NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TRENDS THROUGH 1987

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-01347
• Publication Date: July 27, 1982

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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AlMommimmimmummimmoll
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--seefeeT---
(b)(3)
NIE 4-82
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TRENDS
THROUGH 1987
Information available as of 16 July 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
SECRET
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
ECKET
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
DISCUSSION
9
Global Trends
9
Nuclear Suppliers
10
Third World Attitudes
11
Effectiveness of the NPT and the IAEA
11
Regional Trends
14.
South Asia
15
Near East
17
Latin America
20
East Asia
23
Africa
24
Implications for US-Soviet Relations
25
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate focuses on trends in nuclear proliferation that�:over
the next five years�will impact upon US interests. The paper augments
individual country studies by assessing the regional impact of prolifera-
tion trends and identifying trends that affect the proliferation issue
globally.
Many industrialized countries such as Japan and West Germany
are not included in the discussion -of potential nuclear weapon states,
even though they already have extensive nuclear capabilities that could
be used to produce weapons. The altered political circumstances that
would lead such countries to produce nuclear weapons almost certainly
would entail overriding implications for the United States, beyond the
scope of this paper.
1
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Ci
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--SECRET
KEY JUDGMENTS
Over the next five years, efforts to slow the spread of nuclear
weapons capabilities will become more difficult. Several global trends
contribute to a judgment that the current international nonproliferation
regime is in trouble:
� The mechanisms by which nuclear technology spreads are
shifting, pointing to an accelerated diffusion of weapons-related
capabilities among developing countries.
� In particular, sources of nuclear material and technology,
traditionally available only in advanced states, are expanding
among the developing states�for example, Brazil and Argen-
tina. China also is beginning to export nuclear materials.
These countries are unlikely to adopt unilaterally nuclear
export policies as strict as those of the advanced states.
� Commercial sources of technology within the advanced states
also have become a more difficult proliferation problem. The
emergence of brokers specializing in the discreet acquisition
of nuclear-related equipment and in the circumvention of
government export policies has reduced the effectiveness of
existing nuclear export restrictions.
� The development of small nuclear forces has become increasing-
ly feasible, even without nuclear tests. The necessary time gap
between the production of fissile material and the production of
nuclear weapons has thus become narrower. The room for
diplomatic action by the United States or other's�aimed at
preventing states from producing nuclear weapons�therefore
has decreased.
� The progress of particular states toward nuclear weapons capabil-
ities is likely to aggravate regional political tensions that will
complicate diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing nuclear weap-
ons production. - -
� The credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency's
safeguards system has been declining in recent years and could
easily erode further. Evidence of weaknesses in the system is
growing here and in foreign capitals�a trend that could lead to a
3
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general consensus that the IAEA is not capable of ensuring the ef-
fective implementation of nonproliferation safeguards agree-
ments. Unless countered, such a consensus would increase the
security concerns of some states and lead others to lower their es-
timates of the risks involved in violating safeguards.
� Developing countries are becoming more unified and influential
in international nuclear-related forums. They generally are
inclined to identify superpower disarmament, technology trans-
fer, and the discriminatory nature of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty as problems needing attention before nuclear prolifera-
tion itself. This trend will increase the resistance of developing
countries to international efforts aimed at undertaking new
nOnproliferation initiatives or strengthening existing systems.
Nuclear proliferation will become a greater threat to US interests
over the next five years. On one level, the spreadof nuclear weapons ca-
pabilities to additional countries will add to the long-term nuclear
threat to US citizens and property. On a separate plane, even before ad-
ditional states can acquire nuclear weapons, their research and develop-
ment programs will exacerbate regional political tensions. This disrup-
tive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater
threat to the United States over the next five years. At a minimum, in
the more volatile areas of the world, nuclear proliferation will threaten
US efforts to enhance stability and to improve US security relationships:
� Stability in South Asia will be seriously weakened as Pakistan
approaches a nuclear weapons capability threatening to India.
� The potential for a preventive military strike by India, the
consequence of which could well be a fourth Indo-Pakistani
war, will increase.
� The likely alternative is that India will establish its own
nuclear force, thus making India and Pakistan the first pair of
nuclear armed adversaries in the Third World.
� When Pakistan achieves the capability to test a nuclear
device, the value it places on its security ties with the United
States may slow Pakistan's nuclear efforts, including the
deferral of a nuclear test. In the meantime, Pakistani efforts
to amass plutonium could jeopardize the US-Pakistani
relationship.
� Israel
Its at ACK against Iraq s nuclear research center last year illus-
trates the destabilizing implications of further movement toward
4
--frEeliff
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nuclear proliferation in the region. Israeli concerns will persist,
particularly as both Iraq and Libya will continue their attempts
to obtain a nuclear weapons capability.
� Nuclear trends in other regions also point to potential problems
for the United States.
� In Latin America, efforts by Argentina and Brazil to develop
unsafeguarded nuclear-weapons-related capabilities threaten
nonproliferation efforts globally. Differences with these states
over the need for comprehensive nonproliferation safeguards
and the undesirability of so-called peaceful nuclear explosives
will tend to hamper US efforts to restore influence in the
region.,
� US relations with South Korea and Taiwan will continue to be
strained as both governments react to internal pressures to
acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Both will press
the United States to help ensure their energy security, hoping
for eventual US approval for their acquisition of such facili-
ties.
� In Africa, the implications for the United States will depend
heavily on whether Pretoria continues to keep its nuclear
weapons options hidden. South Africa at present probably
either has nuclear weapons or could produce them on short
notice. Overt activity, such as the underground nuclear
testing that was planned in the 1970s, would create consider-
able foreign pressure for a United Nations resolution impos-
ing broad sanctions on South Africa. The available evidence
.does not permit confident predictions about future South
African nuclear policy.
5
SECRET
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� Trends in nuclear proliferation increase the chances of some
form of nuclear terrorism:
� The increasing number of foreign facilities capable of pro-
ducing special nuclear material expands the potential sources
of material for terrorists and increases the difficulty of
refuting false threats. Heightened public sensitivity to nuclear
hazards of nuclear power reactors, publication of nuclear
weapons design information, and press reporting of existing
inadequacies in the physical protection of nuclear material all
combine to increase the likelihood and potential impact of a
nuclear terrorist/extortionist hoax.
� The potential for terrorist fabrication of a nuclear weapon
will remain low. The most likely forms of nuclear-related
terrorist incidents will be attacks on nuclear power plants in
Western Europe and attacks against US nuclear weapons
deployed overseas.'
The above trends have major implications for US-Soviet relations:
� The pattern of US-Soviet cooperation and general harmony in
nonproliferation efforts over the past 15 years is based on a
conviction that the spread of nuclear weapons threatens both
states.
� Nevertheless, such cooperation may be severely tested in the
years ahead. While sharing a desire to discourage nuclear
proliferation, the United States and the Soviet Union will have
conflicting national interests to protect in the regions where
additional countries actually do acquire nuclear weapons. Nucle-
ar proliferation in South Asia, for example�together with
sustained superpower competition for influence in the region�
could damage cooperation on nonproliferation efforts in other
regions, particularly the Near East.
In a more general and far-reaching sense, nuclear proliferation has
an impact on the US-Soviet relationship because of the extent to which
nuclear proliferation affects US and Soviet influence and interests
asymmetrically:
� The issue creates difficulties for the United States in its bilateral
relations with nearly every state mentioned in the regional
'For a detailed discussion of nuclear terrorism, see SNIE 6-78: Likelihood of Attempted Acquisition of
Nuclear Weapons or Materials by Foreign Terrorist Croups for Use Against the United States, and the re-
cent Memorandums to Holders.
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discussions, a situation the Soviet Union can be expected to
exploit in order to undercut US influence. The United States and
its allies have far greater equity in strategic and economic ties
with most of these countries than does Moscow.
� The nonproliferation issue also will continue to be a divisive
element within the Western Alliance, as the different members
compete for nuclear exports and react differently to regional
proliferation-related developments.
� Instability in the Middle East and South Asia created by the
spread of nuclear weapons�and by the progress of certain states
toward such capabilities�will be likely to damage Western
interests more than Soviet interests.
7
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ZECRET
(b)(3)
Nuclear Capabilities of Countries of Major Proliferation Concern
Legend:
Unsafeguarded Safeguarded
L CIC
3/43
4813
CIO A tested nuclear explosive
34-Significant nuclear-explosives design/development
�-�7:7", Available plutoniuma
lib
0' �
Available highly-enriched unaiuma
Significant research reactorb
Power rcactor(s)
Reprocessing
Enrichment
Nuclear Capabilities/Accomplishments
Countryc Current
Nuclear Capabilities/Accomplishments
Expected Enhancements Through 1987
Earliest
Possible
Nuclear Test
India
I
kg
Tested 1974
(b)(1)
South Africa
Nig)
ib
*AY*
41
)4(c
Pr)
Anytime
Pakistan
Vit
ri. 4 ti, Yr.
lb.
0:07*
1983
Argentina
s4
1984
Brazil
in
Late 1980s
Taiwan
511
1985
South South Korea
Late 1980s
Iraq
1990s
Libya
1990s
a Bomb-significant quantities; unsafeguarded or diverted.
b produces at least 2 kg of plutonium annually.
cAll of the listed countries have fighter-bomber
aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
Secret
587010 7-82
(b)(3)
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DISCUSSION
Global Trends
1. Nuclear-proliferation-related trends in individ-
ual countries combine to pose some common problems
for the United States because of the global character of
the nonproliferation regime. Nuclear weapons devel-
opment in one region can affect proliferation trends in
other regions because of the impact on global percep-
tions of such issues as the utility of the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT), the effectiveness of the Internation-
al Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system,
the likely reaction of powerful states to new arrivals in
the nuclear weapons club, and the feasibility of nucle-
ar-weapons-free zones. Other factors that link differ-
ent regions include the nuclear export policies of major
nuclear suppliers, the play of nuclear issues in the
North-South context, and Third World emphasis on
superpower disarmament issues.
2. We have identified several trends of a global
nature that are likely to influence adversely the course
of nuclear developments in individual regions and
countries. These trends include (1) the emergence of a
growing number of nuclear suppliers, (2) an increasing
number of Third World states likely to take an active
role in resisting certain nonproliferation initiatives,
and (3) decreasing credibility of the IAEA and its
safeguards system coupled with generally low regard
for the NPT in the developing countries.
Early Nuclear Weapons in the Developing World
The development and dispersal of basic scientific knowl-
edge and technologies over the past 80 years have ensured
that nuclear weapons designers of the future will not have
to retrace all the difficult steps of the earliest nuclear
weapons programs. Solid-state electronics have increased
the reliability of fusing and firing systems, for example,
while decreasing weight and bulk. Even more important in
reducing weight and size are improvements that have been
made by explosives industries in precision detonation
capabilities. The availability of certain weapons-related
nuclear data, design information inadvertently declassi-
fied, and high-speed computers will permit greater confi-
dence in designs that otherwise might not emerge until a
series of test explosions had been conducted.
As a result, new nuclear weapon states probably will be
able to establish reliable, small nuclear forces on the basis
of a single, successful, nuclear test. First-generation nuclear
weapons are likely to be bombs weighing 1,000 kilograms
or less and having a diameter of 80 centimeters or so.
Western and Soviet sales of fighter-bomber aircraft appear
to ensure that new nuclear weapon states will have credible
delivery capabilities for such weapons.
An increasing number of countries will be able to
develop small nuclear forces in the absence of even a single
nuclear test explosion. Uncertainties concerning weapon
performance will be small enough that some governments
may be willing to commit resources, and a measure of
security dependence, to the stockpiling of untested weap-
ons. This will be particularly so in situations where the
government expects to have time�in a worsening security �
environment�to explode a test device and to incorporate
modifications into the nuclear force.
Weapon yields chosen without nuclear testing, or based
on a single test explosion, probably would be limited to
about 20 kilotons. Further testing would open the door to
higher yields�or smaller warheads�attainable through
the development of boosted and thermonuclear weapons.
An important implication of this assessment is that the
room for diplomatic action by the United States and
others�aimed at preventing states from developing nucle-
ar weapons�is decreasing. The time gap between produc-
ing fissile material and producing nuclear weapons has
become narrower. Fundamental assumptions about timely
warning of foreign decisions to use safeguarded material in
nuclear weapons�assumptions implicit in the structure of
international nonproliferation arrangements dating back to
the 1960s�have gradually become less valid. Policies and
treaties aimed specifically at deterring states from explod-
ing nuclear devices will become less effective in obstruct-
ing the production of weapons.
9
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Nuclear Suppliers
3. Cooperation among nuclear supplier-state gov-
ernments, in the area of proliferation-related export
Policies, has gradually and steadily improved since
formation of what is known as the Zaanger Committee
in 1971 and the informal "London" nuclear suppliers
group in 1975. This improvement�through bilateral
contacts�has enabled supplier governments to en-
hance the use of export controls as a means of slowing
the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. These gains
are being undermined by two factors:
� Private firms are becoming more active in nucle-
ar-related exports. The uranium enrichment pro-
grams of Western Europe, for example, have led
to the involvement of many firms that lend
developmental or manufacturing expertise to gov-
ernment-controlled projects. In many instances
the product line of such a firm does not subject the
company to scrutiny as a "nuclear" firm. At times
these firms are able to export -key items such as
valves or even centrifuge components without
their governments' knowledge. The dual-use na-
ture of many important items frustrates efforts at
regulation, particularly for foreign governments.
Moreover, the possibility of buying nuclear facili-
ties piecemeal has led to the emergence of special
consultants and brokers, operating at the fringes of
legality and allowing for the circumvention
governmental export restrictions.
� New supplier states are emerging among the
developing countries.
The new suppliers' policies concerning
nuclear assistance are not likely to take shape until
significant export opportunities develop, but sev-
eral observations are applicable. Most of the po-
tential new suppliers are not parties to the NPT,
and most are attempting to develop their own
nuclear programs in the face of export restrictions
entailing the application of safeguards. These new
supplier itates would be unlikely to authorize
exports of nuclear materials and assistance that
would contribute significantly to any regional
nuclear proliferation threat they themselves might
face but, in general, exports to other regions would
pose fewer problems for them. Their view of the
larger proliferation picture�to generalize�ap-
pears to be that the global threat posed by nuclear
proliferation is small compared with the danger
10
--3ECRET�
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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--SECRC
���
inherent in superpower nuclear weapons stockpil-
ing. At the same time the commercial and politi-
cal benefits to be gained from nuclear exports
could be large for these new suppliers. In general,
therefore, they are unlikely to adopt unilaterally
nuclear export policies as strict as those of the
advanced states. The likely consequence of addi-
tional Third World sources of nuclear technology,
combined with strict export controls by advanced
states, would be an increase in the level of nuclear
cooperation among developing countries.
4. China's recent entry into the nuclear export
business warrants special attention. Although not
strictly representative of the above trend in new
supplier states, recent Chinese sales of unsafeguarded
heavy water -and enriched uranium to Argentina�
either through direct sales or through intermediaries�
illustrate the potential for unbridled nuclear exporters
to undermine international nonproliferation efforts.
China has exported enriched uranium to South Africa
through West European intermediaries, and has con-
sidered sales to several other developing states as well.
Although China appears to be in the nuclear market to
stay, concern about its image and a desire for foreign
nuclear technology may induce Beijing to accommo-
date some Western views on proliferation. China does
not appear ready to cooperate formally, however, with
the international nonproliferation regime. It is doubt-
ful that Beijing in the near term will require interna-
tional, IAEA safeguards as a condition of export.
Third World Attitudes
5. Since the drafting of the NPT in the 1960s,
developing countries generally have contributed little
effort to limiting nuclear proliferation in the Third
World beyond joining the NPT. (Mexico has been a
notable exception.) The viewpoint of developing states
has generally been that superpower disarmament and
nuclear assistance to developing countries are more
pressing issues. This attitude prevailed at the 1980
NPT Review Conference and defeated the efforts of
advanced states to secure a formal endorsement of the
treaty as an effective agreement, although many states
recognized the importance of the NPT for internation-
al security. This attitude also led developing states to
cooperate last year in attempting to elect one of their
own representatives to head the IAEA when Director
General Eklund's term expired. (Though the attempt
11
failed, some concessions were obtained in the appoint-
ment of Third World nations to other IAEA posts.)
Preparations for an international conference on the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy next year indicate that
Third World states are organizing to exploit that
forum as well. Over the next five years, efforts to win
the cooperation of developing states in improving the
global nonproliferation regithe 'probably will remain
difficult, partly because the preferred focus on super-
Power disarmament is one of few issues on which the
nonaligned movement can achieve consensus, and
because the subject of nuclear assistance fits neatly
into the context of the contentious North-South issue
of aid to developing countries.
6. Third World interest in technology transfer is
reinforced by the gradual spread of nuclear power
reactors to additional states. Table 2 shows the growth
in developing countries pursuing nuclear power pro-
grams and likely to develop a more direct and sus-
tained interest in nuclear trade issues. In international
forums, the observed tendency of developing countries
to cooperate in resisting nonproliferation initiatives is
generally likely to be strengthened as the number of
states committing themselves to billion:dollar nuclear
programs grows.2
Effectiveness of the NPT and the IAEA
7. The global nonproliferation regime clearly is in
trouble, although efforts are being made to strengthen
it (see inset). Concerning the NPT, broad disenchant-
ment among developing states is focused on Articles
IV and VI, which call for advanced countries to share
their nuclear technology with developing countries
and for established nuclear weapon states to work
toward disarmament. Unless developing states see
progress on these two issues, the NPT is likely to
encounter greater disaffection in the 1985 review. In
the interim, proliferation-related events could lead to
a general judgment that the NPT is unable to fulfill its
titular function, possibly creating the conditions for
The opposite potential effect of nuclear growth�namely, a
growing concern among developing states about proliferation as
their neighbors begin nuclear power programs�appears less likely.
For most of the candidate countries in table 2, the start of nuclear
dower programs would be only a small step toward nuclear
explosives production capabilities. And although some developing
states would become concerned, these states generally are also the
ones most interested in keeping their own nuclear weapons options
from becoming encumbered by added proliferation controls,
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Table 2
Developing Countries Pursuing
Nuclear Power Programs
1971
Argentina
India
Pakistan
South Korea
Taiwan
1982-87
Imminent
1981 Additions
Argentina
Brazil
Cuba
India
Mexico
Pakistan
Philippines
South Africa
South Korea
Taiwan
Yugoslavia
Egypt
Libya
Other
Candidates
Algeria
Bangladesh
Chile
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Kuwait
Morocco
Nigeria
North Korea
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Venezuela
initiatives aimed at drastically amending the treaty or
for moves to withdraw from the treaty. Any amend-
ment of the treaty�whether favorable or unfavorable
to the United States�would probably be attainable
only at the cost of considerable friction between
advanced and developing states. Depending on the
course of North-South issues generally and the progress
made in disarmament negotiations, the cohesion of
developing states on the issue of NPT inadequacies
would be likely also to cause problems between the
United States and its allies, which have varying sensi-
tivities to Third World pressure, varying attitudes
toward disarmament, and often disparate views on
tactics for combating proliferation.
8. The International Atomic Energy Agency faces a
likelihood of growing problems. It implements the
safeguards required by the NPT or other agreements
with non-NPT parties, and serves as a conduit for
information and technical assistance to its members.
The IAEA traditionally has sought insulation from the
political issues debated in some other international
forums. The insulation has been less effective in the
past decade, however, as the member states of the
agency have been pressed by Arab and African repre-
sentatives to increase the isolation of Israel and South
Africa. Growing politicization of the agency could
further impair the ability of the IAEA to function
12
International Nonproliferation initiatives
A variety of international undertakings have been -
proposed by states interested in inhibiting the further
spread of nuclear weapons. Most proposals involve either
additional treaty obligations or an internationalization of
nuclear materials production and storage.
The first category includes proposals to create nuclear-
weapons-free zones in the Near East and in South Asia,
modeled in some instances after the Latin American
(Tiatelolco) treaty. An important consideration is thatl
certain states
(b)(1)
would already be assumed by
neighboring states to possess nuclear weapons, which
raises the less ambitious idea of a nuclear-explosion-free
zone. Also in this category are proposals for more strin-
gent test limitations that would include not only existing
nuclear weapon 'states but potential nuclear weapon states
as well.
The second category includes a wide range of ideas
aimed at inducing states to surrender control over weap-
ons-usable nuclear materials, and to forgo indigenous
production of such materials, by offering participation in
multinational ventures. Iran's participation in the
French-led uranium enrichment consortium, Eurodif,
was an example. Other proposals, for international nucle-
ar fuel storage facilities, have offered a way to relieve
states of the burden of crowded spent-fuel facilities
without the need for reprocessing in the near term.
Similar proposals address the possibility of international
reprocessing facilities, with a variety of ideas for return-
ing the energy value of plutonium to participating states
without necessarily returning the plutonium itself.
The IAEA is pursuing a number of efforts�including
long-term research to improve safeguards technology�
that could lead to improvements in the international
nonproliferation regime. One idea under discussion in-
volves international storage of the surplus plutonium of
member states. Another set of discussions is proceeding
under a special committee on assurances of nuclear fuel
supply, at the particular urging of developing countries.
Though not the specific objective of the developing states,
the committee work could lead to international fuel
supply guarantees that would help to erase energy-
independence arguments that are used to justify sensitive
nuclear projects in individual states. In developing coun-
tries, such indigenous projects nearly always have dubious
or clearly negative economic aspects.
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reliably as an impartial watchdog on proliferation
Matters.
9. Compounding the political problems for the
NPT and the IAEA, confidence in the efficacy of
IAEA safeguards is declining and could erode rapidly
if serious violations were made public. Much would
depend on whether the IAEA itself reported the
violations or, conversely, if it were to become publicly
known that IAEA officials had covered up suspicious
data. A number of countries are aware of such data or
believe they know of safeguards violations committed
by their neighbors. India probably will have the
greatest incentive to reveal information that would
challenge the IAEA safeguards system white embar--
rassing Pakistan. Israel, if it obtained convincing evi-
dence of any Iraqi violations, would be likely to air
that information in the context of future international
discussions about its bombing of the Iraqi nuclear
center last year. Chile, frustrated by the course of its
territorial dispute with Buenos Aires, might elect to
embarrass and discredit its rival
to prompt
an investigation of Argentina's compliance with safe-
guards agreements.
10. Judging by past Libyan and Iraqi uranium
procurement activities and by reports of Argentine
and Pakistani reprocessing-related activities, we be-
lieve the trend is toward a global accumulation of
information damaging to the IAEA. An increasing
number of people and � governments are likely to
become convinced of serious IAEA limitations. In the
absence of the IAEA's taking substantial steps to
correct current deficiencies, the probability of a major
indictment of IAEA effectiveness will be fairly high in
the coming years, possibly leading to a general consen-
sus that the IAEA is not capable of ensuring the
effective implementation of nonproliferation safe-
guards agreements. One consequence of a general loss
of faith in IAEA safeguards would be heightened
concern by some states about the 'ambitious nuclear
programs in neighboring countries. Moreover, any
state contemplating safeguards violations -would be
likely to lower its estimate of the chances of detection.
On balance, global nonproliferation efforts could be
significantly impaired. Reduced confidence in IAEA
- -safeguards could have a serious adverse impact on
Western firms engaged in the nuclear trade.
13
Implications for Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear proliferation trends influence the prospects
for some forms of nuclear terrorism.' During the Period
of this Estimate, the ability of subnational groups to
acquire nuclear materials and to fabricate a workable
nuclear device probably will remain low. The technical
skills required probably will remain beyond the capabili-
ties of well-known terrorist groupi, and special nuclear
material will remain difficult to acquire.
On the other hand, the potential for terrorist groups to
carry out a credible nuclear explosives hoax is increasing
considerably. There are three reasons for this assessment.
First, the difficulty of disproving false claims is increas-
ing. Established producers of fissile material have been
able in the past to discredit reports of unauthorized
possession of fissile material by checking their own
inventories, and by placing some confidence in being able
to consult with other producers. Political barriers will
obstruct frank and reliable exchanges with the new
producers concerning the possibilities of their having lost
weapons-usable material. Thus, although the probability
of subnational access to fissile material may be low, our
ability to verify or refute reports of missing material may
be even lower. Accidental declassification of nuclear
weapons design information in recent years has further
increased the difficulty of dismissing potential terrorist
claims.
Second, the inability of the international community to
fully account for stocks of special nuclear material will
increase the number and credibility of scenarios for Its
acquisition. Both the terrorist group contemplating a hoax
and the victim contemplating a terrorist's threat would be
mindful of the enhanced potential authenticity of a -
nuclear blackmail attempt.
Third, public concern in the event of a publicized
threat probably will become more difficult to manage.
Global reactions to the Three Mile Island.accident in 1979
heightened a long-term sensitivity to nuclear hazards to
the populace. Public awareness of trends in nuclear
Proliferation will be based largely on press reporting,
which has tended to err on the side of overstatement
concerning nth-country capabilities and the ineffective-
ness of safeguards. The public, at the same time, will not
have access to intelligence resources that might detract
from the credibility of publicized threats. Well-organized
antinuclear lobbies in Western states would be quite likely
to act in ways that would lend credibility to a publicized
nuclear threat, in order to exploit its potential impact on
domestic nuclear power programs or deployment of the-
ater nuclear forces. The ability of Western governments to
refute false nuclear threats confidently and persuasively
prbbably is therefore declining.
3 For a detailed discussion of nuclear terrorism, see SNIE 6-78:
Likelihood of Attempted Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons or
Materials by Foreign Terrorist Groups for Use Against the United
States, and the recent Memorandums to Holders.
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Regional Trends
11. Nuclear developments in different regions of
the world vary in the level and nature of potential
costs to the United States over the next five years: As
discussed below, South Asian nuclear developments
pose the most immediate threats to US interests. The
Near East holds the greatest potential for nuclear-
proliferation-related surprises that would have direct
consequences for US policy. Latin American nuclear
policies are becoming more critical with Argentina's
progress toward a nuclear explosives option. Circum-
stances in the Far East will tend to keep the United
States in the role of policing the nuclear programs in
South Korea and Taiwan. South Africa's nuclear weap-
ons and test program is likely to remain thinly veiled,
with the potential to embarrass the United States and
to complicate US relations with Pretoria and other
governments in the region.
. 12. In each region the proliferation problem derives
from past political circumstances. Present trends result
from decisions made by small groups of leading
officials�scientists and industrialists as well as politi-
cians�based on considerations of national prestige,
military security, bureaucratic interests, domestic poli-
tics, and personal motivations. Rarely have these
decisionmakers had to account to their countrymen for
their nuclear-weapons-related policies because of the
extreme secrecy involved[]
\ Nevertheless, foreign leaders
will have to plan for potentially serious domestic and
international repercussions should their nuclear weap-
ons capabilities and policies be made known. Thus the
timing of significant voluntary acts such as nuclear
testing is certain to be captive to broad issues of
internal and external politics, but the timetable is
unlikely to be discernible to outsiders well in advance
(see inset).
13. Considering, as it does, a five-year period, the
discussion does not. attempt to predict timetables or
chains of events in each region. Rather the focus is on
trends in order to identify likely changes in the overall
nuclear proliferation problem for the United States. In
each region, we have examined the trend of expanding
14
technical capabilities, for three reasons. The evolution
of nuclear capabilities:
� Can be estimated fairly well and is not susceptible
to rapid fluctuations.
� Offers insights into past policy decisions, some-
times the only reliable evidence concerning cur-
rent policies.
� Can itself drive important political developments.
(China's nuclear program led. India to undertake
some early nuclear-weapons-related research in
the 1960s. Iraq's. nuclear program prompted an
Israeli air attack last year.)
14. It is a fundamental characteristic of the nuclear
proliferation problem that once a country approaches
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a capability to produce nuclear weapons, a wide range
of political developments becomes possible. India's
nuclear test in 1974 was largely unrelated to the
concerns about China that originally prompted the
necessary research. The potential for miscalculations
further multiplies the number of possible develop-
ments. Over the past year, for example, Indian advis-
ers have been informing Prime Minister Gandhi on a
regular basis that Pakistan could explode a nuclear
device on short notice�a judgment that appears one-
to-two years premature. Even President Zia of Paki-
stan believed mistakenly in 1979 that his country
would be ready to explode a device in that year.
15. In the following discussion, therefore, we high-
light the likely evolution of nuclear capabilities in
� potential problem countries and necessarily restrict the
discussion of possible damage to US interests. We
indicate in boxed text the potential scope and earliest
likely timing of nuclear arsenals in several states. More
comprehensive discussions of the various states' nucle-
ar programs and policies are available in separate
papers as indicated.
South Asia
16. Both Pakistan and India are preparing capabili-
ties to produce nuclear weapons.4 Pakistan regards the
development of nuclear weapons as critical to its long-
term security, quite apart from its relationship with
the United States. Pakistani nuclear activities have
caused India to activate its own nuclear explosive
development capabilities, which heretofore have been
viewed by New Delhi primarily as capabilities for
developing a nuclear deterrent against China.
17. New Delhi probably believes that Pakistan in-
tends to stockpile nuclear devices.
believe that Pakistan has accumulated enough
fissile material for a nuclear weapon to be assembled.
18. India is likely to try several methods of stopping
or delaying Islamabad's nuclear weapons program.
Diplomatic attempts are being made in response to a
Pakistani call for negotiations toward a nonaggression
� For more detailed discussions, see SNIE 31-81, Palcistan's
Nuclear Weapons Program: The Next Three Years, 17 November
1981; and SNIE 31/32-81, India's Reactions to Nuclear Develop-
ments in Pakistan, 8 September 1981.
pact, but the prospects for a significant reduction of
tensions through talks are poor. Other likely tactics
would include the use of sabotage, intimidation, and
propaganda to delay the Pakistani program, although
New Delhi probably would not depend heavily on the
success of such measures.
�
19. Over the next few years, India is likely to judge
that the prospects for achieving any significant delay
in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program through
diplomatic means are poor. New Delhi may try to
induce Pakistan to tip its hand with regard to nuclear
weapons development. The main objectives would be:
� To confront the nuclear threat openly in its
incipient stages rather than after a prolonged
Pakistani stockpiling effort.
� To provide a justification for Indian nuclear
weapons production or preventive military action.
� To undermine the relationship between Pakistan
and the United States.
Several tactics would be possible, including the
following:
� Revealing sufficient information�or misinforma-
tion�to win support for demanding a formal
investigation of Pakistani violations of nonprolifer-
ation safeguards agreements.
� A far less likely possibility would involve conduct-
ing a so-called peaceful nuclear test, with one aim
being to prompt a Pakistani nuclear explosion.
20. Ultimately, if other tactics fail, India will face a
choice of either using force to prevent Pakistani
Production of nuclear weapons or abandoning the
preventive option. The decision would be likely to
depend heavily on prevailing judgments about the
costs and benefits of a fourth war with Pakistan;
because any effective military action against Pakistan's
nuclear facilities could well escalate rapidly to large-
scale hostilities. We cannot predict with any confi-
dence what India's decision would be. We note,
however, that if New Delhi chose not to prevent
Palcistan from producing nuclear weapons, that choice
probably would entail a decision to establish an Indian
nuclear strike force, in readiness to deter Pakistani use
of nuclear weapons and to ensure India's continued
preeminence in the region.
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2L On the Pakistani side, top government officials
favor nuclear weapons development because they see
it as a deterrent to Indian military action. Islamabad
has doubts about the reliability of a security relation-
ship subject to annual review by the US Congress. In
addition, they suspect that US security assistance will
not be sufficient to bring long-term stability to South
Asia. Furthermore, the nuclear program enjoys over-
whelming popular support. Nevertheless, while proba-
bly continuing to support the nuclear weapons pro-
gram, President Zia probably will not reach any firm
decisions about nuclear testing until late 1983 or 1984,
when domestic production of fissile material is likely
to make nuclear testing feasible for the first time. By
that time, as noted above, New Delhi might already
have reached some critical decisions concerning pre-
ventive military action or efforts to uncover Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program. In the meantime, Pakistan
may undertake clandestine efforts to reprocess nuclear
fuel in violation of international safeguards agree-
ments. By violating safeguards to recover plutonium
from nuclear fuel, Pakistan could jeopardize its rela-
tionship with the United States.
22. Nuclear proliferation trends in South Asia point
to a high potential for damage to US interests over the
next five years and beyond. The likelihood of Indo-
Pakistani preventive military action will remain signif-
icant. If New Delhi refrains from military action, the
most likely result will be a continuation of nuclear
weapons development in Pakistan and India, leading
in all probability to their eventual emergence as Third
World nuclear weapon states. The implications of
nuclear weapons production by Pakistan and India
would be considerable:
� US influence in the region would tend to erode--
in the near term because US-Pakistani relations
would be strained, and in the long run because
India would be likely to assert a greater claim to
influence over regional developments.
� In the early years of a nuclear arms race in South
Asia, Pakistan's nuclear weapons command, con-
trol, and delivery capabilities would be likely to
foster a launch-on-warning philosophy in Islam-
abad. It would be difficult for Islamabad to ensure
both the adequate protection of nuclear weap-
ons�from external attack and unauthorized use�
and the rapid scrambling of nuclear-armed air-
craft from airstrips that�because of Pakistan's
16
Potential Nuclear Weapons Production
in South Asia
By the end of 1986 Pakistan could accumulate five to
10 enriched uranium implosion weapons and�assuming
persistent violation or abrogation of safeguards�five to
10 plutonium weapons. Technical problems make the
lower numbers more likely. Pakistan probably would
design such weapons to be deliverable by F-16 and
Mirage fighter/bomber aircraft Missile capabilities are
lacking during the period of this Estimate.
India already could produce about 25 plutonium
weapons, beginning shortly after a decision to do so, if it
broke peaceful-use assurances and used existing stocks of
plutonium that are not subject to IAEA inspection. By
1984 India may be able to produce plutonium that is not
encumbered by nonproliferation agreements�yielding at
least enough material to produce about five weapons per
year. By 1986 new unsafeguarded reactors could yield
enough plutonium for an additional 20 weapons per year.
India also has the scientific and technical resources to
develop boosted and thermonuclear weapons by 1986,
assuming a willingness to resume nuclear testing. Such
devices could be developed using currently available
plutonium, without a deviation from India's stated policy
concerning peaceful nuclear research. New Delhi proba-
bly would authorize the ,construction of nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles if it decided to establish a nuclear force.
India probably could not produce more than a few
prototype missiles by 1986, however. The principal deliv-
ery system probably would be Jaguar fighter-bomber
aircraft.
small size�would be vulnerable to Indian sur-
prise attack. The potential for human error would
be significant.
� Pakistan's security therefore would be liable to
deterioration in the short term and, in any event,
would almost certainly never reach the higher
levels suggested by US-Soviet experience with
mutual deterrence.
� The potential for nuclear technology transfer be-
tween South Asia and the Near East would in-
crease as Indo-Pakistani tensions led the two ad-
versaries to seek the good will of Arab oil
producers.
� Contingency planning for US military operations
in the Indian Ocean and littoral regions would be
complicated by the increased possibility of nucle-
ar weapons use. The likelihood of Indian conven-
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(b)(1)
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tional military intervention in conflicts affecting
the region might also increase if New Delhi
viewed nuclear weapons as further enhancing its
status as a major power in the area.
� The pattern (since the late 1960s) of US-Soviet
cooperation to discourage nuclear proliferation
would not necessarily lead to similar cooperation
in dealing with the problem of deployed nuclear
weapons in specific countries. The pattern of US
and Soviet sponsorship for the two adversaries in
South Asia, in particular, would tend greatly to
inhibit superpower cooperation.
Near East
24. , Israel re-
- .gards the progress of Arab states toward nuclear
weapons capabilities as an intolerable threat, chiefly
(b)(3)
because of extreme geographic and demographic vul-
nerabilities. Eventually, if and as the Arab states
approach capabilities to Produce nuclear devices, Isra-
el will be strongly motivated to attack preemptively. (b)(1)
25. In June 1981 the Israeli Government took mili-
tary action to disrupt the most threatening Arab
nuclear program. Iraq's acquisition of a large research
reactor represented an unacceptable potential for
Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear weapon in the foresee-
able future, in light of the reactor's plutonium produc-
tion capability, the quantities of highly enriched ura-
nium fuel in Iraq, and Iraq's advances in other related
nuclear technologies. The reactor was destroyed by an
air strike, and fuel shipments have ceased. Iraq retains
significant laboratory-scale and pilot-scale equipment
related to the production and reprocessing of nuclear
fuel, and it is seeking to upgrade a small Soviet-
supplied research reactor, but�lacking a sizable reac-
tor�Iraq will not be able to generate significant
amounts of plutonium during the period of this Esti-
mate. Nevertheless, we judge that Iraq intends eventu-
ally to acquire a nuclear weapons capability despite its
NPT commitments and will continue toward that goal.
One effect of the Israeli raid may have been to
increase Iraq's desire for secrecy in attempting to
acquire nuclear-related assistance from foreign
sources, which would increase the potential for Iraqi
safeguards violations.'
26. Libya, like Iraq, is a party to the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty. But, under the leadership of Colonel
Mu'arnrnar al-Qadhafi, Libya probably will continue
to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Having failed to
obtain nuclear weapons or fissile material from other
states in the 1970s (evidently including the Soviet
vinihHoUsafeguards, it is likely that
both Iraq and Libya already have obtained significant quantities of
natural uranium not yet reported to the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
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Union, China, Pakistan, and India), Libya is attempt-
ing to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities. Techni-
cal discussions are under way with Soviet officials�
and have been for several years�concerning the
construction of a nuclear power plant. Such a project
would be the focal point of an ostensibly peaceful
nuclear power program. Additional emphasis is likely
to be placed on clandestine purchases of nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology. A variety of
reports indicate that NPT obligations will not deter
such clandestine activities. A shortage of trained per-
sonnel will seriously hamper the indigenous program,
however, and suspicions about Libyan intentions will,
in general, inhibit the major nuclear supplier govern-
ments from providing sensitive technology.
27. If international financing is made available, the
Egyptian nuclear program is likely to make significant
progress in the 1980s, including the construction of
light water power reactors and possibly some nuclear
fuel fabrication capabilities. Egypt is likely to main-
tain an assiduous regard for safeguards because of its
dependence on the West for nuclear power reactors
and associated fuel and its concern that it not create
Israeli misgivings about its intentions.
28. On balance, we estimate that the present sub-
dued nuclear-strategic situation in the Near East will
continue through 1987 and that the nuclear issue will
not significantly influence political developments in
the region. Our confidence in this projection is not
high, however, because of a variety of surprises that
could occur. The impact of developments in South
Asia on nuclear weapons aspirations in the Near East is
one unquantifiable factor. Iran may restore the sub-
stantial nuclear development begun under the Shah.
Various Middle East countries, not necessarily with
weapons intentions, could institute nuclear programs
that would contribute to Israeli anxieties. Saudi Ara-
bia's disinterest in nuclear options could be replaced
by a serious commitment to nuclear development
efforts, possibly including a desire for access to Paki-
stani nuclear technology. Egypt Might resurrect plans
for a heavy water production plant and a natural-
uranium-fueled reactor. Similarly, Syrian, nuclear ini-
tiatives, while unlikely to yield significant progress
over the next five years, will be troubling to Israel. The
Arab countries most intent on developing nuclear
weapons options�Iraq and Libya�might succeed in
using oil supply leverage as a means of extracting
nuclear materials and technology from supplier states.
19
Nuclear Stirrings in Iran and Saudi Arabia
Iran has been reexamining the civil nuclear program
that was stopped in 1979. Iranian officials have indicated
an interest in having the firm
complete at least one of the two reactors it had been
building near Busher before the revolution. (Construction
of the nuclear power station had been well advanced, but
extensive deterioration in recent years might necessitate
considerable rebuilding.) The Nuclear Technology Center
at Esfahan, which had been undergoing a considerable
expansion is now to be completed
by IranlaiFfirms. Depending on the level of foreign
assistance, Iran could have a sizable nuclear research
program by 1987. Such a program would disturb the
Iraqis and other neighbors, although Iran probably would
not be in a position to produce nuclear weapons in this
decade.
In Saudi Arabia, the Defense Minister has announced
that the government is considering peaceful applications
of nuclear power. A new council has been given responsi-
bility for nuclear power development and is promoting
the acquisition of civil nuclear research facilities. An
indigenous program of graduate studies in nuclear engi-
neering is to be established next year. Preliminary discus-
sions have been held with various foreign organizations
on the subject of nuclear cooperation.
A serious Saudi Arabian interest in nuclear energy�
albeit strictly peaceful�could have significant implica-
tions for the United States because of the potential for
nonproliferation issues to interfere with Western energy
concerns and regional security matters. Saudi Arabia's
policy to date not to accede to the NPT suggests that
voluntary acceptance of full-scope safeguards would be
unlikely
A special relationship with Pakistan and grow-
ing ties to Taiwan would create some potential for
acquiring sensitive nuclear assistance without safeguards.
Serious differences with the United States over nuclear
assistance�or between the United States and others over
the issue of nuclear assistance for Saudi Arabia�would
be quite possible.
Recent US efforts to secure foreign cooperation in
limiting the transfer of nuclear technology from ad-
vanced states to the Near East might, if successful,
p'rompt certain Islamic states to cooperate more effec-
tively in the acquisition and development of nuclear
capabilities.
29. If nuclear programs in the Near East proceed
with little change from present patterns over the next
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five years, the potential for Israeli preventive strikes
against Arab nuclear programs will be small. Even so,
nuclear developments will create or contribute to
several problems for the United States in the region:
� Pressure exerted by oil-producing states on indi-
vidual European nuclear suppliers will maintain
the potential for friction between the United
States and other suppliers concerning nuclear ex-
port policy.
� Israel's sensitivity to Arab nuclear development
will remain high, considerably higher than that of
the US Government.
Moscow might also see in
Israel's longer range missile development�and
perceived US support for it�evidence of a grow-
ing anti-Soviet bias in the implementation of US
nonproliferation policies.
Latin America
30. Argentina and Brazil are the only states in the
region having major nuclear programs. They have
reported sizable uranium deposits�assured reserves of
at least 30,000 tons and 60,000 tons, respectively�
which they plan to use primarily for indigenous power
generation. Both countries are pursuing multibillion-
dollar nuclear po,:ver programs that call for West
German (and, in the case of Argentina, Canadian)
20
assistance in the development of local power reactor
manufacturing capabilities. The programed assistance -
extends into the 1990s. The desire for foreign nuclear
technology will tend to deter any overt production 'or
testing of nuclear explosives over the next five years,
especially in Brazil, but activities under way in both
states indicate plans at least to develop the necessary
capability. Both, countries are developing extensive
nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
31. Argentina has been interested in producing
plutonium since at least the mid-1960s, when its first
laboratory-scale reprocessing plant was built. Since
then, Argentina has obtained nearly all the ingredients
for an independent and unsafeguarded plutonium
production capability, including a small =safeguard-
ed reprocessing facility that is nearing completion. Its
major remaining requirement is an unsafeguarded
research reactor. Such a facility was to be built during
the period of this Estimate. Late reports reveal, how-
ever, that preparations to build the reactor have been
canceled and that at least a portion of the funds
earmarked for this project have been transferred to the
reprocessing program. Argentina had indicated that
the research reactor would be used for the production
of radioactive isotopes and for the testing of materials
for tower reactors, but the intended capacity of the
facility-100 megawatts (thermal)�indicates that it
would also have produced significant quantities of
plutonium./
It is significant that Argentina proba-
bly will begin to reprocess nuclear fuel from its
Atucha-I power reactor�a safeguarded facility�in
the near future, probably in 1984; the ability to
produce safeguarded plutonium evidently would not
have met all of the government's requirements!
32. It is too soon to determine whether the cancella-
tion of the research reactor project represents a long-
term reorientation of the nuclear program or whether
funds have been withdrawn from the project only
temporarily to help defray expenses resulting from the
recent hostilities with the United Kingdom. We have
Indeed, Argentina's need for any plutonium is unclear. The
Argentine plan ostensibly is to reuse plutonium in existing nuclear
power reactors, which ordinarily use natural uranium�an abundant
domestic resource that should last well into the next century.
Argentine nuclear officials publicly have stated an intent to sell
plutonium.
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speculated that Argentina's defeat in the Falklands
might give a boost to the nuclear program by encour-
aging the belief in Buenos Aires that nuclear weap-
ons---or merely a foreign perception that Argentina
had such weapons�could have made a difference.
The withdrawal of funds from the reactor project
argues against that thesis. But the transferral of funds
to support reprocessing efforts rather than to help
rebuild Argentine military capabilities suggests that
the government remains determined to produce pluto-
nium. One element of the reprocessing program is the
construction of a facility to reduce plutonium to
metal�a form that is useful, in practical terms, only
for manufacturing explosive devices. It is likely that
Argentina, while deferring a long-range capability to
produce unsafeguarded plutonium, nevertheless wish-
es to reprocess power reactor fuel because of the
potential nuclear weapons capability that Argentina
thereby would be seen to possess.
34. Whether Argentina will choose to explode a
nuclear device in the next five years is difficult to
predict, although, at present, we would judge it to be
unlikely. Elements of the Argentine military Probably
support nuclear testing and weapons development for
national security purposes, but�considering the na-
ture of Argentina's defense requirements�the mili-
tary utility of such a program probably would not be
worth the effort. Diplomatic and domestic political
purposes might be more clearly served a demon-
stration of nuclear weapons capabilities? But most of
'Certain political benefits of a nuclear weapons program could be
obtained by developing and testing a "peaceful" nuclear explosive.
Argentina believes that it would have the right to develop such
explosives under the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
21
the benefits of nuclear testing probably could be
gained without actually exploding a device. The in-
centives for nuclear testing thus do not appear to be
great. At the same time, however, the various disincen-
tives�including strained relations with neighboring
states and with Western industrialized states, the
potential for a long-term cutoff of foreign nuclear
technology, uncertainty about the implications of pos-
sible Brazilian reactions�probably would not appear
unmanageable to Buenos Aires.
35. Argentina's attitudes toward safeguards, its ob-
jections to ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco,'� and its
rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as unaccept-
ably discriminating against developing countries sug-
gest that Argentine policy regarding exports of nuclear
materials and technology will not be helpful to global
nonproliferation efforts. This issue has not arisen
frequently in the past, because Argentina's ability to
supply sensitive materials and technology has been
quite limited. Over the next five years, Argentina's
potential for nuclear assistance to developing countries
will be considerably greater. The construction of a
large unsafeguarded research reactor and the opera-
tion of a reprocessing plant�and possibly the comple-
tion of an indigenously built heavy water production
facility�would represent impressive accomplishments
to developing countries seeking nuclear assistance.
36. Brazil views nuclear development as reducing
its dependence on foreign energy resources and as
enhancing its technological prestige abroad. A capabil-
ity to explode a nuclear device would be useful in this
latter regard, particularly if it were widely perceived
but not demonstrated by a nuclear test. Viewed from
Brazil's perspective, Argentina's nuclear program con-
stitutes an incentive to develop contingency nuclear
explosive capabilities. Argentina and Brazil are not
military adversaries, but the two countries have a
longstanding rivalry for influence in the region which
has been somewhat muted in the last several years due
to a willingness on both sides to reduce tensions and
increase cooperation. Argentina's history of political
"The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a Latin American nuclear-weapons-
free-zone agreement Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba have not
yet brought the treaty into force. Argentina's objection to ratifying
the treaty centers on the fact that the IAEA safeguards applied to it
under the treaty could not accommodate the development of
peaceful nuclear explosives. Brazil, which also asserts a right to
develop nuclear explosives under the treaty, probably will not bring
the treaty into force at least until Argentina does.
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instability also also is a factor. Thus, indications of an
Argentine intent to explode a nuclear device probably
would prompt Brazil to plan a similar expression of
nuclear weapons capability.
37. In this context, we assiNs reports of sec' ret
Brazilian nuclear-related research, including centri-
fuge uranium enrichment research, as evidence of
some desire for nuclear weapons production capabili-
ties. Some Brazilian officials have explicitly advocated
nuclear weapons development�and plans reportedly
exist for the development of ballistic missiles to carry
nuclear warheads�but the limited size and diffuse
nature of the clandestine research effort suggest that
Brazil is not urgently pursuing a nuclear weapons
program.
38. Brazil's Primary effort in the nuclear field is the
fulfillment of a 1975 agreement with West Germany
for the purchase of a broad range of nuclear technol-
ogy and facilities under safeguards. A small reprocess-
ing facility is scheduled to go into operation by 1987.
A uranium enrichment plant is to be built if small-
scale efforts now under way show the German jet
nozzle enrichment process to be economically sound.
Most important to Brazil and to the Germans are two
large power reactors now under construction." Brazil's
emphasis in this cooperative arrangement with West
Germany has been the assimilation of technology that
will enable Brazilian firms to become competent in
the construction and operation of nuclear facilities.
Various firms have been established since 1975 with
German participation to achieve this goal.
39. West Germans also have helped Brazil to estab-
lish another facility�an experimental laboratory in- -
tended to assist Brazil to investigate the safety require-
ments associated with the reprocessing, of irradiated
nuclear fuel elements. The laboratory, as currently
configured, has a negligible reprocessing capacity and
is not subject to safeguards. A proliferation issue could
arise in the future if the Brazilians were to modify the
facility to increase its potential annual throughput.
40. Despite some discord concerning the pace of
German technology transfer, Brazil may establish itself
"The agreement calls for Brazil to purchase at least two more
power reactors, but their construction has been delayed and is likely
to be postponed further because of revised power demand
projections.
22
Potential Nuclear Weapons Production
in Latin America
Argentina could begin in 1984 to separate safeguarded
plutonium from power reactor fuel at a rate sufficient to
produce one to four nuclear weapons per year. By 1987,
if the recently canceled research reactor project were
reinstated, Argentina could be able to produce unsafe-
guarded plutonium at a rate sufficient to build about five
per year.
Delivery systems available to Argentina currently in-
clude A-4 and Mirage fighter-bomber aircraft and Can-
berra bombers. Efforts are being made to develop indige-
nous missile capabilities, but systems able to deliver
nuclear warheads probably could not be available until
the 1990s,
Brazil will not be able to produce nuclear weapons
until the late 1980s even if it abrogates its safeguards
agreements. A resultant cutoff of enriched uranium fuel
would eventually force Brazil to shut down its nuclear
power plants. The plutonium retrievable from the avail-
able power reactor fuel (although not well suited for
weapons use) could permit the production of a few
weapons per year in the late 1980s, if Brazil pursued such
an unlikely program. Longstanding research and devel-
opment of satellite launch vehicle technology could
support the indigenous development of nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles.
as a major nuclear supplier in the 1990s. Over the next
five, years, however, Brazil's potential for nuclear
exports will be limited to the production of unenriched
uranium dioxide, fabrication of certain heavy compo-
nents for nuclear reactors, and the provision of techni-
cal information relating to the nuclear fuel cycle. The
German agreement places limits on the retransfer of
German technology to third parties, and any such
transfer would be required to come under IAEA
safeguards, but West Germany's ability to detect
transfers and to enforce the terms of its accord would
be uncertain in the case of a clandestine evasion by the
Brazilians.
41. Nuclear trends in Argentina and Brazil point to
potential difficulties for the United States in sustaining
close bilateral relations with these states�a problem
that became acute in the late 1970s, when the United
States applied persistent pressure on Buenos Aires and
Brasilia to modify their nuclear plans and policies.
Both states reacted with strongly nationalistic opposi-
tion to this pressure at the time and would do so in the
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future. They regard the level of US pressure on their
nuclear programs and policies as important determi-
nants of the state of bilateral relations with the United
States. The US objective of gaining full regional
adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco�while ruling
out the peaceful nuclear explosives development to
which Argentina and Brazil claim a right under the
treaty�will remain a source of potential conflict in
bilateral relations. The potential for friction will in-
crease when specific bilateral nuclear issues arise, such
as when deadlines are approached for action under the
US-Brazilian contract for uranium enrichment ser-
vices. At such times their sustained interest in keeping
nuclear explosives options open and their aversion to -
full-scope safeguards would inhibit the ability of the
United States, under present laws, to contribute to
their nuclear power and research programs. 't
42. Trends in the region portend greater difficulty
for the United States in achieving global nonprolifera-
tion objectives:
� Argentina and Brazil are likely to export nuclear
materials and technology. Their nonproliferation
requirements may be less stringent than those of
the established guidelines of the London Suppliers
Group.
� As they continue to deal successfully with nuclear
suppliers, their emphasis on independent fuel cycle
capabilities and stiff resistance to full-scope safe-
guards will encourage leaders in other Third
World governments to expect similar policies to be
feasible in their own countries. Resulting pressures
on supplier governments will contribute to the
difficulty of achieving an international consensus
on appropriate nuclear export policy.
� Argentina's defeat in the Falklands war will, at the
very least, strengthen its resolve to keep open all of
its nuclear options.
East Asia
43. Nuclear trends in East Asia point to potential
problems for the United States in reconciling-nonpro-
liferation objectives with the conflicting, desire to
" Nuclear relations with Argentina currently are in a suspended
state, and Argentina has arranged with the Soviet Union to obtain
'enriched uranium services that could not be obtained from the
United States. Buenos Aires appears to be satisfied with this state of
affairs.
maintain close and friendly relations in the region.
Over the next five years, South Korea and Taiwan will
continue to seek to ensure the availability of nuclear
fuel and waste management services as an important
element of their energy security planning. Lobbies
within both governments will continue to press for the
construction of indigenous reprocessing and, in the
case of South Korea, enrichment research facilities,
believing that such capabilities will become increas-
ingly important as their nuclear power programs
mature. At the same time, both South Korea and
Taiwan have questioned the reliability of their alli-
ance with the United States, giving them some incen-
tive to develop nuclear weapons production capabili-
ties as a backup to US security guarantees. Advocates
of nuclear weapons development in both governments
will continue to promote nuclear research because of
its potential contribution to military security.
� US decisions appearing to signal a diminishing
commitment to South Korea would increase the
probability of its engaging in clandestine nuclear
weapons development activity.
� In Taiwan, however, where there already is a
Perception of a declining US commitment, fear
that secret nuclear weapons development would
further accelerate this decline will act to discour-
age such activities.
44. Both South Korea and Taiwan have provided
assurances to the United States that they will not
undertake nuclear weapons development�assurances
dating from a period in the mid-1970s when the
United States discovered evidence of dedicated pro-
grams to develop nuclear weapons. If US support
remains strong over the next five years, lobbying for
sensitive nuclear research in Seoul and Taipei is
unlikely to move either government to renounce these
assurances to the United States. Nevertheless, the
governments are concerned that the constraints that
the United States wishes to impose on their nuclear
fuel cycle research threaten their future energy securi-
ty. They believe steps need to be taken over the next
five years to begin developing capabilities to reprocess
spent nuclear fuel�or to dispose of spent fuel in other
ways�in order to avoid problems in the 1990s. They
will press the United States to be helpful concerning
their fuel management problems, and will hope to win
approval eventually for relaxation of some US-im-
posed nonproliferation constraints. Unless the United
23
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States relaxes its opposition to their development of
peaceful nuclear fuel cycle capabilities�or alleviates
the problem through alternative arrangements�the
nuclear issue is likely to become a more serious
impediment to close relations with the � two
governments.
45. Were the United States to relax its opposition to
indigenous sensitive facilities in Taiwan or South
Korea, permitting the development of uranium en-
richment and fuel reprocessing capabilities under
IAEA safeguards:
� The probability would be small that either govern-
ment would jeopardize its security ties with the
United States by attempting to use its sensitive
facilities to manufacture nuclear weapons
clandestinely.
� Regional adversaries would react negatively. Nu-
clear issues would cause friction in US relations
with China. North Korea would be concerned
about the increased potential for a future South
Korean nuclear weapons production program.
� The difficulty of denying sensitive nuclear tech-
nology to other states would increase. The distinc-
tion drawn by the United States and other nuclear
suppliers between the proliferation threat posed by
nuclear development in countries having advanced
nuclear programs�such as Japan�and that posed
by less advanced countries would be more difficult
to defend.
46. Public North Korean statements and recent
discussions between North Koreans and several nucle-
ar suppliers suggest that P'yongyang has increased its -
interest in nuclear power development. (At present,
North Korea maintains only a small nuclear studies
program.) As in the past, the enormity of the financial
burden involved in building nuclear power reactors,
amplified by North Korea's lack of hard currency and
its poor credit standing, probably will defeat any plans
for starting a nuclear power program over the next
five years.
Africa
47. The Republic of South Africa, over the past
three years, probably has stockpiled a substantial
quantity rif hiqhlv enriohed uranium Indeed, it is
possible �that several test
(b)(1)
devices or first-generation weapons already have been
produced and stockpiled using this uranium. Thus, at. _
the very minimum, South Africa probably has the
capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.
Under considerable international pressure, South Afri-
ca discontinued nuclear test preparations in the Kala-
hari Desert in early 1978; there have been no detect-
able signs of test., preparation since then. However, a
nuclear test alert was declared on 22 September 1979.
It is still a matter of considerable disagreement as to
whether a nuclear explosion occurred. Nevertheless, it
raises the possibility that South Africa may already
have tested a nuclear device.
48. South Africa's 20-year effort to develop a nucle-
ar weapons capability has taken place against a back-
drop of growing international isolation and a heighten-
ing sense of threat. Pretoria's security concerns include
a need to demonstrate resolve for military prowess to
both external and domestic audiences. In our view, the
perception of a South African potential to build
nuclear weapons now has greater value to Pretoria
than nuclear weapons testing could have. Moreover,
much of the political benefit associated with the
explosion of a nuclear device has already been reaped
by the South Africans because of the September 1979
event. Nevertheless, we judge that South African
officials may still view nuclear testing as an important
strategic objective. Whether Pretoria will continue to
be satisfied with the present level of nuclear weapons
capability, and with the present perception of others
regarding South Africa's capability, is not discernible
from past and present trends.
49. The implications of South Africa's nuclear poli-
cy for US interests over the next five years are most
easily identified in the field of nonproliferation:
� South Africa's image as a latent nuclear weapon -
state will continue to serve as a pretext for other
African states to threaten disassociation from their
nonproliferation commitments.
50. Broader US interests also will be affected, al-
though the impact will depend heavily on whether
24
qECRET
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South African Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
Since 1978 South Africa has been operating a uranium
enrichment facility, near Pretoria, which has produced
highly enriched uranium. The estimated plant capacity
would permit the production of two to four weapons per
year. By 1987, Pretoria could have a stockpile of 15 to 30
weapons. It is not possible to determine how much
material has been produced to date, however. (Technical
problems have limited production rates in the past and
may still do so.)
The availability of enriched uranium rather than
plutonium gives Pretoria greater flexibility with respect
to the design of reliable first-generation weapons. Gun-
assembly weapons, smaller and lighter than the device
dropped over Hiroshima, could be developed for delivery
by Mirage aircraft in the South African inventory, and
could be relied upon to explode without nuclear testing.
With somewhat less confidence, on the other hand, twice
as many implosion weapons could be produced using the
same amount of uranium.
There are indications that South Africa intends to
develop an indigenous line of nuclear reactors. During
the next five years, South Africa is likely to construct a
small reactor that will not be subject to nonproliferation
safeguards. If so, the South Africans probably will devel-
op a reprocessing capability and recover the plutonium
generated by the reactor operations (possibly amounting
to the equivalent of one weapon per year). There have
also been some indications of consideration given to
reprocessing fuel elements from the Koeberg reactors,
though not in the context of weapons production.
South Africa's nuclear weapons capability remains
hidden:
� Damage to bilateral relations with Pretoria because
of US nuclear export restrictions has decreased in
the recent past as South Africa has managed to
secure fuel elsewhere for its nuclear power reac-
tors. This trend probably will continue over the
next five years as South Africa establishes its own
fuel production capabilities. If South Africa con-
ducts a nuclear test, however, the United States
probably will come under considerable foreign
pressure not to obstruct a UN resolution calling for
severe sanctions against Pretoria.
� South Africa's possession of an unsafeguarded nu-
clear materials production capability is linked
indirectly to certain US assistance, creating the
25
potential for future embarrassment. The Soviet
Union has exploited that linkage from, time to
time in an effort to promote suspicion in Southern
Africa concerning US policies in the region. Such
propaganda has not had a significant impact in
the past, partly because of apparent Western
efforts to prevent Pretoria from manufacturing
nuclear weapons. Further moves by South Africa
to develop nuclear weapons, however, could en-
hance Moscow's opportunities for increasing its
influence in the region.
Implications for US-Soviet Relations
51. Both superpowers will continue to have incentives
to discourage nuclear proliferation over the next five
years, but conflicting interests are likely to take on
greater relative importance than in the past. Both coun-
tries find that proliferation trends in the Third World
come into direct conflict with other foreign policy goals.
Examples may be found in Moscow's nuclear dealings
with Libya and the foreign policy difficulties that the
United States faces in Pakistan.
52. If additional countries become declared nuclear
weapon states, this will be a second factor likely to
strain superpower cooperation. While sharing a desire
to discourage nuclear proliferation, the United States
and the Soviet Union would nevertheless have very
different policy objectives in dealing with a particular
country after it had opted to become a nuclear
weapon state. This situation may confront the United
States within the period of this Estimate. Moreover,
the risk of damage in US-Soviet relations is increased
by the probability that the first occurrence would
involve Pakistan and India�two adversaries, with
opposing superpower affiliations, joining the nuclear
weapons club almost simultaneously. China's hereto-
fore ambivalent attitude toward the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by additional states "�and conse-
quent Soviet suspicions about possible Chinese assist- -
ance to Pakistan�could compound the difficulty of
reaching an understanding between the superpowers
" In the 1960s China's policy was to justify the development of
nuclear weapons by additional states�a policy that reacted to
foreign pressure against China's own nuclear weapons. Beijing
continued thereafter to describe nuclear weapons acquisition as a
matter of sovereign right for individual nations, but China until
recently was not interested in contributing to other countries'
nuclear programs. As China establishes a role as a nuclear exporter,
its activities will provide a clear indication of Chinese attitudes
toward nuclear weapons development in other states.
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Soviet Efforts to Influence Libyan Nuclear Policy
The Soviet Union probably does not believe its own
protestations that Libya is a stable, responsible state
seeking peaceful nuclear capabilities. At the same time,
Moscow probably is confident that it can prevent its own
nuclear assistance from being used in a 'Libyan weapons
program, and its involvement in the Libyan program
arguably affords the Soviet Union an opportunity to
monitor�and frustrate�progress toward nuclear weap-
ons development. In recent years, however, Moscow
appears to have placed a higher priority on broadening its
influence in Libya than on preserving a maximum of
control over Libyan nuclear activities.
Throughout the 1970s, Moscow's insistence on Libyan
acceptance and fulfillment of obligations under the NPT
was a persistent feature of the Soviet nuclear assistance
program. Moscow did not agree to supply research and
power reactors until Libya ratified the NPT, which it did
in 1975. In the late 1970s, the Soviets evidently withheld
progress in building the Libyan nuclear research complex
at Tajura in order to press for Tripoli's negotiation and
ratification of a general safeguards agreement with the
IAEA. In the spirit of cooperation with the United States
on nonproliferation matters, Soviet officials indicated
their plans for additional measures (particularly the
repossession of spent fuel) aimed at thwarting any Libyan
nuclear weapons aspirations.
Since then, Soviet officials have been less candid with
US counterparts in describing their Libyan nuclear assist-
ance policies. Moreover, in contrast with past behavior,
Moscow provided nuclear fuel for the Tajura research
reactor without pressing Libya to complete the final legal
arrangements needed to put IAEA safeguards into effect.
concerning mutually acceptable behavior toward new
nuclear weapon states.
53. In a more general and far-reaching sense, nucle-
ar proliferation has an. impact on the US-Soviet rela-
tionship because of the extent to which nuclear prolif-
eration affects US and Soviet influence and interests
asymmetrically:
� The issue creates difficulties for the United States
in its bilateral relations with nearly every state
mentioned in the regional discussions, a situation
26
i the Soviet Union can be expected to exploit n-
order to undercut US influence. The United States
and its allies have far greater equity in strateiiC
and economic ties with most of these countries
than does Moscow.
� The nonproliferation issue also will continue to be
a divisive element within the Western Alliance, as
the different members compete for nuclear exports
and react 'differently to regional proliferation-
related developments.
� The regional importance of the states in question�
causing neighboring states to refocus their foreign
policies to accommodate a new threat. External
powers will be likely to find their influence in the
region somewhat reduced. Considering the states
and regions of greatest proliferation concern, the
impact will be felt adversely primarily by the
United States rather than Moscow.
� Instability in the Middle East and South Asia
created by the spread of nuclear weapons�and by
the progress of certain states toward such capabili-
ties�will be likely to damage Western interests
more than Soviet interests.
54. Nevertheless, many of the factors that have
fostered US-Soviet cooperation on nonproliferation
goals in the past remain valid. Foremost among these
is the danger to both the United States and the Soviet
Union of becoming entangled in regional conflicts
having a potential for escalation of nuclear weapons
use. Additionally, the greater complexity and uncer-
tainty that the spread of nuclear weapons would
introduce into global power politics with the concomi-
tant greater risk of superpower miscalculation is a
danger that both countries would want to avoid.
53. In sum, while the United States and the Soviet
Union will continue to share a common desire to
inhibit nuclear proliferation, cooperation in nonprolif-
eration efforts may become strained or damaged over
the next five years. Moreover, even if the superpowers
maintain a cooperative effort in the nonproliferation
field, the trends discussed in this Estimate are likely to
have an adverse impact on US influence abroad,
compared With that of the Soviet Union.
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