<SANITIZED>OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION 1948-1952, VOLUME I

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01066718
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 296
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2021
• Case Number: F-2020-00661
• Publication Date: February 1, 1973

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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF
OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
1948-1952
VOLUME
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OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
1948-1952
I. Introduction
The Russian-actuated Communist movement gath-
ered a great deal of momentum in the era immediately
following World War II, slipping stealthily into the
political vacuums created by the toppling of the Ger-
man, Italian, and Japanese fascist movements. As a
result of shifts in power after the war, Russia looked
upon the United States as the leader of an opposite
camp. Within Communist ideology, democracy was an
ultimate target for destruction. A whole series of
inimical actions engineered from Moscow served to
engender a state of apprehension within the American
body politic.*
Modern day gurus often refer to those years as
the "McCarthy era." As a consequence, his political
reprehensibility is generally projected without ade-
quate exposition of the unallayed anxiety that ex-
isted at the time in the public mind because of the
aggressive actions of the USSR. To some, the manipu-
lations of Senator Joseph McCarthy appeared more as
a product of the existing public trepidation than as
a cause of it as alleged by others.
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In September 1946 an important state paper was
prepared by Mr. Clark M. Clifford, an aide to Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman, on the subject of US relations
with the Soviet Union. It supplied the President with
every past detail of the wartime relationship with
the USSR. More importantly, as it turned out, it
charted the postwar prospect with startling presci-
ence outlining the shape and thrust of Truman's sub-
sequent programs, namely: the Greek-Turkish aid
legislation or Truman Doctrine; the Marshall Plan;
and the North Atlantic Alliance. Clifford's memo-
randum summarized the situation as follows:
The gravest problem facing the
United States today is that of Ameri-
can relations with the Soviet Union.
The solution of that problem may de-
termine whether or not there will be
a third World War. Soviet leaders
appear to be conducting their nation
on a course of aggrandizement de-
signed to lead to eventual world domin-
ation by the USSR. Their goal, and
their policies designed to reach it,
are in direct conflict with American
ideals, and the United States has not
yet been able to persuade Stalin and
his associates that world peace and
prosperity lie not in the direction
in which the Soviet Union is moving
but in the opposite direction of
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international cooperation and friend-
ship. 1/*
Postwar US foreign policy, shaped by aims
toward world peace, awakened only slowly to the dan-
ger of the Russian threat at home and abroad. At
home, a tocsin was sounded in 1948 by the exposure
of the extent of the Russian espionage that had
been conducted in the United States. Featured
prominently in all of the media was the indictment
of Mr. Alger Hiss of the Department of State. The
related confessions of Mr. Whittaker Chambers and
Mrs. Elizabeth Bentley were disconcerting disclo-
sures of the perfidy of a wartime ally.
Overseas, the organization of the Communist
Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947
marked a resumption of the process of international
revolution which purportedly had been discarded by
the dissolution of the Communist International
(Comintern) in 1943. This subversive formation was
viewed by the American people as a portent of aggres-
sive Russian intentions.
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The Communist efforts to disrupt the political-
economic system of the Western World were reach-
ing a crescendo by 1948. France and Italy were be-
leaguered by a wave of Communist-inspired strikes.
Italy was facing its first national election and
the threat of a Communist victory. Greece was
fighting the Communist guerrillas in its northern
provinces.
The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in Feb-
ruary 1948 was followed by a total blockade of Ber-
lin and its subsequent relief by American airlift.
In China the defeat of the Nationalists by the Com-
munist armies was impending. In the Philippines
the Government was under continuing guerrilla at-
tacks by the Communist Hukbalahaps.
US leaders were convinced that the Russian
regime and its satellite satrapy were completely
untrustworthy and, as later voiced by Premier Niki-
ta S. Krushchev, out to "bury" the Americans. There
was ample evidence to conclude that Russia aimed at
hegemony over the industrial potential of Germany,
France, Italy, and all of Europe. It was apparent
that the Cominform was preparing to capitalize in
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the undeveloped countries on the political uncertain-
ties brought about by the voluntary and involuntary
decolonization of territories previously occupied
by the European powers.
With the imminent end of US nuclear monopoly
following the explosion of an atomic bomb by the
USSR in 1949, the US leaders did not know how far
Russia might go
Truman Doctrine
icy came out in
nism. This, of
to attain its objectives. With the
as a takeoff point, US national pol-
favor of the containment of Commu-
course, amounted to a decision to
bring about a political confrontation with the Russians.
It was to be a peaceful confrontation; but should
Russia react with hostile moves, it was deemed prudent
that the United States should quietly prepare itself
for any eventuality (1 July 1952 was a target date
frequently mentioned). Diplomatic and economic mea-
sures would be the means of outright confrontation.
The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty fol-
lowed on the heels of the Greek-Turkish aid provided
under the Truman Doctrine; but it was recognized
that these measures could have little lasting impact
unless the subversive aggression of Communism could
be halted.
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To gain ascendency, alternatives to the Com-
munist ideology would require the strengthening and
building of institutions of independent thought. At
the same time, individuals and groups abroad moti-
vated by political aspirations contrary to those of
the Communists had few resources to advance their
cause. They would need a strong source of secret
support, financial, material and moral. It had to
be secret to allay possible charges of foreign poli-
tical meddling which might defeat the very purpose
of the support. If covert aid of this sort were not
forthcoming from the United States, it appeared that
the Cominform might proceed unhampered in its pro-
gram to envelop the world with Communist ideology.
To this end the United States decided to stem
Soviet underground subversive operations and to cre-
ate a clandestine agency for that purpose. This
would have to be a new organization in order not to
militate against the clandestine collection of in-
telligence and counterintelligence already assigned
to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by the
National Security Act of 1947. On 18 June 1948, by
directive of the National Security Council (NSC),
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the task of confrontation on the clandestine front
was assigned to the Office of Policy Coordination
(OPC), then called the Office of Special Projects.
OPC was formally established on 1 September 1948 and
continued operating until its 1 August 1952 merger
with OSO into a combined directorate which became
the CIA Clandestine Service.
The NSC directive which created OPC in 1948
gave it a loose charter to undertake the full range
of covert activities incident to the conduct of se-
cret political, psychological, and economic warfare
together with preventive direct action (paramilitary
activities) - all within the policy direction of the
Departments of State and Defense. This authority
superseded a previous and much more limited directive
whereby the Office of Special Operations (OSO) was
to engage in certain secret psychological activities
along with its existing commitments for the conduct
of espionage and counterespionage. The new 1948 di-
rective took cognizance of "the vicious covert acti-
vities of the USSR" and reflected the high state of
arousal existing in US Government circles at that time.
OPC was placed in CIA alongside OSO with an
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adjuration by the NSC that it was to operate as inde-
pendently of the other offices of CIA as efficiency
would permit. The head of OPC, Assistant Director
of CIA for Policy Coordination (ADPC), was to be
nominated by the Secretary of State (General George
C. Marshall at the time) on the basis that he was
to be acceptable to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI) and appointed by the NSC. The appoint-
ment was made in the summer of 1948.
By collateral accord with State and Defense
the DCI, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, agreed
that their policies would flow directly through de-
partmental Designated Representatives to the head of
OPC. When Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith re-
placed Hillenkoetter in October 1950, he put a dif-
ferent construction on the NSC directive. Thereafter,
State and Defense policies reached OPC only through
the DCI, who effectively installed himself in control
of its operations.
During the corporate life of OPC, the top of-
fice of ADPC was held by just two individuals, Mr.
Frank G. Wisner (1 September 1948 - 23 August 1951)
and Colonel Kilbourne Johnston (23 August 1951 -
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1 August 1952). Wisner, a man of intense applica-
tion with a solid background in secret intelligence
work, was a singular choice to create a covert or-
ganization from scratch; and Johnston with much man-
agerial experience was well qualified to organize
that establishment toward a more orderly existence.
Wisner was promoted in 1951 to become the Deputy
Director for Plans (DDP), thereby assuming general
direction of both OSO and OPC operations; and John-
ston was General Smith's choice to succeed him as
ADPC.
The scope of the OPC effort and the mainten-
ance of its relationships with the highest levels
of State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
and other governmental agencies was a tremendous
challenge to these men and their staffs, and a
heavy burden as well. Operational requirements em-
anating from State, Defense, and JCS taxed OPC capa-
cities from the very moment of its establishment.
As the US Government increased the pace of peaceful
confrontation (the cold war), OPC grew faster and ex-
panded further than initially anticipated.
Operational directives issued from the NSC in
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a seemingly unending stream to the Departments of
State and Defense which in turn called on OPC for
covert support. Its relationships with these de-
partments and with the JCS were salutary on the
whole. There were however some temporary moments
of tension with State's propaganda office and with
the psychological warfare office of the Army, as
well as with the Far East Command. Generally, they
were all soon quieted, but one particular point of
discomfort persisted. In 1949, inadvertently preci-
pitated by CIA, a security and loyalty investigation
of Mr. John Paton Davies, a senior Foreign Service
Officer on State's policy Planning Staff, created
considerable fanfare.* It generated extensive com-
ment in the media over a period of several years
and came to be a cause of chagrin to OPC.
To the United States and to OPC the conduct of
political and psychological warfare in peacetime was
a new art. Some of the techniques were known but
doctrine and experience were lacking. OPC was to
learn by doing. By 1952 OPC had built an organization
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capable of executing covert action on a worldwide
scale. It had gone through a period of rapid expan-
sion in terms of both people and money.
The secret war provided an im-
mediate area of confrontation and, as a consequence,
there was much governmental pressure to "get on with
it." Operations grew apace, some successful and some
not, as revealed by a quick look at what happened
during the 1948-1952 period.
In the years 1948 to 1950, OPC concentrated its
efforts on Europe and the West. Its representatives
were placed first in the Western European countries
excepted); then in some of the Middle East-
ern states,
and South Asia; and in the Far Eastern coun-
tries. South America and sub-Sahara Africa were low
on the priority list.
At first most of the OPC sta-
tions and bases had only skeletal staffs. Their capa-
bilities were limited; but their very presence was a
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cogent factor. Local individuals groups, and intel-
ligence services quickly came to understand that there
was a force abroad in the world around which they
could rally and gain support in their own opposition
to Communism. OPC began working with foreign intel-
ligence services at an early date,
The objective
of the liaison was war planning, and, to a limited
degree, political and psychological (PP) operations.
Highest on the Department of State's list of
priorities was the need to deal with the political
leadership of the countless thousands of refugees
and emigres who had fled to the West from Russia
and the satellite countries. The immediate problem
was to deal with them outside of the Iron Curtain.
These leaders could not be endorsed to head govern-
ments-in-exile for the realities of the situation
ultimately demanded recognition of the Communist regimes
that had assumed power; but they could be employed
in the conduct of PP operations behond the Curtain.
As a consequence, the National Committee for
Free Europe (NCFE) was organized in 1949 with OPC
support under the aegis of prominent financiers,
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lawyers, industrialists, and savants in order to
give the political energy of these foreign nation-
ality groups some direction. The main activity of
NCFE centered on Radio Free Europe (RFE) with broad-
casting facilities directed toward the satellites.
Another
project involved the organization of the American
Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Rus-
sia which established Radio Liberty to broadcast to
Russia itself. RFE and Radio Liberty were still
operating in 1971 and had figured prominently in the
press.
The Cominform, following its formation, con-
cocted a number of wide-ranging front organizations
(so called because they provided a facade for Com-
munist indoctrination), including the World Peace
Council; the World Federation of Democratic Youth;
the World Federation of Scientific Workers; the In-
ternational Union of Students; the Women's Inter-
national Democratic Federation; the International
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Organization of Journalists; and the International
Association of Democratic Lawyers.
These international organizations spoke out in
favor of peace and solidarity in order to prepare
the unwary for subtle indoctrination into the Com-
munist ideology. As instruments of psychological
warfare, their announced aims were so estimable that
it was difficult to devise a means of defense except
in kind. Principally although not exclusively in
the West, OPC became active in sponsoring rival in-
ternational organizations of a non-Communist hue,
specifically in the cultural, youth and student,
veterans', women's, labor, and lawyers' fields.
Certain labor operations had been instigated
by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) be-
fore OPC came into being. As a consequence, OPC in-
itially concentrated its efforts within the circum-
ference of the trade union movement with the assist-
ance of the ECA which had certain counterpart funds
available for the purpose,
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produce a significant opposition to the Communist-
dominated syndicate which, it appears, would have
become overwhelmingly dominant had it gone on un-
checked. In France, the democratic unions, although
their leadership was weak, were able to bring about
the failure of the Communist-inspired port strikes
called to prevent the off-loading of the first ship-
ment of US assistance materials.
Some of this activity extended outward toward East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the other satellites.
In Munich, RFE established its
programming headquarters and a part of its broad-
casting equipment; other facilities were in Lisbon,
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Portugal.
The US policy of containment was soon tested
by Communists when the Republic of Korea was invaded
on 25 June 1950. Up to this point, OPC's responsi-
bility for preventive direct action or PM activity
or unconventional warfare as it came to be known -
had been limited to
staybehind networks
Much of this effort
Treaty Organization
countries
had been undertaken
-
the plans and preparations for
in the event of a future war.
was in support of North Atlantic
(NATO) planning in the European
Much of the preparatory work
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Korea precipi-
tated a call for immediate PM operations in support
of US participation in the United Nations (UN) in-
tervention.
OPC's effort in the Far East had not made much
headway up to 1950 except for certain nascent psy-
chological operations directed against the
and against the Communist
revolutionaries in Southeast Asia. This was due in
part to the problem of an overburdened staff. A
principal obstacle, however, was the fact that Gen-
eral Douglas MacArthur was as chary of CIA as he
had been of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
Now he wanted assistance from wherever possible,
including OPC.
Having reached a modus vivendi with the Far
East Command (FEC), OPC's Pacific operations ex-
panded rapidly. Korea provided a testing ground for
the support of conventional warfare with unconven-
tional methods. The Americans had learned a great
deal about unconventional offensive tactics in World
War II but the Communist states had learned from the
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Soviets a great deal about defensive tactics. As a
result, unconventional warfare in Korea was some-
thing of a standoff. Some American aviators were
recovered by "rat-line" operations.* A number of
harassment operations, conducted overland and by
small boats in coastal waters, were carried out suc-
cessfully. It was quickly apparent that the Com-
munist regimes knew a great deal about how to deal
with their internal security; consequently little
resistance by the civilian population could be lo-
cated in the north on which either intelligence or
action networks could be constructed by OSO and OPC
respectively.
* Specific routes over which escapers and evaders
are passed through safe houses and safe areas to
neutral or friendly territory.
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Sometimes errors
were made because officers were bemused by their own
creative urges and ventured too far into activity
that was overt by nature and not OPC's business.
Ill-starred ventures into the production of motion
pictures demonstrated this point.
There were many sound decisions and some injudi-
cious ones; but the margin for error, it is clear,
decreased as experience was gained.
When Smith became DCI in October 1950, he was
perplexed, if not dumbfounded, at the wide-ranging
responsibilities of OPC. A few months before his
appointment the NSC had decided to expand US PP ac-
tivities. Encouraged by some apparent cracks in the
Bloc structure, there was even talk of separating
the USSR from some of its satellites. OPC had been
told to accelerate its activity but no one knew how
far it was to go or from whence were to come the
means to get there.
At an early moment, Smith deliberated on the
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merger of OPC and OSO but deferred any action for
fear that the self-revealing activities of OPC might
interfere with OSO's long-range espionage and coun-
terespionage (CE) mission. He decided to bridge the
duality of their overseas representations by super-
imposing Senior Representatives of his own choosing
and reporting to him.
In May 1951 Smith decided to seek further guid-
ance from the NSC as to the scope and pace of OPC
operations. He requested that the NSC initiate a com-
prehensive review of covert operations in light of
the increase in their magnitude, that such review re-
state the responsibilities involved for US covert
operations, and that if the review should reaffirm
CIA's covert operational responsibility, he should
be provided with a way to obtain the necessary sup-
port from other agencies.
He received half an answer from the NSC. The
operational responsibility of CIA for covert activity
was reaffirmed. But the review of operations and
methods for the provision of their support was placed
in the hands of a committee - the Psychological Stra-
tegy Board (PSB). Evidently Smith was to have the
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satisfaction of answering his own question, for he
soon became chairman of the PSB. Separated from the
making of strategic policy as it was, the PSB proved
to be a frail reed, but it was the beginning of a
process whereby mechanics were later established for
better relating the conduct of covert operations to
US national strategy.
The answer from NSC, unsatisfactory though it
was, may have been the turning point in General
Smith's considerations of merging OSO and OPC, a
course urged on him by his deputy, Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
and his operational deputy, Wisner. At least he knew
that for the foreseeable future he would be privileged
or saddled - depending on how he looked at it - with
the responsibility for conducting covert operations.
A number of actions began to take place within OSO
and OPC and between them, looking toward integration.
By the time of the 1 August 1952 merger, OPC was
active in all spheres of covert activity and, under
the NSC direction and within departmental policy, was
expending a major share of the CIA budget
In terms of the tools
of its trade, it had acquired many installations and
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facilities at home and abroad and had accumulated
against planning contingencies for wartime a huge
stockpile of ordnance items. It had acquired sub-
stantial numbers of aircraft for support purposes
and the Air Force had undertaken to allocate to OPC
support four air wings, again to fulfill planning
contingencies.
In strength levels OPC had overtaken and passed
OSO. In the course of its growth, OPC had found it
necessary to undergo several major reorganizations.
By 1952 the leaders of CIA were of the opinion that
OPC had grown to a point where a period of consoli-
dation of its resources was in order. On the eve of
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merger, a review board of senior OPC officers was ap-
pointed by General Smith to reduce OPC's monetary
commitments by as much as one-third. It quickly be-
came known as "the murder board." Although many
projects were earmarked for termination, their li-
quidation was found to be a complicated and some-
times painful procedure. Further sorting out, it ap-
peared, would have to take place after 1 August 1952
within the framework of the merged service.
In concluding this introduction to the history
of OPC's tough encounter with the Soviets in the
covert action (CA) field, it would be exciting to say
that OPC emerged as the winner, but the most one can
say is that the contest was a "see-saw" affair. The
Soviets were ready at the end of World War II with
an aggressive game plan and had taken an early lead.
OPC, a new organization, was faced with trying to
plan a catch-up game from the very start. No one
can say how and when the contest ended - or if it
has ever ended - but the Soviet Union no longer had
the field completely to itself.
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II. Enabling Directives and Related Actions
A. Introduction (NSC 4-A)
At the end of World War II, CA operations car-
ried out by OSS and other agencies during the period
of hostilities had come to a standstill with little
indication as to when, how, or if they might be re-
sumed short of another war.
The secret intelligence and counterintelligence
(CI) activity of OSS had passed into the trusteeship
of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) on 1 October
1945. Its uncertain future was partially resolved
when President Truman on 22 January 1946 directed
the coordination of intelligence activities, includ-
ing the formation of the Central Intelligence Group
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(CIG). � This directive contained certain phrases
that were ultimately to have significance in connec-
tion with the future conduct of covert operations.
The DCI was directed to perform those intelli-
gence-related services which could be accomplished
centrally with more efficacy as might be determined
by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. The DCI
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was also to "perform such other functions and duties
relating to intelligence affecting national security
as the President or the National Intelligence Author-
ity" might direct. Although it was not clear that
this clause envisioned the future conduct of covert
activities, the same language was repeated in the
National Security Act of 1947, which among its other
provisions established the NSC and under it CIA to
succeed CIG. Whatever the original intent, the NSC
was to interpret these words as sufficient authori-
zation to place the conduct of covert activities in
CIA in tandem with OSO which was the office within
the new CIA structure already conducting espionage.
4/
and counterespionage on foreign soil.
As US leaders in the postwar era came to rec-
ognize the need to repulse the underground attack
by the USSR, countermeasures received the consider-
ation of an interagency committee consisting of
State Department and the Military Services which
emerged as the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordi-
nating Committee (SANACC).* Based on its deliberations
The State, War, Navy Coordinating Comittee (SWNCC)
formed 29 November - 4 December 1944, was renamed SANACC
on 4 November 19471 and was terminated on 30 June 1949.
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a decision to engage in covert psychological action
was secretly formalized on 17 December 1947 by the
NSC through the issuance of NSC 4-A. (See Attach-
ment B.) This directive placed responsibility for
covert operations on the DCI, directing him "to in-
itiate and conduct, within the limit of available
funds, covert psychological operations designed to
counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities."
The DCI, Hillenkoetter, who served from I May
1947 to 7 October 1950, was not altogether convinced
as to the advisability of conducting covert psycho-
logical operations in combination with secret intel-
ligence operations. It was a responsibility, more-
over, that he was ill-prepared to accept, as he was
then deeply involved in organizational problems in-
cident to the establishment of CIA. Nevertheless,
Hillenkoetter, shaped by military tradition, de-
ferred to his superiors in the NSC.
B. OPC's Basic Directive (NSC 10/2)
The Department of State apparently felt that it
did not have enough influence over the burgeoning ac-
tivities of the Special Procedures Group (SPG), the
CIA operating component which Hillenkoetter had
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established within OSO in response to NSC 4-A.*
State, moreover, looked with a jaundiced eye on the
planning activities then taking place within the JCS
with respect to secret psychological and political
warfare. Regarding itself as the prime source of
policy in these matters, State was ready to jump at
almost any chance to put a check-rein on the JCS,
even to the acceptance of some joint vehicle for the
conduct of covert activities. At the same time, sen-
timent for a more encompassing program of covert ac-
tivity was growing at Cabinet level. The.concate-
nation of all of these factors led to the issuance
of a far-reaching directive on 18 June 1948, set
forth in NSC 10/2, which established within CIA the
new Office of Special Projects (OSP) "to plan and
conduct covert operations." (See Attachment C.)
This was the basic directive leading to the es-
tablishment on 1 September 1948 of OPC, an innocuous
title replacing OSP included in the initial wording
of NSC 10/2. It stated that the OPC chief was to
When established on 1 January 1948, this unit
was called the Special Procedures Branch. It was re-
designated Special Procedures Group on 22 March 1948.
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report directly to the DCI, but to the maximum de-
gree consistent with efficiency, OPC was to operate
independently of other CIA components. Policy guid-
ance as to covert operations was to flow from the
0('
senior levels ,aiState and Defense, and the JCS was
to be consulted on the planning for covert activi-
ties in wartime. However, on the question of the
responsibilities for the conduct of covert activi-
ties in wartime (as opposed to planning them), the
document left considerable room for argument.
The external channels of OPC guidance and di-
rection deriving from this directive had resulted
from the fact that State and Defense were both deter-
mined to provide certain policy signals without ac-
tually playing in the secret political and psycho-
logical warfare game. CIA was again specified as the
agency within which the instrument for these opera-
tions was to be housed. Both the Hoover Commis-
sion's working committee on National Security Organ-
ization under the chairmanship of Mr. Ferdinand
Eberstadt and NSC's Survey Group reviewing the na-
tional intelligence structure, comprising Messrs.
Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson,
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which were active during the months that NSC 10/2
was in formulation, voiced the opinion that all clan-
destine activities to whatever end should be con-
ducted in concert. Since CIA was already carrying
out secret espionage and CE operations, both commit-
tees concluded that it should conduct covert acti-
vities also. Their advice was followed.
There is ample evidence among the historical
documents of the time to indicate that interdepart-
mental rivalry in relation to the conduct of the bur-
geoning cold war was rampant and had its impact on
the method whereby policy guidance to OPC was con-
5/
stituted by the NSC. OPC was on notice that it
would have to walk the fence between its two mentors,
State and Defense, with a delicate balance.*
The established cover story of OPC was based
on the presumption that its existence would soon be
known, or at least suspected, as its operations
There is one document in the OPC files which
reveals a high level of arousal within State caused
by the discovery that the JCS were about to submit
a psychological warfare plan to the NSC. This ap-
pears in an internal State memorandum dated 3 June
1948, handed to Wisner by Davies sometime after
the former's appointment as OPC head. 6/
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unfolded. Its presence within the CIA structure
might then be imputed. It appeared advisable there-
fore that a fable be formulated in such fashion as
to substitute vagueness for any strenuous effort
at total secrecy that might not long be sustained.
That was the thinking behind the choice of the
name: Office of Policy Coordination. Its respon-
sibilities were covered under the following legend:
OPC was established to coordinate
the activities of CIA with national
security policy as adopted by those
agencies of government responsible
for the formation of such policy. 7/
It was felt that in this role, as a sort of a
middleman, OPC might legitimately and logically eval-
uate both the intelligence and planning aspects of
various covert activities. In explaining the OPC
role to persons with a legitimate interest, no men-
tion was to be made of action programs; only its
planning, intelligence coordinating, and defensive
aspects were to be stressed. To the greatest extent
possible, contacts were to be arranged through se-
cure cutouts, with no reference whatsoever to OPC.
The "covert operations" to be handled by OPC
were defined by NSC 10/2 as all activities (except
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as noted) which were to be conducted or sponsored
by the US Government against hostile foreign states
or groups, or in support of friendly foreign states
or groups. They were to be so planned and executed
that any US Government responsibility for them would
not be evident to unauthorized persons. If uncovered
the US Government was to be able to disclaim plausi-
bly any responsibility for them. Specifically, such
operations were to include any covert activities re-
lated to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive
direct action, including sabotages antisabotage, de-
molition and evacuation measures; subversion against
hostile states, including assistance to underground
resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee libera-
tion groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist
elements in threatened countries of the Free World.
Such operations were not to include armed conflict by
recognized military forces, and excluded espionage,
CE, and cover and deception for military operations.
The exception noted in the preceding paragraph
referred to a statement in paragraph 4 of the direc-
tive which stated:
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In active theaters of war where
American forces are engaged, covert
operations will be conducted under
the direct command of the American
Theater Commander and orders there-
for will be transmitted through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff unless other-
wise directed by the President.
This language was foredoomed to be the cause of much
contention between OPC and the JCS as to their re-
spective roles in wartime in regard to the conduct
of covert activity.
C. Understanding of 6 August 1948 on Implement-
ing NSC 10/2
On 6 August 1948 a meeting to clarify the im-
plementation of NSC 10/2 was attended by: DCI Hillen-
koetter; Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, and Mr. Robert Blum,
representing the Secretary of Defense; Mr. George F.
Kennan, chief of State's Policy Planning Staff; Ad-
miral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary, NSC; and
Wisner, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Occupied Areas who was about to take over on 1
September 1948 as CIA's Assistant Director for Policy
Coordination (ADPC). It is reasonable to conclude
that before taking that office Wisner was asking for
an agreed interpretationJof the parameters of the task
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he was about to undertake. A memorandum of conver-
sation and understanding was agreed to and initialed
by those present. (See Attachment D.) Within the
context of the understanding reached, OPC was to be
given considerable latitude to operate independently
of the CIA machinery of command and administration,
with the proviso, however, that the DCI was to be
"kept informed in regard to all important projects
and decisions." "Important" was not delineated and
as it turned out, the determination was largely left
up to the head of the new instrumentality for covert
activities. It was clear, moreover, that depart-
mental advice was to flow to the ADPC directly, not
through the DCI.* Wisner was installed as ADPC on
1 September 1948.
The relationship of OPC to CIA during the period
when Admiral Hillenkoetter was DCI is described by
Dr. Edward P. Lilly, an historical observer, in the
following terms:
OPC was in CIA administratively
and with a strict reading of NSC 10/2,
the Director of CIA would have control
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over its policy and operations.
When it commenced to operate, how-
ever, because of the personalities in-
volved, because OPC received instruc-
tions and guidance directly from the
Secretaries of State and Defense, and
because of the special sensitivity of
its operations, there was a general
agreement among the officials involved
that OPC should be a separate and inde-
pendent entity within CIA. Independ-
ence even went so far that OPC's intel-
ligence requests were handled by CIA
as requests of a separate agency. OPC,
on its part, was reluctant to tell the
intelligence side of CIA about its op-
erations even though the DCI had been
given the responsibility of policy co-
ordination and of appealing to NSC if
policy disagreements arose. The prac-
tice developed, however, that the de-
partmental policy representatives only
consulted with OPC, and the DCI was
initially left out of covert planning.
This procedure initially gave OPC a
relatively greater freedom of action,
but removed the single responsible
authority who could decide if a parti-
cular covert operation was in accord
with American policy. 8/
D.
Financing OPC
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Early in 1949 legislation highly important to
the conduct of covert activities was enacted. Al-
though the National Security Act of 1947 had given
statutory recognition to CIA, it did not include
enabling legislation authorizing the DCI to acquire
9/
or administer CIA funds in his own right. He
continued to depend upon allocations from the Depart-
mental Secretaries and tenuous understandings with
Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO), and
certain other Government agencies as to the purposes
for which available funds could legally and properly
be expended. On 20 June 1949, Public Law 110, 81st
Congress, was approved "to provide for the adminis-
tration of the Central Intelligence Agency, estab-
lished pursuant to Section 102, National Security
Act of 1947 and for other purposes." This legisla-
tion provided specifically that:
. . . the sums made available to
the Agency may be expended without
regard to the provisions of law and
regulations relating to the expendi-
ture of Government funds; and for
objects of a confidential, extraordinary,
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or emergency nature, such expendi-
tures to be accounted for solely on
the certificate of the Director and
deemed a sufficient voucher for the
amount therein certified.
This would appear to have given the DCI the
authority to set up an organizational system to con-
duct clandestine activities in any way he saw fit,
subject only to the rule of prudence and good sense.
However, since established patterns of governmental
procedure appeared to present the minimum risk to
future interpellation, Admiral Hillenkoetter and
his advisers chose not to pioneer.
E. Revision in the Understanding on Implementing
NSC 10/2
General Smith replaced Admiral Hillenkoetter
as DCI on 7 October 1950. He was the appointee of
President Truman and had direct access to the Presi-
dent when required. Smith, differing from his pre-
decessor, held uncompromising views with respect to
the authorities and responsibilities of command. He
determined that OPC would be an integral part of CIA
responsive to his policy guidance.
Three years later, in 1953, General Smith was
to describe his views on NSC 10/2 to the Senate
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Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on his
nomination to the post of Under Secretary of State
as follows:
The Office of Policy Coordination
. . . was set up under rather pecu-
liar circumstances.
It was created as a result of the
recognition that something had to be
done in the way of the cold war, and
it was created at a time when, as you
know, Secretary Johnson was Secretary
of Defense, and Secretary Acheson,
Secretary of State.*
�
Anything that was created at that
time in that field inevitably had to
be a sort of compromise, and that was
what this OPC thing was. It was cre-
ated by an order of the National Se-
curity Council, which I thought was
not a particularly sound order when I
read it.
It put in the Central Intelligence
Agency this entity which was actually
in but not of the agency. It took its
direction largely from a policy group
of officers of the Defense and State
Departments. Admiral Hillenkoetter
felt he did not have very much control
over it.
Smith was somewhat hazy in his chronology.
These positions were held respectively by James V.
Forrestal and General George C. Marshall when OPC
was created on 1 September 1948. Johnson was ap-
pointed on 28 March 1949 and Acheson on 21 Janu-
ary 1949.
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On the other hand, it was the
place where the money was spent, and
all the rest of the agency was sus-
picious of it. 10/
Smith was advised by senior members of the CIA
staff to seek modification or amendment to NSC 10/2
to eliminate the provisions which served to act in
derogation of the DCI's full authority and responsi-
bility for covert operations and to clarify its most
controversial provision which pertained to wartime
planning and covert operations in military theaters:
Smith was not prepared to move in this fashion. At
the same time, he found it impossible to accept a
situation wherein the authority of the DCI to allo-
cate resources was being hamstrung by the fact that
the Departments of State and Defense were directing
OPC policy without his prior approval.
Smith felt secure enough in his position to
conclude that he could bring OPC under his full con-
trol by a change in existing procedures without open-
ing up NSC 10/2 to modification. Accordingly, he
instructed Wisner, OPC chief, to advise State, De-
fense, and the JCS that the 6 August 1948 memorandum
was no longer applicable or effective in the light
of altered circumstances (apparently altered in the
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sense that he was on the scene).
Wisner's compliance with this instruction was
reported to the DCI on 12 October 1950. (See Attach-
ment E.) Wisner advised the representatives of State,
Defense, and the JCS that General Smith saw no immedi-
ate necessity for a revision of NSC 10/2 in order to
accomplish the full integration of OPC as an element
of CIA under the authority and command of the DCI.
Wisner explained that the advice and policy guidance
from State, Defense, and the JCS would not thereafter
be regarded by Smith as placing any or all of them in
the position of giving orders or instructions to OPC.
Such guidance thereafter would be considered as com-
ing to CIA as an organization and not merely to OPC.
Smith then proceeded to take direct control of
OPC, and OSO as well, by means of an internal reor-
ganization which arrogated the principal supporting
functions to a deputy director for administration re-
sponsible directly to the DCI. Thus, by taking con-
trol of resources (money and manpower) through a
channel reporting directly to him, General Smith in
effect took control of operations themselves.
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F. Revision of Paragraph 4, NSC 10/2
By October 1950 controversy between OPC and
the JCS over the interpretation of paragraph 4 of
NSC 10/2, aggravated by the ambiguity surrounding
command relationships in Korea and the Far East, had
become so egregious that Smith was persuaded to re-
verse his previous decision and to seek a modifica-
tion of the directive. The interpretation of the
paragraph was, according to Wisner, "the subject of
more divergent views and conflicting constructions
than any other portion of the paper." From the van-
tage point of 20 years later, the divergent construc-
tions may seem somewhat recondite; but a sense of
reality is restored when it is recognized that the
interpretations were being made by dedicated plan-
ners who believed that the United States was living
in imminent peril of World War III.
Following conversations with Smith, Wisner on
23 October 1950 wrote a memorandum confirming the
need for and reasons behind a definitive and autho-
ritative interpretation of the troublesome para-
11/
graph. Wisner pointed out that the basic dif-
ficulties lay in the fact that nowhere in NSC 10/2 did it
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specifically provide that OPC was to be "responsi-
ble for the conduct of covert operations in wartime."
Related problems involved were: first, the specific
participation of OPC planners in both peacetime and
wartime preparation of plans for wartime covert op-
erations; and second, the delineation of the manner
in which covert operations would be set up and di-
rected in military theaters.*
Paragraph 4 was suspended on 14 December 1950
by the NSC at the suggestion of General Smith in or-
der that a supplementary draft directive tentatively
designated as NSC 10/3 could be considered, incor-
porating a rewording of the controversial paragraph
4 along with certain other changes.** The JCS found
NSC 10/3 unacceptable and at the 11 April 1951 NSC
meeting it was withdrawn when a rewording of paragraph
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4 proposed by General Smith was approved, as fol-
lows:
In time of war, �or when the Presi-
dent directs, all plans for covert
operations shall be coordinated with
the JCS. In active theaters of war
where American forces are engaged,
covert operations will be conducted
under the direct command of the Amer-
ican Theater Commander and orders
therefor will be transmitted through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless
otherwise directed by the President.
12/
G. Scope and Pace of OPC Operations (NSC 68);
NSC 10/5 and the Psychological Strategy Board
NSC 10/2 remained in force with this revision
until 23 October 1951 when it was supplemented by
further NSC action with regard to the "scope and
pace of covert operations" through publication of a
document identified as NSC 10/5.
In early 1950 US policymakers had determined
that a more rapid buildup in the basic potential for
waging cold war should be undertaken by all relevant
branches of government. Thus, the formulation of a
cold-war policy and appraisal of the assets neces-
sary to wage it was undertaken by the NSC, culmin-
ating in the issuance in April 1950 of NSC 68.
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NSC 68 provided for a nonmilitary counter-
offensive against the USSR and for recapture of psy-
chological initiative in the following terms:
In regard to U.S.S.R. and satel-
lites, offensive operations short of
war, including intensive overt pro-
paganda, encouragement to and organ-
ization of exiled groups and defec-
tors, energetic prosecution of ap-
propriate covert operations within
the Soviet orbit, and vigorous exploi-
tation of favorable opportunities as
they occur, e.g. Korea . . .
[were to get underway.] 13/
A State representative on 19 April 1950 briefed
a number of top OPC officials by citing the particu-
lar NSC 68 provisions applying to the planning and
operations of OPC as follows:*
At the same time, we should take
dynamic steps to reduce the power
and influence of the Kremlin inside
the Soviet Union and other areas under
its control. The objective would be
the establishment of friendly regimes
not under Kremlin domination. Such
action is essential to encourage the
Kremlin's attention, keep it off
balance and force an increased expend-
iture of Soviet resources in counter-
action. In other words, it would be
the current Soviet cold war technique
used against the Soviet Union.
The underlining was made by the State repre-
sentative, Robert P. Joyce.
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Tasks relating to the OPC mission were described as:
Development of programs designed
to build and maintain confidence
among other peoples in our strength
and resolution, and to wage overt
psychological warfare calculated to
encourage mass defections from Soviet
allegiance and to frustrate the Krem-
lin design in other ways.
Intensification of affirmative and
timely measures and okperations by
covert means in the fields of economic
warfare and political and psychologi-
cal warfare with a view to fomenting
and supporting unrest and revolt in
selected strategic satellite countries.
14/
In the course of its considerations, NSC called
for budgetary estimates constituting a six-year pro-
jection for the period beginning 1 July 1950 and end-
ing 30 June 1957. The assumptions conveyed to OPC
in May 1950 in connection with the formulation of
these projections were briefly that the US Govern-
ment had decided to make a major effort in the field
of covert operations; that there would be no overt
hostilities during the period under consideration;
and that, if the measures espoused by NSC 68 were
successful, a shooting war might be avoided. None-
theless, preparations for a shooting war (overt hos-
tilities) were to be made and the year 1954 was
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regarded as crucial. 15/
It was readily apparent that the pace of the
cold war envisioned by the policymakers called for
a more rapid expansion of resources than OPC had
theretofore been able to undertake. A memorandum
7
written in November 195;.. commented on the fact that
such broad and comprehensive undertakings as delin-
eated by NSC 68 could only be accomplished by the
establishment of a worldwide structure for covert
operations on a much grander scale than OPC had pre-
viously contemplated. It would be a task similar
in concept, magnitude, and complexity to the crea-
tion of widely deployed military forces together
with the logistical support required to conduct mani-
fold, complex, and delicate operations in a wide
variety of overseas locations. 16/
These considerations had led Smith to seek
clarification from the NSC. In a paper dated 8 May
1951, entitled "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations"
sometimes known as the "Magnitude Paper," he com-
mented on the extent of the resources which would be
needed to accomplish the mission apparently envi-
sioned under NSC 68 and concluded that a program of
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17/
such magnitude required further review by the NSC.
He recommended: (a) that NSC should initiate a
comprehensive review of the covert operations situ-
ation in view of the magnitude issue; (b) that this
review should contain a restatement or redetermin-
ation of the several responsibilities and authori-
ties involved in US covert operations; (c) that if
the review should result in a reaffirmation of CIA's
covert operational responsibility, then CIA should
be provided the necessary support from other govern-
ment agencies to insure the successful discharge of
the responsibility, with certain specific assurances
as to policy and planning relationships and provi-
sion of the needed quantities of personnel and lo-
gistical support; and (d) that guidance for covert
operations of concern to more than one department
should be coordinated and issued to CIA (and to other
participating agences) by the newly created Psycho-
logical Strategy Board (PSB).
PSB had been constituted on 4 April 1951 by
Presidential Directive.* It was to be responsible
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for the formulation and promulgation of over-all
national psychological objectives, policies, and pro-
grams and for the coordination and evaluation of the
national psychological effort. There was reason to
doubt, however, that the PSB would be able to muster
the authority required for the proper discharge of
its responsibilities.
NSC 10/5 was issued on 23 October 1951, re-
sponding to General Smith's "Magnitude Paper" and
calling for an intensification of covert operations.
(See Attachment F.) It "reaffirmed" the responsi-
bility and authority of the DCI for the conduct of
covert operations under NSC 10/2 subject to the ap-
proval of the PSB. NSC 10/5 established the general
order of emphasis for covert operations: (a) to place
maximum strain on the Soviet power structure; (b) to
strengthen the orientation of the free world toward
the United States; and (c) to develop underground re-
sistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla opera-
tions in strategic areas.
The role of the PSB was defined as follows:
(a) to determine the desirability and feasibility of
covert operational programs and of individual major
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projects; (b) to establish the scope, pace, and tim-
ing of covert operations and the allocation of pri-
orities among them; and (c) to coordinate action to
ensure the adequate provision of personnel, funds,
and logistical and other support to the DCI for the
carrying out of approved operations. NSC 10/5 di-
rected that the development of underground resist-
ance and the conduct of covert and guerrilla opera-
tions should wherever practicable provide bases on
which the military might expand military operations
in time of war within active theaters of operations.
The directive called for the advice and collabora-
tion of the JCS in the formulation of PM operations
during the period of the cold war.
As it applied to OPC, the purpose of NSC 10/5
was to provide through the PSB an authoritative as-
sessment of the covert activity being conducted and
to furnish policy guidance as to the future extent
of such activity. It is evident that the PSB fell
short of this purpose. As the "Jackson Committee"*
was later to find, the creation of the PSB was based
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on a misconception that psychological warfare strat-
egy could exist apart from the total national strat-
egy.
H. Summary
NSC 10/2 was the basic national directive un-
der which OPC was constituted and covert activities
begun. NSC 10/5 was intended to refine the earlier
directive by providing the method whereby OPC could
receive guidance as to the scope and pace of those
activities. It fell short in this respect but did
reconfirm the fact that responsibility of CIA for
covert activities was to continue.
In addition to these basic directives, there
was a steady stream of NSC policy guidances with
respect to specific areas of the world or to speci-
fic problems. Sometimes CIA was called upon by name
for covert action but generally CIA's role was more
indirect through its provision of covert support to
articulated courses of action assigned to State and
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Defense.*
NSC 10/2 was, in effect, a treaty between
State and Defense to define how US covert activities
were to be conducted. Whether it was a sound idea
to place the instrument for conducting those activi-
ties in CIA was thought to be beside the point. The
executive arm of the Government was convinced that
immediate action had to be taken to forestall "the
vicious covert activities of the USSR."** CIA pre-
sented the only vehicle immediately available for
undertaking such countermeasures without instituting
action by Congress which would certainly make for de-
lay and might in the long run prove to be unobtain-
able.
Like most treaties NSC 10/2 contained certain
seeds of discord, such as:
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a. The requirements placed on OPC by
State and Defense were widely disparate. One
involved the.conduct of political and psycho-
logical warfare; the other, plans and prepar-
ations for paramilitary operations. This
dichotomy of interests immediately posed a
problem in priorites to OPC. It did not have
either the personal or physical resources to
meet both demands.
b. With Hillenkoetter acceding, the di-
rective permitted the uncanalized admission
of policy. direction from State and Defense
into OPC. With this shortcutting of command
channels, the relationship between Hillen-
koetter and Wisner became an uneasy one at
best. In a memorandum dated 19 October 1948,
General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston pointed
out to the DCI a number of debatable provi-
sions and interpretations deriving from the
NSC 10/2 paper. 18/ Houston argued that
there were no means under the existing law by
which the Director could divest himself of, or
be separated from, his personal responsibility
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for the expenditure of unvouchered funds.
Houston suggested a further clarification by
NSC to the end that the DCI should have full
administrative control of OPC personnel and
supplies, final authority over the expendi-
ture of its funds, and the right to initiate
or veto its projects. In the alternative, if
control and responsibility were to remain out-
side of CIA, then it should be made clear that
the Director's responsibility was specifically
limited to that of affording housekeeping sup-
port only. There was no clarification of NSC
10/2 until General Smith handled the matter to
his own satisfaction by taking over full con-
trol of OPC.
c. Hillenkoetter made an accurate fore-
cast in arguing that the proviso permitting
OPC to operate independently of other CIA com-
ponents would lead to continued argument and
bickering over financial management. That in
fact turned out to be the case.**
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d. Until the controversial paragraph 4
was changed by mutual consent, the original
wording led to endless negotiations and de-
bate between CIA and the JCS on issues of
"cold war" versus "hot war" responsibilities
and prerogatives.
e. Covert operations pertaining to eco-
nomic warfare were to be conducted by OPC
"under the guidance of the departments and
agencies responsible for the planning of eco-
nomic warfare" but where such responsibili-
ties finally rested never came to light.
f. NSC 10/2 was an adequate document to
get covert operations under way. As time
went on and operations multiplied, however,
it became clear that some determination would
have to be made as to the extent and source
of the resources to be devoted to the covert
effort. An attempt to remedy this deficiency
within the provisions of NSC 10/5 fell short
of the mark. In fact, the creation of ma-
chinery to supply high policy in this cate-
gory involved a whole historical episode in
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itself, extending far into the future after
OPC disappeared as such.
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renamed divisions instead of staffs. The Programs
and Planning Division was split internally into
three staffs: Staff I, with a supporting secre-
tariat, was given the responsibility for policy
planning and review, for war mobilization planning,
for liaison control, and for intelligence support;
Staff II consisted of a new geographic planning
structure with area branches paralleling those in
the operating structure; Staff III encompassed the
seven previously existing functional program branches
The Operations Division consisted of the five pre-
vious area branches plus a sixth Foreign Branch F,
added in the March reshuffle, responsible for opera-
tions originating in the United States. The Oper-
ations Division also acquired a supporting staff,
more in the nature of technical advisers than a
staff, which was named the Operations Special Staff
consisting of five groups, that is, Air Operations,
Operational Security, Cover and Deception, Signal
Operations, and Naval Operations (See Figure 3,
page 132.)
The modification made at the end of
1949 brought to OPC an organization that was much
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