MEETING OF THE CONSULTANTS AT PRINCETON, 19 AND 20 NOVEMBER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00978115
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: December 15, 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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'OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
15 December 1959
STAFF Y2M0RANLUM NO. 53-59
SUBJECT* Meeting of the Consultants at Princeton, 19 and 20 November
Consultants:
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Cyril E. Black
Calvin B. Hoover
Klaus Knorr
George A. Lincoln
Harold Linder
Philip E. Mosely
Joseph Strayer
T. Clayler Young
Governments
Allen W. Dulles
Abbot Smith (Chair)
Allen Evans
William P. Bundy
Robert Matteson
K. V. burks
O. LeRoy Karlstrom
Robert Miller
Papers presented for discussions
Chapter VI of NIE 11-4-59; Soviet Foreign Policy
Chapter II of NIE 11-4-59; Developments in the Soviet Economy
NIE IL0-ea-59s "Estimate of the World Situation"
* *
In general, there was some feeling among the consultants
that the Chapter on foreign policy might be too optimistic.
Certain of the group tended to press home the probability of a
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missile gap gap in 1961, and to question whether; as a consequence
of this gap, Sdviet 'foreign policy might not, two years or so
hence take a harder lino than presently estimated in Chapter VI.
The Missile Gap. The burden of this argument was carried
by MOSELY, who appeared to feel more strongly on the issue than
the other consultants. STRAYER and KNORR indicated general
agreement with MOSELYIe position. EVANS announced his intention
of "shooting down 11-4 with 11-8" (Soviet Capabilities For
Strategic Attack Through 1984�).
� In 1961: MOSELY asserted; the Soviet Union might acquire a
clear qualitative superiority over the US in strategic weapons.
American missile sites would still be soft and American missiles
liquid-fueled. The location of these Sites would be available to
the Russians through a reading of the US press. The USSR, on
the other hand, right have nanufaotured and deployed as many as
500 ICBMs. Since hmerican observers would not have inspected
more than five percent of Soviet territory, the location of these
sites would be unknown to the American military.
Though a Soviet advantage of this sort would begin to diminish
in 1962; as the American; developed solid fuels and hardened sites,
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in the year 1961 the Soviet leaders might come to believe that
they had a decisive superiority. They might believe that, with
a single salvo, they could virtually destroy the American capability
for strategic attack, without in turn receiving unacceptable
damage from American counter blows. In this circumstance the
Soviet leaders might very well consider launching general war.
Or they could attempt to Profit from this unique and transitory
advantage through blaokmeil, . Either action could have been
prefaced or: more accurately: camouflaged: by a long period of
relaxed tension and growing cultural exchange. Consequently:
in NOSELIes view: the estimate of Chapter VI according to which
Soviet foreign policy over the next five years will alternate
batmen efforts at conciliation and limited aggressive actions
should be revised to take these more dour-poisibilities into
account.
From time to time some consultants attempted to pierce the
MCSELY argument with doubts and reservations. LINCOLN, for
example, was strongly of the view that it would be well-nigh
impossible for the 'Russians to get off a properly aimed salvo
of 500 missiles within the 15 minutes necessary to avoid the
alerting of SAC. No military operation in history has been
ft. 44.
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carried off on schedule with the precision such a salvo would
require. Dian at'West Point 21 gun salutes rarely go off without
a hitch,' If SIC were on air alert, moreover, the impact of the
missiles would send those bombers already in the air
scurrying for Soviet targets. The Russians could never be sure
of destroying the American nuclear capability without receiving
unacceptable damage in return.
� To this MOSEIX replied that the RUssians could prepare the
salvo at their _leisure, tht they could take into account such
factors as inetlight failure by increasing the weight of the
salvo, and that RAND COrporation studies had shoun that the
USSR would not necessarily receive unacceptable damage from an
American counter�attack. What the Kremlin would be willing to
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regard as acceptable damage was probably far more extensive than
anything our planners had in mind. The YOSEIY argument appeared
to impress many consultants, though support was more general
for the probable use of blackmail than for a possible one�time
salvo.
Soviet "instructions" to the Communist Party
connection with this discussion of Soviet foreign policy, the
consultants were briefed on a series of reports purporting to
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contain instructions given by the Kremlin to the
HOOVER felt intuitively that internal evidence argued
against the authenticity of these reports but MOSELY argued that
their contents were entirely consistent with public statements
of the Soviet leaders; indeed, the instructions could have been
drawn up by the Soviet Central Committee on the basis of such
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
utterances.
This would explain
the Soviet ninstruotion" according
to which the
Should prepare for a seven-year period
(b)(1) '
(b)(3)
of relaxed tension. STRAW R thought that Moscow scarcely had a
high enough regard for the security or the influence of the
to trust it with any secrete.
�
The Issue of Berlin. The conseitants were asked whether
in actual fact the Soviets had not backed down on their demand
that the West withdraw from Berlin. The consultants were inclined
to think not. BLACK seemed to express the consensus in saying
that the Russians had so far surrendered nothing on the Berlin
issue; they could return to the charge whenever it suited their
convenience. They had not ever really expected to get all of
Berlin; they understood that West Berlin was the key to the whole
of Western Europe. Meantime the Yiest had been making significant
concessions as a consequence of the Soviet pressure on Berlins '
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some measure of recognition of the GDR, an invitation to
Ithrushchev,to visit the United states, a conference at the summit.
,
Most of the consultants leaned to the view that by making these
concessions the West had begun to tread the slippery downward
path.
Chapter II, which presented the prospects for the Seven-Year
Plan as extremely goods was more acceptable to the constltants.
They were nonetheless of the view that the Chapter tended rather
to overplay the obstacles which stood in the way of the realisation
of the Plan ahead of schedule.
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The Labor Shortage. STRAYER thought initially that the labor
shortage might cause the USSR serious difficulty. The critical
population slice was the 16-28 age group and the competition of
industrials agricultural, and military demands for the services
of this group would make across-the-board solutions difficult.
NOSBLY and LIMER countered bf emphasizing the still considerable
reservoir of labor in agrioulture and among women, as well as
the possibility of increased introduction of unskilled workers
into the labor force as suggested by US war experience. BUNDY �
stated that the shortage was small�, than CIA had �rig/tell; believed
and agreed that the problem was not a major one provided investment
in agriculture were substantially increased.
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Planning Problems.ani Foreign Exchange. LINDER, MOSELY,
and HOOVER felt that the paragraph of Chapter II which dealt
with Soviet planning problems probably exaggerated the extent
to which the Soviets were handicapped by the lack of reliable
efficiency criteria which could provide an accurate measure
of price/coat relationships. LINDER noted, in passing, that
prices in many other countries, including the United States, are
subject to major distortion and frequently do not reflect real
costs. .
LINDER, moreover, thought Chapter II overemphasized the
difficulties the Soviet government might face in acquiring the
foreign exchange required by the import schedule of the Seven-Year
Plan. LINDER pointed out that the trade- involved was not large
and that dumping could be used to obtain the currencies involved.
KNORR and LINCOLN made comments along the same line and further
stressed the political advantages likely to accrue to the USSR
from a rapidly expanding economic base, and the use of external
aid and grants.
Consumer Expectations and Leisure Time. The consultants
did not feel that the Soviet regime would have any serious
diffioulties as a consequence of rising consumer expectations.
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ARMSTRONG, BOOM, And BLACK joined forces in arguing that the
Soviet citizen could.rightly expect further increments in
living standards over the longer run and that, in ally case, he
was not psychologically disposed to challenge the government on
this or any other issue. MOSELY was disinclined to believe that
the proposed reforms in the collective farm would provoke much
opposition from the peasantry, pointing nut the extent to
whiCh the private plot had already lost in significance.
The DIRECTOR wished t� know what might be the social and
economic implications of a growing availability of leisure time
in the USSR. BLACK thought that the reduction of the official
work week to roughly 46 hours has probably not led to any
meaningful increase in leisure. Most Soviet workers, owing to
the high cost of living, either work overtire regularly, or have
an additional employment. LINDER commented that the Soviets
"use their leisure by not having it."
An Attempt to be Cheerful. In response to an urgent request
for views of a more cheerful nature, MOSEL! responded by
listing three areas of economic activity which while not
upsetting the general picture of growing Soviet strength -- might
tend to slow the Soviet rata of growth somewhat: 1) increased
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costs of raw matctial cling to the exhaustion of easily available
minerals, etc.', 2) increased investment costs as the Soviet
economy matures, 3) the growing weight of the service sector in
which per capita increments to national product tend to be
relatively slower, Both KNORR and =NUR, however, emphasized
the relative insignificance of these considerations.
When called ion to evaluate the draft of 100-8-50 "Estimate
of the World Situation", the consultants found that it was too
optimistic in tone, and that it tended to underestimate the amount
of trouble to be expected in the underdeveloped areas of the
world.
Prospects in the Underdeveloped Areas, STRAIER argued that
particularly in Africa the paper gave too much hope for a
rational and orderly development. HOOVER wished to add Latin
America to the list of future trouble spots, though he doubted
that the difficulties would be primarily Soviet-induced. The
DIRECTOR remarked that at the 21st Party Congress instructions had
been given to Latin American Communist leaders to lay greater
stress on the nationalist element in their agitation. He felt
that these orders have some bearing on recent outbreaks in Latin
America.
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Atomic and Conventional Power. LINCOLN made the general
critioism,that the draft tends to ignore the meaning of military
,
power in the world. This was a genorally recurrent theme of
the discussion. Any limitation of nuclear armament, whether by
agreement or stand-off, would increase the importance of
conventional military power. In these circumstances, the growth
of Soviet power would be even greater than if the nuclear
competition continued. The consultants predicted, furthermore,
that China would obtain a nuclear capability of its own within
the next 10 years. MOSELY thought that a clue to China's future
nuclear achievement night be found through systematic study
of Chinese scientific journals. The DIRECTOR asked that a check
be made to see whether this was being done.
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The Balance of Payments. The draft did not devote enough
attention to the influence of the deficit in the American balance
of payments on foreign policy. KNORR discussed the recent meeting
at Princeton devoted to the deficit. There was general agreement
among the experts that the deficit was in small part due to
structural change, and in great part due to temporary factors.
It was further agreed that a small deficit would be a good thing
and that a large one could be best prevented, not by our raising
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obstacles against the flow of goods, but by encouraging other
nations to reduce their restrictions still further. 'rho estimate
should spell out the disastrous effects of any reversal of our
free trade policies, particularly in the section on the Image of
America. It was disgraceful for the United States to become
panic-stricken over a email loss of gold at the very time this
loss was promoting economic conditions abroad favorable to our
policy goals.
� Soviet Foreign Aid. There was some disagreement among the
consultants with regard to the proposition, put forward in the
draft, that the USSR is rapidly becoming a "haven nation and will
therefore find itself under inoreasing pressure to grant aid to
underdeveloped countries across the board. LINDER felt that the
Soviets would have no campunction against remaining selective
in their aid programs, and would concentrate on impact projects
in key countries. STRAYER .disagreed, at least insofar as Africa
is concerned, since it was still very difficult to identify the
key countries of the future on that continent. NOSELY took
issue with the draftls suggestion that the Soviet aid program
woad put pressure on Soviet ressurces. Soviet assistance is
in fact a way of expanding Soviet foreign trade. Payment for
Soviet assistance will be in the form of consumer goods which can
be sold in the USSR at high profits, thus not only helping to
satisfy the Soviet demand for consumer goods but also providing
capital for further expansion of basic industries.
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East-West_Exchanges. In general, the consultants disagreed
with the suggestion that the papOr should center about the currant
development of greater diplomatio and cultural exchange between
East and West. HOS= argued that Khrushchev's purpose in
undertaking such exchanges was to exploit both internal and
international differences in the West. Stalin's aggressive
policies tended to unite the West. Khrueshchev, on the other
hand, settles certain issueslitaorder to ccncentrate on others
which have the character of exaggerating Western problems. While
Khrusbohev gives the appearance of a peace.seeking man willing
to travel anywhere and do anything in order to relax international
tensions, he actually took a harder line during his visit to the
US than was necessary. He came to America, not to join the club,
but to demonstrate his strength and Khrushohev
believes the time is rapidly approaching when the nuolear stalemate
will force the Wi)st to retreat on certain issues in the face of
superior Soviet conventional strength. Khrushchev also feels
that increased contacts are necessary to loep the West calm as
Soviet strength grows; otherwise there might be danger of an
impulsive Western attack.
The Four Illusions. The DIRECTOR inquired how far the
Soviets could go in cultural exchange without spreading ideas
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dangerous to totthe existing ordar in the Soviet Union. The
conaonaua among the comitiltans was that ti-IG Sovi= policy
makers are following a very selective approach and have co
far placed us in a disadvantageous position by th(air insistence
on tahing from ua more thaL iy are will to give in return.
!SLY concluded the discussion by reopunting four illusions
shared by many persons high in Washington concerning the Soviet
Union. There was the illusion that a greater availability of con..
*u goods in the Soviet .Union would lead to an easier life
and thus to a relaxation of Soviet foreign policy. There was
the illusion that the inpaot of Western ideas and influences,
exorcized through cultural exchange, would lead to a gradual modifiss
cation of the totalitarian .character of the Soviet regime. There
_ -
was the illusion that China and Russia would end by quarreling,
and thus relieve the pressure on the West. And there was,
finally, the hope that when Ehrushchav died his lieutenants would
engage in a bloody struggle, for the succession, during which the
6ient would be left in peace.
Richard V. Burks
0. LeRoy Earlstrou
William Miller
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