DEPUTIES' MEETING (DULLES) 1959-61

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00986640
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2014-00454
• Publication Date: May 10, 1961

Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 C00986640
DM-
10 May 1961
DEPUTIES' MEETING
Present: Mr. Dulles, General Cabe11, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Amory,
Colonel White, Mr. Helms, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Abbot Smith,
General Balmer, Mr. Earman
MR. DULLES:
a.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
b. Noted an outgoing State Department Circular reviewing
problems posed by the Castro regime, and asked that CIA Chiefs of
Station at.pcistt where 'this cable was received get in touch with their
respective ambassadors with particular reference to paragraph 6.
c. Referred to the record of actions taken at the NSC meeting
on 5 May 1961, and asked DD/P to follow up on any action required by
CIA. Mr. Amory noted that a copy of the record of action in question
had been sent to Mr. Bissell.
d. Noted there is a possibility the President may visit
Montevideo, and asked DD/P to take a hard look at.the security implica-
tions involved.
e. Stated that in his opinion there is a good possibility that
Kong Le may come out as head of the military forces of Laos as a result
of a peace settlement, and commented we should be thinking about ways
and means to induce him to "redefect" should this come about. He
remarked that Captain Lynch, who participated in the Cuban operation,
knows Kong Le well and in fact had trained him prior to his defection to
the Pathet Lao. Action: DD/P
f. Asked DD/P to draft a cable to Admiral Dennison expressing
appreciation for his support during the Cuban operation.
Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 C00986640
Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 C00986640
SECREt
- -
g. Stated he was not convinced that all is quiet in Algiers
and will remain so,
Action: DD/P
GENERAL CABELL:
(b)(1)
(b)(3)1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
Noted a cable reporting the
possibility of a coup in Venezuela,
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
The Director concurred. Action: DD/P
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
MR. HELMS:
a. Reported that he had been advised by Jim Critchfield,
CIA representative on the Iranian Task Force, that at its meeting
yesterday Mr. Hilsman of State was of the strong opinion that a new
estimate on Iran is needed and should be prepared by him and (b)(3)
CIA Station Chief, Teheran. Mr. Helms said that Mr. (b)(3)
Critchfield had suggested to Hilsman that this was a matter of primary
concern to the estimators, and Hilsman had replied that the estimative
machinery was "too cumbersome" and all that was required was for
him (Hilsman) and to roll up their sleeves and produce the (b)(3)
estimate in the shortest time possible. Mr. Bissell noted that in his
opinion Mr. Hilsman's proposal is wrong and the Director should bring
our feeling on the matter to his attention. He pointed out that the Board
of National Estimates and the military should not be left out in the
preparation of any estimate and, further, that requests for estimates
on any subject should be channeled through the DCI. Mr. Amory
remarked that our 28 February 1961 estimate on Iran is a good one, is
valid, and that at the moment of ONE is working with (b)(3)
Mr. Talbot and others in State in bringing it up to date. Mr. Bissell
again stated he could not too strongly recommend that Mr. Hilsman be
advised that intelligence contributions to task forceslpointed on a given
area should be requested through the Director and handled by the
established estimative procedures.
b. Reported he had quite a lengthy conversation with Eric Timm
yesterday regarding the President's visit to Paris and that both were
concerned over the fact that at the moment no one dares get in touch
with the rightist element in France. He said it is an established fact
that the leaders' telephones are tapped, that (b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 C00986640
Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 C00986640
,
- 3 -
and therefore it is almost impossible
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
to find out whether this element will organize
(b)(3)
or attempt to organize demonstrations during the time the President
(b)(3)
is in France.
(b)(1)
The Director
(b(b)(1)
concurred.
(b)(3)
MR. BISSELL:
Reported that an officer of the FE Division, had (b)(3)
recently been in contact with and (b)(1)
at the end of this conference had indicated he was on his way to the (b)(3)
White House to see Arthur Schlesin er in order to prevent "another
Cuba." Mr. Bissell recalled that is the individual who was (b)(3)
guilty of a security violation in a letter to the White House seeking
employment with the new administration and wherein he had revealed
his activities with CIA to include (b)(1)
He said that while the (b)(1)
s
contact
is not a security violation, it is a violatio(b)(3)
of CIA regulations requiiing such contact be first cleared with (b)(1)
Mr. Bissell went on to say that is an old friend of (b)(3(b)(3)
Arthur Schlesinger. After some discussion, it was agreed that DD/P (b)(3)
would talk to and make it clear to him that this recent instance (b)(3)
was his second violation of rules and regulations of the Agency and any
future such violations could cause his dismissal. The Director said
Mr. Bissell should not tie this case to the contact with-Schlesinger
but, rather, continued disregard of regulations that all (b)(3)
employees of CIA are re uired to abide by. The Director also stated
Mr. Bissell might advise that if he is dissatisfied with employ- (b)(3)
ment here, N.Nrc would make every attempt to find him a job elsewhere
in government.
MR. BARNES:
a. Reported that he had seen Arthur Schlesinger to brief him
and believes Schlesinger now has
the information he desired. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
b. Reported that the most recent
took the (b)(1)
Cuban operation to task, stating it was particularly
ill planned
from (b)(3)
the viewpoint of the invasion beaches selected. After some d
it was agreed that Mr. Barnes would take up this matter with
r-SE
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2021/04/05 C00986640