NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01017926
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01488
• Publication Date: October 4, 1996

Approved for Release: 2017/11/08 C01017926
Director of of Central Intelligence
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Friday, 4 October 1996
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4 October 1996
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2017/11/08 C01017926
Approved for Release: 2017/11/08 C01017926
Table of Contents
SOUTH KOREA: Mulling Response to North Korean Threats
(b)(3)
NR
6 (b)(3)
NR
Top Secret
4 October 1996
Approved for Release: 2017/11/08 C01017926
Approved for Release: 2017/11/08 C01017926
Tip Setrei
SOUTH KOREA: Mulling Response to North Korean Threats
Foreign Minister Kong believes
P'yongyang's threat to avenge the killing of its infiltrators is "serious." He
assessed the most likely retaliation scenarios to be an undefined incident
along the DMZ, a sabotage or terrorist attack in South Korea, or the murder
or kidnapping of South Korean citizens.
� Kong said the North is also probing for weakness in the US�South
Korean alliance. He argued that a display of military power might
be necessary to show resolve. He apparently rules out a substantial
augmentation of US troops, which could provoke the North to
lash out violently.
�
Seoul, at a minimum, wants a Security Council presidential statement on the
submarine incident; Kong said Beijing is signaling that it will not block the
move. The South has been slow to decide on other responses, in part
because it has few attractive options.
�Any effort to deliberately hinder implementation of the Agreed
Framework or pursuit of four-party peace talks would isolate
South Korea without harming the North. P'yongyang would be
pleased if Seoul limited its participation in both efforts.
� Halting secret talks with the North on economic aid would
foreclose the South's only forum for bilateral contact. This would
leave the diplomatic field to direct US�North Korean contacts on
issues such as POWs/MIAs.
Seoul must also be wary of erratic South Korean public opinion, which in
the past has turned in favor of cooperation with the North after periods of
tension.
6
�Top Secret-
4 October 1996
Approved for Release: 2017/11/08 C01017926