NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOVIET BCW AGENT DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00968686
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01432
• Publication Date: January 24, 1984

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New Directions in Soviet
BCW Agent Development
and Their Implications
Special National Intelligence Estimate
...PreirSeCrotto.
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:4 Januar.1 1984
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washiagtos. D.C. 20505
NationalhadligenceCouncil
Id- 7- XV,Ze.2(
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28 February 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of SNIE 11/17-84/CX:
New Directions in Soviet BCW Agent
Development and Their Implications
SUBJECT : Classification of pages 9 and 10
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SNIE 11/ 17-84/CX
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOVIET
BCW AGENT DEVELOPMENT
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Information available as of 19 January 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Deportment of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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KEY JUDGN1ENTS
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CONTENTS
III
ecret
Page
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Soviet Union has. over the past decade, expanded its traditional
R&D program for developing new biological and chemical warfare
(BCW) agents to include a program which applies recent advances in
biotechnologies such as genetic engineering. This means that the Soviets
can develop a Much broader range of BCW agents than was heretofore
possible.
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The Soviets could use modern molecular biology techniques to
develop agents against which our current military personal protective
equipment is inadequate, against which we have no effective medical
prophylaxis or treatment, and for which we have no method of field de-
tection or identification. Application of genetic engineering techniques
increases tremendously both the number and kinds of possible agents
and the ability to produce them in useful quantities. Furthermore,
developing effective countermeasures to a wide variety of possible
agents will be extremely difficult
The range of novel agents that could result from this program
includes compounds that normally are present in the body in minute
quantities. These compounds can produce a wide range of deleterious
effects if introduced in high concentrations or if genetic manipulation
has been used to alter their effects. Toxins not normally found in
humans but derived from other organisms, such as bacteria, fungi.
plants, and some animals, could also be produced or altered for BCW
1
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use through these techniques. The effects caused by such compounds
could range from emotional and behavioral changes to physical effects
such as drowsiness, hemorrhage, and death. Properties could conceiv-
ably be tailored to specific field requirements for stability, persistence,
dissemination characteristics and rapidity of effect. In a field setting,
there would surely be an unquantifiable psychological impact on
combat units subjected to such agents, and the psychological stress could
severely degrade morale and impair combat effectiveness.
There are nonmilitary rationales for studying such compounds, for
example, enhanced pharmaceutical production, better understanding of
medical problems, or as tools to investigate biochemical processes.
Nonetheless, for the following reasons we believe that the Soviets have a
novel BCW agent research and development program:
The support that has been given to Soviet molecular genetics
research has allowed the scientists to achieve quickly a high level of
competence in using sophisticated techniques. Whereas Soviet research
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has generally lagged Western (especially US) state of the art, their rapid
progress attests to their ability to achieve technological advances in an
area given special emphasis.
Western technology acquisition has been central to the rapid
progress of biotechnology development in the USSR. However, the
United States is no longer the principal direct supplier of biotechnology
research expertise to the USSR and in the last decade has been
increasingly supplanted by other Western nations as the principal
supplier of research equipment and materials. Curtailment of technol-
ogy transfer from the United States might temporarily slow research
progress, but would not prove a permanent impediment.
The Soviets' biotechnology-based BCW agent development pro-
gram makes it likely that technical approaches to monitoring current
and future treaties will be insufficient. \
� Their biotechnology-based BCW agent program would not
necessarily require unique and identifiable production facilities
or storage sites. Furthermore, gearing up for large-scale produc-
tion could probably be done within days to weeks. Thus it will
be extremely difficult to determine by national technical or
other physical means whether the Soviets are, at any given time,
producing or storing agents. Even on-site inspections would not
be sufficient to ensure that prohibited activities could be
detected in a timely manner. Establishing intent would be a
critical factor.
� The Soviets could easily explain having small quantities of these
potential agents for nonmilitary purposes. It is difficult or
impossible, on the basis of scientific evidence alone, to differen-
tiate between BCW R&D and that directed toward pharmaceu-
tical development or other nonmilitary purposes.
� As already demonstrated by the -Yellow Rain" situation in
Southeast Asia, both detecting and documenting deliberate use
of unknown BCW agents (in that case a toxin that occurs
naturally in many parts of the world) is difficult.
� The great variety of types of possible novel agents will make it
difficult to word effectively a future BCW treaty to contain
unambiguous definitions of proscribed agents. Moreover, since
no other nation has developed a comparable BCW capability,
the Soviets have little incentive to modify existing agreements.
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