ONE MEMO 1/18-/68 ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF HANOI'S INTENTIONS - 1968/01/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01142498
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
18 January 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Alternative Interpretations of Hanoi's Intentions
INTRODUCTION
1. There are several hypotheses concerning the progress
of the war in coming months and the intentions of the Communists.
Most of them can be argued plausibly, for and against, and can
be supported by some evidence. None is capable of conclusive
proof or disproof, mainly because the evidence is either insuffi-
cient or can be interpreted in various and often diametrically
opposed ways.
2. For example, there is the question of whether the North
Vietnamese are willing to "negotiate." Hanoi has declared that it
"will" talk if the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped. It is
idle to say that this represents no change of attitude whatsoever;
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it is evally idle to assume that of itself it indicates an early
end to the fighting. One may argue, quite plausibly, that Hanoi
has finally comprehended that war against the power of the US can
have but one ultimate conclusion, and is now probing to find out
what US terms are. But one may also regard this latest statement
simply as another political and psychological move to encourage
dissent in the US and inflame world opinion against Washington.
3. In present circumstances it is true that any of a multi-
tude of things could happen, at almost any time. Hanoi could
quit tomorrow, or at any time thereafter; the Chinese could enter
the conflict with their own armed forces in great number; China
could collapse in total chaos; the Soviets could take a far more
active role, either in support of Hanoi to continue the war or in
withdrawing such support; the South Vietnamese government and polit
could disintegrate; the Sino-Soviet controversy could become far
more or far less acute than it is, and thus change the context of
the Vietnam struggle; the policy of the US government could
change in any of a number of ways, and so on.
4. A balanced estimate of the situation cannot rule these an
other possibilities wholly out of consideration. The best it can
do is to decide, on the basis of evidence and careful argument,
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that many of them are so unlikely as to be irrelevant, at least
until more evidence appears, and that others should be held as
possible qualifications and correctives in a net judgment. In
the paragraphs that follow we attempt to show how the evidence
and arguments may fit or not fit into alternative estimates of
the prospects in Vietnam.
5. There are three hypotheses under which the situation in
Vietnam maybe considered and to which most of the evidence may
be related: (1) Hanoi has decided that it must terminate the
fighting in the course of this year; (2) Hanoi still feels a good
measure of confidence in its prospects and firmly intends to fight
on until it perceives a break in its favor in US policy; (3) Hanoi
is less certain of its prospects and is keeping several options
open. It intends to continue hard fighting in the months ahead,
but recognizes it may be advisable to seek a compromise solution
within the next year, according to the way things develop.
I. PESSIMISM IN HANOI
6. The more solid evidence supporting the proposition that
Hanoi intends to quit at an early date comes from an analysis of
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Communist prospects in South Vietnam. According to our view of
the data, the leaders in Hanoi could conclude that their pros-
pects in South Vietnam are steadily and surely diminishing. The
toll on their forces is increasingly heavy; their losses cannot
be reduced without undermining the effectiveness of their military
and political operations; recruitment in South Vietnam is becoming
more and more difficult, control over the population is diminishin
and morale is becoming more of a problem as the war continues
without conclusive results. Even though such problems may not yei
be critical, the overall effect is that the Communist position
will be weaker at the end of 1968 than it is now. Military actiol
can arrest the decline but cannot change it fundamentally.
7. Proceeding from this analysis, Hanoi's current efforts
on the military and political fronts can be seen as one last push
to gain the best possible terms in an early settlement. For
example, it can be argued that Hanoi would not intentionally
seek the bloody and costly battles that it has, unless it knew
that the fighting would end fairly soon and replacements would
not be a problem. Hanoi would not, under this hypothesis, commit
part of its strategic reserve, unless it believed there would be
no real threat of an invasion from the US. Nor would the North
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Vietnamese claim that 1968 would be "decisive" and lead to the
formation of a "coalition" government unless they actually
anticipated an early political settlement.
8. There are, of course, various other considerations or
factors which could cause Hanoi to seek an early end to the fight-
ing; some of these have some evidential base. Perhaps the burden
of the war on North Vietnam is in itself a decisive factor. The
leadership may find that the annual loss of young men, added to
the sum of economic and material damage, is unacceptable in its
implications for the future vigor and productivity of the nation.
Our own view, however, based on a variety of sources and buttresse
by the recent testimony of the Spanish repatriates, is that the
strains of the war on North Vietnam are still well within manage-
able limits.
9. There are other possibilities which are no better than
sheer conjecture, but which cannot be entirely excluded. For
example, it could be that Moscow, concerned over a decline in
Communist strength in Vietnam, a possible US invasion of the nortl
and greater Chinese involvement and influence in North Vietnam, it
exerting pressure on Hanoi to end the war. Such pressure could
have taken the form of a threat to terminate major military aid
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after the the completion of the deliveries negotiated this past fall
along with a promise to provide substantial aid for economic
development once the fighting stops.
10. Pressures from Peking could also be responsible for a
decision to end the fighting. The Chinese, for example, might
have made their continued aid conditional on Hanoi's acceptance
of Chinese advice on both military and political strategy.
11. Neither of these conjectures can be supported by any
available evidence. Indeed, Peking and especially Moscow have
appeared reluctant in the past to apply direct and heavy pressures
on Hanoi; neither wants to force Hanoi into the embrace of the
other. While Moscow, unlike Peking, is not committed to prolonga-
tion of the war, it has always seen some advantages in the fight-
ing and has demonstrated no willingness to intervene with Hanoi
in favor of early negotiations.
12. Alternatively, Hanoi may have concluded that the Sino-
Soviet dispute will undermine effective aid. The USSR may be
refusing to ship certain weapons through China, or to risk
delivery by sea. Hanoi may anticipate that one of the Communist
giants will insist that it take a clear cut stand in the dispute;
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this would place Hanoi in the position of alienating at least
one side.
13. Another possibility is that the North Vietnamese leaders
may have concluded that turmoil and disruption in China make it a
poor prospect as a "reliable rear area." Hanoi may fear that
China's antics are encouraging the US to escalate the war without
fear of Chinese reactions. And Hanoi might even fear that the
time will come when the Chinese will insist that North Vietnam
begin its awn "cultural revolution."
14. There is, of course, evidence of Hanoi's concern over
the Sino-Soviet dispute and over China's internal policy. Last
year the North Vietnamese Politburo and Central Committee
apparently passed a resolution affirming Hanoi's neutrality in
the dispute. Missions were sent to both Moscow and Peking to
explain this position, which has been continually re-emphasized.
At one point last year, Hanoi apparently had to become directly
involved in ensuring that Soviet supplies transited more expedi-
tiously through China. Hanoi also reacted to Mao's cultural
revolution by issuing a fairly pointed criticism of Chinese
behavior and the cult of Mao. Added to these concerns is the
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fairly open record of Chinese opposition to any hint of talks
between Hanoi and the United States.
15. What is lacking, however, is any evidence that the
tensions with China or the concern over Soviet support have
reached the level where Hanoi would fear Soviet or Chinese
disengagement. The physical evidence suggests that both Peking
and Moscow are in fact increasing their aid.
16. If for any of the reasons discussed under this
hypothesis Hanoi should decide to end the fighting, it would
have at least two alternatives. It could simply decide to
allow the conflict to die down, without seeking a political
resolution. Or it could attempt to obtain the best possible
terms for a settlement under the existing circumstances. In
this latter case, the recent Trinh statement on talks with the
US could be read as the first step in the gradual development
of a negotiating position. The North Vietnamese, of course,
would still bargain for favorable terms, but they would also
recognize the need to be more forthcoming and to reduce their
demands for a settlement. It would also make sense under this
interpretation for Hanoi to get negotiations underway before
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rather than after the American elections, reasoning that during
an election campaign it would have more room for maneuvering
against the US. Hanoi's handling of the follow up to the Trinh
interview will be a test for this hypothesis; if it is correct
confirmatory evidence should become available before long.
II. CONFIDENCE IN HANOI
17. The North Vietnamese may be more impressed with their
achievements in the past two years than with the problems they
have encountered. They have withstood the massive American
intervention in the South and the heavy bombing of the North.
Despite the bombing, they now fight with more and better arms
and ammunition, and their supply lines are more elaborately
developed. The political infrastructure in the South has been
maintained, even if in somewhat weakened condition. Their
military effort, based on the increasing threat from the border
areas, not only presents a new challenge to the US on the ground
but also introduces new political complications for the Americans.
FL:ally, of course, because of their experience with the ebb and
flow of the French war, the natural inclination of the political
leaders would be to exaggerate their own strength and expect the
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US to concede defeat rather than face the prospect of a
protracted war.
18. Hanoi's determination to keep fighting could also be
explained by what it believes are fundamental weaknesses in the
American and South Vietnamese position. The Communists may be
convinced that the Saigon regime has little chance of becoming an
effective government, generally accepted by the people. Moreover,
Hanoi may be persuaded that the South Vietnamese army will never
develop into a fighting force which is effective enough to assume
part of the US burden. Thus, even if the US military effort is
highly successful, in the end the US will find it has no political
base in South Vietnam and will be forced to conclude a political
settlement with the Front.
19. Even if Hanoi does not read the situation in South
Vietnam in this way, it maybe relying= assurances of substantial
external support which will enable the Communists to fight on
effectively. The Chinese may have promised more logistical and
air defense troops and even some combat units in order to meet
any manpower needs in North Vietnam. The Soviets may have promised
new weapons to cope with superior American fire power and the air
and naval attacks on the North.
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20. Perhaps the best evidence in support of this general
interpretation of Hanoi's outlook is the record of the past
two years. At each phase of the US buildup Hanoi has been
willing to respond by committing additional resources to the
struggle in the South. A high level of infiltration has been
maintained; the most recent deployments near the western end of
the DMZ may express a determination not only to persist in the
war, but to try for a decisive defeat of the US in some local
battle. Hanoi's leaders have not taken advantage of several
opportunities for negotiations; this could mean that they believe
nothing can be gained at the bargaining table unless it has
already been won on the battlefield. Finally, a committment to
fight a protracted war was the main decision of the North
Vietnamese Central Committee resolution of late 1965, was re-
affirmed by the Central Committee in early 1967, and continues
to be cited as basic policy.
21. As to evidence of external support, Hanoi has recently
concluded a series of new agreements with its Communist allies.
Moscow has openly promised a variety of weapons; Soviet coastal
defense missiles could be the first of several new items on the
list. New Chinese weapons have shown up in the Delta for the
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first time in the war. We known of no increases in Chinese troop
strength in North Vietnam in recent months. Recent high level
reaffirmations of pledges to support Hanoi, however, could be read
as a, willingness to increase Chinese commitments. And air defense
cooperation between Hanoi and Peking has grown markedly in recent
months.
22. We know of no evidence that is totally inconsistent with
an intention to continue the war for some considerable period
of time. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Hanoi would never
draw down its home army and weaken the defense of North Vietnam
if it looked forward to a long war, particularly in light of
continuing concern over an American invasion. And it could be
further argued that Hanoi would not tell the troops in the South
that this would be a "decisive" year, if in fact it believed the
war was likely to continue well beyond 1968. Finally, why Hanoi
would want to keep alive hopes for negotiations, aggravating the
Chinese in the process, if it had no intention of reaching a
political settlement in the near future?
23. If Hanoi's mood and outlook is roughly as assumed
under this hypothesis then its attitude toward peace talks is
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likely to be intransigent. Upon exploration, moves like the
recent Trinh statement will come to nothing. Hanoi, of course,
would welcome an end to the bombing, but will adamantly refuse
to pay any price for it. Negotiations would be mainly to register
the defeat of the US and the end of the Saigon regime.
24. Finally, one may conjecture that Hanoi's postulated
confidence rests on some factor or event which is not yet apparent
to the US, such as a major escalation by the Communists. This
might take the form of a military offensive in Laos which would
threaten to expand the area of conflict and further strain US
resources in Southeast Asia. Or escalation might take the form
of Chinese moves in Vietnam or elsewhere around its periphery.
Or again, the North Vietnamese could be relying on the USSR to
create a diversionary crisis, say in Berlin.
25. Such possibilities have been carefully considered almost
since the beginning of the US intervention in Vietnam. Thus far,
there is no persuasive evidence that Hanoi, Peking or Moscow
intends to enlarge the war beyond Vietnam or take major action
elsewhere against the US.
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III. SUSPENDED JUDGMENT IN HANOI
26. The third hypothesis assumes that Hanoi's estimate of
the situation is based on a mixture of increased pessimism and
continuing confidence, Which are compounded by other factors,
particularly the American elections. Under this hypothesis Hanoi
is keeping several options open and will continue to do so at least
until late spring or summer, when it should be in a better position
to judge the effect of the American primaries and conventions and
the results of its own military offensive. At that time Hanoi will
also be better able to judge the effectiveness and durability of
the Saigon government.
27. If this is so, Hanoi's winter-spring offensive is
designed not only for its immediate military objectives but for
its overall impact on the US. HAnoi would recognize that its
chances for a military victory have evaporated, but it would still
hope, by sustaining high levels of combat in the months ahead, to
create the impression of a stalemate. It would not expect the
US to capitulate, but it would see increased Chances for a
compromise on terms that would protect the Viet Cong infrastructur(
and provide the basis for a new political phase in the revolutions]
struggle. Hanoi could not be confident of what the outcome of its
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own efforts will be. But it would recognize that the next twelve
months provide an unusual opportunity because of the American
elections.
28. Even if political overtures combined with military
pressures do not bear fruit, Hanoi could reason that by agitating
the question of a coalition government and contacts with the
Front, the strains between Washington and Saigon will grow and
the US will come under increasing international pressures to
modify its own terms. In short, Hanoi would do what it could to
maintain its military pressures, but would at the same time
become more flexible in its diplomacy, waiting for some months
more to decide whether to make the best deal possible, continue
the war more or less along present lines, or even to adopt a
radically different way of fighting, i.e., guerrilla warfare.
29. This hypothesis rests on a different reading of much
of the same evidence already cited. Hanoi has made military
decisions which strike some observers as inexplicable given the
nature of their problems. Hanoi cannot possibly hope to drive the
US into the sea and probably cannot expect another Eden Bien Phu.
Thus, it would seem better advised to conserve its forces for a
protracted war in which it would hope to sap the will of the US.
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Instead, the North Vietnamese commit more troops and seek
costly battles. Moreover, since last July they do seem to have
indicated more interest in maintaining private contacts with the
US and, in some cases, actually inviting US negotiating probes --
moves which their rather rigid public position would not justify.
30. This hypothesis is supported by some negative evidence.
For example, why should China be so cool to the new program of
the NFL unless Peking senses that the revision of the program
was a step toward a negotiating situatioll? Why did the Front try
to send representatives to New York, if as Hanoi claims the UN
has absolutely no business in the Vietnam question? And, above
all, why do the captured documents contain intriguing tidbits
suggesting that the war may not go beyond 1968? These contradic-
tions or inconsistencies could be reconciled within the frame-
work of this third hypothesis.
31. Uncertainty could also grow out of the state of
relations with China and the USSR. In actual fact we know
little of Hanoi's relations with its allies. What we
do know is based on glimmerings from captured documents,
deductions from overt statements and an occasional hint from
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Soviet sources. In any case, Hanoi cannot be very confident
that Moscow and Peking will not fall into an even more bitter
conflict, or that the situation inside China will not deteriorate
further. Indeed, Hanoi could conclude that it would be better to
explore US terms for a political settlement while China is still
in some disarray rather than later, when the Chinese leadership
might be reunified and tempted to interfere more directly in
Hanoi's affairs.
32. Indications of uncertainty could also be reconciled
with an even more extreme variant of this hypothesis, namely,
that the North Vietnamese Politburo is badly divided and is
pursuing an indecisive and at times contradictory policy. Perim]
as Ho Chi Minh's health has declined, factionalism has reared its
ugly head and led to a fairly even split between hawks and doves.
Both factions could seek comfort and support from abroad, the
hawks from Peking and the doves from Moscow. The hawks may insisi
on the need for further intensive military effort while the doves
could be arguing for a shift to political tactics.
33. Though there is some evidence that the North Vietnamese
leaders have engaged in debates over policy, mainly on the proper
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military tactics, there has never been sufficient evidence to
conclude that the leadership is divided on basic policies of
whether to fight or quit. A power struggle in Hanoi, of course,
is a possibility after Ho and could be developing now. But the
evidence is lacking, and this explanation of Hanoi's behavior
seems highly unlikely.
34. Even less likely but still within the realm of the
imaginable is a split between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. As Hanoi
has assumed more of the burden and direction of the war, it may
have alienated a faction within COSVN. The Viet Cong could argue,
with support from certain figures in the Hanoi leadership, that
all talk of negotiations is defeatism. Hanoi may suspect a
Chinese bent in the Viet Cong, etc., etc. There may be actual
divergencies between Hanoi and same of the Viet Cong leaders, but
a real split should be excluded as unlikely.
35. As noted at the outset of this discussion we cannot
rule out any of these three hypothetical explanations for Hanoi's
behavior. It would certainly not be surprising if the North
Vietnamese continued the war through next year and for some time
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afterward. It would be more surprising if they decided to end
it soon. We believe there is much to recommend the third case:
in the months ahead Hanoi will continue its military effort but
will probe more intently to discover what the shape of a
political settlement might be.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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