<SANITIZED>) IRAQ'S INTERNAL SECURITY AND PROSPECTS FOR A COUP

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01079909
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01399
• Publication Date: January 1, 2001

Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 CO1079909
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Iraq's Internal Security and Prospects for a Coup
Saddam maintains a vise grip on Iraq's political and internal
security system despite an erosion of military capabilities and further alienation of
Iraq's Shia and Kurdish populations after 10 years of sanctions. Saddam
remains obsessed with survival, and his multilayered security apparatus enforces
his authority and cultivates an image of invincibility.
� Saddam's son Qusay presides over the security and intelligence
community, oversees the Republican Guard and Special Republican
Guard, and controls high level appointments in the regular Army.
Qusay has the authority to implement the Baghdad Security Plan for
securing the capital during emergencies.
� Senior government and military officials view their fortunes as tied to
Saddam, and frequent rotations and close scrutiny by security
services complicate the development of antiregime networks.
Iraq exhibits many of the conditions of a regime susceptible to a
coup, including a rigid political system, concentration of power and wealth in a
small elite, and oppressive security that brutally eradicates perceived disloyalty
and diffuses independent bases of authority through a combination of rewards
and threats. In this atmosphere of suspicion and foreboding:
� Rivalries within Saddam's own clan have created fissures within the
ruling elite that could threaten stability
� Saddam's inflexible power structure could crack under pressure if
security forces were unable to sustain his image of invincibility.
A successful coup would probably come from a critical segment
within the regime that could sustain an alternate power base in order to supplant
Saddam's rule.
� Essential tasks under any coup scenario would include sustaining a
secure network, locating Saddam and purging key regime loyalists,
seizing the national communications infrastructure, and integrating or
neutralizing key security and military forces.
Three distinct levels within the regime hierarchy could support a
(b)(3)
�SteRE-T--
pproved for Release: 2018/05/17 C01079909
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 CO1079909
(b)(3)
coup, although each would face a series of obstacles and opportunities. Saddam
deliberately imposed barriers to overthrow during his 20 year reign, drawing on
his personal experience plotting against the Iraqi government in the 1960s and
directing Iraq's security apparatus under his predecessor.
� Saddam's bodyguards and select regime officials have direct access to
Saddam but not to his daily schedule. They would have difficulty
gaining support from military and security services.
� Elite security organizations responsible for outer layers of presidential
security maintain regular contact with Saddam's inner circle and
Iraq's most capable military forces, but they lack direct access to
Saddam and do not control forces sufficient to sustain a new
government.
� Senior military commanders control forces sufficient to depose
Saddam and establish a new government, but intense regime
oversight, frequent rotations, and a diluted command structure
complicate their ability to sustain a secure network necessary to
move against the regime.
(b)(3)
�SEeRET.
2
pproved for Release: 2018/05/17 C01079909