(EST PUB DATE) THE STATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01223258
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2018
• Case Number: F-2014-01189
• Publication Date: April 1, 2004

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Intelligence Science Board
Task Force Report
on
The State of Science and
Technology Analysis in the
Intelligence Community
April 2004
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
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This report is a product of the Intelligence Science Board (ISB).
The ISB advises the Director of Central Intelligence and senior Intelligence
Community leaders on emerging scientific and technical issues of special
importance to the Intelligence Community. Statements, opinions, conclusions and
recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of
any agency of the Intelligence Community.
This report is S ET/
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TASKING LEI 1ER V
TERMS OF REFERENCE VII
TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP IX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XI
Introduction xi
Observations and Recommendations xiii
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 1
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 13
CONCLUSIONS, OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25
Conclusions 25
General Observations 25
Specific Observations and Recommendations 32
APPENDIX A: A MINORITY VIEW OF S&T INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY ...... 41
APPENDIX B: INDICATORS OF THE CHANGING NATURE OF
WORLDWIDE S&T 45
APPENDIX C: REFERENCES 59
APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 61
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TERMS OF REFERENCE
INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS CAPABILITY
(UHFOU0) The Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is requested to establish a task
force to address the issues related to maintaining an adequate science and
technology (S&T) analysis work force and capability for the Intelligence
Community (IC).
(UHFOU0) Since the end of the cold war, the number of S&T analysts in the IC has
decreased dramatically, and the threat to national security comes from an ever-
increasing number of state and non-state actors. Currently, much information
concerning foreign S&T resides in the public sector. Technological advances with
security implications, such as information technology, nanotechnology, and
biotechnology, are driven by the commercial market and commercial research and
development (R&D) funds. The global economy tends to disperse this cutting edge
technology to all parts of the world, creating a much different and potentially more
dangerous environment than that which existed during the relatively well-defined
Cold War years.
(UNFOU0) There have been a number of recent studies and reviews performed by
the IC to define and address the level of S&T analysis, such as work of the Science
and Technology Intelligence Committee (STIC) and programs such as the Science
and Technology Expert Partnership (STEP). The capability to do the necessary
intelligence S&T analysis in the current environment will require a combination of
knowledgeable IC analysts and access to the commercial S&T community.
(UHFOU0) The S&T Analysis Task Force should:
� Review the current status of the S&T analysis work force using information
recently generated by the IC.
� Analyze the appropriate role for the S&T intelligence analyst in today's
global environment with its complex and well-paid technology work force.
� Analyze an appropriate manpower level for S&T analysts in the IC.
� Construct and assess appropriate paradigms to meet S&T analysis capability
needs for the IC. Consider the STEP process, MEDEA, and other means to
provide the IC requisite S&T capabilities.
(UHFOU0) This study will be sponsored by the National Intelligence Officer for
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Science and Technology (NIO/S&T). The Task Force should convene in February 2003
and report its results within six months with interim briefings as appropriate. Task Force
reports shall be submitted to the NIO/S&T with copies provided to the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI), the Deputy DCI for Community Management, the Assistant
DCI for Collection, the Assistant DCI for Analysis and Production, and the Director,
DS&T.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP
TASK FORCE MEMBERS
RAND Corporation
Raytheon
NTI
CENTRA Technologies, Inc.
NGIC, 511C
Los Alamos National Laboratory
PARTICIPANTS
The MITRE Corporation
The MITRE Corporation
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUC I ION
Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer (NIO)
for Science and Technology, tasked the Intelligence Science Board
(TSB) to review the state of Science and Technology (Intelligence)
(S&T(I)) within the Intelligence Community (IC), including issues
related to the work force.
In the years following the end of the cold war the threat from
a single bad actor (the Soviet Union) has been replaced by a threat to
national security from an ever-increasing number of state and non-
state actors, many with current or near-current access to weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) � or perhaps weapons of mass hysteria
(WMH). Technology has become the engine for global change, with
the most important drivers (information technology (IT),
biotechnology, nanotechnology, advanced materials, etc.) being
pursued by global commercial enterprises. This raises new concerns
about advanced technology in the service of foreign intelligence and
terrorism in non-weapon ways (communications, covert influence,
collection, dissemination, etc.). Much of the information about
technology development and potential applications is reported in the
open press, further complicating the S&T(I) analysts' mission, even
while the actual number of S&T(I) analysts has decreased
significantly in the last decade.
With this as a background, the ISB S&T(I) Task Force was
asked to examine the state of S&T analysis, to determine the
adequacy of the current S&T(I) work force in terms of rough numbers
of analysts, and to investigate the need for any new paradigms to
address S&T(I) analysis capabilities in the current and future threat
environments. The Task Force was also charged with developing
recommendations that the IC could readily implement.
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In the main body of this report we demonstrate why
technology is such an important driver in national security affairs.
We review the many actions taken and programs generated by the IC
to address S&T analysis across the board. With respect to commercial
technologies we observe that if the IC does nothing fundamentally
different it will continue to provide little of use to its consumer base
in current intelligence and do nothing to reduce the probability of
technological surprise. (Technological surprise is defined as both the
application of known technologies in unexpected ways and the use of
unforeseen technological breakthroughs not under U.S. control.) In
fact, considering the complexity of commercial technologies, the lack
of expertise in these technologies within the IC S&T(I) community,
and the rapid pace of technological advances, the United States is
more likely to be surprised than ever before. Moreover, all this is
occurring in today's threat environment, characterized by multiple,
dispersed, unpredictable adversaries with demonstrated ability to
apply commercially available technology to meet their particular
needs and with increasing access to WMD and WMH and their
delivery systems.
With respect to the more conventional military S&T(I), where
most information is classified, we review the current numbers of
analysts and the new tools and programs now available to analyze
them. The IC has recently established new initiatives to develop a
better understanding of the numbers and capabilities of the S&T(I)
work force using state-of-the-art information technology tools that
should provide a clearer picture of the IC's S&T(I) census and areas
of coverage.
We commend the IC for the many initiatives it has taken to
strengthen S&T across the board. Many of our basic
recommendations were actually made by the IC in the Director of
Central Intelligence's (DCI's) 1999 Strategic Intent, which responded
to the 1998 review of the IC's S&T program conducted by the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). These
recommendations were just not acted upon in an aggressive enough
manner. They fall into the categories of increasing the numbers of
scientists rotating through the IC, increasing collaboration, and
reinstating the use of competitive analyses. These recommendations
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are not meant to replace existing programs, nor are they the complete
solution to this complex problem. However, they are both crucial to
an improved S&T(I) analytic work force and relatively easy to
implement, and would be welcomed across a broad community of
the IC and its consumer base.
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(U) While the IC has made significant progress in all parts of its
S&T program since its response to the 1998 PFIAB report, the S&T(I)
effort devoted to foreign S&T has not kept pace with the advances in
and globalization of critical emerging technologies, and some
remedial action is urgently needed.
Observation 1
The IC's S&T(I) capability is not what it could be and not
what the nation needs. This is particularly true in areas where rapidly
changing, commercially driven, emerging technologies intersect
intelligence interests, including those directly and indirectly related
to WMD. Strengthening the intelligence analyst's ability to fully
appreciate the impact of emerging technologies is critical if we are to
limit the probability of future technological surprise and increase our
margin of warning. One way� and there are many�to achieve this is
to borrow techniques already used successfully within the
Department of Defense (DoD) and sporadically within the IC to
rotate non-government experts such as scientists and engineers into
government service for periods of approximately two years (perhaps
more in some cases).
Leading-edge scientists from commercial and government
laboratories can be located, recruited, cleared, and assigned to
various offices and elements within the IC. They can "live" with the
IC S&T analysts, sharing their profound knowledge of the technology
in question and in turn becoming familiar with intelligence needs.
Through their knowledge of the outside community they can
empower IC analysts to make more effective use of existing IC
outreach programs: to become smarter buyers for external
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participation by identifying the most valuable conferences, lectures,
or research studies and papers in a given field and grasp the
implications of current foreign technological developments more
quickly. The scientists would then return to their outside jobs,
clearances intact, and remain available sources of interaction with the
IC S&T analysts and the external, commercially driven S&T
community.
Locating, recruiting, and clearing such experts is a daunting
task, especially for individual IC analysts or their particular offices or
divisions. Yet the DoD has done this effectively and is currently
expanding its efforts as it strengthens its own S&T intelligence
capabilities. The IC can and must do so as well if it is to give its
customers a better chance of limiting technological surprise. The cost
is modest, to say the least, and, given the potential benefits and what
is at stake, the impact, if the effort is successful, would help reverse
the disturbing trend of S&T(I) analysis, especially as regards
emerging technologies in areas directly and indirectly related to
WMD.
Recommendation 1
n Set up a community function to locate, recruit, and clear
it�ading-edge scientists from the "outside" and make them
available to the relevant elements within the IC These experts
should be required to spend a minimum of two years within the IC and
to maintain their clearances when they return to their non-government
careers. This recommendation is modeled on successful efforts used
within the Defense Department and, sparingly, within the IC.
Implementing this program will strengthen the IC's own career S&T
staff and provide them continued access to the cleared scientists who
return to their outside careers in critical areas. Establishing a community
function to accomplish this will relieve the individual IC elements from
the rather daunting tasks of locating, clearing, and managing ongoing
relationships with appropriate candidates. The authority to perform this
function already resides within the office of the Chief Technology
Officer.
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Observation 2
S&T(I) analysts do not adequately share the benefits of many
of the new outreach efforts among different agencies or even among
offices within any given agency. This is clearly wasteful. One
program now under development will use modern information
technology tools to collect and make available knowledge of domestic
and foreign scientific conferences. In this day and age, when
commercial services flash breaking news headlines and stock market
prices across the screen of any desktop computer, the IC can certainly
do a more effective job of permitting collaboration and sharing
knowledge.
Recommendation 2
rProvide all relevant IC elements with the opportunity to
become
aware of and, if appropriate, share the benefits of the
many recently developed and funded outreach efforts of
individual IC elements. Collaboration and networking techniques and
support systems should be implemented to spread the benefits from all
outreach efforts to the relevant analysts across the entire IC. The ADCI
(AV) has initiated an effort to collect and distribute information
concerning foreign conferences to appropriate analysts. This would a
natural office to expand the application of advanced IT tools to achieve
some significant level of collaboration amongst the various outreach
activities.
Observation 3
Our judgment, supported by all information available to date,
is that while we have concern about quality, the IC must also seek
some increase in the numbers of S&T(I) analysts. However, the
appropriate level is difficult to quantify, although our sense is that
the required increase is modest, perhaps several dozen. The
"numbers argument" has been advanced by others using the simple
expedient of comparing "numbers" during the cold war years to
current "numbers," although we do not believe this to be a terribly
meaningful metric to apply to this problem.
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Other issues with the S&T(I) work force came to our
attention. Some of the S&T (I) accounts go back to cold war days. It
may be useful to reexamine the currency of these accounts formally
and on an annual basis. Some will remain the same, but others will
undoubtedly change�not necessarily in content, but in the manner
in which they are organized, addressed, and analyzed. This may be
particularly relevant to many of the emerging technology threats,
such as the cyber threat. In order for the consumer to understand the
magnitude and implications of this emerging S&T threat the IC needs
to develop and present a complete picture. Piecemeal intelligence bits
(especially some current-intelligence bits) only leave the consumer
confused as to the seriousness of the threat.
Recommendation 3
Rapidly apply newly available census information (such as
the Analytic Resources Catalog (ARC)) to monitor in detail the
staffing levels being applied across S&T(I) issues. Having current
visibility into the numbers, along with regular assessments of product
quality, will facilitate making more informed judgments as to the true
shortage in S&T(I) analysts (in light of competing priorities). Such
judgments, conducted by experienced and capable analysts, should be
based upon coverage required on crucial areas rather than on a simple
comparison of numbers. If the current ARC does not contain enough
detail on individual S&T areas, additional census information may be
required.' This approach should be used to redefine the "accounts" as
necessary, It should also be used as a systems tool to organize different
S&T(I) accounts under broad threat categories so that the consumer
can readily appreciate the impact of individual pieces of threat analysis.
This is particularly critical in current-intelligence estimates, especially in
the emerging commercial area where "tidbits" of raw intelligence appear
in the world press.
Observation 4
The problem of "failed assumptions," or blind spots, plagues
not merely the IC, but all aspects of our society. This was pointed out
in a recent speech by the Associate Deputy Director of Intelligence
1 The ARC does not go into detail on S&T areas. For example, everyone who works on
"Emerging and Disruptive Technologies" is captured in one "bin."
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and in a recent speech by the DCI, who stated that intelligence is
"never all right or all wrong." This issue can be especially vexing in
S&T analysis, because the number of analysts who have technical
expertise in any particular subject area tends to be very small (often
one), thus limiting the possibilities that alternative assumptions will
emerge.
When a basic assumption is taken as "truth" the
consequences may include failure to recognize and/or request
information that would support an alternative path and might lead
ultimately to an alternative assessment. Some corrective measures
recently instituted, such as external and internal pre-publication
reviews, may help in this regard, although a more certain approach
involves competitive analysis at all levels of the analytic process.
Competitive analysis requires not just enough capability to produce
one finding but enough analytic expertise across domains to produce
independent analysis and findings.
The IC must ask itself if it is doing everything possible to
limit the number of times it is wrong. This would increase its
credibility, which is essential to supporting our current pre-emptive
national security strategy.
Recommendation 4
Develop a program within the S&T community to introduce
an appropriate level of competitive analysis into its intelligence
production, one that truly challenges basic assumptions before
they are elevated to "truths." Any competitive analysis program
should be carried out in a substantive, sustained manner, both to limit
misjudgments and to improve consumers' confidence in IC S&T(I)
products. A useful learning experience in this regard would be to revisit
selected controversial cases from the recent past, hypothesize different
base assumptions, and determine if a defensible, alternative analysis
can be developed. This activity warrants the personal and continuous
attention of the Chairman of the National InteNence Council.
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Recommendation 5
IC management should take the necessary steps with
respect to career growth to ensure that the S&T work force is
encouraged to make the basic changes recommended above.
Career paths and career growth were paid lip service in the response to
the PFIAB report. Some specific goa6 and milestones need to be
established before this will happen.
Beyond these observations and recommendations, there is a
larger and less conventional view of the question of S&T(I) that may
warrant more attention than the Task Force has devoted to it.
Consider as an example the rapid, commercially driven and globally
based growth in the world of genetics and genetic engineering. It is
reasonable to believe that all information of value concerning this
technology, its future prospects and growth, where it is being
developed, and to whom it is accessible exists in the public literature,
including in the professional literature shared among the world's
experts in this subject matter. In such an example the IC, no matter
how much better it gets, is ill-positioned to be the community that
advises/warns the policy maker of the future threats this technology
poses to our national security in the broadest sense. Obviously,
additional examples have the same characteristics and there is no
reason to believe that if current trends in globalization, commercial
support of critical technologies, outsourcing, etc., continue this new
paradigm will not develop further.
One member of our Task Force has offered a minority view.
He suggests that for these emerging conditions, the nation's S&T
community should be given a much broader mandate to address the
S&T aspects of future threats more fully. The organizational
arrangements would have to be worked out. This is discussed further
in Appendix A.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
In his book The Art of the Long View Peter Schwartz notes:
"The most frequent failure in the history of forecasting has been
grossly underestimating the impact of technologies."2 This view is
central to the concern that created this Task Force. The challenges for
our Task Force were assessing whether the Intelligence Community
(IC), in its analytical efforts, may be underestimating the need to
assess these effects, whether the IC is positioned to assess these
effects, and how the IC might alleviate any deficiencies.
Currently, science and technology (intelligence) (S&T(I))
analysts in the IC are the "front line" for conducting S&T impact
assessments. S&T(I) analysts are charged with assessing and
forecasting how technology developed by, absorbed by, or stolen by
foreign entities is already affecting, or will affect in the future, the
security of the United States. They must understand multiple
technologies well enough to recognize ways in which imaginative
opponents may apply them to harm U.S. interests; and, of course,
they must understand the culture, economics, and other
characteristics of the particular state and non-state actors that are
today's dominant threat to U.S. national security.
S&T(I) analysis was a sufficiently daunting job during the
cold war years when the critical technologies (i.e., elements of
missiles, submarines, bombers, and space systems) were funded and
controlled by the two superpowers, and essentially all the experts on
these subjects were within the respective governments. Then the pace
of technological advancement was slower than it is today, and
deterrence was a strategy that both superpowers appreciated. Now,
the most critical and most rapidly evolving technologies �
information technology (IT), nanotechnology, biotechnology, energy,
aerospace, etc. � are driven by a commercial marketplace that is
2 Schwartz, Peter, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (New
York: Currency Doubleday, 1995).
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increasingly global in nature and readily available to foreign state
and non-state actors. At the same time, not only has the number of
S&T(I) analysts been reduced, but the availability to the IC of critical
skills in emerging technologies, i.e., non-IC research scientists who
fully appreciate the capabilities of the technology, is also limited.
This section outlines why the changing nature of S&T has
significant (yet sometimes obscure) import for intelligence, especially
when dealing with future problems that have not become current
intelligence crises. The IC must not be caught off guard in the future
from grossly underestimating today how S&T affects national
security.
The Nature of S&T Has Changed!
The S&T environment of today is very different from that of
decades past. S&T is in a kind of global technology revolution. S&T
developments are both accelerating and being absorbed globally to
the extent that they are revolutionizing the world. A National
Intelligence Council (NIC)-funded study outlines many of these S&T
trends out to 2015.3 Appendix B of this report contains some
highlights from a National Science Board (NSB) report on science and
engineering indicators.
One significant change involves the decreasing importance of
U.S. R&D funding from the federal government, with an increasing
share provided by industry. This change is often identified with the
end of the cold war, although, as Figure 1 shows, the trend has been
decades in the making, with the peak in the federal share occurring in
the early 1960s.
3 Anton, Philip S., Richard Silberglitt, and James Schneider, The Global Technology Revolution:
Bio/Nano/Materials Trends and Their Synergies with Information Technology by 2015, RAND
Corporation, MR-1307-NIC, Santa Monica, California, 2001. URL:
http: / / www. rand. or g/pu blica tions/ MR/MR1307/
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Percent of
so
70
so
50
40
30
20
10
funding
Figure 1
Changing Sources of R&D Funding in the United States
Commenting on this trend, the National Science Foundation's
NSB stated: "Indeed, the most significant trend among the G-7 and
other OECD countries has been the relative decline in government
R&D funding in the 1990s. In 1998, less than one-third of all R&D
funds were derived from government sources, down considerably
from the 45 percent share reported 16 years earlier."4
Not only has U.S. R&D funding become more of a private
sector responsibility, but it has also become more globalized. For the
period 1989-1999, Figure 2 shows the funding of U.S. R&D in two
categories, performed in the United States by U.S. affiliates of foreign
companies (Foreign R&D), and performed abroad by foreign affiliates
of U.S. companies (Overseas R&D).
4 National Science Board [hereafter NSB], Science and Engineering Indicators - 2002
(Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 2002).
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Billions of current dollars
20 �Foreign R&D Overseas R&D
15
10
5
0
1989 1994 1995 1996 1997
NOTES: Foreign R&D refers to R&D perfolmed in the United States
by U.S. affiliates of foreign parent companies. Overseas R&D refers to
R&D performed abroad by foreign affiliates of U.S. parent companies.
Figure 2
Globalization of U.S. Industrial R&D
While Overseas R&D has risen by about a factor of two,
Foreign R&D has risen about fourfold. The former is an indicator of
increasing capabilities abroad to conduct R&D, while the latter
presumably indicates both a desire by foreign affiliates to capture
U.S. technology and the financial attractiveness of investments in U.S.
firms during this period.
For our purposes, a key issue is not only the status of R&D,
but also the rapidity with which scientific discoveries are absorbed
into practical, available technology. This difficult-to-measure quantity
was addressed by the National Research Board (NRB) using the
proxy of the number of scientific research papers (citations)
appearing in patent applications in the United States. The NRB,
stating, "...citations of scientific and technical articles provide an
indicator of the growing link between research and innovative
application...," provided the data appearing in Figure 3 (red curve).
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1C