discovery was a manhole covering a
repeater point, and the working crew began enlarging the hole
to gain access to the "repeater point."
While the working party was uncovering the tap chamber,
Major Alpatov and Lt. Colonel Vyunik discussed the communi-
cations situation in a rambling telephone conversation at
approximately 0230 hours. They indicated relief at the res-
toration of Air Warning Communications with Moscow, and Vyunik
went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on
FK 150. In context it appears that this suspicion was
directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up the diffi-
culties on FK 150 once and for all. In any event, Alpatov
clearly did not share his colleague's doubts. The general
tone of this conversation was relaxed and casual, completely
in keeping with the character of the two men, both of whom
we know well. The conversation appears to be a clear indi-
cation that, as of 0230 hours on 22 April, neither of these
responsible officers was aware of the existence of the tap.
V Presumably Captain Bartash, an engineer who later
received an unspecified award from Marshal Grechko for the
discovery of the tap.
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Meanwhile back at the site the work of enlarging a hole
to give full access to the �tap chamber continued. At approxi-
mately 0250 hours an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on
the scene, presumably in response to a request for guidance
by the working party. The Colonel did not appear to be a
signal officer since he took no active part in the investiga-
tion and remained on the sdene only for a short time. Having
enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof, the workers saw for
the first time the cables and the trap door on the floor of
the chamber. They assumed the trap door to be "some sort of
box" and had no suspicion of the true nature of the installa-
tion. At approximately 0300 hours barriers were erected to
keep inquisitive onlookers away from the excavation and it
was suggested that someone be sent to the Signal Directorate,
presumably to obtain relevant cable data. At the same time
the first German voice was heard, in conversation with a
German-speaking Russian, The German stated that two trucks
must have passed the spot without locating it. The Russian
answered that "Soviet troops are coming as well," and added
that they must wait "until morning" for the decision as to
what further work would be undertakeft.
While these developments were taking place, Vyunik held
a telecon with the Air Warning Center in Moscow in which he
referred to the move of the GSFG Air Warning Center and
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discussed, in detail, communication arrangements necessi-
tated by this move. This revealing teleconference tends to
support other evidence indicating that as of 0300 hours the
true nature of the installation had still not been established.
The work of excavation continued, and fragments of con-
versation connected with it were picked up by the tap chamber
microphone. A German-speaking Russian commented that "some-
body has come from there and there are fewer workers there,"
suggesting that similar work was in progress at another point.
The Russian gave instructions that' nothing in the installation
,was to be touched. A German remarked that the chamber might
be connected with sewage work and proposed that plans of the
sewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities.
The Russian answered that they already had this information
and that the plans showed "that chamber" to be 120 meters
away from this point.
of the tap chamber was
tenor obtained, those
about its exact nature
At about 0320 hours, when still more
revealed and a better view of the in-
present began to speculate vaguely
and the time of its construction. One
of the Soviets, probably an officer, suggested that it might
have been built during the war, possibly for "Vhe Che" (Russian
abbreviation for "high frequency transmission," but used loose-
ly to denote anything connected with secure communications.)
Shortly after 0330 hours, the Soviets left the site by motor
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vehicle, presumably to report their findings. For approxi-
mately one and one-half hours - from 0330 to 0500 - no
sounds or voices were recorded.
At approximately '0415 hours Vyunik telephoned Alpatov's
apartment in Karlshorst and asked Alpatov if he had spoken
with General Dudakov, Chief Signal Officer, GSFG. Alpatov
said that he had, that he was getting dressed, and that he
would go to his signal center as soon as possible. Vyunik
told Alpatov to telephone him at the GSFG frame room at
Zossen/Wuensdorf, adding, "When we speak we must do so care-
fully. We know what the matter is, so we will speak care-
fully." This indicated clearly that by 0415 hours the GSFG
Signal Directorate and General Dudakov, the Chief Signal
Officer, had been informed of the discovery of the PBJOINTLY
chamber, viewed it with extreme suspicion, and planned to re-
route circuits passing over the target cables. This coincides
neatly with the departure from the tap site of the Soviets at
0330. At 0630 Vyunik telephoned Alpatov at the Karlshorst
Signal Center and informed him that Lt. Colonel Zolochko,
Deputy Chief of the Lines Department, GSFG, had left Wuensdorf
at 0625 to go "there." Vyunik, in a resigned tone, then added
that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do was to sit
and wait.
In due course Lt. Colonel Zolochko arrived at the site,
accompanied by an unnamed Colonel and Captain Bartash, the
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Commander of the working party. By this time the Soviets
apparently had brought circuit diagrams to the site and were
aware of the pair allocations on the affected cables. There
was considerable discussion of the discovery, and one of the
crew actually entered the chamber and made a superficial and
inconclusive examination. Shortly afterwards the statement,
"the cable is tapped," was made for the first time on the
scene.
At about this time (0635 hours) Lt. Colonel Vyunik tele-
phoned Major Alpatov and asked whether he had received the
"task" and whether its meaning was clear. Alpatov replied
that he had received and understood the assignment. Speaking
in unusually vague terms, Vyunik instructed Alpatov to take
over two low-frequency channels, presumably provided by the
KGB signals organization. (These channels would provide tele-
phone communications between Berlin and Wuensdorf via overhead
line and would by-pass the tapped cables.) Vyunik added that
they could continue necessary technical discussions on the
new facilities.
Although teletype traffic continued until the tap wires
were cut - at 1535 hours on Sunday afternoon - the last tele-
phone call of any interest was placed sometime between 0800
and 0900 hours on 22 April, when an agitated General speaking
from Marshal Grechko's apartment attempted to contact Colonel
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Kotsyuba, who was then acting for General Dibrova, Berlin
�
Commandant. Unable to locate Kotsyuba, the General talked to
Colonel Pomozanovskii, Chief of Staff of the Berlin Garrison,
stressing the urgency of his call. Pomozanovskii promised to
find Kotsyuba at once and get him to return the call. The
return call was not intercepted, but there appears to be no
doubt that Marshal Grechko had by this time been informed of
the discovery and wished to discuss it with Colonel Kotsyuba.
A few telephone calls were attempted after this, but the oper-
ators refused to place the calls, and in one case a Karlshorst
operator said, "I won't put you through to anyone. Don't ring,
that's all. I won't answer you any more. It's in the order."
Between 0700 and 0800 hours a number of additional Soviet
officers arrived at the excavation, including Colonel Gusev
of the KGB Signals Regiment. A Russian-speaking German was
heard to remark that a "commission" was expected, and a Soviet
officer said that they would await the arrival of this commis-
sion before making a decision as to what the next step would
be. In answer to a question as to whether anything should be
disconnected, the same officer stated that nothing should be
done beyond making motion pictures of the chamber. He added,
however, that the hole providing access to the chamber should
be enlarged and a detailed inspection should be carried out.
The general discussion continued, and the possibility of some
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form of explosive booby trap in the chamber was discussed at
some length. There was widespread belief that the trap door,
which in fact provided access to the tunnel proper, was a "box"
or "battery box" possibly involving a booby trap. One of the
Soviet officers, probably Zolochko, suggested that, after every-
thing had been carefully noted and recorded, a grappling iron
could be attached to the "box" in order to tear it away. "If
there is no explosion," he said, "then we can calmly go ahead
and deal with it."
Several individuals, presumably German cable splicers,
agreed that the cables were fully tapped and discussed the
method employed. They agreed that it must have been done in
such a way as to render the tap undetectable by measurements,
although one of them failed to understand why the actual cut-
ting of the cables was not detected. He added that at that
time "everyone must have been quite drunk." The Germans con-
tinued to speculate on the nature of the "box" and about the
means of access to the tap chamber. One of them said, "They
themselves must have some means of entering this place, but
naturally it's highly improbable that they have constructed
a passage for getting from here to there!"
Some of those present apparently believed that the tap
was an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faults
on the cable. During this discussion the microphone was
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twice noted, but was not recognized for what it was. In the
first instance the speaker said, "That is not a microphone,"
and in the second it was described as "a black ball."
The general discussion continued, with speculation as to
the nature of the "battery box" and with several comments that
it should be possible to identify the tappers "from the make
of the materials" and the techniques employed. While the Ger-
mans began work enlarging the hole around the tap chamber, the
Soviets discussed in some detail the order in which technical
experts and administrative representatives would carry out
their inspection. The Soviets identified the lead-off cable
as "not ours," indicating that after the inspection they planned
to disconnect the lead-off cable and to "check how far it goes
from here" - probably by means of electrical measurements. It
is evident that at this time (approximately 1130 hours) the
Soviets and Germans were still unaware of the existence of the
tunnel, the means of access to the tap chamber, or those re-
sponsible for the tap.
At approximately 1145 hours one of the German crew was
heard to exclaim, "The box is an entry to a shaft:"
From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seem
that a small hole had been made near the still-intact trap
door. The Germans debated the removal of the trap door, but
continued to work at and around it despite the alternate
12.
SE ET
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suggestion that "we should open up the road opposite until
we reach the cable or the shaft." By approximately 1230
they had removed the hinges and entered the lower part of
the tap chamber. The padlock which secured the trap door from
below was examined and was identified as "of English origin."
Failing to open the door separating the tap chamber from the
equipment chamber, the Germans, after approximately twenty min-
utes, broke a hole through the wall and gained visual access
to the equipment chamber, which they described as "a long
� passage." By 1300 they evidently had enlarged the access hole
and described "a completed installation - a telephone exchange..
.. An installation for listening in /Kbhoeranlage7."
Additional motion pictures were made and frequent excla-
mations of wonder and admiration were heard. At 1420 a Soviet
Colonel, probably Zolochko; a person addressed as Nikolai
Ivanovich, probably Major Alpatov; and a Captain, presumably
Bartash, entered the chamber and discussed the method used
by the tappers in gaining access to the cables. Zolochko
evidently still believed that this was done "from above."
Conversations indicated that the joint Soviet-German commis-
sion, mentioned earlier, had already visited the site and
established the nature of the installation without going into
technical details.
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Measurements of parts of th'e interior were then taken,
discussion of the installation became general, and the partici-
pants clearly indicated that the means of access and full impli-
cations of the operation were finally appreciated. Conversations
reflected that all present realized that the planning of the
tunnel approach to the cables must have necessitated a very
detailed study of relevant maps and plans. The stress to which
the roof of the chambers would be subjected and the necessity
of preparing the lead-off cables beforehand were mentioned,
and a German was heard to exclaim, "It must have cost a pretty
penny." A Russian-speaking German added, admiringly, "How
neatly and tidily they have done it." It was decided that
work on the tunnel must have been carried out during the day
when the sound of the street traffic would drown any noise,
whereas the actual tapping was done "during the night, between
one and two o'clock, when the traffic on the cables is slight."
One of the Germans rather indignantly exclaimed, "What a
filthy trick. And where you would least expect it." -- to
which another replied, "Unless one had seen it for oneself,
nobody would believe it."
Between 1515 and 1530 hours the tap wires were cut, and
at about 1545 the attention of the Germans began to concentrate
on the microphone itself. One of them assumed it to be an
"alarm device - probably a microphone," to give warning of
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approaching motor traffic, and added that it ought to be
photographed. At 1550 hours work began on dismantling
the microphone. Shortly afterward the microphone went
dead and, after 11 months and 11 days, the operational
phase of PBJOINTLY was completed.
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APPENDIX Bs
RECAPITULATION OF THE INTEIJLIGENCE DERIVED
Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence
derived from the REGAL material and some typical consumer
comments.
GENERAL
The REGAL operation provided the United States and the
British with a unique source of current intelligence on the
Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been avail-
able since 1948. Responsible U.S. and British officials con-
sidered PBJOINTLY, during its productive phase, to-be the
prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in
Europe, if not world-wide. Following are examples of items
of intelligence for which REGAL was either a unique or most
timely and reliable source.
POLITICAL
Throughout the life of source (11 May 1955 - 22 April
1956) we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in
Berlin; REGAL provided the inside story of every "incident�
occurring in Berlin during the period - a story which was in
c a I
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each case considerably at variance with accounts of the same
incident as reported by other sources. REGAL showed that,
contrary to estimates by other sources, the Soviets at that
time did not intend to relinquish their prerogatives vis-a-
vis the other three occupying powers despite continually
increasing pressure from the East Germans to assert their sov-
ereignty in East Berlin as well as in the rest of East Germany.
REGAL provided a clear picture of the unpreparedness, confusion,
and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever
an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one
of the Western powers.
The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an
East German Army was disclosed by REGAL in October 1955, in
time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers
Conference in Geneva to that effect.
REGAL provided a detailed account of the Soviet program
for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party Congress,
including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear
scientists resulting from a too-literal interpretation of the
new theory of collective leadership and the denigration of
Stalin.
The progress of Marshal Zhukov's attempt to curtail the
influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces
(which led to his subsequent downfall) was traced in REGAL
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SE
material from the autumn of 1955 to mid-April 1956.
REGAL provided considerable intelligence on the relation-
ships between various key military and political figures of
the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and
the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland.
MILITARY
General
a. Reorganization of the Soviet Ministry of
Defense.
b. Soviet plans to implement the Warsaw Pact by
increasing Soviet-Satellite military coordination.
c. Implementation of the publicly announced
intention to reduce the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.
d. Identification of several thousand Soviet
officer-personnel.
Air
a. Development of an improved nuclear delivery
capability in the Soviet Air Army in East Germany.
b. Re-equipment of the Soviet Air Army in East
Germany with new bombers and twin-jet interceptors
having an airborne radar capability.
C, Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in
Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division.
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d. Identification and location of approximately
100 Soviet Air Force installations in the USSR, East
Germany, and Poland, including a number of key aircraft
factories.
Ground Forces
a. Order of battle of Soviet ground forces within
the USSR not previously identified or not located for
several years by any other source.
b. Soviet training plans for the spring and early
summer of 1956 in East Germany and Poland.
c. Identification of several thousand Soviet field
post numbers (used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of
battle intelligence).
Navy
6
a. Reduction in the status and personnel strength
of the Soviet Naval Forces.
b. Organization and administrative procedures of
the Headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and Soviet
Naval Bases on the Baltic Coast,
SCIENTIFIC
Identification of several hundred personalities associ-
ated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program.
Association of certain locations in the USSR with AE
activities.
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R
Organization and activities of Wismuth SDAG (mining
uranium in the Aue area of East Germany).
OPERATIONAL
Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet
Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of
several hundred Soviet Intelligence personalities in East
Germany and Moscow.
TYPICAL CONSUMER COMMENTS
March 1956
ACSI/Army - "REGAL has provided unique and highly
valuable current information on the order of battle,
training, organization, equipment, and operations of the
Soviet and East German Ground Forces. In addition, the
scope and variety of the types of information found in
REGAL have confirmed that it is our best source of early
warning of Soviet attack."
ACSI/Air - "The numerous productions received from
the REGAL project have been an extremely valuable con-
tribution to the Intelligence Community in our common
problems."
7 February 1958
CIA/OSI - "REGAL has provided valuable information
on atomic energy activities in East Germany, including
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T
organizational relationships, personalities, procurement
details, and uranium ore shipment data. The number of
hitherto unknown atomic energy localities, personalities,
and activities disclosed in REGAL traffic is impressive."
CIA/ORR - "In referenced memorandum we indicated our
great interest in financial material of all kinds which
was available in REGAL material. Thanks to your coopera-
tion we are exploiting the material with great success."
6
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APPENDIX C
TYPICAL AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT
SE ET
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WASHINGTON POST
1 May 1956
TheTun:nd of Look?
The United Statei Government has not yet made
any official reply to the Soviet and East German
allegations and protests concerning the 300-yard
tunnel that American intelligence operatives are
said to have built underneath the border between
West and East Berlin for espionage purposes.
Meanwhile, assuming the story to be correct�we
cannot help thinking the Communists have made
a grievous mistake to raise so much fuss about their
discovery, They are even said to �have conducted
special propaganda tours through the tunnel and
to have exhibited the wiretapping and other record-
ing apparatus that the Americans are supposed to
have installed inside it.
The probable result of all this has been to give
the anti-Communist resistance in East Germany a
good deal of amusement and encouragement. Cer-
tainly it must have served to strAgthen the .im-
pression of American resourcefulness and thereby
to restore some measure of our prestige--which
apparently had been deteriorating since the equivo�
cal attitude taken by the American authorities in
the East German uprisings of June, 1954�among
the captive population. The reaction of their
kinsmen in 'West Germany is probably a pretty
good index to their own.
In West Germany the story has been accepted
at face value with astonishment and delight as an
evidence that the tradition of Yankee resource-
fulness and ingenuity is not a myth after all.
Espionage is one game in which the Communists
were deemed, even by their enemies, to be par-
ticularly expert and our own side to be dismally
inept, Very few Germans, as the Frankfurter
Neue Presse exultantly observed, even suspected
that the Americans "were capable of so much
cleverness"; and it would be even more devastating
to Communist prestige if it were disclosed that
the espionage tunnel had been in operation for
some time before the Communists became aware
of it.
Indeed, if the tunnel episode turns out lo have
been the product of Yankee ingenuity, there is an
interesting parallel in American history. During
the siege of Petersburg in 1864, an 'enterprising
Union officer from the Pennsylvania coal fields
conceived the idea of mining the Confederate
positions from a tunnel under them. The tunnel
was dug and the mines were finally set eff; And
though the operation was a fiasco in part because'
of the failitre of Union commanders to execute
orders, the boldness of the stroke has compelled
.admiration ever since, ' �
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TIME MAGAZINE
7 May 1956 '
BERLIN
Wonderful Tunnel
Berlin, city of � rubble, refugees, and
occasional patches of !glitter, is an Alfred
IIitchcock dream of subterfuge and suspi-
cion. In back streets, darkly mysterious'
houses lurk behind high wire fences sug-
gestive of darker ;Ind more mysterious
doings within. Newsmen recently count!cl
.s.7 separate agencies of Western intelli-
gence known to be at work in Berlin.
Their ols.ratives�some fashionably
'clothed in the grey flannel of New York's !
Nladison Avenue, some with armpit holr
sters bulging under blue serge�report to �
k different headquarters. and rarely know
what. their colleagues are up tu-
tu :di Berlin there is no spot better
suited to the Ili:uncoil( scheme of things
tIi an a rustic, semi-deserted corner known
on the U.S. side as Rudow and in the
Russian zone, just over the way, as Alt-
Glienieke. Self-important ducks and
chickens strut like commissars in Alt-
Glienicke's cobbled street . Berlin�s only
working windmill turns lazily in the
breeze near by, and close to the boundary
separating East and West stands a U.S.
radar station, bending its reticular 'ear to
the operations at East Berlin's busy
Schonefeld Airport. Two rings of barbed
wire guard the lonely radar post, and
The Big Collar. For many a month,
the super-secrecy surrounding the con-
struction and operation of Rudow.s radar
station had fed the gossip of bored Amer-
icans in the occupied city. There were
those who remembered a civilian engineer
hired to supervise the job; he had quit in
disgust because the blueprints seemed so
crazy. "Why build a cellar big enough to
drive through with a dump truck?" he
asked, and was told to mind his own busi-
ness. Others recalled seeing friends whom
they knew to be engineers suddenly ap-
pearing at the station wearing the insignia
of the U.S. Army Signal Corps. Why? An
amused shrug was the only answer ques-
tioners ever got�but last week the Rus-
sians thought they had found a better one.
- One night at 7 o'clock, an angry,
chunky Soviet colonel named Ivan Kotsi-
uba called a press conference in East Ber- '
'lin. Purpose: to protest the building by.
"American organizations" of a secret
tunnel under East German�territory. "with
the criminal intent of spying." Offered a
chance to see for themselves, the Western
� ' � newsmen were taken to a site some sop:
behind them a detachment of uniformed yards from the radar. station at Rudow.-;
Signal Corps men live a life as secret; '
and isolated as monks.
C-3
A Lot of Money. Truckloads of Red
army troops and squad cars crowded with
Voikspolizei stood by. Mobile generators
were humming to provide lights for the
occasion, and at the entrance to a bole
dug in the ground. 0 colonel of the Rus-
sian signal corps was on hand to explain it
all. Ten feet below. its entrance a hole cut.
in the roof by tile Russians. lay the tunnel
itself; a cast-iron tube about six feet
in diameter and soo-600 yards long,
crammed with electronic equipment, ca-
bles, tape receirders, ventilating apparatus
and pumps of both British and American
make. At the East Gemian end. cables led
out of the main body of the tunnel to a
separate chamber where they were linked
to two East German cables and a third
used by the Russians. What was at the
American end? The newsmen were not
permitted to know. As they crawled west-
ward, a sandbag barrier barred the way,
its purpose emphasized by a sign reading
in English and German: "Von are now
entering the American sector.'�
"This tunnel," said the Russian expert,
with a note of admiration, "was built to
last years. The party responsible must
have had a lot of money."
!Who was responsible? Nobody, neither
the Pentagon, the State Department, nor
the Central Intelligence Agency, was say-
ing. But as Berlins'papers erupted glee-
fully with the news, one Berlin editor told
a ranking U.S. official: "I don't know
whether your people (lug that wenderful
tunnel or not, but whoever it was, let me
say I think it was too bad it was found.
It's the best publicity the U.S.has had in.
Berlin, for a long, time."
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� BOSTON OST
cire.: m. 267,872
S.f 196,496
Front Ed I ()Shot
p.c. p4.
, DAY
2E3
MY 41956
r-lope Tr1.4 '
Soviet charges that American intelligence agents;.
dug a tunnel in Berlin, tapped a telephone cable, andi
I recorded conversations over the Red communication ,net-
work, which the Reds .made With considerable�fanfare�
and during a conducted tour of the spy tunnel for cor7� d
respondents, gives us some faint hope.
� Frankly, We didn't.knoW that American intelligencl
Lagents were that smart.: In fact, we were beginning td.
I think that what the Central Intelligence Agency needed.
wZM:new lelsoiis' on the fundamentals. of espionage.
!f_r_orn-S_orLie defected Russian agent$131iti.now_we take it;
all back. If the Soviet charges are true, American intel-
ience
agentS'Ia-Ve-i1Ctually eollected, some important
s information co-ncerning Soviet rmilary operations and.
,..----
,installations in East_QeXIDAM.Y.,,
; "We^ liOpe that American intelligence .agents have
iinfiltrated :the � Soviet department of foreign a'ffairs,
planted western'sympathizers� in the heart of the Soviet!
�bureaucracy and started a stream of microfilmed copie&
of important Soviet' j2smeatz,lowa,i4Ullea,C1.Aoiri
1,7t.T.ashingto . . �
e hope, all this because that is precisely what the
iSoviet spy network 'did and is probably doing right now
in the United States. This is not just tit for tat--butA
istark necessityin'the World of cynical pow0politics.
L... �
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STAMFORD (Conn.)
ADVOCAT
Circ.: c.f 23,166
Front E ..it Other
Pg
. Potle Page
� Dato: 4 Is 4 64 's)1:.j
Ar ,
i Money Well Spent 1-7
� ; .
There is only one agency In Vasil ,
ington which does not account-for the.I
1
i money it spends. The Q�Entral Intell0
gence Agency, headed firlATier�W1
; Dulles, has never reported to Con-
ci
gress. A special committee, appointed
by the President, did make 'a survey
of the agency's activities and was ap-
parently satisfied that it was efficient.
! So sure,. are the activities of this
group that even the amount of
money it spends is unknown. Ac-
countants have estimated that there
is roughly $2 billion in budgets of
other departments which is diverted
,
to the CIA.
Naturally enough, Congress worries
from time to � time that this money
may not be well sent. Last week some
news came out of Berlin which should
calm such. fears;
The Russians discovered that their
three main . telephone cables. from
East Berlin to points east were tapped.
A tunnel from the western zone, con-
nected with the tapped lines arid
wires, led to sandbags at the zone
boundary. The Russians were greatly
disturbed. They claim that all mes-
sages for several years have peen in-
tercepted. They blame this violation
of privacy on American Intelligence.
Our officials have expressed horror,
at the charge. They haven't, they say,'
the slightest idea of Where the lines.
'lead or by whom they were laid. The
Russians are just old meanies to claim.
We wire-tapped.
West Berliners are laughing. Good'
for American Intelligence, they say:
They hope, and so do we, that the,'
Russians have only discovered one of
several taps. At least, the expose
shows that some .of . the . money spent
by,CIA�may�have.beell very well spent
Indeed.. f � . �
"
C�$
VAY 121E
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LATIONAL BROADCAoI.LAv t,v1-44-tuu. IJJ to+
CIA MAY HAVE ORD
or.
WIRETAP TUNNEL --, DREIER.:
Alex Dreier at 6:00 P.M. over WMAQ (Chicago) and the NTO
Radio Network:
"And now under the heading, special report, part one.
JICreat-BI,itain-with-ita-frogman-spy-whe-turned-CUt-to-be-not
--s-0-211c-OsSiP1 ln-hia-secrctivoness-has-nothing_on,us. We have a
tunnel we dug under the communist sector of Berlin and which the
reds exposed to the light of day, as you probably know, a short
while ago. Well, our NBC correspondent, good friend and colleague,
Frank Burkholzer, has investigated the story of the wiretap tunnel
and he' says there's just one conclusion -- it's ours. We dug it,
we equipped it with electronic equipment to listen in on communist
East German conversations for a whole year before they found. us out.
"Presumably we should be embarrassed but nobody in Berlin is.
In factp.there is a hint of American and West German pride in know-
ing that we pulled off an espionage trick on the Reds for a change.
Of course, the East Germans are making a good thing of it by con-
ducting tours through the tunnel to impress their people with the
dastardliness of the American spies, but that may backfire on them
because the East Germans are not beyond getting a quiet chuckle at .
this outwitting of their communist rulers.
"Burkholzer tells us that the United States is stamped all
over the listening post tunnel. Now, the tunnel is on the outskirts
of town with our end being located under a so-called experimental
radar station beside a garbage dump. It runs straight under a plowed
field that has white border marking posts above it. The Russians
have made three openings for the tourists. One is near the wiretap,
another at a point about 150 yards out in the field. When anyone
asks an American why there isn't any radar at the experimental radar
station, the usual answer, according to Burkholzer, is, we said it
was experimental, didn't we? Want to make something of it?"
"Naturally the army and the government in Washington aren't
going to admit anything unless they have to. No one tells who
ordered the eavesdropping tunnel built or who paid for it or who
did the listening and the digging. Perhaps it was the work of a
local Berlin outfit, just a curious bunch of boys. Or perhaps it
was done secretly on orders direct from the Pentagon or the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Anyway, it was done well because it wasn't
discovered for a year and now the Russians may be wondering how
much we learned from recording all the phone talks, possibly includia
everything that went through the switchboard of the nearby Soviet
airfield. So thanks for the information, Frank Burkholzer, and now
we have a question for you. Why don't we open a tourist entrance
at our end of the tunnel and cash in on the publicity? Step up,
one and all. Only a quarter. See modern eapionage in electronic
form and all underground, and who know47 Porloppo you will meet an
occasional communist tourist.�
rt
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J.Nraw
ITZZALD TRIBUNI3
� PAY 2'7-1956
i .
.
pi...(2.4il
.po.,.q.1..esFlock to See:
�,..J. S:, �Wire - Taro Tuniae'
. 1
The 500-yard tunnel repre-
sents a venture of extraordinary
audacity�the stuff of which
thriller films are made. If it
was dug by American Intelli-
gence forces�and that is the.
general assumption�it is a
striking example of their
capacity for daring undertakings.
Seldom equipment on the roof. The
has an intelligence bUilding�is-Surrounded by barbed
organization executed a mere
skillful ;and difficult operation
than that accomplished by the
tunnel's diggers: the tapping of
259 Communist long-distance
telephone lines running under-
ground in Berlin., The lines ap-
amrently included some running
to Soviet satellite state in East-
stern Europe, as well as Soviet.
(Army circuits in Germany. The men who dug the tunnel
Obviously labored under two
_per- Sriek.Ba-r--ThriveS' major handicaps. They had to
The tunnel, discovered by the wbrk very silently to avoid �de-
;Communists a month ago and tection, and they had to haul
CC);
By Gaston Coblentz Sandbag Barricade
Wireless to Hic HeralilTribunci "We have no fault whatsoever
1956, N.Y. Herald Tribune Inc. to find with the technique," one
the greatest siehts of the cold)
May 2G.�One of attendant said.
From the eastern entrance, a
'BERLIN,
%/isnot' can walk westward for
war Is the "American spy tun-
nel" now on exhibition in Xast perhaps 190 yards past the point
where tho tunnel CrOnAen under
Berlin. the sector border. Then 'a sand-
bag barricade is encountered,
and a voice calls out "halt" in:
German.
It is clear that If the visitor;
could continue westward past
the barricade he would emerge.
soon at a .low but prominent
American building with radar.
A study of the area suggest:
no possibility other than that
the radar building encloses the
western end of the tunnel.
Clay Hauled Away
wire and guarded constantly byi
American soldiers. Signs in Ger. Complex Equipment
man warn: "Entry most strictll
forbidden." � Beyond the door is a compart-
ment seven � feet long housing
equipment to maintain certain;
levels of temperature and hu-
midity. The Communists say,
this was necessary to proteet�
delicate equipment in the other-
wise dwelt and cold tunnel.
Finally, there is the complex
tapping equipment, all of Ameri-
can or British manufacture..
This includes eight racks of'
With the tunnel completed
there came the job of installing
the monitoring equipment. Ap-
almeter and with its roof twelve Paren---
tiv this had to be done
feet below the surface,
from a point 200 yards id
of estLthi,..s equipment had the primary
was dugi before the Communist lines
;could be tapped, because part of
wIttlich would haveverempocr
microphone
Berlin. the American sector
.tictivity by the Communist's at,
preventing detection off
point 300 yards inside the Rus-
Berlin. It runs eastward to a!'asit el
ithe phone taps. The mass o ithe point where their lines werei
equipment was painstakingly 'tapped. Any activity there wouldV
, sian sector. The western en-,
!dragged through the tunnel have meant that the tunnel hacil. �
trance .lies in a sparsely-popu-
i along two wooden rails and have
discovered.
lated locality called Itudow. p
Only the eastern end of thelhoused in a special ninety400t- h en who did the. actual! ,
long compartment at the eastern tapping must have been among: � ,
tunnel is open .for visitors. A
end of the tunnel. - ithe great experts in the flelcil
People's Pollee and a communi-
detachment ' of Communist
This compartment begins withlTh did . remarkably tidy;
cations expert. are on hand to a thick steel door at its western.piec'e of work.
entrance. On the door�one. of
explain every detail. They readily Th
express their admiration for the
skill of the project's buildept.;
. ..., .,.�......,-- �-�������� �� : .
.a thriving business 'near theftrucks brought into the radar
. building. Possibly the same
,eastern end of the tunnel, cater;.1
trucks bought in the sections of
dng to East, German factorYj
ebrrugated iron tubing which
;delegations brought to see the!
"pine the tunnel. The Utmost
4, work of ','American imperialists.
!secrecy must have been used to
. After inspecting the tunne1,1
,the factory workers record their;avoid stirring up local talk.
,"indignation" in a visitors' book.! The Communists cstinate that
!this part of the work took sev-
iThe book contains the signa-1
tunes of foreigners on both sidesieral months. -
of the Iron Curtain. Even a
Sudanese official is, listed,.
- The tunnel, six feet in di-
'now the main sightseeing at-etway secretly the thousands of boosters to carry the tapped con-
traction in Berlin, can be visited .tons of clay they dug out, since versation back to the western
.by making a twenty-minute big pilis of earth near the sector end of the tunnel and also to
;drive from the center of Berlin border would have alerted the help prevent detection of the
:to the 'southeast corner of the :Communists. .taps.
Apparently the excavated There are three power-control
A mobile snack bar is doing.iearth was hauled away in closed Units near two long racks of
equipment into which the 259
Communist line lead from
three main cables. Here the in-
dividual monitoring taps are
made. ' Along the 'opposite wall
of the tunnel is a row of benches,
with ftucrescent lighting over-
head: 'The. compartment Is
painted tv, battleship gray. '
Considered Great Experts
At the very end ofthe eastern
compartment there is another
steel door. On the eastern side
of it Is one more important item,
'
'..uwmtinlsts say the in-
the tunnel's nicest touches�I. stallation apparently operated written in ,Russian and, Get' for several months before it was'
man: ''Entry forbidden by ordertliscovered. There is no explana-
of the Commanding General." tion of how it was cletcqed.
LJ
-
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',.. our Eerie Bore ; around mounds of earth exca-
i
BY JOHN H. THOMPSON . : vthaetedtutnonerleyeal two sections of
,
iChle3ro Trihune rw, Service; Across the border, Vopos
. BERLIN, Yay 28 � Three: ' ions, asserting it held signa-
! tock us to , their' commander, '
! American' n e w sine n today +-zures of Chinese, Koreans,
past men and women waiting
; stood 20 feet underground in British,' 'Americans, . and oath.?
to tour the tunnel after watch-
. ; the alleged "American spy and asked us to. sigit,
ing a communist movie of its er,
. tunnel," burrowed 300 yards Just to keep the record
discovery. The commander under Berlin's little Iron Cur- straight, in case the .East Ger;
examined o u r passports,
thin, and peered into the . mans attempt to use Or
smiled, 'and led us down a'
�, gloom of the American sectos
4' over the shoulders of two
kGerman communist tommy
� v gunners. � ' .
Our hest .in as eerie a set-
,,tiry* as�was ever devised by a
4 b
'mystery- writer, was a jack
' booted officer of the East
German communistpolice, the
flight of dirt stairs into the statements br propag,we
� tunnel. .wrote, in my handwriting:
' ,
e '
Encased in steel and con-
W wish to thank the
, ,f
erete was the alleged,wire tap volkspolizei very much or
'laboratory," directly under a' being kind enough to show'ms,
paved road leading from Ber-
the tunnel.", ��, � ; !oiL,A0
lin to the Russian air base at
Schoenfeld. The commander,'
Vopos," or Volkspolizei. .who declined to � give his .
;."
Our tour was the third per'.
name, said that 216 telephone
� initted Western reporters since , ,
lines in three big cables were
the night of April 21 when Lappeu�
the Russian high command Fluescent lightinZ_Illik
.: , ,
here announced 'discovery of eminated a switchboz)rd, banks
the tunnel and equipment it of Current boosters, ampli-
' said was used for wire tap- fiers, acid cables. 'All instruc-.
' ping. 1.
Since then the "spy tunnel,"
i so labeled by the Russians and
; East Germans, has been ys
ited by incise than 15,000 East
;German worker delegations,
!�the Communists said. � .
Germans' Admire Feat
; Situated in line with an ex-
perimental , American army,
'tons on the equipment were.
in English. Some items bore;
the labels Of British, or Ameni-1
can manufactureres.
' Reds Man Guns
Pumps sent hot and cold
water to an air conditioning!
unit. Other long ,pipes held!
oil or air. The tunnel was!
radar station , [the Russians
made of bolted sections of cor-
say it is a dummy], owner-
ship of the tunnel- has -not
:been officially admitted by
:the American Command, here
'or.in Washington.
NV 7,F1: American soldiers in sentry ship of the tunnel has not
U i U 11 b , kiLdit,,A1 . boxes watched us, thru field been established, but that in
. ' .... glasses as we sauntered to- 'a time of "tension," the right-
�'
, . r ward the clearly marked com- ness or wrongness depended
Let 3 U. S. Reporters. munist border, down a dirt upon , the Side of. the fence
road, bordering an open field:
ifrom which the operation was
* s 1
driven' out to' the'. radar site
F.:9 [,-1 ,111' Robert Tuckm,an, Asso-
tJ �� Ul � .
! elated Press bureau chief.
Barbed wire surrounded the
3v
9i ztation and its permanent
I �1hci1/407
611Ji type buildings.
'.. I. Watched by Yanks
the borders of the Germanj
democratic republic?' he
asked.
Pens a Thank You �
Our answer, in halting Ger-
man, explainea that owner-
We could se knots of Vopos
rugated steel, lined on the;
.sides with sandbags.
' Walking back, 300 yards, we
reached the east-west border.I
Therei'behind sandbags twol
West Berliners are con-
young Vopos crouched with'
e vinced the Americans built
their guns and a powerful
. ,.
the tunnel, 'equipped
it. with:searchlight, aimed up the tun-';
�l
expensive apparatus, and then under the American' sec,'
,
ne tor.
'listened in on Red army tel-1
_*
.ephone conversations since' Outside again, the rCom-1
the summer of 1954. � I mander. asked us what would
To them, it was, an the' reaction in the United. astound-I be.
ing feat, which has greatly'
States if the Canadians or Mex.'
''
S �
,enhan ican drove .such a "spy
eed American prestige.;
about it.
The boldness of burrowing
tunnel es' , under our borders.
under th Russian noses, and
We. said the Americans would
'e' '? ;
. or wrong for
, its ,*.technical accomplishment, be �
"unhappys
:have captured the imaginatien "I it right
of. many Germans.
Aniericans to do this �under.
.
.������-�r" No one expected' h sight of
the tunnel ,today when Wai-,
... � �
viewed.
He showed us a book in
which tunnel � visitors were
asked to inscribe 'their' opin-
Chicago Trill-me
MaY 55
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SE
APPENDIX D
NOTE: This analysis was prepared by the PBJOINTLY
SIIT1 as part of the wrap-up of the operation.
ROUND-UP OF EAST GERMAN PRESS
REACTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE
WIRETAP TUNNEL AT THE BERLIN SECTOR BORDER
(Sources as Indicated)
The following is an analysis of the East German press
reaction to the discovery of the wiretap tunnel at the sector
border between West and East Berlin. During the period under,
review - 24 to 26 April 1956 - a total of 31 dailies per day
and four weeklies were available for scrutiny; however, only
the dailies reported and commented on the incident.
Mostly concerned with reporting and commenting on the
incident were the East Berlin papers which, in some instances,
devoted full pages of their local sections to reports and pic-
tures on the tunnel in addition to their front-page or second-
page accounts of developments. The provincial press gave front-
page treatment to the matter only in few instances, generally
refrained from large articles or commentaries, and often
carried pictorial material with only brief explanations. The
least coverage was noted in the provincial press of other
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G r 1
than SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands -
Communist Party Germany) affiliation; none of these papers
published any commentary, or any cartoon of their own, on
the subject up to 26 April, in fact.
Describing the tunnel as inspected by the journalists
after the Soviet press conference, the papers pointed out
that the installation was well designed and constructed, that
the installation was costly and equivalent to a modern tele-
phone exchange, and that the material - of British and Ameri-
can origin - used in the installation was of such quality as
to guarantee long service.
The East Berlin papers, which were leading in the reports
on the issue, treated the matter as a "bitterly serious inci-
dent" which represents an "international scandal" and a
"breach of the norms of international law." The papers, in
their commentaries, addressed the West Berlin Senat, demand-
ing an all-Berlin understanding and stressing the necessity
for united action, and insinuated that Berlin is being kept
divided merely for the purpose of providing the espionage
centers in West Berlin with a base for launching provocations
against the GDR. Other commentaries by central and provincial
papers contained calls for vigilance and for defense prepared-
ness. Only one paper printed an editorial on the incident.
In commenting on the incident the press did not draw a line
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between the different developments, such as the press confer-
ence, the Soviet protest, the GDR Government protest, etc.,
but, as a rule, the commentaries dealt with the incident as
a whole. Later, when the first reaction of the West Berlin
press was available, the central press swooped down upon the
West Berlin press for attempting to belittle the incident and
to divert attention from the "seriousness of the matter."
The few caricatures published by the papers were designed
to slander the Americans.
Day by, Day Reaction
24 April 1956
On 24 April 1956 six East Berlin papers printed the ADN
(Allegemeines Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau - General German
News Office) release of individual reports on the Soviet press
conference, reported on the inspection of the tunnel by the
journalists, and carried excerpts from General Zarenko's letter
of protest (1 - 6). DER MORGEN and BERLINER ZEITUNG (5 and 6)
printed only the abbreviated version of the ADN release. Six
provincial SED papers (7 - 12) carried announcements of the
discovery, brief reports on the press conference, and merely
an announcement to the effect that a letter of protest has
been sent to the American Chief of Staff. Only NEUER TAG,
Frankfurt/Oder, printed the long version of the ADN release(12).
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Provincial papers of other party affiliations carried no
reports.
25 April 1956
On 25 April 22 provincial papers came out with the ADN
version of the report on the discovery of the tunnel (13 - 34);
the six provincial SED papers which had carried a brief announce-
ment the day before followed up their reports by more extensive
accounts of the press conference, the letter of protest, and
the inspection of the tunnel (13 - 18). Papers of other party
affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day.
Only MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME, of all provincial papers, published
an "eye-witness" report containing a description of the tunnel
and quoting individuals who had voiced their "outrage at such
a thing" which produces new material for conflicts in foreign'
policy (16). SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG, which printed the long
version of the ADN release, reproduced the first picture of
the tunnel (22).
Meanwhile the central press, in addition to supplementary
ireports on the discovery of the tunpel, descriptions of the
tunnel, and pictorial material showing sections of the tunnel
such as the amplifier station, etc., came out with the first
commentaries. A total of five commentaries appeared on this
day. The press treated the matter as a "bitterly serious
affair" which represents an "international scandal" and a
4
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"breach of the norms of international law," pointing out that
the United States violated the Buenos Aires Treaty on Telecom-
munications on the one hand and the GDR's sovereignty on the
other hand (35 - 39). NEUES DEUTSdhLAND spoke of a new,
hitherto unsurpassed "gangster act" of the U.S. secret service
(35), NATIONAL ZEITUNG termed the incident as a "sensational
international scandal" (36), NEUE ZEIT stressed that there
no word "strong enough to brand such wickedness" (38), and
JUNGE WELT declared that "this had to happen just to those
who always babble about Communist infiltration but can never
prove it" (39). All commentaries were addressed to the West
Berlin Senat, demanding an all-Berlin understanding for the
purpose of discontinuing the "stubborn adherence to NATO
policy," achieving the withdrawal of the "cold war experts of
all shades," dissolving the espionage centers in the "frontier
city," and achieving a "normalization in the situation in
Berlin." Three papers reported on a meeting held by the
National Front at Alt-Glienicke, at which the population adopted
a resolution protesting against this "provocation." Franz
Fischer, First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive
Board, was reported to have said at the meeting that the
people of West Germany and West Berlin have to pay for this
installation through the occupation costs and to have termed
the tunnel as "an appendix of the cold war" (38, 40, and 41).
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TRIBUENE, moreover, referred to a report by the HAMBURGER
ANZEIGER to underscore the fact that the installations in the
tunnel were not of provisional nature but designed for long
service (40). DER MORGEN, describing the tunnel, added that
West German correspondents who inspected the tunnel noted with
satisfaction the declaration of the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel
that "quite obviously, German quarters have no part in this"
(41), while NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to an announce-
ment made at the Alt-Glienicke meeting to the effect that the
tunnel was open for public inspection (36).
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first carthature on the
issue. The cartoon showed a garden which is divided into two
parts by a sign indicating the "Democratic Sector" - full of
flowers, and the opposite side - a barren piece of land with
a molehill topped by a flag lith the dollar sign. A strong
arm is pulling out of a hole in the Democratic Sector a mole
wearing "U.S."-marked earphones, some sort of Army trousers
with plugs and pliers showing from the pocket, and a U.S.
Army cap bearing the legend "Espionage." The cartoon is
captioned, "Do Not Burrow in Other People's Yards" (35).
26 April 1956
On 26 April 27 papers continued reporting on the issue
(42 - 68). In 17 instances the reports were supplemented
with pictures as outlined above. A total of 15 papers
6
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printed the text of, or large excerpts from, the press release
on the GDR Government protest (42 - 56). Six papers reported
on the inspection of the tunnel by the population, the press,
and representatives of the diplomatic corps (42, 49, 59, 60,
65, and 67). Four papers referred to a report carried by the
West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western journalists
were prohibited from inspecting the mouth of the tunnel on the
Western side (42, 43, 51, and 58), and four papers referred
to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which had spoken of an "eloquent
silence" about the affair on the part of the Americans (42, 51,
55, and 58). A total of four papers reported on the Alt-
Glienicke meeting (51, 60, 61, and 67). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
gave excerpts from Fisher's speech, quoting him to the effect
that the people of West Berlin, in particular the SPD members,
will be invited to inspect the tunnel (51). Three papers re-
produced caricatures (51, 52, and 56), six papers carried:,
commentaries (51, 52, 53, 54, 57, and 58), and one paper came
out with an editorial (55). Three East Berlin papers, through
their commentaries, swooped down upon the West Berlin press
for its attitude toward the incident. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
accused the West Berlin papers of attempting to belittle the
incident and of lauding the efficiency of the American "goblins,"
adding that the West Berlin press is thus making vain attempts
to divert attention from the seriousness of the matter (51).
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JUNGE WELT lashed out at the West Berlin DER TAG, saying that,
by its opinion, the West Berlin paper manifests its total loss
of any sense of decency.. Besides, DER TAG is not in the least
disturbed about the violation also of West Berlin's territory
(52). NATIONAL ZEITUNG held that DER TAG now admitted what it
has been denying at all times, namely that West Berlin is a
de facto part of NATO, adding that DER TAG now regards as
"customary" the military espionage of the United States on
GDR territory in addition to the "customary frontier-city
policy," the "customary" partition, and the "customary"
diversionist activities of the KGU and other underworld
organizations. The paper stressed that all Berliners fully
agree with the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which said that the
people must demand the discontinuation of "such things" (58).
NEUE ZEIT, carrying the only editorial, said that the wire-
tapping post is a feature of West Berlin's misuse as a NATO
base. The paper emphasized that GDR policy will continue to
serve all-German understanding and relaxation of international
tensions. "But it must be kept in mind that the success of
this policy will not only depend on the volume of the appeal
for peace but also on our preparedness to defend our homeland
as well as on our vigilance regarding the prevention of dan-
gers resulting from the fact that one part of Berlin has be-
come a frontier city against peace," the paper added. "What
8
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we need are contact points above the ground and in full
light, namely all-German talks, and not underground trenches
in the cold war" (55).
The first commentaries carried by provincial papers dealt
with the incident as an example of proof for East German press
reports on hostile espionage. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt,
pointed out that the tunnel 'represents "a document" which is
quite apt to dispel all doubts of those who have hitherto
been inclined to regard East German press reports about the
underground activities of Western espionage services as
"exaggerated" (57). MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted several
workers who voiced their indignation over "such a vileness"
which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that
the "Western side" is just as quiet about this "unpleasant
affair" as the population is outraged (53). And LEIPZIGER
VOLKSZEITUNG stressed that anyone reading about the discovery
of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at
maintaining peace against the efforts made by the U.S. espio-
nage service, adding that this "breach of international law"
also places the West Berlin administration "in a peculiar
light." The paper reminded its readers that war preparation,
which "formerly marched on Prussian Army boots," is now
marching on "American rubber soles, chewing gum, and tapping
telephone lines" (54).
, 9
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NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's caricature showed an American soldier try-
ing in vain to "milk" a disconnected, oversized telephone re-
ceiver into a bucket marked "CIC" while another soldier is
thoughtfully standing by (51). JUNGE WELT reproduced a car-
toon showing a mole wearing a U.S. Army cap on its head and
a telephone receiver on its back halting before a sign which
warns that "spies are now facing danger." The cartoon is
captioned, "The Underworld that Shuns the Light," and foot-
noted, "Damned, we did not put up that sign" (52). FREIES
WORT showed rats wearing U.S. Army caps being disturbed by
a Russian soldier in the operation of what looks like a
communication center. Two rats are shown facing the soldier
in surprise, another standing with arms raised, and still
another escaping through an opening in the wall. The
caricature is entitled, "Unpleasant Surprise," and footnoted,
"It is an Effrontery of the Russians to Disturb Us in Our
,(Burrowing) Work" (56).
10.
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�
SOURCES
1956
1.
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
24 Apr
2.
NEUE ZEIT
24 Apr
3.
TRIBUENE
24 Apr
4.
NATIONAL ZEITUNG
24 Apr
5.
DER MORGEN
24 Apr
6.
BERLINER ZEITUNG
24 Apr
7.
FREIHEIT
24 Apr
8.
SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG
24 Apr
9.
VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt
24 Apr
10.
MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME
24 Apr
11.
LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG
24 Apr
12.
NEUER TAG
24 Apr
13,
FREIHEIT
25 Apr
14,
SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG
25 Apr
15.
VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt
25 Apr
16.
MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME
25 Apr
17.
LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG
25 Apr
18.
NEUER TAG
25 Apr
19.
LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU
25 Apr
20.
VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg
25 Apr
21,
DAS VOLK, Erfurt
25 Apr
22.
SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG
25 Apr
23.
FREIE ERDE
25 Apr
24.
OSTSEE ZEITUNG
25 Apr
25.
VOLKSWACHT
25 Apr
26.
FREIES WORT
25 Apr
27.
SAECHSICHES TAGEBLATT
25 Apr
28.
DIE UNION
25 Apr
29,
NORDDEUTSCHE NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN
25 Apr
30.
MAERKISCHE UNION
25 Apr
31.
BRANDENBURGISCHE NEUESTE NABBR.
25 Apr
32.
BAUERN ECHO
25 Apr
33.
DER NEUE WEG
25 Apr
34.
LIBERAL DEMOKRATISCHE ZEITUNG
25 Apr
35.
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
25 Apr
36.
NATIONAL ZEITUNG
25 Apr
37,
BERLINER ZEITUNG
25 Apr
38.
NEUE ZEIT
25 Apr
39.
JUNGE WELT
25 Apr
40.
TRIBUENE
25 Apr
41,
DER MORGEN
25 Apr
11
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42.
43.
44.
45.
46,
47.
48.
S E
BERLINER ZEITUNG
SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG
DAS VOLK, Erfurt
NEUER TAG
FREIHEIT
DER MORGEN
TRIBUENE
1956
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
Apr
Apr
Apr
Apr
Apr
Apr
Apr
49.
BAUERN ECHO
26
Apr
50.
DER NEUE WEG
26
Apr
51.
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
26
Apr
52.
JUNGE WELT
26
Apr
53.
MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME
26
Apr
54.
LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG
26
Apr
55.
NEUE ZEIT
26
Apr
56.
FREIES WORT
26
Apr
57.
VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt
26
Apr
58.
NATIONAL ZEITUNG
26
Apr
59.
VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg
26
Apr
60.
MAERKISCHE UNION
26
Apr
61.
FREIE ERDE
26
Apr
62.
LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG
26
Apr
63.
VOLKSWACHT
26
Apr
64.
SAECHSISCHES TAGEBLATT
26
Apr
65.
OSTSEE ZEITUNG
26
Apr
66.
LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU
26
Apr
67.
DIE UNION
26
Apr
68.
SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG
26
Apr
12
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