CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES IN THE KHE SANH AREA

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01165670
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
EO�
13526 13526
3.3(h)(2)
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13526
3.5(c)
Intelligence Memorandum
Construction and Logistic Activities
in the Khe Sanh Area
3.5(c)
7 February 1968
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3.5(c)
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws. US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
i� GROUP 1
mcw.unim eltom MYT015.1ATIC
UCAYNOHAD1NG AND
DECT.ASBIFICATION
3.5(c)
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SEQth
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
3.5(c)
Construction and Logistic Activities
In the Khe Sanh Area
Summary
The deployment of more than 22,000 North Vietnam-
ese Army (NVA) troops in the Khe Sanh area and up-
wards of 12,500 troops in the north-central DMZ
area has been paralleled by a rapid acceleration
of enemy logistic and construction activities.
These activities point to the acquisition of a
capability for sustained offensive operations.
The construction of two new roads from Laos
toward the Khe Sanh area will facilitate the enemy's
ability to sustain the resupply of his forces. Con-
struction of new fortified positions and weapons
emplacements in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh
appears to be well advanced. These emplacements
will be extremely difficult to neutralize and will
provide the enemy with an improved capability to
defend areas he now holds and to interdict friendly
movement in and out of the Khe Sanh area. These ac-
tivities are hampered and disrupted by intensive US
air strikes, but the enemy appears to be pressing
his preparations and they could be nearing completion.
Information on logistic operations during the
past five months indicates a sharp increase in the
volume of supplies moved into the area. The esti-
mated traffic has been more than adequate to meet
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared jointly by the Office of Economic
Research and the Vietnamese Affairs Staff and co-
ordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence.
It shouZd be read in conjunction with the CIA memo-
randum, "The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh" of 2 February
1968.
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the logistic requirements of these forces, particularly
for ammunition, at greatly intensified rates of com-
bat for a period of 60-90 days. There is no reason
to doubt that the Communist rear service units can
continue to move daily both the estimated 35 tons of
supplies required by the forces at Khe Sanh and the
additional 20 tons for the forces in the north-central
DMZ area under heavy combat conditions.
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New Road Construction
1. Aerial photography has revealed two new
roads being built by the North Vietnamese from a
point near Ban Dong in Laos on Route 9 eastward
to the Khe Sanh area. These roads, detected in
the past month, parallel Route 9 to the north and
south and converge on the Khe Sanh area from the north-
west and southwest. (See Figure 1). Work on both
roads has progressed to the Laos - South Vietnam
border, which is within 12 to 15 miles of Khe Sanh,
and probably is continuing into South Vietnam.
This new road network significantly increases the
North Vietnamese logistic capability near the DMZ,
and reflects the intensive nature of enemy prepara-
tions for major operations in the Khe Sanh area.
2. The Communists have also gained the use
of Route 9 at least as far as the Vietnamese border,
having driven off in late January the Lao Army bat-
talion (BV-33) which had controlled the Ban Houei
Sane area and blocked the use of Route 9 to the Com-
munists since mid-1961. Large bunkers and storage
areas have been detected near the terminus of the
southernmost of the two new routes, and numerous
secondary explosions have followed B-52 strikes in
the area.
Supply Depots
3. The Tchepone area of Laos about 20 miles
west of the Vietnamese border, has long been known
to be a major staging point for the movement of
supplies from North Vietnam through the southern
Laos panhandle. Numerous new depots and distribu-
tion points in Laos and the DMZ area have been built
in recent months to support combat preparations. A
series of storage depots or way stations has been es-
tablished on a north-south axis across the demili-
tarized zone about 10 to 15 miles east of the Lao
border. Additional storage areas have been detected
near the eastern terminus of the southernmost of the
two recently built roads. Other storage and distribu-
tion points have been detected at points in the hill
mass northwest of the main US base at Khe Sanh. Jungle
cover precludes estimating the capacity of these
facilities, but they appear to be extensive.
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Fortifications
4. There are numerous indications of recent
construction of fortifications ranging from groups
of foxholes to entrenchments, bunkers, weapons
emplacements, and large strongpoints. Some of
those in the northwest quadrant from Khe Sanh had
been built during the heavy Communist pressure in
that sector in April and May 1967. One North Viet-
namese regiment that has remained in'the area since
then may have maintained some of these positions in
usable condition. More recent construction includes
a number of bunkers, entrenchments, and large strong-
points in the hill mass south of Route 9 and extend-
ing from the area southeast of Khe Sanh westward to
the border of Laos. These positions have been built
in some depth.
5. Other new fortifications and weapons em-
placements have been detected in and behind the
ridges east and north of the main complex. Consider-
able fortification and entrenchment activity has also
been observed north of Route 9 along the hills and
ridges west and southwest of the main US base. Pho-
tography taken in late January shows several large
but unoccupied groups of foxholes--one numbering
over 400--between Hill 861 and the main base. One
group of foxholes is within 1,000 meters of the base.
(See Figures 2 and 3);
3.5(c)
6. These activities suggest that the Communist
forces are prepared to defend the areas they now
hold, to encircle US positions completely, to extend
their positions progressively closer to ours in siege
fashion, and to prepare in advance assembly areas
from which assaults can be mounted. If these posi-
tions are subsequently connected by communications
trenches, the Communists will be able to maneuver their
forces from one portion of the battlefield to another
under cover from friendly fire. They would also be
in position to block movement from the main base at
the airfield to outlying US positions on the hills
to the northwest. These techniques are similar to those
employed by the Communists in their prolonged siege cam-
paign at Dien Bien Phu.
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Location of Mortar and Rocket Sites
7. The selected weapons sites shown in Figures 2
and 3 are representative of many such sites in the Khe
Sanh area. The circles drawn on the map indicate
ranges from which weapons of various types can be
fired on the base. These include some weapons (82-mm.
mortars) which are organic to enemy infantry units.
The 120-mm. mortar ring also approximates the range
of 75-mm. pack howitzers which the enemy is believed
to have in the area. The 160-mm. mortar ring approxi-
mates the range of the 122-mm. rockets which the Com-
munists have already employed at Khe Sanh. ' Thus far,
antiaircraft positions for 37-mm. weapons have been
detected only at positions from which they can protect
rear depot areas. Positions for 12.7-mm. antiaircraft
machine guns, however, have been observed within 1,500
meters north and northeast of the airfield. Emplace-
ments for 152-mm. artillery weapons have been detected
at distances beyond maximum range of the main US base,
although weapons in these emplacements could reach
some of the outposts northwest of the airfield and the
Special Forces camp at Lang Vei to the west.
8. It is evident from the terrain features and
enemy positions that the Khe Sanh base and airfield
are vulnerable to interdiction from these known emplace-
ments. Profiles of the terrain in a straight line
from each indicated enemy position to the center of
the Khe Sanh runway show that in nearly every case
the enemy has the advantage of cover and concealment
from friendly ground fire, although the positions may
be more vulnerable to air attack. There is little
doubt that for every location noted there are many
more which cannot be detected from the air.
3.5(c)
The Logistic Build-up
9. The deployment of more than 22,000 NVA troops
in the Khe Sanh area and upwards of 12,500 in the
notth-central DMZ area was accomplished by a rapid
acceleration of enemy logistic activities. Intelligence
on logistic operations during the past five months also
indicates a sharp increase in the volume of supplies
moved into the area. During January an estimated 120
tons of supplies or more per day were moved through the
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Laos panhandle from North Vietnam. This volume is
more than twice the supplies normally needed from
North Vietnam by the Communist forces in Laos and
South Vietnam. In addition, substantial amounts of
ammunition are moved directly to the DMZ area. The
estimated traffic during this period has been adequate
to provide stockpiles sufficient for 60-90 days of
combat at greatly intensified rates.
Traffic Through the Laos Panhandle
10. The volume of supplies moved into the Laos
panhandle from North Vietnam during the last five
months has been significantly greater than that moved
during comparable periods in the past. The observed
increases in traffic have paralleled closely the heavy
deployment of troops to the Khe Sanh area, and most of
these supplies seem destined for these forces.
11. According to reports of roadwatch teams
along Route 15 in North Vietnam just north of the
Laotian border, truck traffic moving toward Laos dur-
ing the last four months of 1967 averaged about 17
trucks a day compared with 15 a day during the com-
parable period of 1966. These trucks could have de-
livered over 5,000 tons of supplies for the Communist-
held portions of Laos and South Vietnam, or over 40
tons per day during this period in 1967.* During
January 1968, southbound traffic on the same route
increased to a daily average of 26 trucks compared
with an average of 22 for January 1967. Over 1,900
tons could have been delivered during January 1968, or
an average of about 60 tons per day.
12. Roadwatch reports are not available on Routes
137/912, the other truck route into the Laotian pan-
handle from North Vietnam. An analysis of reports of
aerial reconnaissance over this route reveals a sub-
stantial increase in truck activity on this route in
1967. Although there is no way to quantify the tonnage
moving on Routes 137/912, it almost certainly equaled
the tonnage moved on Route 15 and could have been more.
Moreover, aerial reconnaissance reports show consider-
able truck activity on Route 911 and on Route 9, which
The estimates of supplies moved include an
allow-
ance of 20 percent for 'losses in transit and losses 'due
to air operations.
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lead to the two new roads that now branch off from
Route 9 to the border of South Vietnam in the direc-
tion of Khe Sanh. Roadwatch teams consistently re-
port a low level of truck traffic on Routes 92 and 96
south of Route 9, indicating that most trucks may
have discharged their loads in the vicinity of Route
9. Furthermore, the increase in truck traffic in
this area observed by aerial reconnaissance began
after the first of November 1967.
Traffic to the DMZ Area
13.
the movement of ammunition to
Communist units believed to be located just north or
south of the DMZ reached a high level in November
and continued high in December and January.
it is estimated that at
least 500 tons of ammunition were shipped to the
area of the DMZ in November, about 420 tons in De-
cember, and about 250 tons during 1-22 January.
Data for earlier months show much lower volumes,
14. During November and December nearly two
thirds of the identified tonnage shipped was artil-
lery ammunition. Shipments of antiaircraft ammuni-
tion ranked second. The small shipments of mortar
ammunition cannot be explained, but there is a large
volume of unidentified ammunition. The identified
shipments are shown in the following tabulation:
Short Tons
1967
November
Total (rounded) 500
Artillery (152 and 122 mm.,
and 85 mm. antitank) 320 240
Antiaircraft (100, 85, 57,
37, and 12.7 mm.) 41
Mortar (82 mm.)
Rocket (140 mm.)
Recoilless rifle (122.4
and 82 mm.)
Explosives, mines, grenades,
and unidentified
December
420
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Logistic Requirements for Forces
15. Communist forces currently deployed in the
Khe Sanh area would require on the order of 32 to
37 tons of supplies per day under sustained heavy
combat conditions.* Ammunition supplies would ac-
count for 6 to 10 tons of the total daily resupply
requirement. Actual consumption of ammunition would
depend of course upon combat intensity. The require-
ments given above are for two NVA divisions--the
325C and the 304th--comprising at least six infantry
regiments with artillery support. These forces for
the most part probably receive their supplies from
those delivered by truck into Laos.
16. In addition to these forces, at least two
infantry regiments of the North Vietnamese 320th
Division have been deployed in an area in the north-
central DMZ. The role of the 320th Division is prob-
ably to harass and interdict allied reinforcements
moving from the east toward Khe Sanh. In this role
their logistic requirements would probably be rela-
tively less than those of the forces in the immediate
Khe Sanh area. On this baSis, the requirements of the
320th Division are calculated at between 17 and 21
tons of supplies a day, with ammunition accounting
for 3 to 6 tons of the total. These forces probably
receive their supplies from across the DMZ.
17. Since the deployment of these divisions in
the Khe Sanh and DMZ areas and the logistic build-up
were parallel developments, Communist forces prob-
ably began stockpiling of weapons, ammunition, and
equipment possibly by mid-November or earlier. With
due allowance for materials already consumed, the
estimated flow of traffic has been sufficient to pro-
vide a stockpile of from 60 to 90 days. On the
basis of past experience it is estimated that the
Communists have a daily resupply capability to main-
tain these stockpiles at that level.
*The infantry battalions are given a rate of combat
of 1 day in 10. The artillery regiment and the two
AAA battalions are given a support role of 1 day in
3. These rates of combat are significantly higher than
the 1 in 30 day rate used by MACV as representative of
the 1967 campaigns.
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69504 2-68 CIA
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ENEMY 121 SITIONS AROUND KHE SANH BASE
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