SNIE 57/1-67-SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST WAR EFFORT - 1967/12/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01131516
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO1131516 3.5(c)
SNIE 57/1-67
14 December 1967
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 57/1-67
DEPU CTOR OF cPENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
14 December 1967
N? 142
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Dr. R. J. Smith, for the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
It Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-
mission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security o
the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18,
Sections 793, 794, and 798.
It is to be n ankt hv
to receive
be maintained in accordance with
LATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any
be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to
action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
IS 11PM6llf1P1 (2,crerieIy indoctrinated and authorized
information; its security must
REGU-
which may
be gained, unless such
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and "
declassification
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1
SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST WAR EFFORT
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the extent and significance of Vietnamese Communist
use of Cambodian territory in support of the Communist war effort
in South Vietnam.
CONCLUSIONS
A. During the past year, increasing Allied pressure on the Com-
munists' military structure in South Vietnam has caused them to de-
pend more heavily on the use of border areas. They use Cambodian
territory as a sanctuary to evade Allied forces, as a refuge for rest, train-
ing, medical care, and in some degree as a route for the infiltration of
personnel and military supplies from North Vietnam. We believe that
Cambodian rice currently provides an important proportion of the
food requirement of the VC / NVA regular forces in South Vietnam.
B. We still have no good evidence that military supplies or equip-
ment are moved through Sihanoukville or other Cambodian ports to
Communist forces in South Vietnam. But the Communists continue to
smuggle small quantities of arms and other military equipment from
Cambodia, some of which probably represents unauthorized diversions
from arms imported by the Cambodian Government for its own forces.
C. If the Communists continue their present strategy, the im-
portance of Cambodia to their war effort will probably grow in 1968,
particularly as a sanctuary and as a source of rice. Denial of Cam-
bodian sanctuary would probably not cause the Communist war effort
to collapse in the neighboring areas of South Vietnam, but would make
it much harder for the Communists to conduct effective military op-
erations in these areas.
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D. Over the past year, Sihanouk has become more aware of the
extent of Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodia and more apprehen-
sive over US intentions. He has made some small efforts to control
activity in the border area but he lacks the military capability to im-
pose effective measures. Sihanouk is likely to move toward more
criticism of the US for real or imagined violations of Cambodian
sovereignty, hoping to deter the US from carrying the war into Cam-
bodian territory and thus avoiding direct involvement in the war.
S ET
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DISCUSSION
1. Communist use of Cambodian territory for tactical sanctuary, for base areas,
for infiltration of personnel, and as a source of supply does not appear to have
changed fundamentally over the past year. However, as a consequence of grow-
ing pressure on the Communist military structure in South Vietnam, border areas
have become of increasing importance in Communist strategy. Bases straddling
the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border have facilitated Communist operations
by providing safety for command and communication elements and refuge for
Communist forces.
2. Base Areas.2 Of the major Communist base areas that make use of Cam-
bodian territory, the most northerly is in the tri-border region where Laos, Cam-
bodia, and South Vietnam meet. The Chu Pong and Se San bases in western
Pleiku and southern Kontum provinces and the large War Zone C complex in
northern Tay Ninh province also lap over into Cambodia. The Kas Kok base
appears to lie principally in Cambodian territory, near where the Mekong River
crosses into South Vietnam. There are less important base areas along the
borders of the Cambodian province of Svay Rieng and the South Vietnamese
provinces of Quang Due and Kien Giang.
3. The functions of these base areas have remained about the same as last
year. They include facilities for resupply and training prior to major engage-
ments, and various medical facilities to treat wounded after combat. Some Com-
munist combat regiments, which were subsequently engaged in the battles of
Loc Ninh and Dak To, used Cambodian territory to refit and prepare for these
attacks.
4. Tactical Sanctuary. The Communists continue to use Cambodian territory
as a safe haven after combat, but the pattern varies and depends to a great
extent on the circumstances of the engagements with Allied forces. During a
major US search and destroy operation into War Zone C in early 1967, elements
of COSVN took refuge in adjacent Cambodian territory. On the other hand,
we have no evidence as yet that Communist combat elements withdrew into
Cambodia after the Loc Ninh battle this fall.
5. Prior to the battle of Dak To, two elements of the Communist B-3 Front
Headquarters and the NVA First Division moved north from the Chu Pong base
to the tri-border area. At least part of this movement probably took place over
trails on the Cambodian side of the border. During the actual battle the two
elements of the B-3 Front Headquarters remained inside the northeastern tip
of Cambodia, apparently directing the fight, and afterwards the First Division
1 SNIE 57-67, "Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort," dated
26 January 1967, SECRET, provides a considerable amount of background and detail on
Communist use of Cambodia, most of which is still valid.
'See centerspread map.
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Headquarters and the headquarters of at least one of its component regiments
moved into Cambodian territory for sanctuary.
6. Communist troops withdrawing into northeastern Cambodia penetrate less
than 10 kilometers. Along the more populous southern half of the border, the
penetrations of Cambodia are shallower, and smaller numbers of Communist
troops are usually involved.
7. Infiltration of Personnel. In general, infiltration trails continuing south-
ward from Laos follow the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border as far south
as the Phuoc Long-Binh Long region of South Vietnam. They cross back and
forth across the border in many places and lie less than seven kilometers inside
the border on the Cambodian side. Along the trails are a number of way sta-
tions for rest, resupply, and medical attention. We have little evidence on the
actual use of the trails for infiltration during 1967. We do know, however, that
units in the B-3 Front and COSVN received replacements this year, and it is
likely that many of these replacements used trails in Cambodia for some portion
of their journey south.
8. Routes of Supply. We have observed few improvements on the numerous
supply routes from Cambodia into South Vietnam in the past year. In general,
movement on the roads appears to be about the same as last year while move-
ment on the waterways in the northeast appears to have increased somewhat.
The main direction of movement on these routes is north and east from Cambodia
into Laos and the highlands of South Vietnam, and the supplies moved consist
primarily of food. Some of the military supplies moving southward from Laos
to Communist forces in South Vietnam are apparently portered through Cam-
bodia over a system of trails. But there is still no good evidence that the Com-
munists have been using Cambodian roads and waterways for this purpose.
9. Food. Food shipments from Cambodia to the Communist forces in South
Vietnam and Laos have continued in 1967 but it is difficult to determine the
quantities involved. We believe that the VC/NVA Regular forces and admin-
istrative support troops in South Vietnam require about 180 tons of food per day,
of which 15 to 20 percent probably comes from Cambodia either directly or via
Laos. Cambodian food is also shipped northward into Laos to support the in-
filtration network there.
10. Cambodian rice is particularly important for Communist troops operating
out of the tri-border, Se San, and Chu Pong base areas in the rice-deficit high-
lands. Communist troops in these areas are almost certainly unable to obtain
sufficient rice locally or from the coastal plain. If Cambodian rice were not
available, Communist forces in the tri-border base area probably could be sup-
plied by shipments of North Vietnamese rice down the Laotian route system.
This would substantially increase the daily tonnage of supplies moved and the
movement would be more vulnerable to US aerial interdiction. It would, how-
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ever, be exceedingly difficult to move sufficient rice farther south to the Se San
and Chu Pong base areas, and Communist troops there might be forced to relocate.
In the War Zone C complex, loss of Cambodian rice would probably force the
Communists to allocate additional personnel to the task of collecting rice from
nearby areas.
11. Weapons and Ammunition. Because of South Vietnamese controls, it is
unlikely that any sizable amount of arms or ammunition is being smuggled up
the Mekong to Phnom Penh and thence to South Vietnam. There is a greater
chance that such material could be brought in through Sihanoukville or else-
where along the coast. But despite occasional reports we still have no good
evidence of such movements. We believe that in time we would have tangible
indications of any continuing substantial shipments of arms and ammunition to
Communist forces through Sihanoukville, should such movements occur. The
Communists do, however, continue to smuggle small quantities of arms and other
military equipment from Cambodia, some of which probably represents un-
authorized diversions from Communist arms imported by the Cambodian Gov-
ernment for its own forces.
12. Chemicals and Other Supplies. Some potassium chlorate and other chem-
icals useful in the manufacture of explosives continue to reach the Communists
via Cambodia. But we have little more information concerning the quantities
involved than we did a year ago. The amount of drugs, communications equip-
ment, and other supplies obtained from Cambodia appears to have increased
slightly over the past year probably because increased Allied pressures make
it harder to procure them within South Vietnam.
13. Outlook. If the Communists continue their present strategy, the im-
portance of Cambodia to their war effort will probably grow in 1968, particu-
larly as a sanctuary and as a source of rice. Denial of Cambodian sanctuary
would probably not cause the Communist war effort to collapse in the neighbor-
ing areas of South Vietnam, but would make it much harder for the Communists
to conduct effective military operations in these areas.
14. Sihanouk's Position. Over the past year, Sihanouk has become more aware
of the extent of Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodia and he has made some
small efforts to curtail it. Nevertheless, we do not believe he is likely to make a
major effort, principally because the Cambodian Armed Forces are just not strong
enough. The army totals only 32,000 and less than 9,000 regular troops are sta-
tioned in provinces along the entire 700 mile border with South Vietnam. In
the two large northeastern provinces of Cambodia, moreover, there are only
eight border posts and these are manned by small paramilitary units. Four of
these are clustered around the junction of Route 19 and the South Vietnamese
border, just north of the Communist Chu Pong base area. Along this sparsely
manned frontier from Kontum to northern Tay Ninh are over 20,000 regular
Communist troops.
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15. Sihanouk's basic aim continues to be to avoid involvement in the war.
Ile is increasingly apprehensive that the US will carry the war against the Com-
munists into Cambodian territory. Since he cannot keep the Vietnamese Com-
munists from using his territory, Sihanouk is likely to move toward more criticism
of the US for real or imagined violations of Cambodian sovereignty, hoping
thus to deter the US.
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